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Abstract 
Occupational health and safety legislation in Australia and internationally is based on the 
safe place concept and the hierarchy of control. A safe place is best achieved at the 
design stage and consequently the education of engineers in safety has been a priority. 
There have been notable efforts at the integration of safety with engineering studies, and 
this should be an ongoing objective, however extensive integration is likely to be difficult at 
least in the short term. 
The challenge was to develop a supplemental, innovative way to improve the ability of 
engineers to develop safe place solutions. The hypothesis was that training in creative 
thinking would achieve this aim. The hierarchy of control methodology shares a strong 
relationship with creative thinking. Safe place thinking challenges assumptions in the 
same way that creative thinking seeks to escape dominant paradigms. For this reason 
creative thinking seems a natural aid to the safe place approach. 
This study tested the effect on safety design of a creative thinking program; de Bono's six 
thinking hats method. Given a recognition that groups other than engineers impact on 
workplace design, a range of subjects were included; engineering students, technology 
students, industry safety advisers, and government safety advisers. 
In response to safety case studies, subjects were required to generate solutions and to 
prioritize potential solutions. Subjects worked on a range of problems, s o m e individually 
and some in teams of three. Results show that training in creative thinking improved the 
generation of solutions to safety problems. As the number of solutions increased, the 
average quality of ideas was maintained, therefore the increased number of solutions was 
accompanied by a similar increase in good quality safe place solutions. The results also 
showed in s o m e instances the training improved the prioritization of solutions according to 
the safe place methodology. The effects were of a similar magnitude for individuals and 
teams. 
Creative thinking training was shown to be a useful way to enhance the generation of safe 
place solutions to safety problems. Given that creative thinking skills can theoretically be 
applied to any area of problem solving, the enhancement of these skills are likely to yield 
wider benefits. Furthermore the enhancement of creative thinking accords well with the 
current industrial mandates for improved innovation. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
,1. Introduction 
1.1 The Problem 
Each year in Australia there are approximately 650,000 workplace injuries (Industry 
Commission 1995). Five-hundred of these injuries result in death and 160,000 involve 
greater than five days lost time (Worksafe Australia 1995). In financial terms the workers' 
compensation bill is approximately $4,800M per annum (ABS 1995; 1993-94). When 
allowing for the substantial indirect costs and also the many unreported injuries and 
diseases, estimates ofthe total cost are much greater. Worksafe Australia (1994) suggested 
the figure could be as high as $37,000M (1992-93), while the Industry Commission (1995) 
estimated the total cost to be around $20,000M (1992-93). 
To place these figures in context, Australian Gross Domestic Product and the Gross Farm 
Product were estimated at $430,000M and $12,000M respectively (ABS 1996; 1992-93). 
The health and safety problem (based on $20,000M) can therefore be considered to be of 
the order of five percent of GDP and greater in magnitude than the Gross Farm Product. 
The sponsor of this research, the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission 
(NOHSC or Worksafe Australia), directed the research toward the problem of mechanical 
equipment injuries. The National Commission estimated that mechanical equipment 
featured in over 80% of all work related fatalities and contributed to 28% of compensible 
injuries (NOHSC 1990c). Mechanical equipment is therefore involved in 400 workplace 
deaths and probably contributes $5600M (based on $20,000M total) annually to the cost of 
workplace injuries. Behind the economic losses obviously exists a considerable burden of 
pain and suffering, especially considering the high involvement of mechanical equipment 
features in workplace deaths. While small in number compared to the total number of 
injuries, workplace fatalities obviously have a profound impact. In summary, it is clear 
mechanical equipment injury contributes a sizeable legacy of pain, suffering and economic 
loss and is an area where great improvement should be sought. 
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In the National Strategy for the Prevention of Mechanical Equipment Injury, the N O H S C 
(1990c), outlined their approach to address this problem. They highlighted research 
priorities in the areas of legislation, education, management, and engineering and 
technology interventions. The research here concentrated on engineering and technology 
interventions; about which the National Commission said; 
Research is needed on the development, implementation and evaluation of interventions 
which: 
facilitate research and development of new approaches to engineering/technology safety 
measures and their incorporation into the design of equipment; 
stimulate greater application of known engineering/technology safety measures in the design 
or redesign of mechanical equipment, work processes, etc; and 
increase application of known engineering/technology safety measures already in the 
workplace. (NOHSC 1990c, p. 14.) 
These research needs were distilled to two main themes; 
1. the development of new safety measures; and 
2. the application of existing safety measures. 
The research described in this thesis focuses on these two themes, but is not limited to 
mechanical equipment injury. The reasoning is that the methodologies for prevention of 
mechanical equipment injury apply to a wide array of problems. In relation to this point, 
the National Commission commented that '...many ofthe preventative measures proposed 
in this strategy will also be applicable to other types of injury' ( N O H S C 1990c, p. 3). 
Injury prevention measures should be aligned to the safe place model that underpins current 
legislation in Australia and internationally, however efforts in the past have often been 
preoccupied with behavioural strategies, or a safe person model. The safe person way of 
thinking owes its origins to the unsafe act and unsafe condition model of accident 
causation. Accident scenarios invariably implicated people and thus the unsafe act was seen 
to be the dominant cause. However, as noted by the Industry Commission (1995), 
encouraging safe behaviour is rarely an effective way to prevent injuries. 
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Only very limited, if any, control is possible by focussing on the behaviour of those who may 
be injured. (Industry Commission 1995, p. xx) 
Similarly, in the recently published standard for the Safeguarding of Machinery, Standards 
Australia highlighted the misleading attention given to the role of unsafe acts and the 
consequential concealment of opportunities for safe design. 
Accidents with machines have often been attributed to 'unsafe acts', when a more thorough 
study would have revealed a design deficiency which did not allow for typical foreseeable 
human characteristics or behaviour. (Standards Australia 1996, AS4024. l,p. 12) 
The alternative to the philosophy of encouraging safe behaviour, is to design the system to 
minimise accidents, a course of action n o w referred to as safe place design. This way of 
thinking, and the n o w familiar hierarchy of control, is a general methodology for tackling 
health and safety problems. The emphasis for prevention is on employing controls that 
eliminate hazards or maintain control over the hazards in a passive way. Passive control 
implies the absence of reliance on the vigilance of people. A s a consequence of the need to 
design for people, ergonomics is n o w an integral part ofthe safe place approach. 
The safe place ideal implies a vital role for engineers. Given their influence over design, 
and the need for safety to be incorporated at the design stage, the education of engineers in 
the principles of safety has been a priority for many years. For instance the U K report 
known as the Robens Report said; 
...professional engineering institutions could make their concern with the subject much more 
explicit by including safety and health as an item in their syllabuses and examinations 
(Committee on Safety and Health at Work 1972, p. 127) 
In the United States, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, identified 
the need for occupational health and safety in engineering studies ( N I O S H 1984). They 
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recommended that engineering curricula feature required studies in occupational safety and 
health as well as providing elective, and specialty options. 
All undergraduate engineering curricula should include a required course that will include 
instruction on the responsibilities of engineers for occupational safety and health and an 
awareness of occupational safety and health engineer ingproblems and solutions. 
(NIOSH1984,p.28) 
The National Occupational Health and Safety Commission in their National Education and 
Training Strategy for Occupational Health and Safety (1993) made the integration of 
occupational health and safety into all undergraduate and postgraduate eduction one of its 
five goals. Clearly engineers are a key group to be targeted through such a strategy. 
[Goal:] To promote the integration of quality OHS into education and training for all 
vocations and professions. (NOHSC 1993b, p. 6) 
The Institution of Engineers, Australia (IEAust) emphasised the responsibility of engineers 
for safety as a key ethical requirement. In its Code of Ethics (1994) the IEAust outlined 
nine tenets ofthe ethical behaviour; theirs* of which stressed the importance of safety. 
[Tenet One:] members shall at all times place their responsibility for the welfare, health and 
safety ofthe community before their responsibility to sectional or private interests, or to other 
members (The Institution of Engineers, Australia 1994, p. 3) 
Since around 1980 a number of universities such as; Purdue University, and Ohio State 
University, in the United States (Talty 1986); Delft University of Technology in the 
Netherlands (Lemkowitz 1992); and the University of Ballarat here in Australia (Woolley 
& Viner 1980) have begun the integration of safety topics with engineering studies. 
Similarly in the United Kingdom the accreditation syllabus ofthe Institution of Chemical 
Engineers has since 1983 required subjects on safety (Kletz 1990b). In addition, there have 
been wider programs that aimed to facilitate the integration of safety and engineering 
education. These have included the N I O S H (USA) Safety and Health Awareness for 
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Preventative Engineering program that began in the 1980's (Talty 1995) and more 
recently, the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission's, OHSfor Engineers 
program (NOHSC 1990d). 
While the integration of safety with engineering education is important, a number of 
authors have commented that it has not been sufficiently widespread (NIOSH 1984; Office 
of Technology Assessment 1985; Talty 1986; Kavianian 1989; NIOSH 1990; Hale 1994). It 
has been suggested that a barrier to integration of safety is the already crowded nature of 
engineering curricula and the continued pressure for the inclusion of material (Office of 
Technology Assessment 1985; Talty 1986). While safety education for engineers should 
remain a priority, there appear to be obstacles, at least in the short term, to its full 
integration. The challenge for the work here was therefore to propose a supplemental, 
innovative way of improving the ability of engineers to develop safe place solutions. 
The proposal is that while the importance of safety education for engineers is unquestioned, 
there may be an application for education in creative thinking skills; skills that apply not to 
safety specifically but to any area of work. This idea arose as it became apparant that the 
thinking needed to apply the hierarchy of control process shares a strong relationship with 
many of the principles of creative thinking. The high-order safe place controls direct 
attention toward control at source. This is challenging as it involves rethinking 
assumptions and re-examining hazardous work processes. Creative thinking implies a 
similar approach, thinking outside the square. The role of creative thought seems integral to 
the application of high-order hazard controls. 
Together with a seemingly natural role in prevention, creative thinking now seems to be 
gaining prominence as an important industrial skill. For instance, management writers 
have emphasised the need for innovation (Senge 1992) while the Australian Manufacturing 
Council Secretariat said that 'Innovation will be the next source of substantial growth' 
(AMC 1994, p. 1). The AMC predicted (Figure 1-1) that innovation represents the phase 
that will follow past sources of improvement such as cost and more recently quality and 
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service. Should they be accurate, innovation will shortly be a topic of interest in Australian 
industry at a level equivalentto that of quality in the 1980's and early 1990's. 
Sources of 
Improvement 
and Growth 
Figure 1-1 Sources of Performance Improvement and Growth 
(adapted from A M C 1994) 
Similarly, the review of engineering education, Changing the Culture: Engineering 
education into the future, commissioned by The Institution of Engineers Australia, the 
Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, and the Australian Council of 
Engineering Deans, stressed the need for creative thinking skills. 
There is a need for the introduction into courses at an early stage of greater attention to 
problem solving and the encouragement of creativity and innovation - knowing when analysis 
stops and synthesis starts. (IEAust, ATSE & EACED1996, p. 7) 
It seems that techniques for creative thinking therefore m a y accord with a current industrial 
need for innovation and a recognised need for these skills in engineering education. 
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1.2 The Problem Summary 
Improved safety relies on the application of the safe place design principle. Engineers 
appear best positioned to achieve safe place design and so the enhancement of safety 
studies in engineering education has been a priority, and this focus should be maintained. 
However, given that the integration of safety with engineering education has been 
problematic, the challenge is to investigate a supplemental and innovative way to improve 
engineers' ability to design for safety. 
1.3 Aim 
To investigate an innovative way of improving the ability of engineers to design for safety. 
1.4 Hypothesis 
The hypothesis is that training in creative thinking methods will be an effective way to 
improve the ability of engineers to design for safety. 
1.5 Objectives 
• To establish the model of prevention that would be effective for engineers to employ. 
• To establish what training can be employed to improve creative thinking of engineers. 
• To design a methodology to test the hypothesis, including selecting a technique for 
implementation and developing a way to assess safety design in terms ofthe themes of 
development and application of solutions. 
• To implement the research and report the results. 
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Chapter Two 
Accident Prevention 
2. Accident Prevention 
The theory of the prevention of injury n o w gives priority to a concept known as control 
at source. For some time it has been established through c o m m o n law that it is an 
employer's duty to establish and maintain a safe plant, premises, and a safe system. 
Nowadays these responsibilities are outlined by legislation. While a safe system has 
been required, the core meaning of what characterises such a system is best emphasised 
by the importance that legislation n o w accords the notion of hazard management. 
Control of hazards at source has been clearly expressed by legislation in many parts of 
the world. In particular the United States' legislation from 1970 and more recent 
Australian legislation, such as the Western Australian, Victorian and South Australian 
Acts, made the priority of hazard control very clear. 
Each employer shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment 
which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or 
serious physical harm to his employee. 
(Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (USA) s. 5. (a) (1), emphasis added) 
The employer shall take all precautions necessary to prevent the employee from being 
exposed to health hazards or accident risks. 
(Work Environment Act 1977) (Sweden 1994), ch. 3 s. 2, emphasis added) 
The objects of this Act are— to reduce, eliminate, and control the hazards to which persons 
are exposed at work 
(OccupationalSafety and Health Act 1984 (W.A.) s. 5. (d), emphasis added) 
The objects of this Act are— to eliminate, at the source, risks to the health, safety and welfare 
of persons at work 
(Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985 (Vic.) s. 6. (d), emphasis added) 
The chief objects of this Act are— to eliminate, at the source, risks to the health, safety and 
welfare of persons at work 
(OccupationalHealth, Safety and Welfare Act 1986 (S.A.) s. 3. (b), emphasis added) 
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The attention given to control at source represents a model of prevention known as the safe 
place approach. The extreme alternative is the safe person approach where people are 
encouragedto behave safely in a hazardous environment. Atherley(1975; 1978) seemed to 
be the first to employ the terms safe place and safe person. 
Safe place strategies aim at eradicating danger by seeking safe premises, safe plant, safe 
processes, safe equipment, safe materials, safe systems of work, safe access to work, adequate 
supervision and competent and trained people. 
Safe person strategies aim at protecting certain people from danger by care ofthe vulnerable 
(pregnant women, the disabled and young persons); personal hygiene; provision, use and 
misuse of personal protection equipment; careful actions for safety of self and others on the 
part of people at work in danger; and caution towards danger generally. 
(Atherleyl975,p.54) 
Atherley (1978) later defined the terms much more generally and said that safe place 
strategies place emphasis on the control of the work place whereas safe person strategies 
attempt to control the individual. Later authors such as the National Occupational Health 
and Safety Commission ( N O H S C 199Id), in their program for introducing health and 
safety to undergraduate engineering students, and Stranks (1994) adopted the safe place / 
safe person terminology. 
The term 'safe place' refers to the design of workplaces, processes and operations which are 
intrinsically safe, that is, safety of persons within the workplace does not rely on appropriate 
behaviour patterns. The term 'safe person' refers to the reliance on people's behaviour for 
their safety. (NOHSC 1990d, p. 19, emphasis added) 
Accident prevention strategies should thus be directed at, first, bringing about a reduction in 
the objective danger in the workplace, and second, increasing the perception of risk on the 
part of individual workers. This is brought about, in the first case, by the use of 'safe place' 
strategies, and in the second case, by 'safe person' strategies... 
(Stranks 1994, p. 144, emphasis added) 
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In summary, the safe place model underpins current legislation in Australia and in many 
other countries. However its primacy has not always been so evident and even today there 
is strong adherence to the safe person philosophy. The progress in thinking has clearly 
been from a historically dominant safe person model to a situation today where that model 
is questioned and the safe place approach is given greater credibility. Given that over time 
the thinking has changed from the safe person to the safe place philosophy it is natural to 
begin this chapter by discussing safe person way of thinking; its history and problems. 
2.1 The Safe Person Approach 
The safe person approach to prevention is based on a premise that individual people are 
able to avoid accidents by appropriate behaviour. This approach retains its strong appeal 
among the general population and with some involved in specialist safety roles. However 
there is a growing core of opinion attesting to the unjustifiable focus on unsafe acts and the 
consequential attention given to behavioural modification as an effective strategy. 
Similarly, among safety writers there is a common rejection of the accident proneness 
theory. While rejecting the basis ofthe safe person model, many writers also point toward 
the misguiding influence this type of thinking has on preventative efforts. These issues are 
explored in the following pages. 
2.1.1 Unsafe Acts and Unsafe Conditions: Unjustifiable Categories 
Much ofthe focus ofthe prevention of injury from the mid 1800's to the early 1900's was 
concerned with the guarding of machinery. Given the great problems with machinery-based 
injuries it became customary to view the causes of accidents in the machinery or non-
machinery dichotomy (for example; Stephenson 1926; Viteles 1932; Watkins & Dodd 
1940). These terms seemed to be the foundation for a model later known as, unsafe acts or 
unsafe conditions (for example; Vernon 1936; Heinrich 1941; Denton 1982; Watson 1986; 
Stranks 1994). 
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The unsafe acts and unsafe conditions model seems to have had a powerful influence on the 
thinking in safety. Part of this acceptance may be attributable to the popularity ofthe work 
of Herbert W . Heinrich. Heinrich, an engineer working for an insurance company in the 
U S A in the 1920's, studied 75,000 reports of accidents gained from insurance files and 
industrial records. In 1931 Heinrich first published Industrial Accident Prevention; a text 
based on his findings from the analysis ofthe accident reports. Heinrich's (1941) domino 
model (Figure 2-1) ofthe five factors that he thought represented the accident process has 
since become very popular. The five factors considered were as follows. 
1. Ancestry and social environment. 
2. Fault of person. 
3. Unsafe act and/or unsafe mechanical or physical hazard. 
4. Accident. 
5. Injury. 
(The Five Factors in the Accident Sequence, Heinrich 1941) 
(1) Industrial injuries result only from accidents, (2) accidents are caused directly only by (a) 
the unsafe acts of persons or (b) exposure to unsafe mechanical conditions, (3) unsafe acts 
and conditions are caused only by faults or persons, and (4) faults of persons are created by 
environment or acquired by inheritance. (Heinrich 1959, p. 4) 
Figure 2-1 The Injury is Caused by the Action of Preceding Factors (Heinrich 1941) 
According to Heinrich, the accident process was sequential. One factor lead to another and 
so on until the injury occurred. The dominoes represented this sequential and causal 
relationship. Heinrich thought that the central factor, and the key, to the accident sequence 
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was the unsafe act or unsafe condition. A s mentioned above, at the time Heinrich 
developed the model, this type of dichotomy in the cause of accidents was very common. 
Within the sphere of this model it has been a well-entrenched perception that unsafe acts 
are the primary accident cause. Heinrich's study of accident reports found that 8 8 % of 
accidents were the result of unsafe acts and 1 0 % the result of unsafe conditions. Heinrich 
found that the remaining two percent were unpreventable and without apparent cause. 
From these statistics Heinrich centred preventative efforts on the unsafe act. 
The unsafe acts of persons are responsiblefor the majority of accidents. 
(Heinrich 1941, p. 12) 
The general idea around the time of this work was that much had been accomplished with 
machinery safeguards and that the remaining, and growing problem, was with unsafe acts. 
It m a y be that Hienrich's analysis simply became evidence for a way of thinking 
widespread at the time. A s evidence of the thinking of that time consider Eastman's 
comments from 1910. Eastman wrote a report based on the Pittsburgh Survey; a survey that 
examined fatalities in the district over a one year period. The resulting text chronicled the 
stories of the fatalities, the law, and family issues of a year of destruction mainly in the 
infamous railroad, mining, and steel industries. Eastman's characterisation of the 
archetypical response of an industrial manager shows h o w she found the victim blaming 
paradigm embedded among managers. 
"So you 've come to Pittsburgh to study accidents, have you? " says the superintendent, or the 
claim agent, or the general manager, as the case may be. "Well, I've been in this business 
fifteenyears and I can tell you one thing right now,-95per cent of our accidents are due to the 
carelessness ofthe man who gets hurt. Why, you simply wouldn 't believe the things they 11 do. 
For instance, I remember a man, "-and he goes on to relate the most telling incident he knows, 
to prove his assertion. (Eastman 1910, p. 84) 
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Eastman (1910) stood apart as a sceptic among m a n y writers w h o appeared certain that 
victims were the main source of the problems. For instance, Stephenson (1926) and 
Watkins and Dodd (1940) made the following comments. 
To sum up, much has been done towards accident-prevention by the use of mechanical 
safeguards, and a little more may possibly be accomplished by this means.... "The problem of 
accident-preventionto-day is largely a psychological one." Much may be done by education 
and propaganda, still more, probably, by scientific selection. (Stephenson 1926, p. 200) 
If complete information were available, we should probably find that the greater number of 
accidents in industrial communities is caused, not by the absence of adequate safeguards, but 
by negligence, carelessness, want of instruction, want of thought, and a lack of appreciation 
ofthe dangers involved in the complex and intricate machine processes in modern industry. 
...The workman himself, by his carelessness, may be responsible for a large percentage of 
accidents, or the negligence of his fellow workmen may be an equally accountable factor... 
accidents depend in the main on carelessness and lack of attention ofthe workers. 
(Watkins & Dodd 1940, p. 340-341,) 
The following quotes from the 1950's, 60's, 70's and 80's illustrate how the perception of 
the role of unsafe behaviour in accident causation then continued. 
The 'unsafe attitude' is the most serious problem in accident prevention... 
(Scott 1953, emphasis added) 
Good industrial accident records may be marred by personal carelessness or lack of 
cooperation. Irresponsible, inconsiderate, absent-minded, or incompetent drivers cause 
more accidents than mechanical failure, highway conditions, or weather factors. 
(Blasingame, in The American Public Health Association 1961, p. xx, emphasis added) 
... [the] five main causes of accidents which kill approximately 20,000 people eachyear in 
Britain were selfishness, lack of interest in others, inefficiency, bravado, and carelessness 
... [and] it was vitally important to train young people to realise the necessity of adjusting 
themselves to their environment and their equipment. (Porritt 1965, p. 5, emphasis added) 
... Heinrich informed us of what is now painfully obvious and simple truth-that people, not 
things, cause accidents. (Petersen 1978, p. 15, emphasis added) 
...we also know today that his [Heinrich's] concept was meaningful and extremely valid. 
People are the primary cause of accidents. (Petersen 1984, p. 5, emphasis added) 
In fact safety statistics suggest that 85% ... can be attributed to unsafe behaviour alone. 
(Watson 1986, p. 20, emphasis added) 
Recently it has been demonstrated in Australian surveys of workers that the conviction 
about the role of unsafe behaviour remains entrenched. Biggins, Phillips and O'Sullivan 
(1988), Biggins and Phillips (1991) and Gaines and Biggins (1992) conducted surveys of 
workers in various states of Australia and showed a perpetuation of the careless worker 
theory. The surveys showed that approximately 5 0 % of their study groups (98 health and 
safety representatives in Western Australia, 125 workers undergoing health and safety 
training in Queensland, and 82 workers undergoing health and safety training in the 
Northern Territory, respectively) believed worker carelessness was the main cause of 
accidents. A n earlier evaluation of health and safety representative training by Else & 
Cowley (1987) found similar views. A survey commissioned by Worksafe Australia 
recently found that when asked to nominate the main cause of accidents, about 5 0 % of a 
sample of 2000 working age people across Australia nominated lack of training or 
education or worker carelessness ( A N O P 1995). Likewise a recent study of health and 
safety representatives in South Australia (Culvenor, Cowley & Else 1996) found that many 
ofthe 400 respondents (from a sample of 1200) indicated strong agreement that factors 
such as carelessness and lack of training in how to behave safely were important causes of 
accidents at their workplace. These surveys show that the victim-blaming paradigm 
remains strong among the general community and among health and safety representatives. 
In summary, accident causation has been viewed through the spectacles ofthe unsafe act or 
unsafe condition model. Within this model, unsafe acts has been considered by many to 
make up the great majority ofthe problem. This is evident from the comments made by 
writers in safety, through the surveys mentioned above, and indeed in popular culture such 
as in discussions of safety in newspaper and television reports. 
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While still well believed in popular circles and even among workers involved in health and 
safety such as health and safety representatives, many authors have questioned Heinrich's 
focus on unsafe acts and the usefulness of the classification of accidents with this model 
(for example; N S C 1959; ILO 1961; Blake 1953; H a m m e r 1976; ILO 1983). 
In most industrial accidents, both an unsafe condition and unsafe act are contributingfactors. 
...It must be remembered, however that an unsafe condition, in addition to being a direct 
cause of accidents in itself, often can lead people to perform unsafe acts. Many times, an 
unsafe act is the result of poor machine design, inadequately planned method, and other 
engineering deficiencies. 
Experience shows that when an injury occurs, the unsafe condition often is not as glaringly 
evident as the unsafe act. Unless a careful study is made ofthe accident occurrence, the 
correctiblephysical hazard may escape notice. 
Elimination of a hazard due to an unsafe condition removes one of the accident-causing 
factors, and thereby reduces the likelihood of injury from an unsafe act. (NSC 1959, p. 4-4) 
The ILO proposed that a reworking of accident reports could easily result in reversal of 
claims about the ratio of unsafe act/unsafe condition statistics. 
An accident is very seldom due to solely to unsafe behaviour. As already stated, accidents are 
usually caused by a group of circumstances; one of these may be unsafe behaviour, but in all 
probability unsafe conditions are present as well, and so it would be equally justifiable to 
classify the accident as due to unsafe mechanical or physical conditions. (ILO 1961,p. 25) 
Blake (1963) said that invariably both a poor condition and an unsafe act occur leading up 
to an accident, but all too frequently the unsafe behaviour is the centre of attention. 
...in each case of injury both the factor of hazard and that of faulty behaviour are inescapably 
present... Too often, however, these fundamentals are over-looked and sole attention is given 
to the unsafe act. (Blake 1963, p. 56) 
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In the report titled Bitter Wages: Ralph Nader's Study Group Report on Disease and Injury 
on the Job, Page and O'Brien (1973) commented that the unsafe behaviour model is a hoax 
with little real basis. 
One ofthe most persistent ofthe arguments mounted against broad federal involvement in the 
struggle against work accidents and diseases emerged from the notion that the overwhelming 
majority of job injuries result from worker carelessness; therefore, the proper and better 
approach to occupational safety is to educate employees, rather than impose mandatory 
standards on employers. 
Some companies have gone to great lengths in their efforts to "teach " safety and motivate 
workers to be careful... 
A closer look [at statistics] reveals that the worker-carelessness theory is a hoax. It is a 
version of the "nut behind the wheel" argument used in the unsuccessful attempt to stop 
legislation giving the federal government authority to impose performance standards upon 
automobiles. As hoary as the work safety movement itself, the worker-carelessness argument 
has a very shaky basis in reality. Although one cannot deny that some work accidents are 
causally related to worker carelessness, this does not mean that they all are. Nor does it mean 
that the frequency and severity of these accidents cannot be substantially reduced by 
designing the work environment and work practices to take human failings into account. 
(Page& O'Brien 1973,pp. 145-146) 
Johnson (1973), in his text on risk management, suggested that behind many so-called 
unsafe acts lie a lack of human factors in design. 
Experience indicates that accidents previously attributed to "unsafe acts" are often reduced 
after human factors review and correction. This implies that the previous description of 
"unsafe acts " was largely incorrect, and that we really had an "error-provocative " situation, 
and therefore an "unsafe condition." (Johnson 1973, p. 273) 
In his text on accident prevention and engineering, Hammer (1976) commented that 
reclassification of Heinrich's data could easily result in a reversal of ratio of unsafe acts to 
unsafe conditions. H a m m e r wrote that '...until a few years ago it was considered that if a 
man was involved in an accident it was probably his fault.'. H a m m e r illustrated his point 
with the example that plane crashes were once generally blamed on pilot error. H a m m e r 
said that this perception was difficult to justify when the Armed Services investigated 
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crashes of ballistic missiles that had no pilot to blame; they therefore concluded that the 
design systems were inadequate. 
In his 1991 review and overview of safety concepts, Thomas indicated that Hienrich's 
model had been useful in many ways but had a fundamental weakness in its terminology. 
Much good work resulted from the use of this model. Its weakness is the result ofthe use of 
the highly subjective word unsafe. (Thomas 1991, p. 100) 
The word unsafe is subjective and thus can be self perpetuating. A person is always present 
at some point in the failure that leads to an accident and often the person most proximate in 
time and in space is the victim. Beginning an accident investigation with the unsafe act 
model in mind invariably implicates a person (normally the victim) in the cause. Thus the 
unsafe act paradigm is self-perpetuating. Given a perception that unsafe acts cause 
accidents, it follows that this label is simple to ascribe to virtually all accidents. This is the 
case not only in occupational accidents but has been a c o m m o n flaw in thinking about road 
accidents, as Ralph Nader indicated. 
Today almost every program is aimed at the driver-at educating him, exhorting him, watching 
him, judging him, punishing him, compiling records about his driving violations, and 
organizinghim in citizen support activities. Resources and energy are directed into programs 
of enforcement, traffic laws, driver education, driver licensing, traffic courts, and vehicle 
inspection. The reasoning behind this philosophy of safety can be summarized in this way: 
Most accidents are in the class of driver fault; driver fault is in the class of violated traffic 
laws; therefore, observance of traffic laws by drivers would eliminate most accidents. 
(Nader 1965, p. 235) 
There is considerable doubt about the usefulness of attributing accidents to an unsafe act 
alone, or an unsafe condition alone. Within such a framework the attribution of a great 
many accident to unsafe acts has been largely arbitrary. A s a consequence, the model is 
rejected in many circles and considered an unhelpful tool for prevention. 
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2.1.2 Safe Behaviour Promotions: The Myth of the Careless Worker 
The accident prevention literature from the early 1900's focussed heavily on the promotion 
of safe-behaviour (for example; Stephenson 1926; Vernon 1936; Watkins & Dodd 1940; 
Heinrich 1941). This was a natural extension ofthe belief that unsafe behaviour lead to 
most accidents. 
As mentioned, Heinrich suggested that the unsafe act or unsafe condition was the central 
factor in the accident sequence. The theory of prevention that followed was then to remove 
the central factor to interrupt the sequence (Figure 2-2). 
Figure 2-2 The Removal ofthe Central Factor Makes the Action 
of Preceding Factors Ineffective (Heinrich 1941) 
Tracing the dominoes backward it was believed that unsafe acts were causally linked to 
faults of persons created by environmental conditioning (learned behaviour) or acquired by 
inheritance. The means to prevention were then two fold; one of weeding out those who 
had an inherited accident-proneness (discussed later) and secondly by behaviour and 
attitude change programs. Scott (1953), in a brief commentary about attitude problems, 
warmed to the risk homoeostasis theory when he maintained that improving environmental 
conditions should be avoided as it may worsen the safety situation by creating an illusion of 
safety and thus lead to a less alert attitude and hence more accidents! There was a great 
belief among many commentators such as Vernon (below), a psychologist, and Blasingame 
(below), then president of the AMA, that maintaining a safe state of mind would be useful 
in preventing accidents. 
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Everyone is bound to be exposed almost every day to risk of accident in the home and on the 
roads, while apart of the population is exposed to additional risks in factories, coal mines and 
other places. No one can possibly keep himself always at the maximum degree of alertness and 
attention, and it inevitably follows that when attention relaxes liability to accident increases. 
Everyone should therefore endeavour to acquire the habit of increasing his alertness at time 
when specially exposed to risk, and this habit is best acquired by long-continued education. The 
earlier in life this is begun the more effective is likely to be. The safety habit should become to 
some extent instinctive and subconscious, so that exposure to a risk results in the potential 
victim's taking almost automatically the appropriate steps to avoid it. (Vernon 1936, p. 325) 
The physician is also challenged by the psychological aspects of accident prevention. He is 
conscious of his responsibility to help control the effects of anxiety, frustration, sorrow, 
depression, compulsions, confusion, fear, rage, or resentment on the individual's judgement 
and coordination, whether at the wheel, afoot, or while working or playing about the home, or 
on the farm. (Blasingame, in The American Public Health Association 1961, p. xx) 
More recent writers now tend to point out that changing behaviour is really more central to 
the argument than the changing of attitudes. Consequently recent journal articles have 
promoted schemes that use training or coaching to hopefully change behaviour and thus 
avoid accidents (for example; G r u m m o n and Stilwell 1984; Watson 1986; Ashton 1994; 
Hidley and Krause 1994; Geller 1995). These authors have suggested that unsafe 
behaviours be identified, corrected and monitored by training and coaching. G r u m m o n and 
Stilwell (1984) actually promoted teasing as an accident prevention measure. They 
suggested that teasing will prevent unsafe acts by engendering peer pressure to be safe. 
The thinking behind behaviour and attitude safety programs is that promotion will lead to a 
subsequent motivation to be safer. Posters are a c o m m o n example of attempting to reduce 
accidents by simply promoting the safety cause. 
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Figure 2-3 Safety Poster Competition Third-Prize 
Winner, U K National Coal Board (Wood 1965) 
* WorkCover f 
Figure 2-4 WorkCover's Current Safely Slogan (WorkWords, no. 18,1996) 
Figure 2-3, a prize winner among 2,390 entries in a safety poster competition organised by 
the National Coal Board in the United Kingdom in 1962 (Wood 1965), and Figure 2-4, the 
similar slogan currently promoted by the WorkCover Corporation here in Victoria, 
represent most succinctly the technique of encouraging a safe mindset as a means to 
prevention. Unfortunately the older poster shows a picture of a worker; implying the 
importance of their conscious effort. The more recent poster is hopefully directed at 
management level. This would certainly be in keeping with today's legislation however 
there is nothing in the promotion to indicate that management is the target and it thus could 
be mistakenly construed as a call for workers to work safely. 
As noted above, a number of research studies have shown that there is a strong perception 
that worker behaviour is the cause of accidents (refer to section 2.1.1; Else& Cowley 1987; 
Biggins, Phillips and O'Sullivan 1988; Biggins and Phillips 1991; Gaines and Biggins 
39 
1992; Culvenor, Cowley & Else 1996). From such a belief stems a strong temptation to 
employ exhortations and encouragement in the hope that workers can be made to modify 
their behaviour. However, Kinnersly (1973) and Mathews (1986; 1993), whose work 
became standard texts for workplace health and safety representatives in the United 
Kingdom and Australia respectively, ridiculed schemes that aimed to achieve prevention by 
attempting to encourage safe behaviour rather than addressing the environment. Kinnersly 
said that the schemes address the problems too late. 'Exhortations and posters start to fly 
after the ill-conceivedwork system has beensetup and accepted as quite normal.' (1973, p. 
196) while Mathews (1986) derided bonus schemes that purport to encourage safe 
behaviour with some kind of reward. Mathews related an example of how one scheme 
relied on the incentive of a free chicken as an enticement for a period of no lost-time 
accidents. These kind of schemes seem absurd. If someone was in control of their own 
injuries (as per the unsafe act theory), how would a free chicken possibly significantly add 
to the incentive of not losing a personal body part? Kinnersly and Mathews attributed such 
schemes to the myth ofthe careless worker. 
It is possible to draw some parallels with these approaches in occupational safety to those 
in public health and safety. For some time, commentators have noted that the vagueness 
and myths surrounding disease hampered the development of reliable public health 
interventions (for example; Rapoport 1961; Haddon 1973a; Wigglesworth 1978). Both 
Haddon and Wigglesworth drew examples from the times of the European plague where 
there was thought to be a link between the disease and the loose morals and emotions ofthe 
victims. For instance a German physician recommended avoiding emotions of the mind 
such as jealousy, anger, hatred, sadness, horror or fear, licentiousness, and so on, while 
some regulations in Germany, in the 1500's prohibited immoral behaviours such as 
gambling, drinking and cursing (NOHL 1926). These controls were obviously wrongly 
directed as we now know that the disease was controlled by focussing on the control of 
bacteria, mainly by better sanitation. 
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Like earlier writers above, Kjellen and Hovden (1993) recently commented that accidents 
were often viewed as being a fatalistic predisposition of people with an inherent fault. 
In older days, accidents were often viewed as being outside the scope of human control, i.e., 
they were determined by fate or were a punishment of sins and lack of moral standards. 
(Kjellen & Hovden 1993, p. 418) 
However odd the plague stories sound now there are parallels with approaches today. For 
instance, the Victorian Traffic Accident Commission (TAC) use violent images of the 
supposed consequences ofthe lack of concentration and impatience when driving. Then-
relationship between emotions such as impatience and road crashes seems similar to the 
notion that bad morals once caused major plagues. Nohl (1926) described the story of a 
servant in plague-ridden Germany w h o contravened regulations, subsequently contracted 
the disease and then died before being punished. To send a message to others she was 
supposedly exhumed, executed, and then burnt, after her death. While this story is rather 
extreme, the principle is not unlike modern day efforts to chastise people for their 
behaviour. This way of thinking seems to be popular and may appeal to a sense of 
righteousness and punishment, but the link to the reduction of injury is illogical and 
unsubstantiated. In a review of the relationship between insurance and prevention, Luntz 
(1994) said that although there is strong community support, and a community perception 
that the T A C campaigns are successful, in terms ofthe simultaneous reductions in the road 
toll while the campaign has been running; '...it cannot be shown conclusively that the 
advertising campaign has been causally relevant'. 
Ralph Nader, a road safety enthusiast, who has arguably done more to influence safety in 
automobile design than any other individual, described how the National Safety Council in 
the United States continually berated drivers for the behaviour in the hope that this would 
prevent accidents, much like the predictions given great credibility on news programs now. 
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While the AAA may occasionally raise a voice that is displeasing to the automobile industry, 
that "hub ofthe safety movement", the National Safety Council, remains the unswerving 
keeper ofthe traditional faith. Almost everyone in America has heard the council's repeated 
injunction that to be safe one simply has to be careful. Before every holiday weekend, the 
council makes its highly publicized prediction ofthe number of highway deaths. Should the 
prediction be exceeded, it shows how important are the council's warnings against 
carelessness; if the prediction exceeded the actual toll, then the council concludes that its 
warning made people drive more carefully. Either outcome serves to nourish the council's 
image of always being on the side ofthe angels. The council gets enormous publicity as the 
nation's caretaker of traffic safety. Since its founding in 1915, the council has saturated the 
country with slogans, printed material, and broadcasted exhortations for safer driving. It has 
helped to form state and local safety councils, accrediting seventy-two of them as council 
affiliates, all devoted to persuading the public to drive carefully. This may be a generally 
useless endeavor but it is not a harmless one. What seems to fill a need in form succeeds 
very well in excluding alternative methods that could fill it in fact 
(Nader 1965, p. 261, emphasis added) 
It could be said that there remains unreasonable attention given to the culpability of 
workers for their o w n injuries. Recent surveys show a strong belief in this w a y of thinking. 
Similarly, public efforts in road safety seem to reinforce this approach. It could not be said 
though that the model of bad worker behaviour and the subsequent encouragement of good 
behaviour is a very competent application of occupational legislation throughout Australia. 
Whether effective or not, and I would argue not, it needs to be recognised that this approach 
does not coincide with what the law requires. 
2.1.3 Accident-Proneness:A Case of Mistaken Identity 
Along with learnt reckless behaviour, it was thought that some unsafe acts could be traced 
back to unchangeable psychological traits. This theory labelled workers with apparently 
higher than normal accident rates as accident prone. Given that it was an apparently 
unchangeable inherited characteristic, the problem was thought to be best handled by 
avoiding the employment of this type of person. The theory finds little support now. 
Powell, Hale, Martin and Simon (1971) investigated over 2000 workshop accidents in the 
United Kingdom and found that personal characteristics had little to do with accident rates. 
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Cronin's (1971) study of 1800 industrial accidents showed no relationship between age of 
employee even though attributing high accident rates to young and old people was popular 
at the time (and continues to be popular). 
Leigh (1986) studied accident data gained from around 5000 subjects in national surveys in 
the USA in 1978 and 1979 to examine the relative importance of individual and job 
characteristics in accident prediction. Through analysis ofthe data Leigh concluded; 'The 
results suggest that job characteristics are better predictors of industrial accidents than 
personal characteristics' (Leigh 1986, p. 216). That is, the job environment and system are 
predictors of accidents rather than the personal features ofthe victim. 
Mohr and Clemmer' s (198 8) study of the work history records of about 1000 workers in the 
offshore (US) oil industry found little evidence that the study of accident proneness was a 
useful accident prevention measure. They commented 'From the results ofthe present and 
cited studies it is unlikely that overall injury rates in the workplace can be effectively 
reduced by screening out workers with excessive numbers of injuries in any given time 
period despite the intuitive appeal of this approach' (Mohr & Clemmer 1988, p. 127). 
If accident proneness was real, human resource managers would have the task of making 
this selection. An examination of human resource texts indicates that human resource 
specialists generally agree that they have no way to measure the phenomenon (for example; 
Sikula 1976; Robbins, Low & Mourell 1986; Schuler, Dowling & Smart 1988). Sikula 
(1976) agreed with many safety writers that attribution of accidents to accident proneness 
is a statistical misunderstandingthat has retarded the progress of accident analysis. 
Evidence seems to disagree with Heinrich's assertion that inherited personal characteristics 
are related to accident rates. Maclver (1961) many years ago commented that accident 
proneness was then discredited as a useful tool in accident prevention. Many authors since 
have suggested that blaming people with an apparent over-representation in accidents is a 
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sham based on statistical misunderstanding (for example; Energy Research and 
Development Administration 1977; Kletz 1990c). Kletz illustrated the potential for being 
mislead by accident statistics with the following example. 
Assuming 100 accidents per year were distributed randomly among 200 workers at a single 
factory, the Poisson equation predicts that 121 people will have no accidents, 61 will have 
one accident, 15 will have two accidents, and 3 will have three or more accidents. 
The mean accident rate per person is 0.5 per year. It is simple then to be mislead by the 
fact that three people have had six times the average number of accidents, and that 10% of 
the workforce had 40% of the accidents. These type of statistics are true but indicate 
incorrectly that there's something accident prone about these people. There is nothing 
different about these people as the accident rates are merely the result of chance. 
In summary many writers have dismissed the accident-prone worker theory (for example; 
Maclver 1961; McFarland & Moore 1961; Suchman & Scherzer 1964; International 
Labour Organisation 1971; Wigglesworth 1984). Often it has been suggested that the 
misdirected attention directed toward accident-prone personality in accident rates is due to 
a misunderstanding of statistics (Maclver 1961; McFarland & Moore 1961; ERDA 1977; 
Kletz 1990c). Furthermore one could easily draw a parallel between the study of accidents 
and the study of quality where Edwards Deming (1982) went to pains to explain the fallacy 
of rewarding and punishing staff based on similar statistical ignorance. 
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2.1.4 Beginning from Inherent Hopelessness 
Accident: 
an undesirable or unfortunate happening; casualty; mishap 
anything that happens unexpectedly, without design or by chance 
the operation of chance 
a non-essential circumstance; occasional characteristic 
(The Macquarie Dictionary 1985) 
The popular, or dictionary-based, definitions of accident quote words like unexpected, 
unintentional, damage and chance. Scientific or professional definitions are often not the 
same as popular definitions. For instance terms like stress and strain have particular 
meanings to engineers and different meanings to the general population. 
A scan of the terminology employed in the definition of accident from a variety of safety 
literature over a wide time span shows that unplanned, unintended and unexpected are 
often used to describe the phenomena of accidents (Table 2-1). M a n y scientific definitions 
thus conform to the popular (dictionary) definition. 
Accident Definitions Source 
Unplanned Heinrich 1941; Blake 1963; Wigglesworth 1972; James 
1983; Bamber 1994; West 1994; Stranks 1994 
Unintended Blake 1963; Yellman 1987; NSC 1990; Stranks 1994 
Uncontrolled Heinrich 1941 
Unexpected Kuhlmann 1986; Bamber 1994; West 1994; Stranks 1994 
Undesirable Harms-Ringdahl 1993 
Sudden Berman & McCrone 1943 
Table 2-1 Terminology in Accident Definitions 
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The view that accidents are not planned encouraged a very narrow view of accident 
causation. Notably, while Stranks employed the terminology listed above (Table 2-1), he 
emphasised that accidents are unforeseen by the victim. Thereby implying that those with a 
wider understanding of the hazards with which the victim is associated, for example 
management, should have the ability to foresee, predict and so on. 
Haddon, Suchman and Klein (1964) commented that much of the thinking about accident 
causation is bound in folklore rather than systematic thinking. 
It is not uncommon, for example, to encounter physicians, lawyers, economists, and other men 
whose training has involved analytical thinking and the continuous search for cause who 
believe that accidents are "acts of God" that "just happen," and that "lightning never strikes 
twice", that accidents are as uncontrollable as the weather; that, in short, accidents somehow 
mysteriouslydefy any kind of systematic study beyond mere tabulation. 
(Haddon, Suchman & Klein 1964, p. 6, emphasis added) 
As Brauer (1990) discussed in the text for engineering students, Safety and Health for 
Engineers, the most obvious lack of science in accident analysis is in the use of terms such 
as, unplanned, uncontrolled and unpredictable. Defining accidents as unpredictable means 
that by definition there is no possibility of prediction; thus no possibility of control or 
prevention. Similarly, Gibson suggested that the unpredictable approach is fatalistic. 
Defined as a harmful encounter with the environment, an accident is a psychological 
phenomenon, subject to prediction and control. But defined as an unpredictable event, it is by 
definition uncontrollable. (Gibson 1961, p. 87) 
If accidents are unpredictable, then they are also uncontrollable and unplannable. 
Obviously this is not true and some authors point out the fatalism of considering accidents 
to be unpredictable (for example; Gibson 1961; Bird &Loftus 1976b; Terry 1991). 
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M a n y authors, from an engineering standpoint, have lamented the lack of forethought by 
engineers at the design stage. Engineers have a clear opportunity to thwart accidents via 
user-friendly design; design sympathetic to humans rather than in conflict with humans. 
Engineers have many opportunities to eliminate or reduce unsafe conditions. ... Engineers 
also have many opportunities to minimize unsafe acts. 
(Brauer 1990, p. 18, emphasis added) 
Designers have a second chance, opportunities to go over their designs again, but not 
operators... Plants therefore should be designed, whenever possible, so that they are user-
friendly ...so that they can tolerate departuresfrom ideal performance by operators. 
(Kletz 1990c, p. 3, emphasis added) 
Nearly all accidents are caused by some event or physical phenomenon that was entirely 
predictable at the design concept stage. The reasons as to why such obvious potential 
hazards are not identified or catered for are numerous. How/ever, all too often the reason is 
'we didn't think of it'. (Terry 1991,p. 21, emphasis added) 
... modification of products or the physical surroundings is the most effective strategy for 
injury prevention. (Torell & Brembergl995, p. 71) 
There is therefore substantial opinion that use of terms like unplanned, uncontrolled, 
unpredicted and so on, in the definition of accident leave the process of planning for the 
prevention of these accidents unplannable, uncontrollable and unpredictable. Furthermore 
there is a recognition that m a n y so-called unsafe acts are the result of design inadequacy 
and thus designers are in the best position to minimise the opportunities for, and outcomes 
of, operator mistakes. 
2.1.5 Misguiding Preventative Action 
Kinnersly (1973) claimed that careless worker theory causes workers to accept 
responsibility for accidents and thus make little effort to encourage management to improve 
systems. M a n y authors have suggested that management finds it convenient to be absolved 
of responsibility if the blame or fault of an accident can be attributed to someone else, often 
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the victim (for example; Kinnersly 1973; Wigglesworth 1978; Kletz 1985; Cohen & Cohen 
1991). Kletz, an engineer and well-known writer in safety, wrote that attributing accidents 
to human failing is '...comfortingfor managers. It implies that there is little or nothing they 
can do to stop most accidents' (1985, p. 1). 
The main problem with the careless worker theory is that it points prevention efforts the 
wrong way. In his discussion of accident causation within the overall framework of 
industrial safety, Blake (1963) criticised Heinrich saying that the classification system he 
used was an over simplification and 'had the very unfortunate effect of drawing attention 
away from the even more important fact that the first and basic approach to injury 
prevention is and always should be one of hazard reduction or, if possible, complete 
elimination' (p. 60). The ILO (1983) concluded that the approach of fixing blame on 
unsafe acts has done little in the area of prevention. 'The onus is often incorrectly put on 
the worker, and the conditions that have resulted in the unsafe act are not given full 
consideration.' ($. 103). The following comments from Chapanis (1965), Emerson (1985), 
Kletz (1985), Office of Technology Assessment (1985), Hale (1990a) and Thomas (1991) 
demonstrate a growing belief that the attention placed on unsafe acts in the past has been 
harmful to the development of reliable solutions. 
Accident statistics compiled by insurance companies on home, street, railway and industry 
accidents are full of causes such as carelessness, faulty attitude, and inattention. Although 
labels such as these appear to tell us something, they really don't. Everyone is inattentive at 
some time or other, and to say that an accident was caused by inattentivenessgives us no clue 
whatsoever about how we could have prevented it. (Chapanis 1965, p. 9) 
This human error fault concept provided the greatest impediment to the development of safer 
design considerations because ofthe widespread belief that- human error is the cause of most 
accidents. Terms like unsafe act, unsafe condition after Heinrich and his ratio of "88 human 
errors: to 10 design problems: to 2 acts of God" have retardedthe thinking of members ofthe 
safety profession in recent years. A distressing number of safety practitioners held the belief 
that human error caused most accidents. (Emerson 1985, p. 22) 
Accidents are due to human failing. This is not untrue, merely unhelpful. (Kletz 1985, p. 2) 
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The traditional partition between unsafe acts and unsafe conditions unfortunately often draws 
attention away from the job or equipment redesigns that can remove or minimize hazards. 
(OTA 1985, pp. 70-71) 
In other words behavioural rules cannot be used to patch over bad design decisions. 
(Hale 1990a, p. 18) 
This approach [unsafe acts and unsafe conditions] has bewildered the safety movement for a 
long time, particularly when coupled with some early research work which indicated the 
prime causes of industrial accidents as unsafe personal acts. This lead to undue emphasis on 
safety training as the most appropriate remedy to the detriment of removing hazards at their 
source by engineering means. (Thomas 1991, p. 100) 
Ironically, Heinrich pointed to the weakness of behavioural controls. 
In the same breath it can be truthfully said that although man failure causes the most 
accidents, mechanical guarding and engineering revision are nevertheless important factors 
in preventing most accidents. (Heinrich 1941, p. 18) 
...the guarding of machines and hazards has been and always should be a fundamental of a 
complete safety program. Incidentally, guarding and other action of an "engineering-
revision" nature often provide an immediate remedy even for accidents chiefly caused by man 
failure. (Heinrich 1959, p. 34) 
Kletz (1993) said that the notion of unsafe act or human error seems to contaminate 
prevention to the point where it should not be listed as a cause at all when undertaking an 
accident analysis. The most well-known studies to devalue the human error concept has 
been those by Fitts and Jones in the late 1940's (Fitts & Jones 1961a; 1961b). Fitts and 
Jones analysed errors by civilian and military pilots. Five-hundred pilots returned 
questionnaires related to control operation errors and instrument reading errors. The main 
error types in the operation of controls (1961a) were substitution or wrong control (50%), 
wrong adjustment (18%), forgetting or not operating a control (18%), and reversal, 
unintentional activation or unable to reach (14%). Fitts and Jones (1961a) concluded that 
more than 5 0 % of the errors were related to a lack of uniformity in the location and 
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operation of controls. The errors in instrument reading (Fitts & Jones 1961b) consisted of 
misreading multi-revolution indicators (18%), reversal errors (17%), signal interpretation 
errors (14%), legibility errors (14%), substitution errors (13%), using inoperative 
instruments ( 9 % ) , and an assortment of other errors (15%). 
All but the inoperative instrument errors could have been easily attributed to pilot error. 
From this point a program of pilot training or maybe even discipline would have been 
likely. However Fitts and Jones took quite the opposite approach. 
Aircraft accidents usually are classified as due to pilot error, to materiel failure, to 
maintenance, or to supervision, with a large proportion of all accidents attributed to the 
"pilot error" category. It has been customary to assume that prevention of accidents due to 
materiel failure or poor maintenance is the responsibility of engineering personnel and that 
accidents due to errors of pilots or supervisory personnel are the responsibility of those in 
charge of selection, training and operations. The present study was undertaken from a 
different point of view; it proceeded on the assumption that a great many accidents result 
directly from the manner in which equipment is designed and where it is placed in the 
cockpit, and therefore can be eliminated by attention to human requirements in the design of 
equipment. (Fitts & Jones 1961a, p. 336, emphasis added) 
Based on military research into control design, Fitts and Jones made detailed explanations 
of the types of redesign that could minimise the types of errors that had been c o m m o n in 
the past. In general they suggested that uniformity of controls, and natural direction 
principles in the operation ofthe controls and instruments. 
Substitution errors can be reduced by: (1) uniform pattern arrangement of controls; (2) 
shape-coding of control knobs; (3) warning lights inside the appropriate feathering button; 
and (4) adequate separation of controls. (Fitts & Jones 1961a, p. 333) 
Reversal errors can be eliminated almost entirely by adherence to uniform and "natural" 
directions of control movement. (Fitts & Jones 1961 a, p. 333) 
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Further to their application of engineering solutions to human error problems Fitts and 
Jones debunked some myths about the distribution of errors among the inexperienced or 
accident prone. They found errors to be distributed across all age and experience groups. 
Practically all pilots of present-day Army Air Force aircraft, regardless of experience, or 
skill, report that they sometimes make errors in using cockpit controls. 
(Fitts & Jones 1961a, p. 333, emphasis added) 
Instrument-reading errors are not confined to any single class or group of pilots or to any 
particular experience level. (Fitts & Jones 1961b, p. 360, emphasis added) 
Fitts and Jones (1961a; 1961b) demonstrated that defining an accident as due to human 
error did not provide a reason to embark on training or attitude changing programs. Then-
research clearly showed that accidents as a result of human error can be reliably prevented 
by switching the focus back on to the design. Design can be used to prevent, and mitigate 
the effects of, predictable human errors. 
Nader (1965) placed similar attention for the prevention of road trauma firmly on the 
makers of the motor cars and in the following quote drew support from the Federal 
Highway Administrator of the time, w h o suggested that behaviour based programs have the 
unfortunate effect of discouraging more reliable methods of prevention. 
"Perhaps the time has come," Mr. Whitten said, "to examine some of our present safety 
programs and some of our present safety concepts. The truth, as I see it, may be painful.... 1 
am concerned about the great amount of energy being devoted to 'hardsell' efforts to reform 
the driver-to scare or shame him into being a better one. I believe we have exhausted the 
value of this continuing assault on human nature. And I have grave doubts that it works. 
In many cases haven't we given the driver a task beyond the capacity of his senses, nerves, 
and muscles? ... 
"WE must face up squarely to this premise: the majority of drivers and performing as well as 
we can reasonably expect, under existing conditions. From that premise it is logical to reason 
that the conditions must be changed-we must improve the road, the vehicle, and the basic 
control measures ofthe system." (Nader 1965, p. 293 drawing on Rex Whitten, US Federal 
Highway Administrator 1963, emphasis added) 
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... our attention is being distracted and our energy is being diverted from the essential things 
we could and should be doing to reduce the traffic accident toll. 
(Whitten, in Nader 1965, p. 293; emphasis added) 
The absence of any positive value of behaviour-based programs is only part ofthe problem. 
The continued promotion of the safe person approach hampers the strengthening and 
implementation of safe place measures. Rather than being motivated to implement a 
reliable safe place control, employers, employees, engineers, governments, and anyone 
else, could be excused for continuing to be exasperated by the apparant unwillingness of 
people to avoid injury. 
2.1.6 Summary: Problems with the Safe Person Approach 
The safe person strategy springs from the largely arbitrary classification of accidents as 
unsafe acts or unsafe condition, with a bias toward unsafe acts. The emphasis on unsafe 
acts has lead to campaigns focussing on either a dubious process of selecting-out accident 
prone people or on changing individual behaviour. While these m a y appear to address the 
problem, they make no actual change to the system and rely on the continuing active 
vigilance of those at risk. 
2.2 The Safe Place Approach 
The safe place approach relies on a different set of definitions and methodologies to the 
safe person approach. The safe place approach to prevention concedes that different human 
behaviour m a y have avoided accidents, but that attempting to encourage this type of 
appropriate behaviour to avoid further accidents is not as effective as improving the safety 
ofthe system itself. The safe place approach or the hazard management approach to the 
prevention of accident rests on a number of key models and theories. 
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2.2.1 Control at Source 
The concept behind the hierarchy of control is that the most effective means of hazard 
control is to target the hazard source. This concept is n o w a key feature of occupational 
health and safety legislation in Australia and in other countries. A s mentioned above, the 
United States' legislation from the early 70's indicated that workplaces should be free of 
hazards. More recent Australian legislation expresses the concept of control at source 
explicitly (especially the Western Australian, Victorian and South Australian legislation). 
The hierarchy of control stems from the study of occupational hygiene, where it became 
customaryto view the source of contamination as the hazard. The process was modelled as; 
hazard source -> pathway + receiver. Consequently it was realised that the most 
effective prevention was to place the attention for control firmly on the hazard source 
(Hamilton 1929). Hamilton, recognised as a pioneer figure in the establishment of the 
hygiene profession, made it clear that controlling the source of the problem was the only 
reliable way to preventing occupational diseases. Personal protection is usually near to the 
last resort as it does not address the problem source and its reliability has been shown to be 
poor. Personal protective equipment is also a lower order control as there is no 
supplemental control for this method; there can be no back up as it is the last line of 
defence. According to Hamilton protective equipment was suitable for emergency 
situations but not for every-day control. 
If this [mode of entrance into the body] is by way ofthe inspired air, the prevention of fumes 
and dust becomes the matter of first importance. Whatever money is available for factory 
hygiene must be expended first on mechanisms to prevent poisoning of the air... A mask 
carefully selected for the particular poison against which protection is needed, should be 
provided for emergency use, during short periods only, in all places where there is danger of 
fumes or dust, but to place one's trust in masks for the continual protection of men is simply to 
close one's eyes to unpleasantfacts. (Hamilton 1929, p. 538, emphasis added) 
These sentiments are now echoed by various legislation, such as the Swedish Work 
Environment Act 1977. 
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Personal protective equipment shall be used when adequate security from ill-health or 
accidents cannot be achieved by other means. 
(Work Environment Act 1977 (Sweden 1994), Ch. 2. S. 7) 
From the hazard source + pathway -^ receiver model arose a systematic approach to 
prevention known as the hierarchy of controls. Bloomfield (1936) and Brandt (1947) 
outlined the following hierarchies for the management of occupational hygiene. 
Early Hierarchies for the Prevention of Occupational Disease 
Bloomfield (1936) Brandt (1947) 
1. Substitution of a non-toxic material for the toxic one. 1. Eliminating the sources of contamination 
2. Isolation ofthe harmful process. or reducing the amount 
3. Wet methods in the case ofsome dusty processes. 2. Prevention of contaminant dispersion 
4. Exhaust ventilation. 3, Protecting the worker 
5. Respiratory protection. 
Table 2-2 Early Hierarchies for the Prevention of Occupational Diseases 
Bloomfield (1936) commented that the hierarchy is a general model for prevention rather 
than a fixed set of specific rules. 
No set rules may be established for the mechanical protection to be instituted in an attempt to 
control an industrial poison. Specific conditions encountered in a plant will determine the 
type of protection to be employed. In general there are five methods which may be attempted 
in the minimization of an industrialpoison... (Bloomfield 1936, p. 662) 
The concept of control at source has been often illustrated by models such as Figure 2-5 
and Figure 2-6. These are used to demonstrate more clearly the concept of the hazard 
source, pathway and receiver. The pictorial models illustrate that placing a control near to 
the source minimises the potential problem while barriers at the person are a last resort. 
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Di* 
Tank 
Figure 2-5 Source, Pathway, Receiver Model (from NSC 1971) 
mm 
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PRODUCTION PROCESS 
Figure 2-6 Conceptual Model ofthe Three Zones of Influence to Control 
Workplace Hazards (US DHHS NIOSH 1984) 
In the post-war period there was much comment about the relationship between the 
prevention of injury and established approaches in the area of occupational hygiene (for 
example; McFarland & Moore 1961; Suchman 1961). Around this time discussion began 
about the application of the hierarchy of control to injury prevention. 
The engineer should include in his planning and follow-though such measures as will attain 
one of the accident prevention goals listed as follows (in the order of effectiveness and 
preference): 
1. Elimination ofthe hazardfrom the machine, method, material, or plant structure. 
2. Guarding or otherwise minimising the hazard at its source if the hazard cannot be 
eliminated. 
3. Guarding the person ofthe operator through the use of personal protective equipment if 
the hazard cannot be eliminated or guarded at its source. 
(NationalSafety Council 1959, p. 4-2) 
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Nowadays the hierarchy of control is seen as a general approach to health and safety. This 
model is the central theme of a multitude of the state-based regulations and codes of 
practice throughout Australia. The hierarchy has been adopted by the National 
Occupational Health and Safety Commission in many standards and codes of practice such 
as those covering plant (NOHSC 1994b), manual handling and occupational overuse 
syndrome (NOHSC 1990a; 1990b; 1994a) and noise (NOHSC 1993a; 1993c) and recently 
by Standards Australia and Standards New Zealand in the draft standard Occupational 
Health and Safety Management Systems (SA/SNZ DR 96311 1996). 
There are many versions ofthe hierarchy such as those within the regulations and codes of 
practice above. Table 2-3, Table 2-4 and Table 2-5 show a historical account of various 
versions of the hierarchy of control (not including the many versions that now appear in 
documents such as those mentioned above). These tables show a variety in terminology 
and the number of points, however they show commonality of approach along the 
following lines and modelled on the process shown by Figure 2-7. 
1. Reducing the hazard source. 
2. Containingthe hazard source. 
3. Separation ofthe hazard and people (by barriers, distance, etcetera). 
4. Protecting the worker with PPE or relying on safe behaviour. 
5. Post-Event strategies 
PATH / A 
*-\ RECEIVER J 
Figure 2-7 Three Major Areas Where Hazards can be Controlled 
56 
I 
Oi 
to 
O 
o 
3 
o 
3* 
o' 
O 
< 
3 
XJ1 
3" 
o 
5 
era 
3 
o 
o 
o 
> 
•a 
•a 
-i 
o 
f> 
3* 
w 
rr 
o 
a 
O 
o_ 
c 
3 
3 
O 
3 
H 
a" 
•T3 
O 
3 
2, -• 
s * 
o 
•3 
» 
» 
5' 
a 
O 
o 
B 
S 
5 
a 
cn 
o 
e 
"i 
r> 
n 
so 8. 
_ 
•n o 
o 
B Ml 
o 
•*> 
O 
o s
3 
tn 
$ 
3 
3, 
2? 
Q. 
CJ' 
fi. 
H 
13 ~^ 
a" ^ 
e. tn 
_ £_ 
ere C 
o 
O 
f 
3 
FT 
tn 
S 5 
« 
v\ 
JO 
< 3 
2 
5 
VI 
X 
•a 
tn 
3 
^ I 
IS 
fi 
a. 
M 
3 
3' 
2 
P9 
• 
is 
•13 
m 
H 
1 
»1 
2 
0 
0. 
tn 
3 
3 
w §. 
:
-S 
3 
a. 
3 
JO 
0 
3 0 
< 
% 
O •.'• 
O 
•5' 
1 
t-
0 0 
_. 
< 
£0* 
^ 
0 
5-
0 
0-
VJ 
Vi 
0 
fi 
0' 
3 
m 3 
—1 
5| 
tn 
3 
5' 
fi 
on 
c 
cr 
Vi 
1 
0 
3-
_ 
13 
3 
0 
tn 
3 
5' 
fi-
re 
H 
on 
c 3-
1" 5' 
3 
fi o 
* 
'-' CD 
w o 
Os O 
3 
Si 
4- 2. 
H- B 
S" 
*- fid 
-* B 
i 5? 
Ul 
a 
o 
•- C/J 
06
 3 
3 I 
H 
8-
o 
o 
o 
o 
3" 
S' 
GO 
O 
< 
q 
H 
3 
n> 
GO 
3* 
O 
$ 
5' 
oo 
H 
3 
CD 
3 
CD 
O 
O 
3 
3 
o 
3_ 
>, 
•o 
— 
O 
3" 
3* 
O 
3 
5' 
O 
o O 
3 
n> 
H 
I: 
re 
O 
-+) 
"-a 
o 
•<J 
re 
B 
*C 
2 
o 
re 
**• 
o 
a 
CO 
re 
©° 
c 
•-1 
cn 
re 
•a 
_-
_ 
fc> 
o 
•t 
re" 
-
H 
3 p 
5] 
3' era 
tn 
o. 
c 
o p r--
5' 
3 
13 
13 
tn 
Rp 
5? J* on 
a-
KT H: <g 
i1 
fi - • ' 
o §. 
3 5 
JO 
ft 
o 
3 
00 
3 
« 3 
era 
s-
o 
§ 
5 
5> _* J° 3 
llff 
•=• ft 3 3 
03 03 
o 
3 
"' 
8 W 
§ 03 
a. ' 
2 
oo 
o 
c 
8 
03 ? 3
tn 
a. 
c 
oo 
3 
£ n> 
3 
H 
3 
era 
00 
c 
o 
rt 
to 
2 
_. 
O 
a. 
•? 
o o 3 
P 
O 
n 
o B 
et-
_. 
5' 3 
» 
B 
cn 
o B 
-1 
o 
re 
a 
E 
r> 
*^-
s* B 
~3 
O 
o 
B 
<« O 
n 
o 
3 #•* 
-; 
o 
o 
o 
3 
| 
R 
a. 
ff 
n 8 
n 
2 
o a. 
«? 
tn 3 
ro 
— 2? 
ff 
£_. n> 
rt 
13 
ft 
< rt
3 
tn 
3 
re 
— era
tn 
3 
O 
JO 
1 
o 
< 
a 
X 
R 
§. 
3 
o 
< 
m 
3 
rt 
00 
o 
* 
JO 
-a 
JJ 
< 
CD 3 
CO 
c 
13 
J5 
• < 
n 3 
m 3 
O 
a-3 
^ 
r 3' 
£^* 
tn 
3 
rt 
era 
>< 
00 
e 
cr 
tn 
3 
« 
3. 
s* *•* 
JO 
ft 
a. 
c 
o 
rt 
tn 
3 CD
— P9 
v 
tn 
3 
« 
*< 
tn 
3 
5 
p £». 
00 
e cr W5 
•a 
o 
tn 
3 
*n 
P 
o rt 
CD it 
2 
o 
& 
C 
o ft 
m 
3 
era. 
5' 
8 
ac 
R 
S. 
S 3 
K» TO 
TO 
re" 
O 
1 
_> EC 
^ & 
o 
a 
o o 
-a B* 
U> B 
O 
s 
S 2 
_. 
-J 
ON 
o* 
05 
•?" 
Q. 
fr 
r 
o & 
E 
* g 
ON 3 
3 
re 
-i 
H 
_. 
cr 
o" 
to 
ey> 
o 
o a3
o 
3" 
S" 
oo 
O 
< ct 
H 
3' 
00 
3 
O | 
3' 
OQ H
3" o 
1 
> 
3^ 
0Q 
3 
3 
a 
& 
o 
3 3 
o 3 
•3 
O 
g 
to 
3" 
O 
3 
5' 
O 
o_ 
E~ 
3 
3 
O 
3 
CD 
H 
cr 
cT UJ 
o 
••h 
OJ 
o 
i 
M 
< 
re 
s 
**• 
# 
H 
o 
P £E 
a 
• 
D 
CO 
O 
o 3 
3 
Behavi 
Prote
c
 
g E 
B -t 
o 
j ~ 
re i 
• : :
:l
 :
 :
 ::
:!;:;: :; ; 
po 00 
rt 3 
O CD 
-H' 3 
3 . era 
a ft 
3 
• • 
13 <i H 
3 fi 3 
5' 3 
era oo 
" R> 
• 
c/a 
9 
3 
1 
ft 
3 
H 
ft 
£ 
• • 
2 fi. 
tn g_ 
ct' 
5! 
c 
3 
tn 
3 
ft 
era 
•< 
• • 
~o 5? 
tn 9, 
7? oo
>< C« 
ft 
3 
C/5 
• • 
"0 <; H 
S e 3 
tn | fi 3' 5 
era era 
H 
on 
• " 1 • 
73 
CL 
ct 
"0 
S 
CD 
3 
H 
§' 
ft 
cn 
re 
TS 
3 
1 
3 
5' 
B 
' • •
 ;
: -
2 
o 
o. 
«? 
tn 
3.i:» 
: :Ct :::;::: 
v;
• 
o 3 " 
§ 
ere 
ct 
tn 3 ct 
do 
• 
oo 
ct 
•o 
fi 
P 
ft 
S' oo 13 
P 
Q 
ft 
• 
9 
n 
5' 
00 
* 
E1 3 
ft 
S3 
03 
1. 
• 
jo O 
rt o 
O. 3 
3 5 
g. 3 
3 o. 
JO 
ct 
ft" 
g 
fit 
70 
cr 
„ 
ct 
oo 
o 
c 
S rt 
n 
o 
8 
3 5' 
3 
• 
IE 
R 
fi 
o. 
O 
o 
3 
• 
H 
rt o 
3" 
3 o_ 
o* 
00 
<< 
• 
13 
JJ 
< ft 
3 
tn 3 
ft 
«1 
• 
13 
< 
ct 
3 
03 
SI 
c 
-Ci_ 
• 
tn 
3 
cra_ 
3' 
ct 
ct 
3 
era 
S 
> 
o 
o 
3 
to 
o" 
3 
• 
CO 
to 
> 
FT 
3 to 
<* 
ct> 
?o 
o 
o 
o 
5 
%? 
• 
IT-
s 
CD 
•n 
00 
• 
JO 
ct 
a. 
3 
O 
ft 
• 
OO 
cr 
VI 
c 
Ft 
cn 
o 
E 
1 
re 
re 
JO 
CL 
E 
re 
©' 
B 
• 
3C 
i 
fi 
I 
tn 
ct 
—I 
00 
* 
tn 
5° 
o 
R 
fi 
6: 
• 
tfl 
§' 
to 
m 
• 
3 
fi 
ct 
• 
tn 
3_ 
co 
• 
tn 
3 
5" 
p 
ft 
—; 
R 
fi 
a. 
oo t-
^ 
*© 
VO 
>
~
1 
v© 
SO 
v© 
4-
Focu
s
 o
 
n 
o 
B 
< 
5 
re 
0 
3 
5" 
TO B" 
re 
"l 
cn p*. 
re 
T3 
B" 
re 
B 
V) 
O 
B 
E 
3 
"1 
3 
uo 
2? 
B 
TO 
C 
3 
B; 
33 
cn 
PJ 
2 
3 
re n 
£" : 
3 
2.2.2 Defining the Hazard Source: Energy Barrier Models 
As discussed above, the hierarchy of control owes its history to the studies of occupational 
hygiene. Often in occupational disease the source ofthe problem, a contaminant of some 
kind, was easy to conceptualise. The broadening ofthe hierarchy into the field of accident 
prevention was stifled because the source ofthe injury was unclear. The notion of unsafe 
acts and unsafe conditions made application of the hierarchy concept difficult as the 
classification according to these terms is largely arbitrary. A s an alternative way of 
thinking, many of the hierarchies mentioned above refer to eliminating energy as the 
priority. Since the 1960's there has also been growing interest in modelling the hazard 
source as a source of energy. The descriptions of the injury process based on the energy 
principle by Gibson (1961) and Haddon (1963) are markers in this development. 
... injuries to a living organism can be produced only by some energy interchange. 
(Gibson 1961, p. 79) 
...all injuries are causally in one of two groups, either, 'interference with whole body or local 
energy exchange'or 'delivery to the body of amounts of energy in excess ofthe corresponding 
local or whole body injury thresholds. (Haddon 1963, p. 636) 
These definitions made application of the hierarchy concept somewhat easier as hazards 
could be thought of in terms of a physical energy. The hygiene model oi hazard source •> 
pathway ^ receiver could be neatly applied to the study of injury. Haddon applied the 
concept of energy damage to the hierarchical based model of prevention and developed the 
following version ofthe hierarchy of control. 
1. Prevent marshalling of energy 
2. Prevent or modify the release of energy 
3. Remove the m a n from the vicinity of the energy 
4. Impose a barrier 
(Haddon 1963) 
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The energy approach to accident analysis has since been popularised particularly by 
Johnson (1973; 1980) in the text, The Management Oversight and Risk Tree ( M O R T ) . 
Johnson (1973) embedded the energy transfer concept within the accident analysis and risk 
modelling of the M O R T tool, a technique developed for the U S Atomic Energy 
Commission. H e defined an accident in the following way. 
The accident definition which evolves is: 
1. An unwanted transfer of energy, 
2. Because of lack of barriers and/or controls. 
3. Producing injury to persons, property or process, 
4. Preceded by sequences of planning and operational errors, which: 
a. Failed to adjust to changes in physical or human factors, 
b. And produced unsafe conditions and/or unsafe acts, 
5. Arising out ofthe risk in an activity, 
6. And interrupting or degrading the activity. (Johnson 1973, p. 25, original emphasis) 
Johnson reinforced the energy barrier idea as a way of conceptualising methods of accident 
prevention, and introduced the energy trace as a method of system and accident analysis. 
The model emphasised the identification of energy sources by way of energy trace analysis 
and energy barrier analysis. Johnson's use of energy trace has since been cited by many 
authors in the area of safety (for example; Rahimi 1986; Ferry 1990; Stephenson 1991; 
Harms-Ringdahl 1993; Vincoli 1993). The process of injury and also the definition of 
hazard has often expressed in terms of energy. 
Control and guard all energy, and the environment will be right for people to work safely. 
(Aitkenl973,p. 7) 
Accident: An unwanted energy transfer (an incident) causing property damage and/or human 
injury. (Energy Research and Development Administration 1977, p. vi) 
In abstract terms we should only consider the results of damaging energy exchange and 
provide countermeasures,preferablypassive, to control the magnitude of this. 
(Emerson 1985, p. 25) 
61 
Let us begin by defining "accident" as an event involving an unwanted transfer of energy. 
Energy produces injury and damage unless there are adequate controls or barriers. 
(Ferry 1990, p. 239) 
An accident is defined as occurring when this unwanted flow of energy, in the absence of 
adequate barriers, strikes targets in the energy path and injures people and/or damages 
property. (Stephenson 1991, p. 147) 
...an incident is defined as an unwanted flow of energy resultingfrom inadequate barriers or 
having failure without consequence. An accident is further defined as an unwanted flow of 
energy or an environmental condition that results in adverse consequences. 
(Vincolil993,p.l01) 
Hazard—a source of potentially damaging energy or a situation that may give rise to personal 
injury or disease. (StandardsAustralia 1996, p. 9) 
Thus the energy terminology has become reasonably common in the descriptions of the 
accident/injury process. Similarly the defintion of hazard as the source in the pictorial 
model ofthe hazard source •* pathway -^ receiver model been outlined by several writers 
(for example; Figure 2-8; Figure 2-9; Figure 2-10). 
ERROR ACCIDENT 
HAZARD 
" potentially damaging energy" 
INJURY 
Figure 2-8 Injury Causation Model (Adapted from Wigglesworth 1972) 
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Figure 2-9 Extended Energy Damage Model (Viner 1982) 
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Figure 2-10 Generalized Occupational Exposure 
(Office of Technology Assessment 1985) 
A n injury was thought to result from an escape or loss of control of a hazard, transfer of 
this energy to a recipient, and lastly injury to the recipient. The modelling in this way 
provided a sense of scientific rigour in contrast to the subjectivity of the unsafe act / unsafe 
condition model. The Energy Research and Development Administration (1977) outlined 
the following process for the systematic assessment of risk. 
/. All energy sources must be controlled 
2. All potential targets of uncontrolled energy release must be identified for each energy 
source. 
3. All control mechanisms and barriers to energy release must be identified for each energy 
source. 
4. An analysis must be performed in each case to determine failure modes and effects, in 
order to identify the residual risks. (ERDA 1977, p. 3) 
While Kjellen and Sklet (1995) point out that the use of energy analysis can bias hazard 
identification toward accidents with large consequences and well-defined energy sources, 
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they recognised that the methodology is a useful broad identification tool especially given 
the clear link to hazard controls. 
There is now considerable support for energy damage as fundamental to the study of 
accidents and injury. In general, the process of injury has been described as beginning with 
the existence of an amount of energy that could cause harm, hence the term; potentially 
damaging energy (for example; Waller & Klein 1973; Wigglesworth 1984; Viner 1991). 
An accident then consisted of a release or loss of control of this energy (Aitken 1973; 
Hoyos & Zimolong 1988; Viner 1991). The loss of control of potentially damaging energy, 
may then lead to injury via a transfer, or exchange of energy with humans (Gibson 1961; 
Haddon 1963; Bird & Loftus 1976b; McFarland 1973; Viner 1982; 1991; Wigglesworth 
1984; Waller 1987; Ferry 1988; Thygerson 1992; Harms-Ringdahl 1993; Vincoli 1993). 
This separated the notion ofthe accident, or damaging energy release, and the interaction of 
that energy with humans. The exchange of energy, however, does not automatically 
imply injury, as many authors have pointed out, the exchange of energy only results in 
injury if it exceeds the human threshold of energy exchange (Gibson 1961; Haddon 1963; 
McFarland 1973; Viner 1982; 1991; Wigglesworth 1984; Emerson 1985; Ferry 1988) or 
interferes with whole body energy systems, as in the case of suffocation (Haddon 1963; 
Bird & Loftus 1976b; Wigglesworth 1984). 
In summary the overall valuable points taken from the energy damage models are that they; 
1. Show the process (energy source •_• pathway -^ receiver). 
2. Highlight ways to manage the process (energy controls, path controls, PPE) 
3. Highlight the problem source rather than the person. 
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2.2.3 Ergonomics and the Study of Work 
Ergonomics is a science which developed from the need to understand the physiological, 
psychological and social needs of operators during the process of designing work 
environments.... The word ergonomics, first used in 1949, is derived from two Greek words, 
ergon meaning work, and nomos meaning natural laws. Thus, ergonomics means the natural 
laws relating to work. (Standards Australia SAA HB59—1994, p. 5) 
Ergonomics, or human factors, is the study of the interaction of people, with their 
surroundings and equipment. The importance of considering the capabilities of people in 
design is emphasised by many regulatory documents such as the Swedish Work 
Environment Act and the N e w South Wales Occupational Health and Safety Act. 
Working conditions shall be adapted to people's differingphysical and mental aptitudes. 
(Work Environment Act 1994 (original 1977) (Sweden) ch.2.s. 1) 
The objects of this Act are: to promote an occupational environment for persons at work 
which is adapted to their physiological and psychological needs 
(OccupationalHealth and Safety Act 1983 (NSW) s.5.(l)(c)) 
Fashioning tools to human needs is age old, however in terms ofthe scientific application 
of ergonomics to work methods, the work of Taylor (1911) and Gilbreth (1911) are 
significant markers. Taylor and Gilbreth were primarily interested in the improvement of 
manual work, probably because that was the main type of work at the time. 
Taylor began work as a labourer and developed an interest in work methods while working 
in a steel company in the late 1800's. The terms Scientific Management, Taylorism, and 
Time Study resulted from Taylor's development of systematic work analysis, improvement 
and organisation. As a management model, Taylorism now seems to be out of favour and 
discussion of why this is so might be interesting but probably belongs elsewhere. The 
relevant aspect of Taylor's work are the studies of manual handling. Although he didn't 
use physiological terms like static muscle work, his investigations centred on this type of 
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theory. Much of Taylor's early work was about manual work efficiency. Aside from an 
over-emphasis on the selection of workers, Taylor embodied the principles of ergonomics 
with the attention he gave to matching work to the physical capabilities of humans. Taylor 
also worked in non-manual handling areas such as the study of efficient metal machining. 
Gilbreth (1911), whose work became known as Motion Study, also aimed toward the 
improvement of manual work productivity. Gilbreth showed that improvements in the 
motions of work could be vastly improved; often many movements could be eliminated. 
Gilbreth's writing embodied the ergonomic model more clearly than Taylor's. The 
improvement of work according to Gilbreth involved considering; 
1. the worker; 
2. the surroundings,equipment, and tools; and 
3. the motions. 
A careful study ofthe anatomy ofthe worker will enable one to adapt his work, surroundings, 
equipment, and tools to him. (Gilbreth 1911, p. 10) 
For example; the improvement of bricklaying involved modifying the trowel, raising the 
height of the mortar box, raising the height of the brick tray, developing a brick stacking 
and delivery system so that the bricks were the right way round, and so on. Gilbreth 
employed the now popular notion of best practice to describe the first step in motion study. 
There are three stages to this study: 
1. Discoveringandclassifyingthe bestpractice. 
2. Deducing the laws. 
3. Applying the laws to standardize practice, either for the purpose of increasing output or 
decreasing hours or labor, or both. (Gilbreth 1911, p. v., emphasis added) 
In summary, while Taylor's name might be out of vogue by association with a management 
style of the past, Taylor and Gilbreth made important contributions by showing how 
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improvements were possible by considering the human-equipment-environment 
relationship. They drew attention to the possibility of improving work though 
understanding human abilities and designing the environment and tools to suit. 
Later, during World War II, ergonomics as a discipline was formalised when it became 
recognised that psychology had an important role in engineering design. Psychologists 
assisted engineers in the design of miliary equipment to improve operations such as gun, 
radar and aircraft control (Stevens 1946; Fitts 1947; Kappauf 1947; Taylor 1947; Chapanis, 
Garner & Morgan 1949). One of the simplest examples was the redesign of aircraft 
insignia to distinguish U S aircraft from Japanese aircraft to reduce the incidence of 
incorrect anti-aircraft fire. Similarly, McFarland and Moore (1961) pointed out the gains to 
be made using ergonomics in the design of aircraft controls. 
Confusion has arisen when the controls for operating the flaps and landing gear are located 
too close together or reversedin someplanes. In one 22-month period during World-War II 
inattentive manipulation or mistaken identity caused 547 accidents in one of the services. 
(McFarland& Moore 1961, p. 36, emphasis added) 
The emphasis for the role of psychology was changed from one of trying to change the 
person to fit the job, or maybe even select a suitable person for the job, to one of providing 
assistance to engineers to integrate human factors into the design. 
The designing of all forms of equipment is generally considered to be a purely engineering 
function. But most of the tremendous variety of articles designed by engineers, be they 
industrial machinery, household appliances or children's toys, are intended for use or 
operation by human beings. It is apparent that the utility or success of such equipment must 
be, at least in part, dependent upon the degree to which it is suited to the psychological 
characteristicsofthe human beings who must use it. (Fitts 1947, p. 93, emphasis added) 
The main message arising from the study of psychology in the military was '...the art or 
gearing machines to the minds and muscles of men...' (Stevens 1946, p. 390). Aside from 
Taylor and Gilbreth's work, designing for humans represented a reversal of approach. For 
> 
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instance in 1932, Viteles devoted around 200 pages ofthe text Industrial Psychology, to a 
section headed Fitting the Worker to the Job; the very anti-thesis of modern ergonomics. 
The fitting of people to tasks required an understanding of physiology and psychology. A 
great deal of psychological data about equipment controls was collected during the war, 
while long before this time Galton (1889) collected and collated some of the first 
anthropometric data such as weight, height, strength, arm span, and so on. 
From the military studies the concept of the person-machine, or ergonomic system was 
created. The experience gained in the wartime studies lead researchers of that time to 
develop the ideas into pictorial information-flow models (Figure 2-11). Birmingham and 
Taylor's (1961) model presented in 1954 showed the role that people play in the operation 
of machinery in monitoring and controlling the machine. Later, Taylor (1957) and 
Grandjean (1982, original 1963), Meister (1971) and Singleton (1972) simplified the model 
by including diagrams to better illustrate the flow of information. 
Chapanis (1965), and more recently Hammond (1978) went beyond the man-machine 
interface to include the environment factor, however their models indicated that the main 
interaction is between the person and the equipment. The working environment seemed to 
have a passive influence. Sometimes it seems convenient to include the environment as 
something that must be part of the interaction. For instance, in the road system, it's 
probably more convenient to think of road signs as environmental features rather than 
equipment features. McCormick( 1970, p. 5) indicated that the model of ergonomics should 
emphasise interaction with the environment, and so should be known as; '...man-machine-
environment systems, since we shall be primarily concerned with systems that are a 
combination of people and machines and the environments in which they function'. Thus 
the three factors of person, equipment and environment are now often represented to show 
the interaction between these three elements (Kuhlmann 1986; Figure 2-11). 
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Ergonomic System Models 
MAN 
IMPUT OUTPUT 
Machine 
Display instrument 
Control instrument 
Figure 2-11 Ergonomic System Models 
Clockwise from Top Left: Birmingham & Taylor (1961, original 1954); Taylor (1957); Chapanis (1965); 
Kuhlmann (1986); Hammond (1978); (Grandjean 1982, original 1963) 
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In summary, the study of ergonomics has shown the importance of the interaction of 
system elements. It is not only good human skills, good equipment, and good environment 
conditions or systems that are important for good design, it is the quality of the interaction 
between these elements. Furthermore it is recognised that the most reliably adapted 
components are the environment and equipment. The essence of ergonomics is '...fitting a 
job to a man' (Kappauf 1947, p. 85), or nowadays perhaps; fitting the job to the person. 
This represents a different way of approaching the study of hazard control compared with 
the unsafe acts/unsafe conditions model. Finally, Gary Larson captured the importance of 
good ergonomic design (Figure 2-12). 
Fumbling for his recline button, 
Ted unwittingly instigates a disaster. 
Figure 2-12 How Poor Design Contributes to 
H u m a n Error (Larson 1992) 
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2.2.4 Safe Place: Consolidated Concepts 
2.2.4.1 A Commonality of Approach 
The concept of a hierarchy of control is now common and bears a strong relationship to the 
control-at-sourcemodels, emphasising elimination of the hazard, or passive hazard control, 
as a preference over measures relying on appropriate hazard-avoidancebehaviour. 
Identifying the hazard source is obviously important when using the hierarchy. In 
occupational hygiene the hazard has often been easy to conceptualise, however in the area 
of injury it has not been so clear. Nowadays the definition of hazard seems to fall into two 
main categories; the potential to cause injury or illness and the energy-based definitions. 
Whether the hazard is defined in terms ofthe energy approach or some other way, the main 
intention of control at source is made clear by the hierarchical approach. 
Table 2-3, Table 2-4 and Table 2-5 (pp. 57-59) show the relationship between the 
hierarchies and the following model. 
1. Modifying the hazard source 
2. Containing the hazard source 
3. Separating the hazard from the person 
4. Relying on personal protection and behaviour 
5. Post-event measures 
While categorising a particular type of control is difficult, the agreement about a general 
approach to prevention is evident. The ideal safe place control is complete elimination. In 
contrast low-order controls are often known as safe person controls; that is; the person is 
encouraged to be safe in a poor environment. In summary, the United States Congress, 
Office of Technology Assessment (1985) said that 'Put simply, the principle of the 
hierarchy of controls is to control the hazard as close to the source as possible'. 
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2.2.4.2 Integrating Ergonomics and the Hazard, Path, Receiver Model 
The hierarchy of control is very much a result ofthe linear source •*• pathway •*• receiver 
model. Similarly the ergonomic approach has been a significant influence in the 
development of the understanding of reliable ways of preventing accidents. It seems then 
logical to combine these two models. 
In the model of source •* pathway •> receiver, a symbol is sometimes drawn around the 
hazard source to indicate the means of hazard control. If the control is to be reliable then it 
must employ the ergonomic methodology. Wigglesworth's (1972) model (Figure 2-8) 
showed how the concept of human error related to the common linear model and went 
some way to integrating some ofthe ergonomic methodology. 
Later, Kjellen and Larsson (1981) described the energy damage process as consisting ofthe 
initiatory, concluding and injury phase. These three elements were thought to occur against 
a background of a system that could contribute to accidents by way of deviations in; 
material; labour; information; man/machine system; intersecting or parallel activities; and 
the surrounding environment. Their modelling therefore emphasised the role of 
ergonomics in building a safe system in order to maintain hazard (energy) control. 
Taken a step further, the classic person-equipment-environmentergonomic model can be 
combined with the traditional hazard source ^ pathway "^ receiver model to show more 
clearly the relationship ofthe ergonomic elements in the action of control (Figure 2-13). 
The model shows the ergonomic relationship between people, equipment and the 
environment that contributes to hazard control systems, while showing that these elements 
also represent the exposures to the hazard. The hazard in this model could be described as a 
potentially damaging energy or in general terms such as the potential to cause harm. 
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Figure 2-13 Ergonomic Hazard Management 
While the linear models could be seen to give equal emphasis to the importance of controls 
at the person and controls at the hazard, this model centralises the issue ofthe hazard. The 
importance of control at source is therefore made more apparent. Furthermore this model 
shows that damage as a result of an accident can be to people, equipment, or to the 
environment. The environment is intended to mean the physical and organisational 
working environments as well as the natural environment which may also be at risk of 
exposure. The model shows that hazard management is dependent on the relationships 
between the human elements, equipment and environment features. 
Methodologies for minimising risk then follow the familiar hierarchy of control; minimising 
the hazard source; minimising the exposures and maximising the integrity of the hazard 
control system (considering the role of human, equipment & environment factors). 
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2.2.4.3 Intrinsic Safety, Passive Safety, and the Two-Dimensional Hierarchy 
Passive safety measures ...do not require anything ofthe person; they do not depend on 
human memory or constant human care. (Kalin 1994, p. 25) 
The top-order hierarchy of control measures revolve around the concept of making a safe 
environment. These safe place strategies are seen by m a n y as the most effective form of 
accident prevention and their success depends on two factors; the degree of reduction of 
exposure to the hazard source, and the degree to which control over the hazard source is 
passive, ergonomic, and intrinsically safe. Intrinsic safe design, or passive 
countermeasures, do not rely heavily on active involvement or the continuous attention of 
potential victims for safety. The case for the importance of passive safety has been argued 
in the areas of automobile safety (Nader 1965), occupational health and safety (The 
Committee on Safety and Health at W o r k 1970), and public health (Wigglesworth 1978). 
The seat belt should have been introduced in the twenties and rendered obsolete by the early 
fifties, for it is only the first step toward a more rational passenger restraint system which 
modern technology could develop and perfect for mass production. Such a system ideally 
would not rely on the active participation of the passenger to take effect; it would be the 
superior passive safety design which would come into use only when needed, and without 
active participation ofthe occupant. ... Protection like this could be achieved by a kind of 
inflatable air bag restraint which would be actuated to envelop a passenger before a crash. 
Such a system has been recently experimented with for airplane passenger protection. Both 
General Motors and Ford did work on a system like this about 1958 but dropped the inquiry 
and now refuse even to communicate with outside scientists and engineers interested in this 
approach to injury prevention. There are a number of general energy-absorptionsystems that 
engineering ingenuity could devise to operate whether inside or outside the vehicle. 
(Nader 1965, p. 124) 
...the first step in the promotion of safety and health at work is to ensure, so far as may be 
practicable, that plant, machinery, equipment and materials are so designed and constructed 
as to be intrinsically safe in use. 
(The Committee on Safety and Health at Work 1970, p. 111, emphasis added) 
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The consensus that passive countermeasures (i.e., those that are independent of human 
behaviour) are more likely to be successful than those that are active (i.e., those that require 
some component of human behaviour for their success) follows a basic principle of public 
health in that countermeasures apply to persons at risk without their active involvement. 
(Wigglesworth 1978, p. 793). 
If the minimisation of risk is by a combination of hazard exposure and the creation of an 
intrinsically safe, passive, or ergonomic hazard control, then the hierarchy can be thought 
of as a two-dimensional construct. Within this one could argue that the minimisation of 
hazards and the minimisation of exposure represents two variables. However by 
eliminating the hazard so too do w e effectively eliminate exposure to that hazard. Likewise 
by eliminating exposure w e effectively eliminate the possible impact of the hazard. 
Conceptually, exposure can be considered to represent a unit person, being exposed at unit 
proximity to a unit hazard. W e can say then that the safe place concept is composed not of 
a one dimensional variable along the continuum of controlling the problem at the source to 
controlling it at the person, but a two dimensional variable. The two dimensions are those 
of exposure and that of integrity of control (ergonomics). 
Stephenson (1991) referred to a draft US Army document Facility System Safety Manual, 
that modelled risk controls in a matrix format (Table 2-6). 
Hazard Control Mechanism 
Hazard Control I. Design II. Passive III. Active Safety IV. Warning 
Safety Device Device Device 
A. Eliminate Energy Source 
B. Limit Energy Accumulated 
C. Prevent Release 
D. Provide Barriers 
E. Change Release Patterns 
F. Minimize/Treat Harm 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
3 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
Table 2-6 Control Rating Code (CRC) Matrix (from US Army Facility System Safety Manual in Stephenson 1991) 
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A score of one indicated the best control (for example eliminating the energy source 
through design) while a score of four indicated the least desirable control (for example 
minimising or treating damage through a behavioural mode of action). This matrix showed 
the two dimensional nature ofthe hierarchy of control. This concept can be perhaps more 
effectively represented by the following model (Figure 2-14). 
Figure 2-14 Safe Place Matrix 
The Safe Place Matrix (Figure 2-14) represents the relationship between safe place and safe 
person control measures in terms of hazard reduction and control. The link between safe 
place and safe person is a continuum based on the following. 
1. A reduction in hazard exposure (by hazard reduction or exposure reduction). 
2. Improvementsto the ergonomics ofthe hazard control (enhancing passive control). 
An ideal safe place control is one that eliminates the hazard and maintains this elimination 
by passive means, whereas a safe person control is one that leaves the hazard in place and 
control the hazard by way of active involvement of people (normally the potential victims). 
The banding on the model indicates levels within the safe place to safe person continuum. 
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2.2.4.4 T h e Hierarchy: A Problem Solving Tool 
Leading to the discussion in the following chapter (creative thinking), one would hope that 
the hierarchy of control serves as a productive thinking tool. Whether employing the 
c o m m o n one-dimensional list-based hierarchy or the two-dimensional construct suggested 
above, one would hope that the outcome would be better solutions. The hierarchy ideally 
plays an active role, guiding the thinking first toward the higher order controls. This is 
important in that the hierarchy should assist the development of good solutions. 
Alternatively the hierarchy can be used to classify one solution against another. In this way 
the system is simply a set of boxes to put controls in after they've been developed. This 
m a y have some advantage in comparing the controls but the disadvantage of using the 
hierarchy in this way is that there is potential to become very confused as it often seems 
that one solution belongs in many categories. 
The relationship between the hierarchy of control and the methodologies for creative 
thinking are very strong. A key to creative thinking is to escape from assumptions that 
have become dominant though experience. The hierarchy of control is a specific 
application of these techniques to accident prevention. B y its nature the first step of 
eliminating the hazard is a challenge to the current situation; it implies that some hazard put 
in place probably for some very justifiable reason should be eliminated. As Laflamrne 
(1990) noted, the important features of accident models is that they direct preventative 
thinking toward transforming the system (macroscopic thinking) rather than focussing on 
microscopic issues with the current system such as the behaviour of people. 
In fact, prevention could find its source in the man-machine system, at a microscopic level, but 
also in eventual corrections and transformations ofthe general conditions prevailing in the 
workplace. (Laflamrne 1990, p. 159) 
Stepping back from the microscopic level of analysis and considering workplace 
transformations implies an approach sought when encouraging a creative style of thinking. 
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The parallels to creative thinking are thus very strong. The main links are that the 
hierarchy provides a challenge to current assumptions and that the hierarchy's key function 
is to act as a thinking directing tool, positively affecting the outcome. 
2.3 Accident Prevention Summary 
From early this century, accidents have been seen mainly to be a result of either unsafe acts 
or unsafe conditions. This way of thinking was an extension of the dichotomy of 
machinery and non-machinery accidents that was a relevant way of thinking about 
accidents in the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century. 
From a premise that accidents were the result of either unsafe acts or unsafe conditions, the 
work of Heinrich in the 193 0' s embedded a psyche that the primary cause of accidents were 
the unsafe acts of people. In popular culture and in many scientific circles, this model 
continues to be accepted and promoted. However popular the model remains, there is a 
growing core of opinion that the unsafe acts and unsafe conditions model has little validity, 
is easily manipulated, and unfortunately has the tendency to lead to ineffective accident 
prevention measures. 
Any accident can be explained as due to either unsafe acts or unsafe conditions; thus the 
attribution to one or the other is largely arbitrary and depends on the investigator's bias. 
The investigator is likely to be affected by a general belief about the pre-eminent role of 
people in accident causation; thus the model becomes self perpetuating. The model 
invariably assigns the cause of accidents the bad behaviour of people (often victims) and 
therefore typical prevention measures aim at altering the attitude and behaviour of people. 
Escaping from this trap demands a new model. The unsafe acts and unsafe conditions 
model is widely criticised due to the imprecision involved in making a decision between 
these two options. Given the difficulty of assigning a cause of an accident as either an 
unsafe act or unsafe condition, this way of thinking would seem to be of little use. 
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Legislation n o w universally adopts the model of focussing on the hazard source. Rather 
than identifying unsafe acts and unsafe conditions, these laws require a focus on hazards. 
The hazard source concept is one that arises most directly from the study of occupational 
diseases. Often the source ofthe problem was readily identified as a contaminant (such as 
an airborne chemical or dust). The study of occupational diseases was then modelled as 
being composed of hazard source -* pathway •*• receiver. The priority for effective 
prevention was then control at source. 
The now familiar hierarchy of control model emerged from this way of thinking and 
eventually became a standard methodology for understanding accidents and prevention. A 
useful concept that facilitated the application the model to the study of traumatic injuries 
was the defintion of energy sources as the primary source of hazard. This conceptualisation 
has now become reasonably popular and has provided a more rigorous approach to the 
analysis of risk. However the energy-based approaches are not universally used, hazards 
often being defined simply, as the potential to do harm, or similar. There is yet to be a fix 
on a standard set of definitions, although the model of hazard source •> pathway ^ 
receiver is established. 
The safe place concept revolves around two main themes. Firstly the reduction of 
exposure to a hazard. Exposure to the hazard takes in the concept ofthe hazard itself and 
the exposed groups; thus the exposure can be reduced by focussing on either element; by 
reduction or substitution of the hazard itself or by rearranging the way work is done so that 
the groups at risk are exposed to a lesser degree. The second concept is that of control over 
the hazard and how the integrity ofthe system is maintained. The core concept here is that 
of the primacy of passive controls; those controls that place little reliance on human 
vigilance for its success. Achieving these controls implies a good understanding of 
ergonomics in design. In summary then the following points describe the models of 
thinking that would be important in engineer's application of contemporary approach to the 
prevention of injury. 
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• Accidents are plannable, predictable and controllable. 
• Accidents are best prevented by the safe place approach. 
• The hierarchy of control is a tool to guide hazard controls toward safe place controls. 
• The hierarchy of control is a list of general control ideas ranging from controls that 
focus on the hazard source to controls that focus on those people at risk. 
• The hierarchy of control draws its beginnings from the study of occupational hygiene 
where the hazard source ^pathway ^ receiver model was employed. 
• The hazard source + pathway ^ receiver was generalised to the problem of injures 
especially through the energy approach. 
• The hierarchy of control can be conceptualised as a two-dimensional construct 
composed ofthe minimisation of exposure and the maximisation ofthe integrity ofthe 
control considering the ergonomics of that mechanism. 
• The hierarchy of control is a problem-solving methodology that shares strong parallels 
with general creative thinking tools. 
• The hierarchy of control encourages a re-examination ofthe current work system. 
• The same solution can be suggested more than one in the hierarchy of control as the 
hierarchy is for the development of solutions rather than their categorisation. 
• The development of multiple solutions allows a greater choice of action and also may be 
important given the potential for the staged implementation of controls. 
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Chapter Three 
Creative Thinking 
3. Creative Thinking 
3.1 Creative Moments 
Create: 
1. to bring in to being; cause to exist; produce 
2. to evolve from one's own thought or imagination 
3. to be the first to represent (apart or role) 
4. to make by investing with new character or functions; constitute; appoint 
5. to be the cause or occasion of; give rise to 
6. to be engaged, often ostentatiously, in creating something, as a work of art. 
(The Macquarie Dictionary 1985) 
There are many well-known stories describing great moments of things coming into being 
in the midst of original thought and imagination. 
Archimedes is said to have leapt from the public bath and run down the streets of Syracuse 
shouting Eureka!, meaning, I've found it! Archimedes observed that as he immersed 
himself in the water the level rose. Archimedes realised this would be a good way to 
measure the volume of metal in a complicated crown so that he could then determine if the 
crown was entirely gold or a mixture of gold and another metal. 
Darwin's theory of selection became clear to him while relaxing reading a paper for his 
o w n entertainment about population growth. 
Watt is supposed to have observed a kettle lid bouncing away under the pressure of the 
steam and transferred the concept to a larger system; the steam engine. 
Pythagoras discovered a basic principle of physics, not in a laboratory, but when passing a 
blacksmith's shop and noting that rods of iron being hammered gave off varying sounds 
according to their length. 
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Alexander Fleming happened across penicillin by observing mould on a culture plate. 
French mathematician, Henri Poincare, found the concepts of mathematical functions 
called Fuscian functions bouncing around in his head while unable to sleep after drinking 
coffee and then later while taking a bus trip to the beach. 
Mozart claimed that he did not know from where his musical ideas came. They appeared 
in his mind while daydreaming, when relaxed and in good spirits. 
In 1885 Rontgen noticed by chance that a paper screen covered in barium platinocyanide 
became fluorescent while a cathode ray tube was operating inside a black cardboard box. 
At the time it was thought no radiation could penetrate this box. Rontgen soon discovered 
that these X rays could also penetrate human flesh and reveal an outline ofthe skeleton. 
In 1821 Faraday invented the electric motor and made a working model, however the 
invention attracted little interest. Ten years later Faraday invented the dynamo which 
became very popular for generating electricity from steam engines. The electric motor was 
ignored until 1873 when a technician mistakenly connected a second dynamo to one 
already being driven by a steam engine. The second dynamo sprung into life and the 
electric motor was reborn; fifty years after its invention! In hindsight it was obvious that the 
motor was the reverse ofthe dynamo but beforehand it was not, even to the inventor! 
For a century after vaccination (arising from vacca meaning cow owing to the connection 
with cow-pox) to immunise against small-pox became common, it had not been realised 
that the same principle could be applied more widely. In 1879, Pasteur was investigating 
chicken cholera and mistakenly left a culture aside for several months. When subsequently 
injecting chickens with the weakened culture they survived, and were then found them to 
be immune from the disease. One hundred years after its establishment as a way of 
preventing small-pox, Pasteur had discovered that vaccination had wider application. 
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3.2 Creative People 
Creativity is often discussed in terms of great creative achievements such as those outlined 
above and it's been c o m m o n to associate the creative outcome with the greatness of the 
person involved. Rickards (1988) argued this case suggesting that creativity is usually 
viewed by most people as a special skill held by special people. H e described experiments 
where he has asked people to think of someone being creative. Upon this request, he says 
that the subjects rarely think of themselves. The image they have is usually that of a 
painter, writer, architect, or maybe a famous thinker, like Newton or da Vinci. I've done 
this small experiment too and found much the same result. Passmore (1991) commented 
that the notion of a work of imagination, tends to be^ narrow, not only implying greatness 
but tending to be limited to works of art or literature such as poetry to the exclusion of other 
fields like science or engineering. Weisberg (1986) said that it m a y be surprising to many 
that great thinkers like Newton and da Vinci once experimented with now odd notions such 
as the practice of alchemy and the idea of people flying by attaching feathers to their arms 
(although this sounds something like a modern hang-glider so maybe da Vinci has been 
proved correct). Seeing creativity as something other, special, people do is a great barrier 
to creativity as Ribot suggested a century ago. 
Invention is thus unduly limited when we attribute it to great inventors only. 
(Ribot 1906, p. 156) 
Furthermore a person who is creative is often characterised as eccentric or perhaps 
mentally unstable (Kubie 1961; Prentky 1989). For example great thinkers like Socrates 
and Newton were thought to be mentally unstable (Prentky 1989). Torrance commented 
that this c o m m o n perception has limited the wide teaching of creative thinking. 
Doesn't everybody know that the highly creative person is "a little crazy" and that you can't 
help him anyway?... Unfortunately,these are attitudes which have long been held by some of 
our most eminent scholars and which still prevail rather widely. (Torrance 1962, p. 1) 
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A n analysis of abstracts of creativity research reveals a great interest in personality, 
giftedness, intelligence, sex, age, socio-economic status, reading skills, etcetera. Great 
effort has been expended testing relationships between personal factors and creativity. For 
instance, Furnham and Yazdanpanahi (1995) recently reported that psychotics tend to 
produce more creative ideas when brainstorming than non-psychotics. Many writers in the 
area of creativity have agreed with Torrance (above) and have said that the focus on 
personality is misleading and unfortunately guides efforts away from examining the 
creative process (for example; Harrisberger 1966; Perkins, 1981; Isaksen 1987b; Niemark 
1987; Zaleznic 1988; Halpern 1989; Mason 1989; Barry & Rudinow 1990; Torrance 1993; 
Sternberg & Lubart 1996). In short, the study of creativity as it relates to the personalities 
ofthe great achievers gives little clues as to how other people can be more creative. The 
alternative is to consider great creative outcomes in terms of some type of process or 
method. 
3.3 Problem-Solving Process 
Formal descriptions of the problem-solving process have often followed a step-by-step 
model (Table 3-1). The typical steps include problem identification, information gathering, 
ideation, exploration, incubation, etcetera (for example; Harrisberger 1966; Gordon 1969; 
Bransford& Stein 1984;Zechmeister& Johnson 1992). 
Problem Solving Processes 
Harrisberger (1966) 
1. Define 
2. Ideation 
3. Synthesis 
4. Optimisation 
5. Detail & development 
6. Test & improve 
Bransford& Stein 
1. Identity 
2. Define 
3. Explore 
4. Act 
5. Look 
(1984) Zechmeister& Johnson (1992) 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
Identify 
Define 
Set goals 
Alternatives 
Narrow alternatives 
Evaluate alternatives 
Decide 
Trial 
Table 3-1 Problem Solving Models 
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These processes can be traced to the methods of Ribot (1906) and Wallas (1926) shown in 
Table 3-2. Wallas (1926) based the process on the work of Helmholtz and Poincare. T o 
begin the problem solving process Poincare emphasised preparation and then incubation. 
These sudden inspirations... never happen except after some days of voluntary effort which 
has appeared absolutely fruitless and whence nothing good seems to have come, where the 
way taken seems totally astray' (Poincare 1952, p. 38) 
Most striking at first is this appearance of sudden illumination, a manifest sign of long 
unconscious prior work. The role of this unconscious work in mathematical invention 
appears to me incontestable, and traces of it would be found in other cases where it is less 
evident. Often when one works at a hard question, nothing good is accomplished at the first 
attack. Then one takes a rest, longer or shorter, and sits down anew to the work. During the 
first half-hour, as before, nothing is found, and then all of a sudden the decisive idea presents 
itself to the mind. (Poincare 1952 p. 38) 
Problem Solving Processes 
Ribot (1906) - Complete Ribot (1906) - Abridged Wallas (1926) 
1. Idea (the aim) and 1. General preparation 1. Preparation 
Incubation (unconscious) 2. Incubation 
2. Invention or Discovery 2. Idea, Inspiration, Eruption 3. Illumination 
3. Verification or Application 3. Constructive and 4. Verification 
Developingperiod 
Table 3-2 Problem Solving Models from the Early 1900's 
Incubation, like intuition, was intended to allow the brain to unconsciously sort the chaos 
into order. Ochse (1990, p. 243) described intuition as '...unconsciously triggered 
automatic integration of relevant elements of information...'. Because this process is 
apparently illogical, it is sometimes called gut feel, not really a function ofthe supposedly 
logical brain. Situations where definitions are poorly defined or information appears 
unclear lend themselves to this type of thinking. Following incubation, a further period of 
conscious effort was thought to give rise to illumination; the flash of insight about a 
potential solution. A period of more conscious effort was then recommended in the 
verification phase to the test the validity ofthe solution. 
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These procedures describe a metacognitive guide to attacking a problem. They systemise a 
way of thinking about problems. However, the attention placed on problem defintion and 
the assumption that the right problem can be identified at the beginning has been criticised 
(for example; Harrisberger 1966; Brann 1991; Csikszentmihalyi 1992). These are 
criticisms ofthe methodologies in their totality and are valid, but here I intend to focus on 
the core; the creative event; the breaking of conceptual boundaries. 
3.4 Thinking Outside the Boundaries 
Great creative efforts seemed to be characterised by changes in paradigms. The pivotal 
events have been those that changed the domain ofthe potential solution. The key element 
to the creative process seems to be some insightful thinking that forms a new arrangement 
out of old information. Guilford (1950), a guiding influence over creativity research, 
stressed the importance of transformations; the change of paradigms as the key process, 
and employed the term divergent thinking to describe this way of thinking. The change of 
paradigm, or divergent thinking, is characterised by the nine dot task (Figure 3-1). The task 
is to connect the dots with a continuous line of no more than four straight sections. 
Figure 3-1 The Nine Dot Task 
The classic solution requires moving outside an assumption that the lines need to be within 
the boundaries ofthe square (Figure 3-2). Part of solving the nine dot problem is breaking 
the assumed boundary. This is the pivot to solving the problem. 
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Figure 3-2 The Classic Nine Dot Solution 
The insightful model of creative thinking was discussed early this century and many ofthe 
concepts considered at that time remain current. Wallas (1926), like others, discussed 
illumination but did not speculate on how illumination can be encouraged; other than to be 
prepared. In the text Creative Mind, Spearman suggested that new ideas could be formed 
by abstracting the principles of one idea into the realm of another (Figure 3-3). 
When two or more items (percepts or ideas) are given, a person may perceive them to be in 
various ways related... (Spearman 1930, pp. 18) ... When any item and a relation to it are 
present to mind, then the mind can generate in itself another item so related. 
(Spearman 1930, p. 23, emphasis added) 
1 
Experience Relations Correlations 
Figure 3-3 Principle of Experience, Relations and Correlations (Spearman 1930) 
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Like Spearman, Ribot (1906) considered creative thinking to chiefly involve association, 
and especially analogy; a form of association involving association by resemblance. 
Analogy, an unstable process, undulating and multiform, gives rise to the most unforeseen and 
novel groupings. Through its pliability, which is almost unlimited, it produces in equal 
measure absurd comparisons and very original inventions. 
(Ribot 1906, p. 27, emphasis added) 
Spearman and Ribot emphasised the abstraction of ideas from one domain to another. 
Later, Hebb (1949) commented that a feature of creative thinkers is a willingness to borrow 
ideas from another field; a willingness to connect the apparently unconnected. 
It is, likewise, a basic factor in originality, the original and creative person having, among 
other things, unusual sensitivity to the applicability ofthe already known to new problem 
situations. (Hebb 1949, p. 110) 
The central element of creative thinking seems to be this movement, or breaking of 
assumed boundaries, or dominant paradigms. However not all ascribe to the theory that 
creativity is characterised by insight. Ochse (1990) commented that a great deal of 
unremarkable work normally accompanies great achievements. Burnham and Davis (1969) 
demonstrated this concept with some experiments using the nine-dot problem (see 
Appendix A for detail). They measured the success of subjects working on the nine dot 
problem when given various clues. While drawing outside the boundary is important to the 
ultimate solution, a clue to this effect facilitated only reasonable improvement. However, 
changing the diagram (Figure 3-4) lead to a dramatic improvement. 
Similarly, Weisberg and Alba (1981) conducted a series of experiments that showed that 
breaking the boundary did not lead to an immediate solution (see Appendix A ) . From these 
experiments Weisberg and Alba (1981), like Burnham and Davis (1969) showed that while 
the clue to break the assumed boundary exposes the subjects to the domain in which the 
solution can be found, it does not necessarily quickly lead to the solutions itself. 
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• • • 
• • • 
• • • • 
Figure 3-4 The Eleven Dot 'Nine Dot' Task 
(from Burnham & Davis 1969) 
Weisberg (1995) later argued that the attention given to restructuring is too high. This 
claim is supported by the experiments of Burnham and Davis (1969) and Weisberg and 
Alba (1981). Their implication was that the aim of thinking outside the square has been 
overemphasised. It would seem though that their experiments did not reject the importance 
of thinking outside the square, but showed that making use of a suggestion like "what about 
drawing outside the square", will probably require a substantial amount of subsequent work 
to ultimately be useful. This does not mean that the divergence to thinking outside the 
square is not vital to the solution. While divergent thinking does not necessarily offer quick 
solutions it is an important pathway to solving many problems. 
De Bono (1992a) described this divergent thinking as escaping from the boundary of 
reasonableness (Figure 3-5). In the classic stories of creative achievement it seems that a 
fortuitous event typically triggered a new way of thinking. It seems often the boundary of 
reasonableness has been prodded by happenstance events. Watt had a cup of tea. Fleming 
and Pasteur forgot to do the dishes. Darwin read a magazine. Archimedes took a bath. 
Mozart had a good time and a daydream. What's the message in this for the development 
ofthe type of creativity these people enjoyed? The gathering of information won't in itself 
necessarily inspire the creative moment. As Dewey said; 'Observation supplied the near, 
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imagination the remote' (Dewey 1910, p. 223). The challenge is to arrange more of these 
useful events that cause a re-examination of the domain ofthe likely solutions. 
„.- Chance 
Thinking 
u 
^ 
t Boundary of reasonableness 
Provocation 
Figure 3-5 Thinking Outside the Boundaries 
(deBono 1992a) 
As a demonstration of the continuous need for divergent thinking, Adams (1987) wrote that 
a young reader had written him a letter explaining that he had solved the nine-dot problem 
with one-line line. Adams' correspondent had broken normal assumptions about the 
thickness of lines relative to the dots and had used one really thick line! However, while 
the elegance of this new solution is obvious, there are widely discussed reasons why 
insights such as these are unlikely to occur. 
3.5 Thinking Inside the Boundaries: Uncreative Mind 
The notion of thinking outside the boundaries is thought to be unnatural. The mind seems 
more adept at repetition rather than the creation and this theory that basic function of the 
mind impedes creative thinking is now widespread (for example Gerard 1952; de Bono 
1969; Gardner 1982; Adams 1987; Rickards 1988; Kosko 1993). 
The way the mind is suited to repetition and the relationship of this to creative thinking is 
widely mentioned now, but was also apparent in the writings of Locke (c. 1680), Hume 
(c.1740) and early this century, such as Dewey (1910), Kohler (1930), and Spearman 
(1930). Drawing from the ancient Greek principles, Hume for instance referred to the 
principle of custom, and suggested that repetitive experience of the association of ideas 
tends to infer a similar association in the future, even when this may not exist. Locke 
suggested that given the tendency toward self-organisation of information, that the 
gathering of information was not thinking or learning. Learning was facilitated by the 
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independent reorganisation of the information; or a transformational approach, to use 
Guilford's (1967) terminology. The gathering of information then is preparatory but 
clearly not central and can play a negative role by reinforcing invalid ideas. Both Locke 
and H u m e considered that familiarity represented an impediment to creative thinking. 
Let a man be given up to the contemplation of one sort of knowledge, and that will become 
everything. The mind will take such a tincture from a familiarity with that object, that 
everything else, how remote soever, will be brought under the same view. 
(Locke 1882, p. 45, originate. 1680) 
For wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew 
the same act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the 
understanding, we always say, that this propensity is the effect of Custom. 
(Hume 1910, p. 339, original c. 1740) 
Dewey's writings around the turn ofthe century similarly suggested that the self-supporting 
nature of most evidence was a barrier to creative thought. 
Empirical evidence follows the grooves and ruts that custom wears...failures to agree with the 
usual order are slurred over, cases of 'successful confirmation are exaggerated. 
(Dewey 1910, p. 148) 
Experience is not a rigid and closed thing; it is vital and hence growing. When dominated by 
the past, by custom and routine, it is often opposed to the reasonable, the thoughtful. 
(Dewey 1910, p. 156) 
Ribot (1906) suggested that the brain does not record accurately but records information 
selectively based on experience and reinforcement. Ribot said that images stored by the 
brain are changed according to experience. Spearman then went further and suggested that 
this process is a hindrance to creative thought. 
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[The mind]... is not at all like a photographic plate with which one may reproduce copies 
indefinitely... theimage undergoes change like all living substance... 
(Ribot 1906, p. 19, emphasis added). 
...the mental energy, taking the line of least resistance, is directed along those channels which 
have by previous usage-thatis to say, by virtue ofretentivity-acquireda disposition to receive 
it. All such mere reproduction, or course, is the very antithesis to creation. 
(Spearman 1930, p. 32, emphasis added) 
These ideas, established about a century ago, form the basis of today's understanding of the 
conservative nature of thinking. Patterns of experience, or memory make everyday life 
possible. The more familiar, the stronger the pattern. Like a river does not suddenly 
change it's course due to a small change in rainfall patterns, the mind does not alter patterns 
readily; they are moulded into shape over time. 
We recognize but cannot define. The neural nets in our brains are good at that. They evolved 
over hundreds of millions of years to do that, to quickly and ceaselessly match sensed patterns 
to stored patterns. We recognize faces and music and seasons and we have little or no idea 
how to define them. We cannot explain how we recall a name or answer a question or have a 
new idea. We just do it. Our neural nets just do it. (Kosko 1993) 
Luchins (1942) conducted a series of experiments examining the effect of prior experience 
on problem solving. Luchins referred to this as the effect of einstellung. Luchins used the 
water jar problems where given three different sized jars the task was to arrive at a certain 
volume of water. For example; Jar A=21, Jar B=127, and Jar C=3, obtain 100 units of 
water. The result can be obtained by B-A-2C (127-21-3-3=100). The first five problems 
had jars of different sizes and different goals but could all be solved by this formula. The 
next two problems (six and seven) be solved in this way but could also be solved by a more 
direct route. For example, problem seven, A=23, B=49, C=3, obtain 20 units of water. The 
previous method works (B-A-2C=20), but the problem can be solved more simply by A-
C=20. Luchins compared the way that subjects solved problems six and seven if they had 
previously completed the first five (experimental groups) with the way that subjects 
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completed six and seven having done no prior problems (control groups). Subjects were 
222 college students (aged 17-21), 913 adult high school students (aged 16-40), 1259 
public school students (aged 9-14), 40 private school students (aged 8-12) and 275 
university students (aged 19-52). About one third ofthe subjects were controls (no pre-
conditioning) and the remainder experimental subjects. Luchins found that for all subjects 
virtually 100% ofthe control group subjects used the simple method. In stark contrast only 
around 25% ofthe pre-conditioned subjects chose the simple method, the remainder opting 
for the familiar but longer method. 
Birch (1945), drawing on the work of Kohler, investigated the effect of previous experience 
on problem solving with chimpanzees. Six chimpanzees were given the use of a stick with 
which they could retrieve food from outside their cage. In 30 minutes only two of 
chimpanzees used the stick to retrieve the food; and one of these discovered the use ofthe 
stick by chance when bumping it and noticing the food moving. In contrast, all the 
chimpanzees solved the problem within 20 seconds, when the experiment was repeated 
following three days of being allowed to play with the sticks,. The results indicated that the 
chimpanzees were able to solve the problem by employing the knowledge gained through 
previous experience. However this experiment showed the positive value of previous 
experience rather than the potential negative effect. 
Later, Birch and Rabinowitz (1951) showed the inhibiting effect of previous knowledge on 
problem solving. The task was to connect two strings hanging from the ceiling. The 
strings couldn't be grasped at the same time, however on the floor were two pieces of 
electrical equipment, a relay and an electric switch. Both items could be used as a weight 
to convert one string into a pendulum to complete the task. A control group of six electrical 
engineering students, familiar with the use of both objects, showed no bias toward either 
object; three using the relay and three using the switch. A further 19 college students who 
were not experienced with electrical equipment were divided into two groups. One group 
were trained to use the relay to solve an electrical circuit problem and the other group 
trained to use the switch to solve the same problem. The ten subjects who used the relay to 
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solve the circuit problem all used the switch as the pendulum, whereas almost all (seven out 
of nine) ofthe subjects who used the switch to solve the circuit problem chose the relay as 
the pendulum. The pre-conditioning biased the later use ofthe objects. When asked for 
reasons, subjects tended to be defensive about their choice and its superiority over the 
alternative object. Both groups offered seemingly logical explanations; claiming their 
choice was easier to attach, more compact, heavier and so on. 
Like Birch and Rabinowitz (1951), Schooler and Melcher (1995) demonstrated that 
previous experience can limit problem solving. Schooler and Melcher showed that poorly 
focussed photographs are more difficult to distinguish when subjects have previewed the 
same photograph even more poorly focussed (their methodology is not reported in detail). 
Repetition, custom and habit have all been ways to express the same problem. Gardner 
(1982) said that the ability to copy and mimic are basic learning functions, however they 
can block the development of new ideas. Likewise, Osborn (1948) suggested that better 
recall abilities may even be a hindrance to creative thinking. It is recognised that the best 
abilities ofthe mind constitute something of a barrier to creative thinking. From this arises 
a need for mechanisms to aid the process of creativity; as Rickards said; '...the need for 
lateral thinking arises because the mind does not record successive data in an objective 
way, butproducesunderstandingthroughcreatingpattern.'' (Rickards 1988). 
3.6 Uncreative Culture 
Sometimes the cultural effects on creativity can be harsh. For example, despite being right, 
Copernicus became very unpopular by suggesting that the Sun was the centre ofthe solar 
system. The assumptions held by his detractors were learnt from their surroundings and 
experience. However, criticism, victimisation, short-sightedness, and ridicule, are not 
confined to uneducated times well past. Peters (1987) illustrated this with a number of 
more contemporary examples where creative ideas were subjected to harsh criticism that 
later proved to be very short-sighted. 
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' Who in the hell wants to hear actors talk?' 
Harry Warner, founder of Warner Bros. Studio, in 1927 
'/ think there's a world market for about five computers.' 
Thomas J. Watson, Chairman of IBM, in 1943 
' There is no reason for any individual to have a computer in their home.' 
Ken Olson, President of Digital Equipment, in 1977 
Cultural rigidity and cultural barriers to creativity are not only features of the western 
world. 'The geniuses are kicked out'! This was the comment of Tadatsugu Taniguchi, 
Molecular Biology Director at University of Osaka, about that way that the Japanese 
education system promotes evenness, overlooking individuals brilliant in special areas (in 
Bylinski & Moore 1987). Although a recognition exists of the industrial importance of 
innovation in Japan (Tatsuno 1990), their societal, cultural and education systems tend to 
obstruct creativity. These cultures equate seniority with wisdom, suppresses individuals in 
favour of groups, values improvement little-by-little rather than concept changes, and 
resists the conflict that often comes with creativity (Bylinski & Moore 1987). 
It seems that like our brain, our way of living prefers order. Parnes (1971) said that Tn a 
society each individual must live in a box, hemmed in somewhat'. A post to creativity 
discussion group captured elegantly the thinking limitations of a boxed-in lifestyle. 
A few years ago I met some Indians from the Amazon rainforest visiting the US... I asked what 
they found interesting or surprising about the U.S. One ofthe things they offered was that 
they had always been confused by North American/Europeanvisitors to the rainforest because 
they all appeared to think and talk in boxes. After visiting NYC and other metro areas, they 
realized it was only natural. Everyone lived in small boxes, many of them stacked on top of 
each other. To them, this explained many of our conceptual limits (Baker 1995) 
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In an attempt to compare cultures, Li and Shallcross (1992) investigated the difference 
between Asian and American students on the nine dot problem. Subjects were 80 Chinese 
and 80 American students split equally into four age groups (6-7; 10-11; 15-16; 17-18). Li 
and Shallcross measured several variables and found that the Chinese students; 
• succeeded more often (43 compared with 17) 
• went beyond the boundaries more often (55 compared with 3 8) 
• took longer to break the boundary (32 minutes compared with 21 minutes) 
• took longer to solve the problem (41 minutes compared with 26 minutes) 
• took longer to give up (75 minutes compared with 3 0 minutes) 
• took more trials to solve the problem (3 9 compared with 29) 
The mean time that Chinese students took to solve the problem was 41 minutes. American 
students who did not solve the problem gave up after 30 minutes on average. Given that 
most ofthe Chinese success was beyond the 30 minute time, this seems to indicate that 
persistence is significant in the overall success ofthe Chinese compared to the Americans. 
The lack of persistence is possibly linked to the issue of ego. Ego is a term intricately 
linked with social culture. In Freud's definition ego is social awareness and conscious. In 
social interaction the ego is a restriction to explorative thinking. For instance in the case of 
solving the nine-dots problem, if subjects fail to persist it may be because they don't wish 
to be involved in something at which they fear being incompetent. Once committed to a 
point of view, for instance that the task is impossible, there is not much incentive to 
continue. Social awareness (ego) leads people to be wary of looking foolish, being 
indecisive, changing their mind frequently or backing eventual losers. Like the response of 
the Editor ofthe Daily Express of London, when John Baird, inventor of television, wished 
to see him in 1925; 'For God's sake, go down to reception and get rid of a lunatic who's 
down there. He says he's got a machine for seeing by wireless! Watch him-he may have a 
razor on him' (in Peters 1987). 
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A d a m s (1987) reasoned that fear to make a mistake, to fail or to take a risk are common 
emotional blockages to new ideas. Some authors cite the strong ancient Greek influence as 
the basis for this passion for Tightness. ' Western science took a full two-thousand years to 
liberate itself from the hypnotic effect of Aristotle.' (Koestler 1969, p. 176) 
The belief in a concept of a fixed truth encourages a search for the truth and the ego creates 
a desire to be seen to know the truth. M a n y authors have commented that spontaneous 
judgement of rightness is an obstacle to creative thinking (Osborn 1948; Gerard 1952; 
Perkins, 1981; A d a m s 1986; Rickards 1988). Osborn (1948) said that judgement is a safe 
kind of thinking as it produces only a verdict rather than an idea. Gerard concurred and 
said that judgement often rejects new ideas. 
For ideas, like mutations, are mostly bad by the criteria of judgement, and experience and 
expertness suppresses them - unless imaginings get out of hand and displace reality, as in the 
insanities. (Gerard 1952, p.227) 
In summary, the box that creative thought escapes from, is a box of assumptions, a box of 
perception based on past experience and learnt patterns. Originality is characterised by an 
altering of perception, a break from the boundary. There is not only the conservative nature of 
the mind to cope with but the conservative nature of social and cultural interaction. Rickards 
(1988) noted that yes, but... was the most likely retort to a new idea and that this expression 
represents the epitome of judgemental thinking. The message is that methods to provoke 
thinking out of dominant boundaries and ways to be sympathetic to seemingly illogical ideas 
are vital for a real change of paradigm. Gary Larson (1992) characterised the superficiality of 
many creative efforts when thinking becomes embedded in habit (Figure 3-6). 
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The writers for "Bewitched" sit down to 
their weekly brainstorming session. 
Figure 3-6 A Cartoon Comment on Superficial Thinking 
Embedded in Habit (Larson 1992) 
3.7 Intelligence 
Early definitions of thinking were such that thinking was only subliminal movement ofthe 
vocal chords. Thinking was no more than talking to yourself. Words were thinking; and 
therefore good thinking meant good verbalising (Koestler 1969). 
Language has subsequently dominated education and in the assessment of intelligence its 
role has always been central. The dominance of language skills, and mathematical skills, in 
the assessment of intelligence has been widely criticised on the basis that the tests attempt 
to determine a single value and are too narrow in their approach (for example; Gardner 
1985; Guilford 1987; Sternberg & Lubart 1995). Gardner (1985) suggested that intelligence 
tests show past learning rather than future potential. They reveal little about a person's 
ability to re-organise information or solve a new problem. Gardner illustrated the problem 
by showing that some people who were excellent in some areas of thinking, were poor in 
others. For example, Leonardo da Vinci is upheld as being creative in many areas but was 
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not particularly good at music. Thus, if IQ tests were based on musical intelligence, da 
Vinci would be classified as unintelligent. Similarly, A d a m s (1987) commented that tests 
based on good skills in mathematics and language (often the hallmarks of intelligence and 
school testing) lead to similarly poorly based claims that those w h o do well have high 
intelligence, and those w h o do poorly have low intelligence. These contemporary writers 
echoed the sentiments of Dewey's earlier writing. 
The conviction that language is necessary to thinking (is even identical with it) is met by the 
contention that language perverts and conceals thought. Three typical views have been 
maintained regarding the relation of thought and language: first that they are identical; 
second, that words are the garb or clothing of thought, necessary not for thought but for 
conveying it; and third (the view we shall here maintain) that while language is not thought it 
is necessary for thinking as well as for its communication. (Dewey 1910, p. 170) 
Verbalising to memorise is a common way for western people to learn. Hebb (1949) 
described an experiment where subjects were asked to remember an image of 16 characters 
arranged in a four-by-four matrix. The image was typically recalled in the familiar, left to 
right, horizontal orientation, showing that that the stored image of the square was not 
remembered as a spatial image but memorised according to the normal reading culture. 
While words are useful for reading, are they useful for thinking? Michael Faraday saw the 
stresses surrounding magnets and electric currents as curves in space. James Maxwell 
made mental images of problems, that is symbols without words and Francis Galton said T 
fail to arrive at the full conviction that a problem is fairly taken on me unless I have 
continued somehow to disembarrass it of words' (in Gordon 1961). Einstein commented 
that words are useful for describing thinking but have little to do with the thinking itself. 
The words or the language, as they are written or spoken, do not seem to play any role in the 
mechanism of thought. The physical entities which seem to serve as elements in thought are 
certain signs and more or less clear images which can be voluntarily reproduced and 
combined. (Einstein 1952, p. 43) 
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While words are certainly useful for analysis, description and communication they are not 
necessarily a part ofthe actual process of thinking (Einstein 1952). Yet formal thinking is 
dominated by verbal logic as the main form of thinking (Kornhaber & Gardner 1991). 
Relying only on analysis, description and logical explanation of the way the things are 
perceived to be is a major cause of irrationality and an obstacle to creative thinking (Adams 
1989; de Bono 1992a). M a n y authors have suggested that Western education systems have 
a large responsibility for building barriers to creativity by promoting judgemental thinking 
(Osborn 1953; Torrance 1962; Rickards 1988). 
While language has dominated the testing of intelligence, models of the functions of the 
mind have for a long time considered wider range of factors; the five senses perhaps 
constituted the simplest model of this type Spearman (1930) vigorously questioned the 
validity of assumptions made about intelligence and intelligence testing. Spearman felt 
there was some commonality in intelligence, or a general intelligence, and yet was 
dissatisfied with the indiscriminate application of intelligence tests that measured one 
aspect and then transposed this to indicate overall intelligence. Recently Guilford (1987) 
commented that the attention given to language has been to the detriment of creativity. 
It should be remembered that from the time ofBinetto the present, the chief practical criterion 
used in validation of tests of intellect has been achievement in school. For children, this has 
meant largely achievement in reading and arithmetic. This fact has generally determined the 
nature of our intelligence tests. Operationally then, intelligence has been the ability (or 
complex of abilities) to master reading and arithmetic and similar subjects. These subjects 
are not conspicuously demanding of creative talent. (Guilford 1987, p. 36) 
In 1909, Binet (1975), who somewhat ironically was also one ofthe first involved in the 
development of intelligence tests for children, said that good teaching must activate a full 
range of senses. Some years later, Hebb (1949) found that patients with the entire right 
cortex removed could often still achieve excellent IQ scores. Hebb suggested that this 
showed that good language skills are commonly associated with high intelligence, while 
the skills more strongly associated with the right cortex are not measured. It seems 
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commonplace for those with poor speech to be seen as having an impaired intelligence. 
For instance, it would be rare for someone lacking in musical ability to be labelled 
retarded, but labels like these are often unfortunately ascribed to those with poor speech. 
Torrance said that '... it is safe to say that IQ represents a gross oversimplification of human 
giftedness' (Torrance 1992, p. 10), while Dewey (1910) earlier commented that signs are 
necessary for thinking, but words are not the only kind of sign. 
... language includes much more than oral and written speech. Gestures, pictures, monuments, 
visual images, finger movements - anything consciously employed as a sign is, logically, 
language. (Dewey 1910, pp. 170-171) 
While the actual testing of intelligence concentrated on abilities in the verbal and 
mathematical area, it has been well recognised that there are clearly a range of other ways 
that intelligence can be expressed. 
The brain cortex is usually described in terms of a left and right hemisphere and so there 
has been much interest in determining which types of intelligences relate to which 
hemisphere. The division of the brain into two parts has been known for several hundred 
years (Blakemore 1990). Thomas Willis in 1661 began dissecting brains and came to the 
conclusion that perception, memory, voluntary activities and so on, occur in the cerebral 
hemispheres. Mainly during the last century there has been a mapping of functions to 
certain areas ofthe brain. In the 1960's, Sperry, Gazzaniga and Bogen (1969) conducted 
experiments with patients whose brain hemispheres had been disconnected. They observed 
that each ofthe separated hemispheres had its own visual sensations and memory, however 
the left hemisphere was dominant in verbal and mathematical tasks. Their testing 
equipment involved a patient looking at a screen, on the back of which could be projected 
silhouette images. The patients could reach under the screen to manipulate objects, but 
could not see past the screen. In one experiment the patient was asked to fix vision on the 
centre ofthe screen. T w o images were projected for 1/10 second; one on the left field and 
one on the right. If asked to select the object they saw, by feeling with the left hand, the 
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patient selected the object matching the left-field image. W h e n asked to name the same 
object the patient responded with the name ofthe object in the right-field. Objects seen in 
the left-field, or manipulated with the left-hand, could not be verbalised, whereas those on 
the right-side could be verbalised. Similar effects were shown for mathematical tasks. 
Under normal conditions, where the eyes scan all around, these results were not found and 
speech and mathematical ability appear normal. From these studies and others, the 
functions dominated by each hemisphere are usually described as follows. 
Left Hemisphere Right Hemisphere 
Words Spatial 
Logic Perception 
Numbers Imagination 
Sequence Rhythm 
Symbols Colour 
Wholeness 
Dimension 
Table 3-3 Typically Cited Dominant Functions ofthe Left and Right Hemispheres 
Sperry (1983) later suggested that most education focuses on the development of the left 
hemisphere. This has perhaps been to the detriment of creative thinking, that is thought to 
importantly involve reorganisation, imagination and so on. As a result methods that are 
supposed to promote thinking using the right-hemisphere have made their way into many 
texts on creative thinking. For instance, the spatial technique of taking notes, known as 
mind-mapping, mainly promoted by Buzan (Buzan 1974; Buzan & Buzan 1993), is based 
on tapping a non-lineartype of thinking (Figure 3-7). 
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The left/right brain model has appeared in many texts and research studies of creative 
thinking. For instance, Williams, Stockmyer and Williams (1984) compared brainstorming 
with a program designed to activate both sides of the brain. Subjects were 62 
undergraduate students in two equal-size groups who were required to think of similarities 
between an island and a school. They found a similarity in the number of ideas, but the 
techniques to stimulate both sides ofthe brain lead to more creative ideas. 
However some authors have suggested that the distinctions are over-played and are not 
nearly as clear as the typical lists indicate (for example; Sperry 1983; Dobbs 1989). 
Mind Maps 
Figure 3-7 Examples ofthe Structure and Layout of 'Mind Maps' 
Clockwise from Top Left: Glenn 1973; Buzan 1974; Lazear 1990; Rickards 1988 
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Gardner (1982; 1985) claimed that no function resides wholly in any one area ofthe brain; 
some areas simply are relatively more important for certain functions. Correspondingly, 
Perkins (1981) said that drawing conclusions like intuition and rationality lie in the right 
and left brain respectively involves definitions far too loose to be of practical use. Sperry, 
awarded a Nobel Prize for work in this area, s u m m e d up the difficulties of the typical 
classifications with the following comment. 
One must caution in this connection that the experimentally observed polarity in right-left 
cognitive style is an idea in general with which it is very easy to run wild. You can read today 
that things such as intuition, the seat ofthe subconscious, creativity, parapsychic sensitivity, 
the mind of the Orient, ethnocultural disposition, hypnotic susceptibility, the roots of the 
counterculture, altered states of consciousness, and what not, all reside predominantly in the 
right hemisphere. The extent to which extrapolations of this kind may eventually prove to be 
more fact or fancy will require many years to determine. Meanwhile it is important to 
remember that the two hemispheres in the normal intact brain tend regularly to function 
closely together as a unit, and that different states of mind are apt to involve different 
hierarchical and organizational levels, or front-back and other differentiations in laterality. 
(Sperry 1985, p. 19) 
While the left and right model ofthe brain is probably the most pervasive, there have been 
other ways to split up the functions of thinking. Guilford introduced the widely accepted 
structure-of-intellect (SOI) model, a cubic morphological model of intellect (Guilford 
1967; Figure 3-8). 
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OPERATION: 
Evaluation — 
Convergent production 
Divergent production 
Memory 
Cognition 
Units 
" Relations 
Q 
O 
K Systems 
Transformations 
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CONTENT: 
Figural 
Symbolic 
Semantic 
Behavioral 
Figure 3-8 Structure of Intellect (SOI) M o d e l (Guilford 1967) 
The SOI model consisted of a cube; each dimension representing a series of related intellect 
factors. Guilford (1988) later extended the model to include a greater number of factors; 
dividing memory into memory retention and memory recording, and dividing figural 
content into visual and auditory content. The factors then consisted ofthe following. 
1. Content 
Visual (visual-ftgural) 
Auditory (auditory-ftgural) 
Symbolic (signs, symbols, words) 
Semantic (thoughts, without visual or auditory images) 
Behavioural (behaviour cues such as body language) 
2. Products 
Units (any bit of information) 
Classes (groupingdue to similarity) 
Relations (one thing directly related to another) 
Systems (organised units) 
Transformations (the change of something into another) 
Implications (one thing associatedwith another) 
3. Operations 
Cognition (knowing) 
Memory Recording (holding on to the knowing long-term) 
Memory Retention (holding on to the knowing short-term) 
Divergent Production (generation of alternatives) 
Convergent Production (lookingfor one answer) 
Evaluation (judgement) 
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Guilford (1988) wrote that experiments employing the technique of factor analysis have 
shown that over 100 ofthe 180 potential abilities have been individually demonstrated. 
The model provides a mechanism for understanding intelligence and creative abilities in a 
broad sense. Recently there's been growing educational interest in a similar, but simpler, 
model proposed by Gardner (1985). 
Gardner suggested that intelligence could be usefully divided into seven intelligences; 
linguistic, mathematical, musical, body kinaesthetic, spatial, interpersonal, and 
intrapersonal intelligence. Hatch and Gardner (1990) undertook a project with a small 
sample of preschool children with a series of intelligence evaluation tools that were 
designed to reflect a broad range of intelligences, loosely related to Gardner's multiple 
intelligence model. They found that the children's strengths in various areas were 
unrelated to strengths in other areas and that standard Stanford-Binet (IQ) scores only 
correlated well with mathematical functions. The multiple intelligence model would seem 
share a similarity with the content factors in Guilford's model, with a few modifications 
and additions. While Gardner's model has not received the research interest of Guilford's, 
it seems to be having a growing influence in the educational field. The model provides a 
simpler approach than Guilford's and while the terms may not be validated in a scientific 
sense they provide a model for widening the scope of activity that might be designed in to 
class activities and tests. Much like the split of functions into the hemispheres encouraged 
development of tools like mind mapping, Gardner's model may at least serve to highlight a 
range of thinking skills; a worthwhile outcome for the enhancement of creative thinking. 
As evidence ofthe validity of such an approach, studies have shown that physical exercise 
(Gondola 1986; Curnow & Turner 1992), and especially aerobic exercise (Hinkle, 
Tuckman & Sampson 1993) can improve creativity. Others have shown that programs 
involving music (Curnow & Turner 1992), dance (Flaherty 1992), creative arts combining 
physical expression such as dance and visual art (Gruber, McNinch & Cone 1991; Goff 
1992), and programs designed to enhance self-control of thinking (Berretta & Privette 
1990) can be worthwhile in enhancing creativity. 
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If the studies of intelligence have aided the study of creativity it is by showing the 
importance of encouraging broad application of thinking abilities. Various models that 
expand the notion of thinking, such as the simples senses model, the hemispheres model, 
Guilford' sstructure-of-intellectmodel, or Gardner's multiple intelligence model all serve to 
encourage thinking to be considered in wider terms than language and logic. 
3.8 Active Divergent Thinking (ADT) 
Einstein suggested that the process of productive thought involved the manipulation or 
combination of abstract ideas. 
...from a psychological viewpoint, this combinatory play seems to be the essential feature in 
productive thought-before there is any connection with logical construction in words or other 
kinds of signs which can be communicatedto others (Einstein 1952, p. 43) 
Thus according to Einstein, productive thought was not logical, but abstract. Logical 
descriptions or explanations came after this abstract thinking. Psychologist, Abraham 
Maslow (1965) agreed and said that making connections and reforming ideas in a new way 
will require patience or perhaps an acceptance of uncertainty, wrongness and ambiguity. 
It was noted above that often a fortuitous event provided the inspiration of divergence from 
the established train of thought. Guilford referred to this kind of thinking as divergent 
thinking. The techniques that aim to increase the likelihood ofthe movement of thinking 
outside dominant paradigms I've labelled active divergent thinking. The term, active, 
meaning that the thinker takes deliberate steps to encourage divergent thinking. A 
summary ofthe main techniques or features of active divergent thinking follow. 
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3.8.1 Chance 
The classic tales of creative success often involve a seemingly fortuitous combination of 
the problem at hand with a useful by-chance event that jogged the thinking into a new 
mode. Mednick (1962) used the term serendipity to describe the by-chance association that 
is a typical part of famous incidents of creative inspiration. Mednick (1962) suggested that 
the central element of creativity is the association of previously unassociated elements. 
Waiting for these events is unreliable and so the active use of chance has been suggested as 
a way to bring more certainty to the process. For instance, introducing a random word or 
random object has been suggested as a simple way to stimulate new perception of a 
problem (Mednick 1962; de Bono 1971). 
A useful technique that sometimes helps towards the formation of new ideas or new ways of 
looking at things is to pick an object out ofthe environment and then try to see how it could be 
relevant to the matter under consideration. The supposition is that if both the objects and the 
problem are simultaneously held in consciousness, some sort of context will gradually develop 
to embrace them both, (de Bono 1971, p. 104) 
3.8.2 Analogy 
Ribot (1906) considered that analogic comparisons to be the centre of creative thought. 
M a n y writers since have promoted its use as a creative thinking technique (Gibson & 
Phillips 1958; Gordon 1961; Koestier 1969; de Bono 1971; Bransford& Stein 1984). 
A further technique for breaking down the rigidity of a particular way of looking at things is 
to transfer the relationships ofthe situation to another more easily handled situation. 
(deBonol971,p.80) 
The synectics model (Gordon 1961) is probably the most well-known for using analogy as 
a method for active divergent thinking. In 1944 Gordon and others instigated the Synectics 
program at Cambridge University. Synectics, a Greek word, means joining together 
different or apparently irrelevant elements and reflected the diversity of the group 
membership. However, synectics later related to the creative processes of analogy that the 
program emphasised. The method is n o w commonly mentioned, sometimes as synectics, 
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or sometimes just as analogy. Barry and RudinOw (1990) suggested using analogies to 
relate difficult problems to simple problems. They used the example of a ping pong 
tournament with 208 competitors. The tournament is a knock-out and the problem is to 
work out how many matches are needed to arrive at the winner. Often people approach the 
problem using a tree diagram or a mathematical technique. An alternative is to draw an 
analogy between the 208 entrant tournament and a tournament with two entrants. Clearly 
only one match would be needed. With three entrants, two would be needed. It is then 
apparent that 207 matches will be needed for the 208 entrant tournament. 
Analogy between the moving parts in an ear and an idea for a telephone is supposed to have 
helped Alexander Graham Bell to invent the telephone. Gutenberg is thought to have 
invented the printing press by drawing an analogy between a wine press and a coin 
stamping machine. Analogies make new things familiar by comparison to already 
understood ideas. Halpern (1989) said that analogies used in this way make understanding 
new or complex things less difficult. In the examples of inventions cited earlier, analogy 
was often part ofthe development of a new idea. 
Bouchard (1972) compared brainstorming with and without the technique of personal 
analogy as described by Gordon (1961). Subjects were 44 undergraduate students arranged 
into three groups of four who brainstormed using the analogy method and eight control 
groups of four who brainstormed in the usual way. Each group worked on nine alternative 
uses problems in three sessions. The subjects in the groups using personal analogy were 
instructed to take turns at acting like the object in question (for example they had to pretend 
to be a cigar when this was the object). The results showed that for the first session (three 
problems) the personal analogy groups generated significantly more ideas (100%) than the 
control groups. However in the subsequent two sessions (six problems) the analogy groups 
were not significantly better. There were indications of success, however Bouchard did not 
conclude with certainty that the personal analogy technique improved idea generation. 
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In addition to sometimes being known under the synectics banner, bisociation has been 
used to describe analogic thinking (Koestier 1969). Bisociation meant the linking of 
concepts, or in Koestier's terminology, thinking on two planes rather than one. The 
technique of bisociation was to amalgamate two normally unconnected ideas which is 
another way of expressing the idea of analogy. The purpose of analogy as an active 
divergent thinking technique is to establish links by association. Often this association 
shifts perception showing the situation in a new light. 
3.8.3 Forcing Relationships: Morphology 
Forcing ideas together can be an effective method to generate new ideas (Parnes 1967). 
Putting this into practice can be achieved via the technique of morphology as described by 
Allen (1962) and Zwicky (1969). Morphology is the practice of idea combinations usually 
using a matrix. Morphology has since been widely discussed in texts on creative thinking 
(for example; Koberg 1981; Adams 1986; Rickards 1988). Sometimes the method is called 
attribute analysis, especially when related to product design (Parnes 1976; Adams 1986). 
As an example of product design, Table 3-4 shows Allen's matrix for the design of a kettle. 
Container 
Construction 
Pressed 
Case 
Single Wall 
Double Wall 
With Air Space 
Metal Used 
Aluminium 
Stainless Steel 
Copper 
Type of 
Bottom 
Single Metal 
Double Metal 
Solid 
Double Bottom 
With Air Space 
Automatic 
Heating 
Controls 
Underneath Kettle 
On Kettle 
On Handle 
On Cord 
Capacity 
(Quarts) 
2 
3 
5 
8 
Power 
Rating 
(Watts) 
500 
850 
1350 
2000 
Table 3-4 Morphological Matrix (Morphologizer) to Design a New Kettle (Allen 1962) 
By thinking of the relevant parameters, and then developing a few options for each 
parameter, the resultant combinations soon amount to a large set of options. The kettle 
matrix has six parameters with only three or four options for each parameter, and yet this 
yields 3000 different kettles. Listing the 3000 options would be monotonous and many 
options would seem not too different from many others, however the power of the 
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technique comes by way of forcing relationships that would ordinarily be not considered, 
and by opening an appreciation of the many variations that are possible. 
As a further example, Niemark( 1987) reproduced the following phrase generator (Table 3-
5). Choosing a random number such as 241 or 735 yields impressive phrases like diverse 
harmonious awareness or realistic dialectical response. The method force fits words 
together and provides a fast way to generate a phrase. Although a little facetious, this 
example shows random combinations to be a powerful method of idea generation. 
Column A Column B Column C 
1 Profound Interpersonal Awareness 
2 Diverse Emotional Oneness 
3 Genuine Dialectical Relationship 
4 Subjective Harmonious Network 
5 Complex Communal Response 
6 Sophisticated Open Linkage 
7 Realistic Humane Consensus 
8 Meaningful Interactive Context 
9 Mutual Collective Dialogue 
0 Objective Societal Forum 
Table 3-5 Phrase Generator (Niemark 1987) 
The element of active divergent thinking in morphology is to employ the matrix to force a 
link between ideas that are not normally linked. The technique thus employs the principle 
of combinations as a thinking diversion. 
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3.8.4 Brainstorming 
Brainstorming: a technique in which a group meets in order to stimulate creative thinking, 
new ideas, etc (The Macquarie Dictionary 1985) 
Brainstorming is probably the most well-known term in creative thinking. Alex Osborn 
(1948) first used brainstorming at his o w n company in 1939 and it has since become a 
popular method for creativity. For instance, Fernald and Nickolenko (1993) recently 
surveyed 1000 businesses in Orlando about creative methods. One hundred responded and 
the results showed that brainstorming was the most frequently mentioned technique. 
According to Osborn, the name brainstorm meant to use the brain to storm a problem. 
Osborn said that at least four hundred years ago, Hindu Indians practiced a group creative 
process called Prai-Barshana. Prai meaning outside yourself. Barshana meaning 
question. The process of prai-barshana thus meant to question outside yourself; to air the 
thinking in a group. Osborn's brainstorming rules were; 
1. Judicial judgement is ruled out. Criticism of ideas will be withheld until the next day. 
2. "Wildness"is welcomed. The crazier the idea, the better; it's easier to tone down than 
think up. 
3. Quantity is wanted. The more ideas we pile up, the more likelihood of winners. 
4. Combination and improvement are sought. In addition to contributing ideas of our own, 
let's suggest how another's idea can be turned into a better idea; or how two or more ideas 
can be joined into still another idea. (Osborn 1948, p. 269) 
These rules were intended to create a setting for the generation of ideas. Osborn suggested 
that the first rule was most vital as attempting to combine idea creation and criticism is like 
getting hot and cold water out of a tap at the same time (Osborn 1948). The theory was that 
deferring judgement overcame education and experience that encouraged judgment and 
criticism. Ideas are much like seedlings in that they are easily trampled when they first 
appear and require a little nurturing before they are judged critically. Osborn suggested 
that judgement must be deferred for two main reasons. 
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1. Sometimes the suggestions may change the parameters ofthe problem. 
2. Ideas of little value m a y be modified or lead to worthwhile ideas. 
Following experience with brainstorming, Osborn (1979) claimed that the more ideas that 
are produced the higher the quality becomes. That is, the best ideas tend to be developed 
near the end ofthe session. The message therefore was to create an abundance of ideas and 
then choose the best. However Adams (1987) said that the natural tendency is to choose 
the first one that comes to mind. Osborn stressed the importance of multiple options for 
two reasons. Firstly, more options increases the probability of a worthwhile idea, and 
secondly many ideas encourages associations; a chain reaction. However getting started can 
be difficult. Blank paper is threatening and anything put on it will stand out. If judgement 
is deferred then starting should be easier. This has a snowball effect as once there are a few 
ideas it seems less threatening to add one or two that even seem a bit silly. Connections and 
modifications are easier to make once the list grows. The principle of the generation of 
alternatives as a key feature of problem solving seems universal among creativity literature 
(for example; Guilford 1950; Kogan & Bagnall 1981; Adams 1987; Sventesson 1990). 
While Osborn is best known for promoting brainstorming in groups, he made observations 
that group idea generation was not always the most efficient. 
For one thing, during certain periods in a creative quest, each member of a team should go 
off by himself and do some brainstorming on his own. When the partners come together after 
such solo thinking, they will find that they have piled up more worthwhile alternatives than if 
they had kept on working as one all the time. (Osborn 1948, p. 264) 
Group work has a strong connection to creativity. The techniques of brainstorming are 
applicable to individual work, however the group setting of brainstorming has been 
strongly associated with the method. This is in part due to considering creativity as a trait 
of people. If some people are creative and some are not, and it's difficult to tell the 
difference between them, then the best way to ensure a creative result is to mix a few 
people together. Hopefully one of them is creative and will spur the others forward. 
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Gordon (1961) wrote that the c o m m o n approach to creativity is as follows; T will select 
creative people, but since creativity is so mysterious and unpredictable, I may have missed 
on some, so I will put several together and hope for the best'. Gordon (1961) said that the 
team using an undisciplined approach degenerates toward the safest, most obvious and 
most superficial solution available; far from the cooperative ideal of group creativity. 
Brainstorming provided a setting for idea generation. As noted already the central element 
to creativity is a change in perception, a move outside the square. Osborn's (1948) model 
included techniques for active divergent thinking, but in many ways they have been 
overshadowed by the brainstorming model. The techniques Osborn (1948) suggested for 
promoting divergent thinking was the following list offocussingverbs. 
1. Seek alternatives 
2. Find other uses 
3. Find similar ideas and copy 
4. Modify 
5. Magnify 
6. Exaggerate 
7. Minify 
8. Substitute 
9. Re-arrange 
10. Reverse 
11. Combine 
(Focussing Verbs; Osborn 1948) 
The checklist provided ways to jog thinking from dominant paradigms. The method 
requires discipline and focussed effort to explore the resulting possibilities. For instance, a 
suggestion like magnify may initially lead to no ideas, but some effort must be made to 
follow this train of thought, otherwise perceptions remain unchanged. The purpose of 
focussing verbs is to actively divert the mind in a direction that might not occur if old 
habits are allowed to dictate. 
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Osborn's personal experience of brainstorming was in the advertising industry. D e Bono 
(1992a) has been critical of brainstorming and suggested that the advertising industry relies 
on novelty and that this approach is not always appropriate where ideas must have greater 
serious application. Likewise, Osborn intended brainstormingto be purposeful. 
But in almost every other field a scatter-gun approach to creativity makes no more sense than 
having a thousand monkeys banging away on typewriters in the hope that one of them might 
produce a Shakespeareplay. (de Bono 1992a, p. 39) 
Thefirstrule is that the problem should be specific rather than general-it should be narrowed 
down so that the brainstormerscan shoot their ideas at a single target. (Osborn 1948, p. 268) 
It may be that Osborn's intention of a specific purpose for brainstorming session has been 
poorly adopted. Perhaps the generation of wild ideas has become the main thrust of many 
brainstorming efforts? The scattergun approach clearly would be a normal and necessary 
feature ofthe free-association of brainstorming, but hopefully this approach would be taken 
within the confines of a certain domain. Alternatively the employment of focussing verbs 
as tools of active divergence do not necessarily involve free association; the new ideas may 
arise not from enthusiastic association but through forced divergent thinking. 
In terms of the success of the brainstorming model, Osborn cited examples from many 
organisations and people that attested to its value. These examples appeared to be an 
indication of the usefulness of the process and its continued popularity has lead the term 
brainstorming to be synonymous with creative thinking. Further to this there have been 
many studies that examined the effect of brainstorming (discussed later). In some studies 
the method was described as the Osborn-Parnes method and as such this deserves a brief 
explanation. The term Osborn-Parnes refers to the process Parnes (1967) developed based 
on the brainstorming model. The Osborn-Parnes model consisted of the steps outlined 
below. The model was a problem-solving framework around the brainstorming core. 
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1. Understandingproblems, problems as opportunities 
2. Defining the problem, what is the real problem, Asking 'Why?' 
3. Deferringjudgement (brainstormingmodel) and challenging habits 
4. Forming associations 
5. Evaluating ideas 
6. Putting ideas into action 
7. Finding; facts, problems, ideas, solutions and acceptance 
8. Observation and perception 
9. Applying the total process to practice problems 
10. Using checklists for idea finding (Osborn's tools) 
11. Making unusual ideas useful 
12. Applying total process to own problems with direction 
13. Forcing relationships, morphology and matrix 
14. Applying totalprocess to own problems, self-directed 
15. Making snap decisions 
16. Summary 
(Osborn-ParnesProblem Solving Method; Parnes (1967)) 
In summary, Osborn recognised many of the typical blockages to creative thought and 
sought to overcome these with a set of simple rules for group meetings that would facilitate 
free expression, combination of ideas and exploration of seemingly weak possibilities. 
These rules also applied to individual thinking although were often applied in a group 
setting. Furthermore Osborn recognised that creative thinking could be enhanced by 
techniques that provided a w a y to actively divert thinking from its well-worn pathways. 
This part ofthe model has been overshadowed by the brainstorming rules for group efforts. 
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3.8.5 Lateral Thinking 
Lateral thinking: a way of thinking which seeks the solution to a problem by making 
associations with apparently unrelated areas, rather than pursuing one logical train of 
thought (The Macquarie Dictionary 1985) 
Lateral thinking characterises thinking outside the boundary. In many ways its usage as a 
term for creative thinking is convenient being not associated with artistic endeavour. In 
connection with creative thinking, the use ofthe term lateral thinking arises from the work 
of de Bono (1971) w h o defined main features of lateral thinking as follows. 
/. Recognition of dominant polarizing ideas. 
2. The search for different ways of looking at things. 
3. A relaxation of the rigid control of vertical thinking. , 
4. The use of chance. 
(de Bono 1971, p. 68) 
De Bono characterised lateral thinking with the diagram below (Figure 3-9) showing that 
lateral thinking is a jump from the obvious. While the side path looked small, once the 
jump is made the pathway appears as wide as the original path. Like Koestier (1969), de 
Bono (1992a) described lateral thinking as a way of thinking that w e normally associate 
with humour. A punch-line delivers an alternative way of seeing the situation described in 
the main body of a joke. Similarly, lateral thinking describes a way of thinking that diverts 
off the main path to potentially show another way of looking at a problem. 
/ / Lateral Thinking 
Figure 3-9 Lateral Thinking (de Bono 1992a) 
119 
The model employs the classic, outside the square model of creative thinking, but moving 
outside the dominant ways of thinking requires some stimulation. Escaping from the well-
worn path can be firstly achieved by recognising the dominance ofthe path. Creating the 
new idea can be achieved by a deliberate examination of current assumptions and making a 
challenge to these assumptions. D e Bono (1971) called this recognition of dominant 
polarizing ideas. Once assumptions are recognised they can be challenged by first simply 
attempting to find another way to view the situation. More directly though, the assumed 
boundaries can be challenged directly by employing processes such as Osborn's (1948) 
focussing verbs as prompts. Alternatively the problem domain might be shifted by the 
introduction of a random word, or perhaps by analogy to another situation, or maybe by 
deliberately reversing an assumed relationship. 
Another useful technique is to turn upside down deliberately by consciously reversing some 
relationship. Instead of looking at the walls of a house as support for the roof the walls may 
be considered as suspendedfrom the roof, (de Bono 1971, p. 79) 
As noted so far restructuring of ideas in a new way is pivotal to creativity. Often this can 
be facilitated by forcing thinking outside current patterns. The divergent thinking 
techniques to achieve this shift often result in unreal or illogical concepts. A s noted earlier, 
Einstein observed that many of his constructing thoughts involved illogical ideas. To 
facilitate the consideration of possibilities brought about via divergent thinking, de Bono 
(1969) introduced the word PO. 
The whole purpose of PO is to provide a temporary escape from the discrete and ordered 
stability of language which reflects the fixed patterns of a self-organizingmemory-system. 
(de Bono 1969, p. 287) 
Sometimes it is necessary to consider an idea that is an impossibility to subsequently arrive 
at a new, possible, idea (Rickards, 1988). P O can act as a signal that an idea is intended to 
be provocative, intended to be a stepping stone, rather than a firm, fixed idea. P O is simply 
a word to facilitate the processes important in creative thinking. 
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Lateral thinking then is in some ways synonymous for divergent thinking. The techniques 
associated with the term involve the recognition and challenging of dominant ways of 
thinking and the injection of stimulation to encourage thinking outside the square. 
3.8.6 Six Thinking Hats 
The tendency in our culture toward critical thinking and judgement is recognised as a major 
obstacle to creative thinking. As such Osborn's model of brainstorming in groups placed 
great importance on the elimination of criticism. Similarly, de Bono's (1985) six thinking 
hats tool can separate phases of thinking into bite size pieces thus offering the opportunity 
to be focussed on creative thought at one time and the judgement of ideas at another time. 
The six hats represented six modes of thinking (Table 3-6). 
Metaphor 
Green Hat 
Yellow Hat 
Black Hat 
Blue Hat 
Red Hat 
White Hat 
Focus of Thinking 
Creativity, alternatives, possibilities 
Benefits, values, opportunities 
Caution, risks, judgement 
Control, managing the thinking 
Emotion, feelings, intuition 
Information, facts, data 
Table 3-6 Six Thinking Hats (de Bono 1985) 
Obviously these words described the kind of thinking that all people do sometimes. Thus 
rather than anything new in the way of content, the six hats represented a way to structure 
thinking. The method aimed at providing a better way to organise thinking to achieve 
greater thinking breadth. One of the main reasons for this was to overcome a common 
tendency for criticism and judgement to dominate our thinking. Clearly judgemental 
thinking is important however it is well recognised that overused it is a hindrance to idea 
production. The six hats method provides a model for focussing on one kind of thinking at 
a time, such as creative thinking. The model provides a way to signal that other types of 
thinking will be used at an appropriate time. In some ways the blue hat is the key to the 
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system. The blue hat is the control hat; the thinking about thinking hat, planning when 
creative thinking is appropriate and when other types of thinking are appropriate. 
The six hats method was intended to create a model of parallel thinking as against 
adversarial thinking. Parallel thinking meaning the situation where groups of people think 
in the same mode at the same time. Thus all the yellow hat thinking is done at the same 
time, all the black hat thinking at the same time, and so on. 
The method promotes involvement. In de Bono's words it 'separates ego from 
performance'. Often it seems that we are discouraged from thinking about both sides of an 
argument because we find ourselves committed intellectually to one side. Backing winners 
in a social sense, involves making early judgements and seeing them though whereas the 
six hats system encourages all people to put forward ideas on both sides. Everyone is able 
to contribute to the exploration without denting ego's as they are just playing the game. 
The metaphor of thinking hats is a convenient way to signal various thinking modes for a 
number of reasons. Hats have been traditionally associated with thinking, for example;put 
on your thinking cap. The six hats represent roles which is in accordance with the 
traditional association of hats and roles. For instance police officers, chefs, baseballers, 
surf-lifesavers, are all easily identified by their hats. Hats are also physically near to the 
mind, and are also physically easy to swap around. Koestier (1969) used the symbol ofthe 
thinking cap to describe the switch of thinking necessary to recombine old data in a new 
way. He said that the most difficult form of thinking is the art of handling the same bundle 
of data as before but relating them in a different way; and this virtually means putting on a 
different kind of thinking-cap for the moment (Koestier 1969, p. 235). 
Koestier highlighted that the thinking cap can be on for a moment; a switch of thinking for 
a set amount of time. This facilitates the key value of the six hats method which is to 
provide a focus on creative thinking at the exclusion of other kinds of thinking. 
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3.8.7 Illustration of the Process of Active Divergent Thinking 
To illustrate the processes of active divergent thinking, consider the following examples. 
3.8.7.1 Example One: The Monk and Mountain Trail 
One morning exactly at sunrise, a Buddhist monk began to climb a tall mountain. The narrow 
path, no more than afoot or two wide, spiralled around the mountain to a glittering temple at 
the summit. 
The monk ascended the path at varying rates of speed, stopping many times along the way to 
rest and to eat the dried fruit he carried with him. He reached the temple shortly before 
sunset. After several days of fasting and meditation he began his journey back along the same 
path, starting at sunrise and again walking at variable speeds with many pauses along the 
way. His average speed descending was, of course, greater than his average climbing speed. 
Prove that there is a spot along the path that the monk will occupy on both trips at precisely 
the same time of day. (Koestier 1969, p. 183-184) 
Logical reasoning seems to indicate that it would be very unlikely for the monk to be in any 
one place at the same time on both days. Koestier cited an example of h o w a person with 
no scientific background solved the problem by visualising the m o n k travelling up and then 
superimposed the m o n k also travelling down. It was then clear that the monks must meet. 
Travelling up and down simultaneously is impossible and yet thinking about the problem 
this w a y lead to the solution. Logic can easily get in the way of a logical solution. A n 
active injection of an illogical visual image lead to a logical solution. 
3.8.7.2 Example Two: The Gardener and the Olive Trees 
You're a gardener. Your employer asks you to plant four olive trees so that each one is 
exactly the same distancefrom each ofthe others. How wouldyou arrange the trees? 
(Barry & Rudinow 1989, p. 376) 
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Arrangements in a square or in a line didn't work. Three trees in a triangle worked but 
wherever the other one goes it is closer to some than others. To solve the problem I 
challenged what I was assuming about the problem. Trees are normally outside; as a 
challenge to this I considered the idea that the trees be indoors. This lead m e to the 
possibility of having some ofthe trees on a different story ofthe house. The solution then 
seemed to be to have three trees on one level in a triangle and the other tree upstairs at the 
centre of the triangle. Given appropriate proportions the problem would be solved. 
Outside the house trees could be planted in a pyramid by using a small hill or depression. 
This solution is obvious and logical; but that doesn't mean that I found the solution by 
logic. Indeed putting the fruit trees inside had nothing to do with logic at all. As in the 
previous example, actively injecting an illogical challenge lead to a logical solution. 
3.8.7.3 Example Three: Active Divergent Thinking and Safe Design 
To illustrate the process of creative thinking in safe design, consider a piece of equipment 
found in many homes. Some time ago the A B C in Australia screened a program about the 
safety of exercise cycles. The main focus of the television program was the problem of 
children becoming caught in the moving parts. They investigated a number of exercise 
cycles and showed how the guarding of the wheel, chain, sprocket and so on, was often 
inadequate. The program was critical of the poor guarding on many bicycles. Australian 
Standard 4092—1993, Exercise Cycles - Safety Requirements, noted that there has been 
injuries to the fingers and hands of young children mainly involving the chains, sprockets, 
flywheel spokes and flywheel loading mechanisms. To solve the problem, the most 
obvious route would be to follow the advice ofthe Standard. 
Guards shall be provided to protect dangerous parts at all locations which constitute shear, 
crushing, or drawing-in hazards, giving particular attention to the following: 
(a) The flywheel 
(b) The drive train 
(c) The flywheel loading mechanism. (SAA AS 4092-1993, p. 6) 
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Exercise cycles in the stores now would seem to be guarded according to the standard, but 
are more expensive. Maybe safety comes with a price tag? In safety, the hierarchy of 
control model gives priority to elimination ofthe hazard. Therefore consider the following. 
1. Hazard (potential to cause injury): Moving Parts 
2. First Priority: Eliminate Moving Parts 
3. Risk Control: Redesign the exercise cycle eliminating the wheel, chain and sprockets. 
4. Outcome: Simpler, lighter, cheaper and inherently safer exercise machine. 
In hindsight this is completely logical (Figure 3-10). The wheel serves no purpose. The 
necessary resistance could be built into the pedal crankshaft. This machine would seem to 
have potential to be cheaper and inherently safer, due to the absence of many of the 
hazardous parts. This example shows the value of adopting the hierarchy of control model. 
The focus on high-order elimination control lead to improved safety along with 
simultaneous benefits such as cost savings, and a lighter cycle with lower maintenance 
needs. This contrasts with the guarding options that involved increased costs and offered 
no side benefits. The hierarchy of control thus served as a means of actively diverting the 
thinking from the dominant paradigms. 
Figure 3-10 Active Divergent Thinking and Exercise Cycle Safety 
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3.9 Research Studies in Creative Thinking/Brainstorming 
In 1950, Guilford wrote of the neglect on the part of psychologists of the subject of 
creativity. Guilford (1950) analysed the index of Psychological Abstracts for the preceding 
23 years and found that only 186 ofthe 121,000 (or approximately 0.15%) of titles were 
listed as relating the subject of creativity. Recently, Sternberg and Lubart (1996) conducted 
a similar analysis of Psychological Abstracts between 1975 and 1994 and found that papers 
relating to creativity represented approximately 0.5% of the total. This represented 
something of an increase in the interest in creativity as a proportion of the field of 
psychology, but Sternberg and Lubart highlighted the relative lack of research about 
creativity by showing that in the same period studies oi reading skill, represented 1.5% of 
the abstracts; three times that of creativity. 
Among the relatively small pool of creativity research noted above, only a portion of this 
research has concentrated centrally on methods for improvement of creativity. While the 
subject of creative thinking is wider than brainstorming, it's influence has been strong. The 
discussion that follows thus centres on research that was undertaken following the growth 
in use ofthe brainstorming technique. A full description of each of these research studies 
in a way so as the methodologies and results could be fully understood would impede the 
reading to a significant extent, therefore the summaries of the following research studies 
can be found in Appendix A. 
3.9.1 The Effect of Brainstorming 
Studies on the subject of brainstorming have typically tested the effect of either training in 
brainstorming versus no training; or tested the effect of encouraging subjects to use the 
brainstorming instructions versus giving them no such instructions. The subsequent tests 
have mainly been based on generating alternative ideas in response to a simple problem 
such as; find alternative uses for a coat hanger. Assessment then has typically involved 
measuring the quantity and quality ofthe output; a model established by Guilford (1950). 
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Many studies have shown that training in brainstorming lead to improvement on these 
tests; both in terms of idea fluency and often a measure ofthe quality ofthe ideas (Meadow 
& Parnes 1959; Parnes & Meadow 1959; Parnes 1961; Reese and Parnes 1970; Baer 1988). 
The magnitude ofthe changes, where reported, have been in the order of 100% (Parnes & 
Meadow 1959) and some have been reported to have maintained some years after the 
training (Parnes & Meadow 1960). While the studies of brainstorming training have 
usually been confirming of each other, one contrasting study found an increase in the 
originality, or quality, but no effect in terms of idea fluency (Kabanoff & Bottger 1991). 
Further studies, have shown that creative output was improved by encouraging subjects to 
use brainstorming instructions as against emphasising non-brainstorming where subjects 
were encouraged to be critical of ideas (Parnes & Meadow 1959; Meadow, Parnes & Reese 
1959; Weisskopf-Joelson & Eliseo 1961; Parloff & Hanson 1964; Sappington & Farrar 
1982; Szymanski & Harkins 1992). Where reported the increases in total idea output have 
been 70% (Parnes & Meadow 1959), 100% (Szymanski & Harkins 1992), 100%-300% 
(Weisskopf-Joelson& Eliseo 1961) and 450% (Parloff and Hanson 1964) and in terms of 
good ideas have been between 50% (Sappington and Farrar 1982) and 100% (Meadow, 
Parnes & Reese 1959; Parloff and Hanson 1964). 
Osborn asserted that brainstorming should lead to an increase not only in the number of 
ideas but also in the quality. The research by Weisskopf-Joelson & Eliseo (1961), Parloff 
and Hanson (1964), and Szymanski and Harkins (1992) tended to not support Osborn's 
claims about this relationship. However, Parnes (1961) examined the brainstorming output 
of individuals and compared the ideas produced at various stages of the brainstorming. 
Parnes showed that the number of good ideas as a proportion ofthe total, improved as the 
brainstorming progresses, thus supporting Osborn's claim. 
Osborn's model encouraged thinking in a free-wheeling, anything-is-possible style. In 
reality, this may be difficult to engender given the relative seriousness of many real-life 
problems. Some studies have examined the link between the potential end uses ofthe ideas 
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and the productive output. Sessions that seemed to lead to direct consequences have been 
shown yield less ideas than when the session seemed to be a training exercise only (Harari 
& Graham 1975; Maginn & Harris 1980). Further studies have demonstrated that 
controversial topics lead to less ideas than mundane topics (Harari & Graham 1975; Diehl 
& Stroebe 1987). These findings show the importance of generating an atmosphere of free-
wheeling, but that creating this environment may be difficult depending on the perceived 
end-uses and seriousness ofthe issue at hand. 
One of the appeals of group work is the possibility that the ideas flowing around can 
prompt the thinking of individual members. One of Osborn's claims was that the stimulus 
of other ideas are an important part of the value of generating ideas in groups. This 
prompted a number of research studies that isolated this effect to measure if it indeed was 
important. The studies that have directly examined the effect of idea-stimulus showed that 
it had no effect (Madsden & Finger 1978; Connolly, Routhieauz& Schneider 1993; Paulus, 
Dzindolet, Poletes & Camacho 1993). It appears that the supposed value ofthe stimulation 
given to individual thinking by the presence of other ideas has not been supported by 
research. It seems that this is not a particular reason to work in groups. 
Criticism is supposed to be withheld in brainstorming. Studies in this area have shown that 
performance can be reduced with a deliberate increase in the level of criticism (Smith 
1993). Direct monitoring of the group's performance has been shown to reduce idea output 
(Diehl & Stroebe 1987) while another study showed that direct monitoring had an equal 
effect with video taping and the prospect of later evaluation (Maginn & Harris 1980). 
There is evidence that criticism reduces performance, however eliminating criticism may 
be difficult as other work has shown that critical people are perceived as more intelligent 
and capable (Amabile 1983). While reducing criticism may increase idea production, 
there are social, ego-based reasons why criticism will be difficult to discourage. 
In summary, some studies have investigated training in brainstorming and found it to be 
effective (Meadow & Parnes 1959; Parnes & Meadow 1959; Parnes 1961; Reese and 
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Parnes 1970; Baer 1988). Others have examined the effect of encouraging subjects to 
employ the brainstorming instructions versus non-brainstorming instructions, and found 
this to be also successful (Parnes & Meadow 1959; Meadow, Parnes & Reese 1959; 
Weisskopf-Joelson & Eliseo 1961; Parloff & Hanson 1964; Sappington & Farrar 1982; 
Szymanski & Harkins 1992). Further work has shown that the components of 
brainstorming are valid by showing that influences like criticism (Smith 1993) or the 
potential for evaluation (Diehl & Stroebe 1987) have a negative effect on idea productivity. 
The brainstorming model invites a free-flowing approach to the generation of ideas. Some 
studies have shown that treating a topic as frivolous has been shown to be beneficial as 
these types of topics lead to greater brainstorming performance (Harari & Graham 1975; 
Maginn & Harris 1980; Diehl & Stroebe 1987). Idea-stimulus, however, a key part ofthe 
supposed value of group brainstorming, has been shown to have no effect (Madsden & 
Finger 1978; Connolly, Routhieauz & Schneider 1993; Paulus, Dzindolet, Poletes & 
Camacho 1993). 
While the studies above either investigated brainstorming components or the technique as a 
whole, a great deal of research interest springing from the brainstorming method has been 
in the area ofthe effectiveness of group thinking. 
3.9.2 Performance of Nominal Groups versus Interacting Groups 
The popularity of brainstorming encouraged group creative thinking. Many studies have 
since compared group brainstorming with individual brainstorming. To test this, the 
productivity of nominal groups (the compilation of individual efforts) have often been 
compared to that of interacting groups. Nominal groups have consistently been more 
productive. Studies of groups of four have shown that nominal groups were more 
productive than interacting groups (Taylor, Berry & Block 1958; Bouchard, Barsaloux & 
Drauden 1974; Harari & Graham 1975; Graham 1977; Maginn & Harris 1980; Jablin 1981; 
Diehl & Stroebe 1987; Diehl & Stroebe 1991; Thornburg 1991; Stroebe, Diehl & 
Abakoumkin 1992; Camacho & Paulus 1995; Furnham & Yazdanpanahi 1995; Paulus, 
Larey & Ortega 1995). Studies with larger groups have shown similar effects and have 
129 
shown that as group sizes increase these effects become pronounced (Bouchard & Hare 
1970; Bouchard, Barsaloux & Drauden 1974). A variant on the typical nominal group 
research has been studies where interacting groups interacted via a computer rather than in 
actual contact. Comparison of these electronically interacting groups with regular nominal 
groups have shown that they yield similar outcomes for groups of up to six or eight 
participants, while the electronic method has been more effective for larger groups (Dennis 
& Valacich 1993; Gallupe, Dennis, Cooper, Valacich, Bastianutti & Nunamaker 1992; 
Valacich, Dennis & Connolly 1994). 
While the literature is dominated by studies showing the effectiveness of nominal groups, 
there have been some studies showing that nominal and interacting groups were similar for 
a group size of four. Bouchard (1969) found that semi-interacting and nominal groups 
were similar, however the semi-interactinggroups were worked half of the time as nominal 
groups and half the time interacting. Paulus, Dzindolet, Poletes and Camacho (1993) also 
found nominal and interacting groups of four to be similar, however this only occurred 
when comparing nominal groups to interacting groups under the influence of individual 
assessment. Madsden and Finger (1978) showed that nominal groups only outperformed 
interacting groups after practice, without the opportunity for practice their performance was 
similar to the interacting groups. 
In groups of two and three the differences have not been so clear. Dyads, or groups of two, 
have been shown to be equally effective when interacting as when in nominal groups 
(Thornburg 1991; Furnham & Yazdanpanahi 1995). In groups of three, Street (1974) 
showed that nominal groups were more effective than interacting groups of three, however 
both these types of groups were outperformed by interacting groups of two! 
In summary, interacting groups of four or more are rarely as productive as nominal groups. 
Due to the decline in per-person performance in interacting groups, the superiority of 
nominal groups grows as the group size grows. The performance of interacting groups has 
actually been shown to not improve as group size was increased from four to seven 
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(Bouchard, Barsaloux & Drauden 1974). In terms of idea quality, nominal groups have 
sometimes been shown to generate better ideas (Diehl & Stroebe 1991) and sometimes 
been shown to be no different (Taylor, Berry & Block 1958). The acceptance of ideas, and 
the ratings of quality has been found to be equally good following nominal group work as 
following interacting group work (Graham 1977). The superiority of nominal groups has 
been demonstrated over a variety of brainstorming session lengths (Diehl & Stroebe 1991). 
3.9.3 Satisfaction and Perception of Success in Interacting Groups 
Through objective comparison of performance, many studies have shown that interacting 
groups were less effective than nominal groups. Measuring the perception of the subjects 
however has drawn out the reversed impression. Some studies have questioned subjects 
about how they perceived the relative performance ofthe groups. The results have shown a 
contrast between the actual performance and the perception of performance. Subjects 
believed that group brainstorming was more enjoyable (Diehl & Stroebe 1991) and more 
effective (Stroebe, Diehl & Abakoumkin 1992; Paulus, Dzindolet, Poletes & Camacho 
1993; Paulus, Larey & Ortega 1995). While the enjoyment is not argued, the effectiveness 
would seem to be a clear mis-perception. Although only Diehl & Stroebe (1991) measured 
enjoyment, this factor may explain the perception of effectiveness. 
3.9.4 The Reasons for Failure of Interacting Groups 
Given the failure of interacting groups to live up to the predictions of Osborn, a number of 
studies have attempted to extract the factors that inhibit idea generation in interacting 
groups. Some personality factors such as homogenous personality (Hoffman 1959), 
apprehension toward communication (Jablin 1981) and social anxiousness (Camacho & 
Paulus 1995) have been shown to inhibit interacting group brainstorming. The possibilities 
for the poor performance generally centre on a few themes such as blocking, social loafing 
and evaluation apprehension. Blocking is the term used to describe the situation where 
people can't talk when they have an idea because someone else is talking, in the meanwhile 
they forget their idea, or think it's too similar to another idea, and so on. Social loafing is 
the phenomenon where an individual's motivation in an interacting group is reduced as the 
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assessment of the performance will be based on the whole group rather than individually. 
Evaluation apprehension means that individuals may be discouraged from making 
suggestions as they fear harsh evaluation of their ideas. 
Sometimes it has been thought that the effectiveness of interacting brainstorming is 
affected by the reduced individual responsibility and motivation that comes with having 
others to provide the ideas. This effect has been known as social loafing. Like Sims' 
(1928) study showing the value of individual motivation in simple mental tasks such as 
reading, the performance of interacting groups when brainstorming has been shown to be 
improved with the use of individual assessment (Diehl & Stroebe 1987) and by giving 
subjects an opportunity to compare their own performance with earlier participants 
(Szymanski & Harkins 1992). This would indicate some type of individual motivational 
increase or perhaps goal setting. Latham & Saari (1979) showed that goals increase 
performance whether self-set or imposed, however Latham and Saari gave no indication of 
the relationship of goals to performance. Locke (1982) showed that higher goals increase 
performance, although Locke's study was flawed and Lorenzi (1988) later found that 
higher goals lead to only slightly higher performance and this was dependant on the 
incentive of a cash prize, without such an incentive the goal levels had no effect. There 
seems to be no strong evidence that goal-setting can lead to substantial improvements in the 
production of ideas. Further studies, investigating the impact of individual assessment, 
have shown that individual assessment made no difference to the performance of 
interacting groups (Diehl & Stroebe 1991; Price 1993). The evidence ofthe existence of 
social loafing is thus mixed. Mongeau (1993) argued that the group leadership that Osborn 
emphasised has not been stressed in many studies and that the presence of stronger 
leadership may impact on the participation of individual group members. Although 
intuitively attractive, there seems no clear evidence that individual assessment will spur 
greater motivation and consequently greater group productivity. 
In addition to these personality or personal factors, there's been substantial interest in the 
examination of structural features of group interaction that give nominal groups an 
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advantage. Subjects in nominal groups are not restricted by the contributions of others 
when adding ideas whereas in interacting groups it is difficult for more than one person to 
speak at a time. Blocking of ideas has been suggested as a possible reason for the failure of 
group brainstorming to live up to the perceptions and expectations. Introducing small 
impediments to the additions of ideas in nominal groups (computer-based)has been shown 
to reduce the performance of nominal groups. These impediments included a small delay 
in the keyboard used to add ideas (Gallupe, Cooper, Grise & Bastianutti 1994); the 
necessity to add ideas one at a time rather than simultaneously (Gallupe, Cooper, Grise & 
Bastianutti 1994; Valacich, Dennis & Connolly 1994; Diehl & Stroebe 1987; Diehl & 
Stroebe 1991); and the requirement to take turns in adding ideas (Gallupe, Cooper, Grise & 
Bastianutti 1994). Diehl and Stroebe (1991) found that the presence of communication 
between members did not reduce the effectiveness of nominal groups, but the imposition of 
a speaking order with requirement to self-manage the order severely impeded the 
performance of nominal groups. It seems that there is reasonable evidence that some ofthe 
poor performance in groups is due to the difficulty in communicating and recording ideas. 
3.9.5 Studies of the CoRT Program 
The C o R T program is named after the Cognitive Research Trust that de Bono established 
in the United Kingdom in the 1970's. Studies of the C o R T program represent the only 
substantial body of research that followed de Bono's writing. The objectives ofthe C o R T 
program are as follows; 
/. That there be an area in the curriculum where thinking is treated directly in its own right. 
2. That students come to regard thinking as a skill that can be improved by attention, 
learning and practice. 
3. That students come to regard themselves as thinkers. 
4. That students acquire a set of transferable thinking tools that work well in all situations 
and all areas ofthe curriculum, (de Bono 1991a, p. 1) 
The main idea is to treat thinking as a skill in its own right; distinct from information about 
any subject in particular. This is similar to the way that the skill of talking is independent 
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ofthe subject matter of the talking. The skill of talking can be applied to any subject area. 
The thrust ofthe CoRT program seems to be to create a similar effect with thinking skills. 
The CoRT teaching program has been used by school children for about twenty five years. 
The program is used in several countries and by children of various ages and ability (de 
Bono 1982; 1991a, 1991b). In a review ofthe program in the larger sphere of cognitive 
education Wolfe Mays (1985) commented that there seems to be some evidence that 
cognitive education of this type can increase ability in judgement, memory, attention and 
motivation. McPeck (1983) wrote that the CoRT program has received little or no critical 
attention from philosophers or professional educators, while Resnick (1987) said that while 
some teachers involved had voiced their opinion, the CoRT program had received little in 
the way of formal evaluation. However, both prior to 1987 and since that time, some formal 
evaluations have been reported. 
In addition to anecdotal support for the CoRT program (Chance 1986; Melchior, Kaufold 
and Edwards 1988; Adams 1989), more formal studies (see Appendix A for detail) have 
revealed an improvement in subjects' ability to generate ideas (Rosenthal, Morrison and 
Perry 1977; de Bono 1978; Edwards & Baldauf 1982; Ruffels 1986; Edwards & Baldauf 
1987; de Sanchez 1987; Eriksson 1990; Edwards 1991). Some ofthe studies indicated a 
potential transfer of the skills into improvement in school subjects (Ruffels, 1986; Edwards 
& Baldauf, 1987; Edwards, 1991). These indications of transfer are tentative and 
sometimes contradictory. The skills have not been conclusively shown to transfer into 
problems distant from those in the program itself (Eriksson 1991). 
While the studies are all supportive in their nature, they are not without qualifications. For 
instance Rosenthal, Morrison and Perry (1977) measured the effects of different methods of 
teaching the techniques rather than the effect of the techniques themselves, while others 
were only reported in summary (de Bono 1978), lacked a control group (Edwards & 
Baldauf 1982; Edwards & Baldauf 1987), or included other material, or modified material, 
in the program (Ruffels 1986; de Sanchez 1987). Bearing these limiting factors in mind, 
the studies have indicated that the CoRT program has value in improving thinking skills. 
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3.9.6 Summary Research Studies in Creative Thinking/Brainstorming 
In summary the research on brainstorming has shown that in terms of creative production 
(usually measures of productivity of ideas and quality of ideas); brainstorming instructions 
and brainstormingtrainingare effective mechanisms. Ofthe components of brainstorming, 
the negative role of criticism has been confirmed, although the injection of novel ideas has 
been shown to have no effect, and working in interacting groups has been shown to be less 
effective than the combined ability of the individuals alone. The poor performance of 
groups m a y be explained at least in part by personality factors such as social anxiousness 
but more readily on restrictions on the processes of adding ideas. The relationship Osborn 
predicted between quality and quantity has not been confirmed. Studies of the C o R T 
program in schools have indicated that these type of techniques m a y also be effective in 
terms of enhancing creative thinking. 
3.10 Assessment of Creative Thinking 
In the 1950's Guilford (1950) suggested that creative output could be considered as being 
composed of factors such as fluency, flexibility and novelty as well as other factors such as 
sensitivity to problems and synthesising ability. Since that time creativity has been most 
often measured in terms of idea fluency (output of ideas) and some measure of idea quality 
(like originality, novelty or usefulness), such as in the popular Torrance Tests (Torrance 
1974). The Torrance Tests were designed for use with school students. The tests present 
the students with a case study problem. The cases are presented as a picture, or a written 
description or sometimes both. A n example is the test of unusual uses. 
Most people throw their empty cardboard boxes away, but they have thousands of interesting 
and unusual uses. In the space below and on the next page, list as many of these interesting 
and unusual uses as you can think of. Do not limit yourself to any one size of box. You may 
use as many boxes as you like. Do not limit yourself to the uses you have seen or heard about; 
think of as many possible new uses as you can. (Torrance 1974, p. 10) 
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The time for students to attempt the tasks ranged from five minutes to ten minutes. 
Responses are scored against three main measures. 
1. Fluency: The number of relevant ideas. 
2. Flexibility: A measure of the breadth of ideas (by allocating ideas to standard 
categories) 
3. Originality: A measure of the originality of the ideas. This is measured against a 
standard set of ideas. Based on past use of the tests with 500 subjects Torrance made 
lists of potential ideas and then dived the list into three categories according to their 
commonness. Ideas that were less often suggested were rated as more original. 
The Torrance Tests for creative thinking are the most widely cited standardised test of 
creative thinking (Shaughnessy 1995). While many researchers have used their own 
assessment techniques, these have usually been based around a similar measurement such 
as idea quantity and idea quality. This methodology has been extremely common 
throughout studies of creativity. Among the research cited in this thesis almost all have 
used these factors in their assessment of creativity. Cooper (1991) added that the Torrance 
Tests have significant validity and reliability although could benefit from some updating in 
the breadth of creativity that is considered and some revision of materials. Polland (1994) 
argued that relying on Guilford's components of creativity (fluency, flexibility and 
originality) is far from ideal and suggested that the originality classifications are subjective 
and can too easily classify ideas as un-original. Polland says that ...the Torrance Tests call 
for responses to questions for which they already have too many answers.' (Polland 1994, 
p. 14). While not suggesting an alternative way to measure creativity, Polland put forward 
the proposal that creativity is personal and depends heavily of the motivation and personal 
interest ofthe subject and that output can be creative for one and not creative for someone 
else. While there are some detractors, Guilford's model is yet to be replaced as a 
methodology for the assessment of creative output. 
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3.11 Creative Thinking: Summary 
Historically there have been some difficulties with the study of creative thinking by 
examining people w h o were very creative. This has been limiting as it implied the role of 
natural talent. More fruitful gain has been made with the strong recognition by 
psychologists early this century of the problem of the uncreative mind. It is thought that 
the best functions ofthe mind, such as recognition and repetition, simultaneously inhibit the 
generation of new ideas. B y studying past creative moments it has become apparent that 
there were often serendipitious events that provided a turning point in the thinking of those 
involved. Consequently it has become c o m m o n to suggest that more of these fortuitous 
events can be deliberately generated by the use of specific techniques that widen the 
potential domain of solutions to a problem. S o m e ofthe simplest involve just searching for 
alternatives, or gathering a group of people to do the same, thus relying on different 
viewpoints, and the possibility of combination. These methods might often be sufficient. 
More formal methods involve active divergent thinking or deliberately challenging current 
assumptions. The techniques can be summarised into three main areas (Table 3-7). The 
first designed to create a creative climate, the second to force relationships between an 
element of the problem at hand and an introduced idea, and the third group of techniques 
are based on altering perception of a problem domain by challenging current assumptions. 
T o these w e could add a fourth set of techniques that aim to broaden of thinking such as 
Gardner's multiple intelligences model, the techniques of mind mapping and so on. 
Techniques of Active Divergent Thinking 
Creative Climate Forcing Relationships Breaking the Boundaries 
• Separate Idea 
Generation and Analysis 
• Exclude Criticism 
• Morphology 
• Analogy 
• Substitution 
• Combination 
• Random Word 
• Magnify 
• Exaggerate 
• Minify 
• Modify 
• Re-arrange 
• Reverse, Challenge 
• Hierarchy of Control 
Table 3-7 Techniques of Active Divergent Thinking 
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Importantly the most apparent technique to be added is the hierarchy of control, a 
technique of active divergent thinking for safety improvement. In safety there is a 
continuing need to develop new approaches to risk control and thus creative thinking would 
seem to be relevant. The specific techniques share strong parallels. The example shown 
above of the exercise cycles showed that the hierarchy of control is functionally much the 
same as many tools in creative thinking. The high-order steps in the hierarchy attempt to 
shift thinking outside the boundaries ofthe current paradigm. 
Weisberg and Alba (1981) demonstrated an important lesson in creative thinking that will 
be also relevant in the application of creative thinking to safety. They showed that breaking 
the assumed boundary in the nine-dot problem, while integral to the ultimate solution, was 
not an instant pathway to the solution. Similarly, the mechanisms of creativity or the 
hierarchy of control, rarely lead to immediately elegant solutions. More often the 
techniques of active divergent thinking (such as elimination) don't make any sense. 
Therefore, there needs to be a period of manipulation to see if the idea can be made to 
work, or to see what other ideas can be developed as a result. The value of active divergent 
thinking may often be only realised with some manipulation of the ideas. Should critical 
thinking be brought to bear on the process too early then its likely that the thinking will 
move back inside the square. Thus active divergent thinking usually has to be followed by 
some effort to manipulate and improve the ideas put forward by these processes because it 
is likely that they will not immediately make sense. Their true value will only be realised 
by some consideration of the possibilities that they propose. This is w h y the creative 
climate is important. Nevertheless, the movement outside the square gained potentially 
through the techniques described as active divergent thinking remains the pivot to the 
creative process. Finally, Charles Darwin: 
The Imagination is one ofthe highest prerogatives of man. By this faculty he unites former 
images and ideas, independently of the will, and thus creates brilliant and novel results. 
(Darwin 1952 (orig. 1871), p. 292) 
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Chapter Four 
Methodology 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Hypothesis 
Control at source and the hierarchy of control are the basis for preventative measures 
required by occupational health and safety legislation in Australia and internationally. The 
hierarchy typically extends from a priority of controlling hazards at their source, to less 
dependable measures such as those that relying on safe behaviour. The high order controls 
demand hazard elimination or controls that do not rely unduly on the appropriate behaviour 
of those at risk. This approach can be described as the safe place philosophy. 
The safe place principle implies that safety is best incorporated at the design stage. Given 
their influence over design, the education of engineers in the principles of safety has been 
seen for some time as a priority and some universities have integrated safety topics with 
engineering studies. In addition there have been efforts at wider integration of safety and 
engineering such as those by NIOSH (USA) and the NOHSC (Australia). The desirable 
integration of safety with engineering education has been difficult due to already crowded 
engineering curricula. The challenge therefore was to develop an innovative way to 
improve the ability of engineers to develop safe place solutions to safety problems. 
The hypothesis is that training in creative thinking methods will improve the ability of 
engineers to develop safe place solutions to safety problems. Part ofthe reasoning behind 
this hypothesis was that the thinking needed to apply the hierarchy of control shares a 
strong relationship with the principles of creative thinking. The preferred controls direct 
attention toward elimination ofthe hazard. The safe place thinking therefore challenges the 
established ways of doing things and demands a rethinking of assumptions, a re-
examination of the process of work. Techniques for creative thinking often aim toward 
similar ideals; that is, to escape from dominant paradigms and generate thinking that is 
outside the boundaries. For this reason it seemed likely that creative thinking may 
facilitate the safe place approach to prevention. The potential for employing creative 
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thinking in prevention exists within a climate of a growing emphasis on creative thinking as 
an issue of wider industrial relevance. 
Hypothesis: The hypothesis is that training in creative thinking methods would be an 
effective way to improve the ability of engineers to design for safety. 
4.2 Development of Testing Tools 
Training programs have often been evaluated by measuring the subjective usefulness ofthe 
training and quality of presentation. However, as Hale (1984) pointed out, rarely have 
training programs been evaluated in terms of their impact on performance. 
There seems to be little available in terms of a general test to measure the ability to solve 
safety problems. The Mental Measurements Yearbooks, published by the University of 
Nebraska Press, list tests of mental abilities. The ninth yearbook (Mitchell 1985) listed 
1409 various tests, but only a few of these had any relevance to safety. A few tests (four) 
of trade competence mentioned safety, while one test, the Supervisory Inventory on Safety 
developed by Kirkpatrick, specifically addressed the issue. Despite writing to the author I 
have not been able to obtain this test. The only review was not complementary and 
suggested that the use ofthe test is not justified (Carbonell 1985). 
Among a total of 477 tests, the Eleventh Yearbook, listed one further test with relevance to 
safety; the Supervisory Job Safety, published by Organizational Tests Limited. The 
summary said that the purpose of the test is to 'Measure "knowledge of and attitudes 
toward safety practices."' (Kramer & Conoley 1992). The test consisted of 80 questions 
to be answered true or false. The test was first written in 1970, however I purchased a 
recent copy. The test seems to be based on the unsafe act/unsafe condition model and 
unfortunately emphasises the safe person philosophy. For instance, according to the test 
the following statements are true; 
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• Physical or mental inadequacy often produce unsafe practices. 
• Unless 'unsafe practices' are detected early, they tend to become strongly entrenched 
work habits. 
• One sound reason for employee medical examinations is to match employee physical 
abilities to the requirements of the job. 
• 'Unsafe practices' most often develop from faulty initial instruction. 
• Every unsafe act should be corrected immediately. 
• A good way to minimize accidents is to eliminate unsafe acts. 
• Keeping the back as straight as possible when lifting heavy objects will usually avoid 
injuries. 
• Women workers should be required to wear caps or hair nets to prevent hair being caught 
in movingparts of machines. 
(A Sample of 'True' Statements from the Supervisory Job Safety Test, Organizational Tests 
Limited 1970) 
The Supervisory Job Safety Test does not reflect the type of thinking sought in prevention 
efforts today, and consequently would not be a suitable measure. For this project, the key 
was to evaluate the effectiveness of the training intervention in terms of its effect on the 
w a y that subjects would design for safety. M a n y studies of creative performance have 
employed a methodology of presenting subjects with a case study problem, allowing a 
limited time for solutions, and then assessing the performance by measuring the number of 
solutions (fluency) and very often by taking a measure of the quality of the ideas such as 
originality. This model stemmed from the methodology suggested by Guilford in 1950 and 
seems widely accepted. 
Given the absence of a suitable testing tool for creative thinking in accident prevention, a 
n e w tool was developed to measure the success of the training (Appendix B) . The 
methodology employed was that widely used in studies of creative thinking but customised 
to field of safety. A series of fictional accident case studies were developed (Table 4-1). 
Subjects completed half the tasks individually and half in teams. Half the tasks involved 
the generation of solutions for which six minutes per case was allowed and half involved 
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the prioritization (ranking) of six potential solutions to a case study problem, for which 2.5 
minutes was allowed. 
Case 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
Title 
Grain Worker and the Rail Carriage 
Lawyer and the Coconut Tree 
Motorist and the Car 
Sawyer and the Circular Saw 
Mining Supervisor and the D u m p Truck 
Bank Manager and the Chain Saw 
Aircraft Fitter and Tug 
Gardener and the Gang Mower 
Cable Laying Contractor and the Bogged Utility 
Orchardist and the Power Line 
Transport Worker and the Falling Pipes 
Production Engineer and the Forklift 
"Team" Size 
t 
t 
t 
ttt 
1 ii 
t i t i i i 
t 
t 
t 
i ii 
i ii 
iii 
Task 
Generate Solutions 
Generate Solutions 
Generate Solutions 
Generate Solutions 
Generate Solutions 
Generate Solutions 
Prioritize Solutions 
Prioritize Solutions 
Prioritize Solutions 
Prioritize Solutions 
Prioritize Solutions 
Prioritize Solutions 
Table 4-1 Case Studies and Tasks 
From this data collection, three variables of interest were drawn; 
1. Generation of Solutions (Number) 
2. Generation of Solutions (Quality: Proportion Safe Place) 
3. Prioritization of Solutions (Correlation of Ranking with Standard Ranking) 
4.2.1 Generation of Solutions (Number) 
For cases one to six subjects were required to suggest risk control solutions. Cases one, 
two and three were completed individually and cases four, five and six completed working 
as a team of three people. This variable was evaluated by simply counting the number of 
solutions generated by each subject, or team. 
4.2.2 Generation of Solutions (Quality: Proportion Safe Place) 
The assessment ofthe quality ofthe solutions was based a measure ofthe extent to which 
solutions were nearer to the safe place or nearer to the safe person philosophy. To measure 
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this, test responses were classified into these two categories according to a standard 
classification developed for this purpose. For each case a list of potential solutions was 
split into the safe place and safe person categories (Appendix C). This list provided 
standard way to classify each solution to then calculate the proportion of safe place 
solutions among a set of ideas from one subject, or from one team. 
4.2.3 Prioritization of Solutions (Correlation of Ranking with Standard 
Ranking) 
A further task was introduced which has not been common in studies of creative thinking. 
The purpose was to test the ability to prioritize solutions once they have been developed. 
This is known sometimes as convergent production (Guilford 1950) and has been described 
as the natural progression from creative efforts (Osborn 1948). However, given that this 
factor is not a central part of creative production, it has subsequently not been a strong 
feature of the assessment of creative thinking programs. While the generation of control 
options is important there comes as stage where a decision must be made as to which ofthe 
control alternatives are the best. Quality decision making skills are clearly important in 
health and safety; it must be clear what types of solutions are likely to be successful. 
Therefore the second part of the test (Book Two, Appendix B) was based on the 
prioritization of control options for a given case study in terms of their preventative 
potential. The prioritization variable was the Spearman correlation of each subject's (or 
each team's) ranking with a standard optimum ranking. The standard ranking was 
validated by expert opinion (Appendix C). 
4.2.4 Summary of Variables 
In summary, the testing tools consisted of two main tasks; generating safety solutions and 
prioritizing safety solutions. Subjects worked on half the cases individually and half as 
teams. The test was carried out in the order that the cases are numbered (Table 4-1). 
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4.3 Training Interventions 
4.3.1 Creative Thinking Training 
4.3.1.1 Rationale for the Choice of the Six Thinking Hats Program 
The creative thinking training consisted of the six thinking hats program (de Bono 1985). 
The reasons for this choice were as follows. 
Altering perception or breaking out ofthe box is a key element of creativity. The six hats 
technique embodies this principle and includes divergent thinking tools. 
It's widely believed that judgement and criticism are harmful to creative thinking but 
keeping this type of thinking at bay is difficult. The six hats model encourages 
concentration on one type of thinking at a time. Potentially this facilitates the exclusion of 
criticism from creative thinking time. 
For individuals to focus on a certain type of thinking it would seem logical that they must 
appreciate where that thinking fits in a larger framework (metacognition). The six hats 
encourages the organisation of thinking thus facilitating this metacognitive approach. 
While the effectiveness of team thinking may be questionable it is undeniable that the role 
of teams represents a major influence in working and social life. Despite the failure of 
team work in many experimental situations, their association with creativity is strong and it 
seemed wise that experiments should be carried out in both individual and team settings. 
The six thinking hats model lends itself to individual and team thinking. 
Gordon (1961) said that models for creative thinking are useless if they are not simple. 
Simplicity is one of the hallmarks of the six thinking hats method. The rules are easy to 
remember and so instructions are usually unnecessary. 
Overall the six thinking hats model provides a mechanism for creative thinking that is 
simple, portable and embodies principles of creative thinking. Furthermore while 
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brainstorming has been studied widely, other techniques like the six thinking hats model 
have not been researched so thoroughly. As an indication of the potential usefulness, the 
studies of de Bono's CoRT program for schools have been positive about the program's 
value (for example; de Sanchez 1987; Eriksson 1990; Edwards 1991). 
4.3.1.2 Accreditation and Training Delivery Format 
Advanced Practical Thinking Training (APTT) of Des Moines, USA, administer the 
certification of trainers and the six thinking hats training materials. In November 1993 I 
attended a four-day trainer's certification session in Toronto lead by de Bono. 
APTT supported this research by supplying the necessary training materials for the 
research. In return for this support they are to receive a copy of this thesis. APTT have 
made no attempt to influence the design ofthe research in any way. 
There were two versions of the training materials provided; the Short Course and Full 
Course. The longer course is essentially the same but includes more exercises. The project 
involved a mixture of these manuals, however all of the training was a similar duration 
(about one day) and covered the same topics (see below). The Technology Students' 
training was about ten to twelve hours in five sessions over a five weeks while the training 
for all other groups was completed in one day. The topics covered in the training included; 
• The nature and history of creative thinking 
• The roles of argument and critical thinking 
• Overview ofthe six thinking hats 
• Developing skills in each hat 
• Switching thinking by switching hats 
• Developing sequences of hats 
• Using the hats individually or conversationally 
• Using the hats in formal meetings 
• Note: No safety information at all was included 
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The key dot-point was perhaps the last one. The purpose of the exercise was to examine 
the effectiveness of a creative thinking training program on safety design ability. 
Obviously the inclusion of any safety examples would have compromised the study and so 
the topic of safety was positively excluded from the training. No safety examples, stories, 
exercises, etcetera of any kind were used in the training. 
4.3.2 Hazard Management Training 
The hazard management training, used in only one part of the study, was conducted by 
VIOSH-Australia over two days and involved an interactive style of learning that included 
case studies. The training emphasised many ofthe ideas discussed in Chapter 2, such as; 
1. Energy damage concept. 
2. Hierarchy of controls. 
3. Safe Place concept. 
4. Risk management (identification, assessment and control). 
4.4 Subjects for the Research 
The focus of this writing has been engineers, given their impact on the design of 
workplaces. There are clearly other groups who influence the design of workplaces and 
consequently other groups were included. There were four study groups in the research; 
three groups of students of the University of Ballarat and a group of government safety 
advisers. All subjects participated voluntarily. 
1. Engineering Students 
2. Technology Students 
3. Industry Safety Advisers 
4. Government Safety Advisers. 
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4.4.1 Engineering Students 
The engineering students were fourth year Bachelor of Engineering students at the 
University of Ballarat. They were recruited by letter and participation was voluntary. 
Forty-two students participated in the research on the 3 September 1994. 
These students had been exposed to health and safety education, mainly through third-year 
Engineering Management and fourth-year EnvironmentalPrinciples (University of Ballarat 
1994). Engineering Management consisted of three hours per week for the entire third year 
with health and safety comprising 25% ofthe content. Environmental Principles consisted 
of four hours per week for the entire fourth year. Approximately 60% of the total, and 
100% of first semester, was devoted to occupational health and safety. 
The student engineers were mid-way through fourth year and therefore had completed their 
exposure to health and safety. Formal contact had been about three hours per week for half 
a semester in third year and four hours per week for a semester in fourth year. 
4.4.2 Technology Students 
The technology students were first-year Bachelor of Technology students ofthe University 
of Ballarat. Eighteen students participated in the research over the first five weeks of 
second semester, 1994. The first semester of this course included no studies in safety. 
4.4.3 Industry Safety Advisers 
The industry safety advisers (referred to from here on as industry advisers) were students of 
the Graduate Diploma in Occupational Hazard Management at the University of Ballarat. 
This course operates by block mode over two years. The students who volunteered were a 
mixture of first and second year students, who in the main were working full-time as health 
and safety practitioners. Forty-eight industry advisers participated in the research during the 
mid-year, on-campus session, on 9 July 1994. First year students had completed one 
semester of the Graduate Diploma and the second year students had completed three 
semesters. This group had the benefit of extensive experience in occupational health and 
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safety. M a n y in this group had bachelor's degrees and as mentioned all had partially 
completed a tertiary course in occupational health and safety. 
4.4.4 Government Safety Advisers 
The government safety advisers (referred to as government advisers) were a group of 
people who work for a state government organisation. Their professional role was mainly 
as advisers to industry about health and safety. Mainly the subjects were trade qualified 
with between five and ten years experience in this job. This group was specialised and 
experienced in safety. Their formal training had typically consisted of in-house short 
courses rather than formal tertiary education. One hundred and forty-six government 
advisers participated in the research on 9 June 1995. 
4.5 Experimental Design 
The training was evaluated by comparingthe performance of untrained subjects with that of 
trained subjects. The only exception being the study with the technology students, where 
subjects were pre and post-tested in a paired design. Table 4-1 shows the broad 
experimental design while Figure 4-1, Figure 4-2, Figure 4-3 and Figure 4-4 show the 
procedures involved with each group of subjects. Subjects fell into either the untrained or 
trained groups by random selection from alphabetical lists of subject names. 
Subjects Treatment Type of Design 
Engineering Students (N=42) 
Technology Students (N=18) 
Industry Advisers (N=48) 
Government Advisers (N=146) 
Creative Thinking Training 
Creative Thinking Training 
Creative Thinking Training 
1. Creative Thinking Training 
Untrained (N=21) v Trained (N=21) 
Pre-test (N=15) v Post-test (N=>12) 
Untrained (N=24) v Trained (N=24) 
Untrained (N=15) v Trained (N=19) 
2. Hazard Management Training Untrained (N=15) v Trained (N=112) 
3. Combined (1&2) HMTrained (N=U2) v CT Trained (N=19) 
Table 4-2 Treatments and Experimental Design 
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4.6 Statistical Analysis 
Statistical analysis was carried out on the effects of the treatment and the differences 
between the four study groups on the three key response variables. 
1. Generation of Solutions (Number) 
2. Generation of Solutions (Quality: Proportion Safe Place) 
3. Prioritization of Solutions (Correlation of Ranking with Standard Ranking) 
4.6.1 Independent Samples and Related Samples 
As Table 4-2 shows the research mainly involved testing independent untrained and trained 
groups of subjects (engineers, industry advisers and government advisers). In the case of 
the technology students the samples were related and so paired analysis (for individual 
subjects) was employed. To account for the possible effect of practice upon repeating the 
tests a second time in the trained condition, the technology students were tested untrained 
(pretest 1) and then tested again one week later after no training (pretest2) before 
completing the training and again completing the test about five weeks later. The practice 
effect was thus analysed by comparing the second pretest with the first while the treatment 
effect was analysed by comparing the trained test with the second pretest. In the case of the 
technology students working in teams, no statistical tests of significance could be 
performed as the composition of the teams changed over the term ofthe study. 
4.6.2 Generating Alternative Solutions 
These are count type data. The variable potentially ranges from zero to infinity on a 
discrete ratio scale. For the comparison of two independent samples (engineers, industry 
advisers and government advisers) the test used was the independent samples t-test. For 
comparison of two related samples (technology students) the test used was the paired t-test. 
Analysis of variance was used for the comparison of multiple independent samples 
(comparison of the groups). 
The assumptions of the t-test are normality and equality of variance within each group, 
although the t-test is known to be robust to violation of these assumptions (Kendell & 
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Stuart 1979). Tests of normality using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (Kendell & Stuart 1979) 
and Shapiro-Wilks (Kendell & Stuart 1979) tests were conducted (Table 4-4). The more 
significant result of these two tests is reported in each case. The analysis shows that the 
data representing the number of alternative solutions have a reasonable level of normality 
and therefore the t-test is appropriate. An enhanced level of normality would be desirable 
though and the often used square root (X'=VX) normalising transformation (Snedecor & 
Cochran 1967) and also the log (X-lnX) transformation (Snedecor & Cochran 1967) were 
trialed but made little improvement (detail of this is not reported). The t-test is sensitive to 
equality of variance. Levene's test of equality of variance (Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim & 
Wasserman 1996) was conducted and where appropriate the t-test for non-equal variance 
was employed and is noted where necessary throughout subsequent reporting of the 
analyses in Chapter 5. 
4.6.3 Generating Effective Solutions 
In their raw form these data are counts (similar to above) when they represent the number 
of safe-place solutions. A statistical analysis was performed on these data and reported 
briefly (see section 5.2.7) however the most important measure ofthe quality of solutions 
was the proportion of the total solutions that these good solutions represent. These are then 
proportions type data. The variable thus ranges between zero and one on a continuous ratio 
scale. For the comparison of independent and related samples the tests used were the same 
as those for the number of solutions variable described above. The normalising transform 
appropriate should the data be non-normal is the arcsin (X'=arcsin(VX)) transformation 
(Snedecor & Cochran 1967) however tests of normality (Table 4-4) revealed that no 
transformation was necessary. 
4.6.4 Prioritizing Effective Solutions 
These data are ordinal data in the raw form. However the variables analysed were 
Spearman correlation coefficients that range from -1 to +1 on a scale of interval quality. A 
t-test could be used however the tests of normality revealed poor normality (Table 4-4). 
The Fisher (z=0.51n((l+r)/(l-r))) normalising transformation commonly used for Pearson 
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correlation coefficients (Kendall, Stuart & Ord 1987) is not appropriate for the Spearman 
coefficients in this case due to the occurrence ofthe extreme values (-1 and +1) which 
result in meaningless transformations. Therefore, a non-parametric test (the Mann-Whitney 
U test) was used for the comparison of independent samples (engineers, industry advisers 
and government advisers). An alternative would have been the Kolmogorov-Smirnovtest, 
however as a direct test of centrality the Mann-Whitney (M-W) U test is more appropriate 
(Siegel & Castellan 1988). For comparison of related samples (technology students) the 
test employed was the non-parametric Paired Wilcoxon test. The non-parametric Kruskal-
Wallis (K-W) ANOVA (Siegel & Castellan 1988) was used for the comparison of multiple 
independent samples (comparison of the groups). 
4.6.5 Directional Tests 
Previous research in creative thinking and the likely link between creative thinking and the 
control of safety problems lead to the hypothesis that the treatment would enhance 
performance on the development of solutions. Given that the treatment chosen is a broad 
thinking enhancement program (as well as creative in intent) improvement was also 
predicted on the prioritization tasks. For these reasons, directional (one tailed) tests were 
used. The adopted level of significance was 5% (the actual test results are reported). 
4.6.6 Summary of the Statistical Tests Employed 
Table 4-3 summarises the statistical tests employed in the data analysis. All statistical 
analysis was carried out using SPSS for Windows: Release 6.1.3 (Norusis 1995). 
Variable 
1. Number of Alternative Solutions 
2. Proportion of Safe Place Solutions 
3. Correlation with Optimum Rank 
Two 
Independent 
t-test 
t-test 
M-Wtest 
Samples 
Related 
Paired t-test 
Paired t-test 
Paired Wilcoxon 
Multiple Samples 
Independent 
ANOVA 
ANOVA 
K-WANOVA 
Table 4-3 Summary ofthe Statistical Tests Employed 
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4.6.7 Tests of Normality 
Table 4-4 shows the summary results of tests of normality (Kolmogorov-Smirnov and 
Shapiro-Wilks) conducted on the variables used for analysis as mentioned above in 
Sections 4.6.2, 4.6.3 and 4.6.4. 
Tests of Normality 
Case Tech. 
Prel Pre2 CT 
Eng. 
u cr 
Ind. 
u CT 
Gov. 
u CT HM CT+HM1 CT+HM2 CT+HM3 
Variable: Number of Alternative Solutions 
One 
Two 
Three 
Four 
Five 
Six 
* " k s 
•ks 
" • k s 
•sw 
" » k s 
•ks 
•ks 
•ks 
•*ks •••ks •ks 
Variable: Number of Safe Place Solutions 
One 
Two 
Three 
Four 
Five 
Six 
"siv »ks 
•sw 
•••ks 
•ks 
•ks 
•ks 
•••ks 
•sw 
•s\v •••ks 
Variable: Proportion of Safe Place Solutions 
One 
Two 
Three 
Four 
Five 
Six 
••sw 
•sw 
*sw 
•siv •sw 
"sw 
•>SW 
*SIV 
Variable: Correlation of Solution Ranks 
Seven 
Eight 
Nine 
Ten 
Eleven 
Twelve 
•sw 
•ks 
•••ks 
*sw 
Its 
••sw 
"sw 
•sw 
"ks 
•*sw 
"SW 
"sw 
•»S!V 
•••ks 
"ks 
•*sw 
•*SIV 
•sw 
•sw 
•sw 
"SIV 
•sw 
•ks 
"•ks 
•ks 
••ks 
"SW 
•*ks 
••sw 
"sw 
"sw 
•siv 
••siv 
••sw 
"sw 
"•ks 
••sw 
••siv 
Table 4-4 Tests of Normality Showing Significance Levels Based on the Kolmogorov-Smimov and Shapiro-
Wilks Tests 
Note: The significance level shown is the more significant ofthe two tests in each case 
ks: Kolmogorov-Smimov test 
sw: Shapiro-Wilks test 
(*/**/***) Statistically significant at 0.05/0.01/0.001 level 
Blank Cells: Not Significant 
U: Untrained 
1: One Team Member Creative Thinking Trained 
2: All Team Members Creative Thinking Trained 
3: At Least One Team Member Creative Thinking Trained (1&2) 
Shaded Sections: Not Applicable 
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4.7 Methodology Summary 
The purpose was to design a methodology to test the hypothesis, including selecting a 
technique for implementation and developing a means of assessing safety design ability as 
the result of training in creative thinking. 
The main intervention was a creative thinking training program; the six thinking hats 
program. Training in hazard management was also evaluated in one part ofthe research as 
the opportunity was available to compare this training with the same group of subjects who 
were involved in the creative thinking training. 
The method of assessment was like past studies of creative thinking but adapted to the 
special outcomes sought in safe design. The following variables were considered. 
1. The generation of alternative safety solutions. 
2. The generation of effective safety solutions. 
3. The prioritization of safety solutions. 
The subjects chosen for involvement consisted of fourth-year undergraduate engineering 
students, first-year undergraduate technology students, practicing industry safety advisers, 
and government safety advisers. The selection of a wider group than engineers was due to 
the recognition that many groups contribute to safe design. The inclusion of this range of 
subjects also allowed a comparison ofthe abilities of subjects with varying safety expertise. 
All groups were involved in the training of central interest (creative thinking) while the 
training in hazard management was with the government advisers only. 
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Engineering 
Students 
Bachelor of Engineering 
Fourth-Year Students 
(42) 
Untrained 
Group 
(21) 
^ / R a n d o m \-> 
^C Allocation ^^r 
Trained 
Group 
(21) 
Creative 
Thinking 
Training 
Creative 
Thinking 
Training 
Tests 
Figure 4-1 Procedure Outline: Engineering Students 
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Technology 
Students 
First-Year Bachelor of 
Technology Students 
(18) 
Untrained 
Pre-Test 1 
(18) P 
One Week Delay 
Untrained 
Pre-Test 2 
(15) 
Creative Thinking 
Training 
(Over five weeks) 
Trained 
Post-Test 
(12) II 
Figure 4-2 Procedure Outline: Technology Students 
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Industry Advisers 
Graduate Diploma in 
Occupational Hazard 
Management Students 
(48) 
Untrained Group 
(24) 
Tests 33 
Creative Thinking 
Training 
Trained Group 
(24) 
Creative Thinking 
Training 
Tests 33 
Figure 4-3 Procedure Outline: Industry Advisers 
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Government Advisers 
Government Employed Industrial 
Advisers in Occupational Health 
and Safety 
(146) 
1 
Creative Thinking 
Group 
(34) 
Random 
Allocation 
Untrained Group 
(IS) 
Tests 
(Untrained) 
Creative Thinking 
Training 
Random 
Allocation 
Trained Group 
(19) 
Creative Thinking 
Training 
Hazard Management 
Training 
Tests 
(CT+HM 
Trained) P 
Hazard Management 
Group 
(112) 
Hazard Management 
Training 
Tests 
(HM Trained) J 
Figure 4-4 Procedure Outline: Government Advisers 
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Chapter Five 
Results 
5. Results 
This study involved four groups of subjects (engineering students, technology students, 
industry advisers, and government advisers) and two training interventions (creative 
thinking training and hazard management training). The data in the raw form are tabulated 
in Appendix D. Out of these data come a number of comparisons of interest; the main 
being the effect of creative thinking training, across all groups of subjects, in terms of the 
three main variables; generating alternative solutions, generating effective (safe place) 
solutions, and prioritizing effective solutions. The effects of the hazard management 
training with the government advisers is included. The last section shows the comparison 
of the different groups of subjects that participated in the study (novice/expert effects). 
Given that the education of engineers has been a priority issue it is of interest to know how 
undergraduate students compare with groups of people w h o are experienced and educated 
in safety. This might give an indication ofthe type of improvement that m a y be achieved 
should engineers have considerable safety education. Some abbreviations used in this 
chapter are noted in Table 5-1. 
Abbreviation Meaning 
Ind Industry Advisers 
Gov Government Advisers 
Eng Engineering Students 
Tech Technology Students 
CT Creative Thinking 
HM Hazard Management 
Table 5-1 Abbreviations 
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5.1 Generating Alternative Solutions (Number of Alternative 
Solutions) 
One of the key variables measured was the generation of alternative solutions to the case 
study problems. Subjects worked individually on cases one, two and three and they worked 
in teams on cases four, five and six. The data that follows are organised according to the 
four subject groups. A summary ofthe results then follows. 
5.1.1 Engineering Students Generating Alternative Solutions 
Case 
One 
Two 
Three 
Four 
Five 
Six 
Mode 
Individual 
Individual 
Individual 
Team 
Team 
Team 
N 
21 
21 
21 
7 
7 
7 
Untrained 
Mean 
4.9 
4.9 
4.4 
7.3 
7.9 
7.6 
SD 
1.8 
2.2 
1.7 
2.7 
2.6 
3.0 
N 
21 
21 
21 
7 
7 
7 
Trained 
Mean 
9.0 
11.9 
11.3 
15.4 
17.3 
19.1 
SD 
2.9 
3.8 
4.4 
3.9 
3.1 
6.5 
t-test 
t 
t(40)=5.45 
t(32)=7.44u 
t(40)=6.54u 
t(12)=4-54 
t(12)=6.16 
t(8.5)=4.24u 
P 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
O.001 
<0.001 
0.001 
Table 5-2 Number of Alternative Solutions to Safety Problems Generated by Engineering Students: Untrained 
and Trained 
(u) Unequal-variance t-test due to significant Levene's test for Equal Variance 
Case One Case Two Case Three 
lUntrained BTrained 
Figure 5-1 Number of Alternative Solutions to 
Safety Problems Generated by Engineering 
Students Individually: Untrained and Trained 
Case Four Case Five Case Six 
lUntrained •Trained 
Figure 5-2 Number of Alternative Solutions to 
Safety Problems Generated by Engineering Students 
in Teams: Untrained and Trained 
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5.1.2 Technology Students Generating Alternative Solutions 
Individually 
Case 
One 
Paired t-test 
Paired t-test 
Two 
Paired t-test 
Paired t-test 
Paired t-test 
Three 
Paired t-test 
Paired t-test 
Condition 
Pretestl 
Pretest2 
Trained 
Pretestl /Pretest2 
Pretest2 / Trained 
Pretestl 
Pretest2 
Trained 
Trained (3 Months) 
Pretestl/Pretest2 
Pretest2/Trained 
Trained/ Trained (3M) 
Pretestl 
Pretest2 
Trained 
Pretestl/Pretest2 
Pretest2 / Trained 
N 
18 
15 
13 
15 
12 
18 
15 
13 
13 
15 
12 
11 
18 
15 
13 
15 
12 
Mean 
4.9 
6.7 
11.9 
4.9/6.7 
7.1/11.8 
4.8 
5.6 
11.7 
13.1 
4.6/5.6 
6.0/11.8 
12.9/14.4 
5.1 
5.7 
11.7 
5.1/5.7 
5.9/11.4 
SD 
1.8 
2.3 
4.4 
1.7/2.3 
2.4/4.5 
2.3 
2.2 
4.8 
5.3 
2.4/2.2 
3.2/5.3 
4.4/4.6 
1.9 
2.0 
4.8 
2.1/2.0 
1.9/4.9 
A 
+1.9 
+4.7 
+1.0 
+5.8 
+1.5. 
+0.5 
+5.5 
SD 
1.1 
3.7 
1.7 
4.7 
3.1 
2.0 
4.2 
t 
6.82 
4.40 
2.24 
4.28 
1.54 
1.02 
4.55 
P 
<0.001 
O.001 
0.021 
<0.001 
0.078 
0.163 
<0.001 
Table 5-3 Number of Alternative Solutions to Safety Problems Generated by Technology Students Individually: 
Untrained (Pretestl and Pretest-) and Trained 
s 
o 
•a 
s 
"3 
at 
e 
14 
12 
10 
8 
6 
4 
2 
0 
Case One Case Two Case Three 
lUntrained (PI) •Untrained (P2) 
Figure 5-3 Number of Alternative Solutions to 
Safety Problems Generated by Technology 
Students Individually: Untrained (Pretestl and 
Pretest2) 
o 
•a 
a 
"3 
Case One Case Two Case Three 
lUntrained (P2) •Trained 
Figure 5-4 Number of Alternative Solutions to 
Safety Problems Generated by Technology 
Students Individually: Untrained (Pretest2) and 
Trained 
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5.1.3 Technology Students Generating Alternative Solutions in T e a m s 
Case Mode Condition N Mean SD 
Four Team 
Five Team 
Six Team 
Pretestl 
Pretest2 
Trained 
Pretestl 
Pretest2 
Trained 
Pretestl 
Pretest2 
Trained 
Trained (3-Month) 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
8.2 
9.2 
18.4 
7.6 
8.4 
17.4 
7.4 
8.4 
16.8 
22.2 
2.59 
2.86 
3.78 
3.78 
2.70 
3.29 
3.51 
2.07 
3.35 
2.36 
Table 5-4 Number of Alternative Solutions to Safety Problems Generated by Technology Students in Teams: 
Untrained (Pretestl and Pretest2) and Trained 
Note: N o statistical test performed as data is dependent and not-paired 
20 
I 15 
o 
10 
Case One Case Two Case Three 
lUntrained (PI) •Untrained (P2) 
Figure 5-5 Number of Alternative Solutions to 
Safety Problems Generated by Technology 
Students in Teams: Untrained (Pretestl and 
Pretest2) 
o 
B 
L. 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0 
Case One Case Two Case Three 
•Untrained (P2) •Trained 
Figure 5-6 Number of Alternative Solutions to 
Safety Problems Generated by Technology 
Students in Teams: Untrained (Pretestl) and Trained 
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5.1.4 Industry Advisers Generating Alternative Solutions 
Case 
One 
Two 
Three 
Four 
Five 
Six 
Mode 
Individual 
Individual 
Individual 
Team 
Team 
Team 
N 
24 
24 
24 
8 
8 
8 
Untrained 
Mean 
4.9 
5.3 
5.6 
6.6 
9.0 
8.0 
SD 
1.7 
2.6 
2.0 
1.6 
2.7 
3.4 
N 
24 
24 
24 
8 
8 
8 
Trained 
Mean 
6.3 
7.3 
7.0 
9.8 
11.3 
12.1 
SD 
2.6 
2.8 
2.5 
2.7 
2.5 
3.3 
t-test 
t 
t(46)=2.12 
t(46)=2.67 
t(46)=2.03 
t(14)=2.85 
t(14)=1.72 
t(14)=2.48 
P 
0.020 
0.005 
0.024 
0.007 
0.054 
0.013 
Table 5-5 Number of Alternative Solutions to Safety Problems Generated by Industry Advisers: Untrained and 
Trained 
14 
Al
te
rn
at
iv
e 
So
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s 
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SJ
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o
\ 
o
o
 
o
 
to
 
lr'/Ml l*.' M_l 
Case One Case Two Case Three 
Figure 5-' 
Safety Pre 
Individual 
7 Numbe 
>blems G 
y: Untrai 
•Untrained •Trained 
a- of Alternative Soli 
enerated by Industry 
ned and Trained 
itions to 
Advisers 
o 
VI 
Case Four Case Five Case Six 
lUntrained •Trained 
Figure 5-8 Number of Alternative Solutions to 
Safety Problems Generated by Industry Advisers in 
Teams: Untrained and Trained 
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5.1.5 Government Advisers Generating Alternative Solutions 
Case 
Three 
Five 
Mode 
Individual 
Team 
Condition 
Untrained 
Trained (CT) 
Trained (HM) 
Trained (CT+HM) 
Untrained 
Trained (CT) 
Trained (HM) 
Trained (CT+HM)c 
Trained (CT+HM)d 
Trained (CT+HM)e 
N 
15 
19 
112 
33 
5 
7 
31 
9 
6 
15 
Mean 
6.4 
7.6 
7.6 
9.3 
8.8 
10.3 
8.7 
14.2 
10.3 
12.6 
SD 
1.7 
2.0 
3.8 
3.5 
2.6 
2.0 
3.4 
6.7 
4.6 
6.1 
t 
t(32)=1.81 
t(36)=2.06u 
t(143>=2.32 
t(10)=1.13 
t(34)=0.08 
t(9.2)=3.40u 
t(35)=1.04 
t(18)=2.37u 
V 
0.040a 
0.024a 
0.011b 
0.142a 
0.470a 
0.020b 
0.154b 
0.015b 
Table 5-6 Number of Alternative Solutions to Safety Problems Generated by Government Advisers: Untrained 
and Trained (Creative Thinking, Hazard Management, Combined Training) 
(a) Compared to Untrained Group, 
(b) Compared to Hazard Management Trained Group 
(c) Whole team Creative Thinking Trained 
(d) One person in team Creative Thinking Trained 
(e) At least one person in team Creative Thinking Trained (1&2) 
(u) Unequal-variance t-test due to significant Levene's test for Equal Variance 
16 . 
14 
o 12 
1 K> 
CO 
1 8 
1 6 
a 4 
< 2 
0 
Figure 5-< 
Safety P 
Advisers 
(Hazard 
Combined 
H H 
II II 
Untrained Trained Trained Trained 
(HM) (CT) (CT+HM) 
) Number of Alternative Solutions to 
roblems Generated by Government 
Individually: Untrained and Trained 
Management, Creative Thinking & 
Training) 
Untrained Trained 
(HM) 
Trained 
(CT+HM) 
Figure 5-10 Number of Alternative Solutions to 
Safety Problems Generated by Government 
Advisers in Teams: Untrained and Trained (Hazard 
Management, Creative Thinking & Combined 
Training) 
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5.1.6 Generating Alternative Solutions (Number of Alternative 
Solutions): Summary 
Table 5-7 shows the summary of the increases in the number of alternative solutions 
generated by subjects trained in creative thinking compared with those untrained. The 
summary table also notes the effect of practice for the technology students (between 
pretestl and pretest2) and the effect ofthe hazard management training for the government 
advisers (who worked only on cases three and five). 
Case 
One 
Two 
Three 
Four 
Five 
Six 
Mode 
Individual 
Individual 
Individual 
Team 
Team 
Team 
Tech. (a) 
Practice 
+38%*** 
+22%* 
+10% 
+12%(d) 
+ll%(d) 
+14%(d) 
Tech. (b) 
CT 
+66% *** 
+96% *** 
+93% *** 
+100%(d) 
+107%(d) 
+100%(d) 
Eng. 
CT 
+84% *** 
+145%*** 
+155%*** 
+112%*** 
+120%*** 
+153%** 
Ind. 
CT 
+27%* 
+40%** 
+24%* 
+47%** 
+25% 
+52%* 
Gov. 
CT 
+18%* 
+17% 
Gov. 
HM 
+19%* 
-1% 
Gov. (c) 
CT+HM 
+24%* 
+63%* 
Table 5-7 Summary of the Increase in the Number of Solutions following Creative Thinking Training 
Notes: 
(*/**/***) Statistically significant at 0.05/0.01/0.001 level (one tail) 
(a) Technology Students Practice Effect is Pretest2 compared with Pretestl 
(b) Technology Students CT Effect is Creative Thinking Training compared with Pretest2 
(c) Government Advisers CT+HM effect is Creative Thinking (in teams where all the Team C T Trained) + 
Hazard Management Training compared with those with Hazard Management Training Only 
(d) Statistical test not possible 
5.1.6.1 Effect of Creative Thinking Training 
The figures show that creative thinking training lead to an improvement of around 100% 
for the engineering (Table 5-2, Figure 5-1 & Figure 5-2) and technology students (in 
addition to the small gains due to practice) (Table 5-3, Figure 5-4 & Figure 5-6). No 
statistical test was performed on the team results from the technology students as the 
groups became mixed. Given the dependant nature of the data a comparison was not 
possible. However the changes are ofthe same order as the engineering students. 
The industry advisers (Table 5-4, Figure 5-7 & Figure 5-8) following the creative thinking 
training generated about 30 to 40% more solutions that their untrained colleagues. The 
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government advisers (Table 5-6, Figure 5-9 & Figure 5-10) seemed to exhibit a similar 
effect size and this effect was significant for individuals but not for teams. 
Over the four groups of subjects the effect of the training was to increase the number of 
solutions generated by between 30% and 150%. The effect of creative thinking training 
was similar for teams and for individuals. These effects seemed greatest for the 
undergraduate students. 
5.1.6.2 Effect Hazard ManagementTraining 
The hazard management training was tested only with the government advisers. Those 
subjects who took the training seemed to generate more solutions than their untrained 
colleagues when working individually but not when in teams (Figure 5-9 & Figure 5-10). 
5.1.6.3 Effect of Combined Training 
Those government advisers who took the hazard management training following the 
creative thinking training generated significantly more ideas than those who took the 
hazard management training only (Figure 5-9 & Figure 5-10). As mentioned above, on its 
own the hazard management training appeared to have little impact on the ability of the 
government advisers to generate solutions. The creative thinking training produced a better 
increase but not substantial. The substantial gains came when these two methods were 
combined. This outcome needs to be moderated given the effect of practice. The 
government advisers who took both forms of training completed the test twice and were 
compared with subjects who took the test only once. The results with the technology 
students showed a significant practice effect in generating alternatives in the order of 10 to 
20%. In comparison, those government advisers who undertook the hazard management 
training after the creative thinking training produced solutions (24% more individually and 
63% more in teams) than those who only attended the hazard management training. These 
results show the potential of adding general creative thinking training to specific training 
such as hazard management training. 
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5.2 Generating Effective Solutions (Proportion of Safe Place 
Solutions) 
The effectiveness of the solutions was assessed by categorising them as either safe-place or 
safe-person according to a standard list of potential solutions (Appendix C). From this 
categorisation the number of safe place solutions can be separately analysed. The data that 
follows are organised according to the four subject groups. A summary ofthe results then 
follows. 
5.2.1 Engineering Students Generating Effective Solutions 
Case 
One 
Two 
Three 
Four 
Five 
Six 
Mode 
Individual 
Individual 
Individual 
Team 
Team 
Team 
N 
21 
21 
21 
7 
7 
7 
Untrained 
Mean 
72 
58 
53 
54 
37 
56 
SD 
22 
22 
28 
15 
10 
11 
N 
21 
21 
20 
7 
7 
7 
Trained 
Mean 
63 
67 
58 
60 
49 
64 
SD 
25 
13 
20 
8 
16 
9 
t-test 
t 
t(40)=1.23 
t(33)=1.61u 
t(39)=0.55 
t(12)=0.91 
t(12)=1.74 
t(12)=1.49 
P 
0.113 
0.058 
0.294 
0.190 
0.054 
0.080 
Table 5-8 Proportion of Safe-Place Solutions Generated by Engineering Students: Untrained and Trained 
(u) Unequal-variance t-test due to significant Levene's test for Equal Variance 
m 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
BU 
1 t (1 Case One Case Two Case Three lUntrained •Trained 
Figure 5-11 Proportion of Safe-Place Solutions 
Generated by Engineering Students Individually: 
Untrained and Trained 
w 
u 
E 
Ji 
W 
CO 
100 
80 
CaseFour Case Five Case Six 
lUntrained •Trained 
Figure 5-12 Proportion of Safe-Place Solutions 
Generated by Engineering Students in Teams: 
Untrained and Trained 
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5.2.2 Technology Students Generating Effective Solutions Individually 
Case 
One 
Paired t-test 
Paired t-test 
Two 
Paired t-test 
Paired t-test 
Paired t-test 
Three 
Paired t-test 
Paired t-test 
Condition 
Pretestl 
Pretest2 
Trained 
Pretestl / Pretest2 
Pretest2 / Trained 
Pretestl 
Pretest2 
Trained 
Trained (3 Months) 
Pretestl/Pretest2 
Pretest2/Trained 
Trained / Trained (3M) 
Pretestl 
Pretest2 
Trained 
Pretestl /Pretest2 
Pretest2/Trained 
N 
18 
15 
13 
15 
12 
18 
15 
13 
13 
15 
12 
11 
18 
15 
13 
15 
12 
Mean 
53 
41 
60 
53/41 
46/58 
43 
45 
62 
61 
41/45 
48/61 
61/63 
34 
37 
47 
31/37 
40/46 
SD 
23 
19 
16 
26/19 
15/16 
24 
27 
14 
17 
26/27 
29/13 
15/14 
22 
23 
19 
23/23 
25/19 
A 
-12 
+12 
+4 
+13 
-2 
+6 
+6 
SD 
23 
20 
17 
30 
14 
15 
20 
t 
-2.05 
1.99 
0.80 
1.48 
-0.46 
1.44 
0.98 
P 
0.030 
0.036 
0.220 
0.084 
0.328 
0.087 
0.174 
Table 5-9 Proportion of Safe-Place Solutions Generated by Technology Students Individually: Untrained 
(Pretestl and Pretest-) and Trained 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 ft 
Case One Case Two Case Three 
lUntrained (PI) •Untrained (P2) I 
Figure 5-13 Proportion of Safe-Place Solutions 
Generated by Technology Students Individually: 
Untrained (Pretestl and Pretest2) (Paired Data) 
©^ 
•a 
CO 
100 
80 
^ 
Case One Case Two Case Three 
lUntrained (P2) •Trained 
Figure 5-14 Proportion of Safe-Place Solutions 
Generated by Technology Students Individually: 
Untrained (Pretest2) and Trained (Paired Data) 
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5.2.3 Technology Students Generating Effective Solutions in Teams 
Case Mode Condition N Mean SD 
Four Team 
Five Team 
Six Team 
Pretestl 
Pretest2 
Trained 
Pretestl 
Pretest2 
Trained 
Pretestl 
Pretest2 
Trained 
Trained (3-Month) 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
36 
47 
59 
29 
34 
47 
50 
43 
59 
62 
26 
11 
5.7 
23 
24 
13 
17 
16 
3.8 
7.4 
Table 5-10 Proportion of Safe-Place Solutions Generated by Technology Students in Teams: Untrained (Pretestl 
and Pretest2) and Trained 
Note: Statistical test not possible 
CO 
100 
80 
S 60 
cd 
Case Four Case Five Case Six 
lUntrained (PI) BUntrained (P2) 
Figure 5-15 Proportion of Safe-Place Solutions 
Generated by Technology Students in Teams: 
Untrained (Pretestl and Pretest2) 
100 
80 
u 
u 
sd 
cd 
CO 
Case Four Case Five Case Six 
lUntrained (P2) •Trained 
Figure 5-16 Proportion of Safe-Place Solutions 
Generated by Technology Students in Teams: 
Untrained (Pretest2) and Trained 
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5.2.4 Industry Advisers Generating Effective Solutions 
Case 
One 
Two 
Three 
Four 
Five 
Six 
Mode 
Individual 
Individual 
Individual 
Team 
Team 
Team 
N 
24 
24 
24 
8 
8 
8 
Untrained 
Mean 
71 
57 
40 
59 
44 
61 
SD 
24 
19 
22 
17 
17 
13 
N 
24 
24 
24 
8 
8 
8 
Trained 
Mean 
70 
69 
55 
68 
50 
70 
SD 
22 
20 
20 
14 
19 
12 
t-test 
t 
t(46)=0-21 
t(46)=2.21 
t(46)=2.42 
t(14)=1.13 
t(14)=0.67 
t(14)=1.43 
P 
0.416 
0.016 
0.010 
0.139 
0.257 
0.088 
Table 5-11 Proportion of Safe-Place Solutions Generated by Industry Advisers: Untrained and Trained 
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Figure 5-17 Proportion of Safe-Place Solutions 
Generated by Industry Advisers Individually: 
Untrained and Trained 
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Figure 5-18 Proportion of Safe-Place Solutions 
Generated by Industry Advisers in Teams: 
Untrained and Trained 
174 
5.2.5 Government Advisers Generating Effective Solutions 
Case 
Three 
Five 
Mode 
Individual 
Team 
Condition 
Untrained 
Trained (CT) 
Trained (HM) 
Trained (CT+HM) 
Untrained 
Trained (CT) 
Trained (HM) 
Trained (CT+HM)c 
Trained (CT+HM)d 
Trained (CT+HM)e 
N 
15 
19 
112 
33 
5 
7 
31 
9 
6 
15 
Mean 
42 
45 
40 
58 
49 
45 
36 
53 
45 
49 
SD 
21 
26 
24 
20 
18 
19 
15 
9 
14 
11 
t 
t(32)=0.42 
t(125)=0.20 
t(60)=3.91u 
t(10)=0.31 
t(34)=1.82 
t(38)=3.24 
t(35)=1.39 
t(44)=3-17 
'P' 
0.340a 
0.421a 
O.OOlb 
0.380a 
0.039a 
O.OOlb 
0.086b 
0.002b 
Table 5-12 Proportion of Safe-Place Solutions Generated by Government Advisers: Untrained and Trained 
(Creative Thinking, Hazard Management & Combined Training) 
(a) Compared to Untrained Group 
(b) Compared to Hazard Management Trained Group 
(c) Whole team Creative Thinking Trained 
(d) One person in team Creative Thinking Trained 
(e) At least one person in team Creative Thinking Trained (1&2) 
(u) Unequal-variance t-test due to significant Levene's test for Equal Variance 
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Figure 5-19 Proportion of Safe-Place Solutions 
Generated by Government Advisers Individually: 
Untrained and Trained (Hazard Management, 
Creative Thinking & Combined Training): Case 
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5.2.6 Generating Effective Solutions {Proportion (%) of Safe-Place 
Solutions): Summary 
As mentioned above the effectiveness of these solutions was assessed by categorising them 
as either safe-place or safe-person according to a standard list of potential solutions 
(Appendix C). The variable was the proportion (%) of safe-place solutions. The results 
here are grouped according to the subject groups. Table 5-13 summarises the difference in 
the proportion of safe-place solutions of the trained subjects compared to the untrained 
subjects. 
Case Mode Tech. (a) Tech. (b) Eng. Ind. Gov. Gov. Gov.(c) 
Practice CT CT CT CT HM CT+HM 
One 
Two 
Three 
Four 
Five 
Six 
Individual 
Individual 
Individual 
Team 
Team 
Team 
-23%* 
+10% 
+19% 
+30%(d) 
+18%(d) 
-14%(d) 
+26%* 
+27% 
+15% 
+26%(d) 
+39%(d) 
+35%(d) 
-12% 
+16% 
+8% 
+11% 
+33% 
+14% 
-2% 
+22%* 
+36%* 
+15% 
+17% 
+14% 
+8% 
-7% 
-3 % +45%*** 
-27%* +47%** 
Table 5-13 Summary ofthe Changes in Proportion of Safe-Place Solutions with Training 
Notes: 
(*/**/***) Statistically significant at 0.05/0.01/0.001 level (one tail) 
(a) Technology Students CTEffect is Creative Thinking Training compared with Pretest2 
(b) Technology Students Creative Thinking Training compared with Pretest2 
(c) Government Advisers CT+HM effect is Creative Thinking (in teams where all the Team C T Trained) + 
Hazard Management Training compared with those with Hazard Management Training Only 
(d) Statistical test not possible 
5.2.6.1 Effect of Creative Thinking Training 
The trained subjects appeared to generate higher quality solutions, with 17 ofthe cells in 
Table 5-13 showing an increase and only three showing a decrease, however most ofthe 
changes in the table are not significant. Some indication of possible improvement due to 
practice was indicated by the technology student data where there were four gains (two 
non-significant and two non-tested), and two decreases (one significant and one non-
tested). It seems reasonable to suggest that the proportion of safe place solutions that 
subjects generated remained at least steady, and showed signs of an increase, following 
training in creative thinking. 
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5.2.6.2 Effect of Hazard Management Training 
The hazard management training (Table 5-12, Figure 5-19 & Figure 5-20) showed little 
change in the quality ofthe ideas for individuals and a lower quality for teams. 
5.2.6.3 Effect of the Combined Training 
While the effects ofthe hazard management training alone were disappointing, the effect of 
the hazard management training for those who had also completed the creative thinking 
training were positive (Figure 5-19 & Figure 5-20). In comparison to the hazard 
management training group, the combined group generated a significantly higher 
proportion of safe-place solutions, both individually and in teams. 
5.2.6.4 Summary Effects for Generating Effective Solutions 
In summary it seems that; 
• Following creative thinking training the average proportion of safe place solutions was 
at least maintained and there were some indications of an improvement. 
• Hazard management training did not affect the proportion of safe place solutions. 
• Adding creative thinking training to the hazard management training lead to an 
improvement in the proportion of safe place solutions 
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5.2.7 Generating Effective Solutions (Number of Safe-Place 
Solutions): Summary 
The combination of the raw number of ideas and the average idea quality represents the 
number of good ideas. Table 5-13 summarises the difference in the number of good, safe 
place, solutions generated by the trained subjects compared to the untrained subjects. 
Case 
One 
Two 
Three 
Mode 
Individual 
Individual 
Individual 
Tech. (a) 
Practice 
+10% 
+44%* 
+15% 
Tech. (b) 
CT 
+102%** 
+118%** 
+125%** 
Eng. 
CT 
+71%** 
+185%** 
+200%** 
IND. 
CT 
+29% 
+73%** 
+63%** 
GOV. 
CT 
+22% 
GOV. 
HM 
+17% 
GOV. (c) 
CT+HM 
+65%*** 
Four Team +29%(d) +145%(d) +141%** +71%** 
Five Team +33%(d) +156%(d) +200%** +50%* +14% 
-22% +127%** 
Six Team 0%(d) +158%(d) +200%** +72%** 
Table 5-14 Summary ofthe Changes in Number of Safe-Place Solutions with Training 
(*/**/***) Statistically significant at 0.05/0.01/0.001 level (one tail) 
(a) Technology Students Practice Effect is based on Pretest2 compared with Pretestl 
(b) Technology Students C J Effect is Creative Thinking Training compared with Pretest2 
(c) Government Advisers CT+HM effect is Creative Thinking (in teams where ail the Team C T Trained) + 
Hazard Management Training compared with those with Hazard Management Training Only 
(d) Statistical test not possible 
The results show that the training yielded large (up to 200%), statistically significant, 
improvements in the number of good solutions for the technology students, engineering 
students and the industry advisers. The training seemed to have only a modest effect with 
the government advisers. Similarly the hazard management training resulted in no 
statistically significant effect. Of note though, is the substantial, and statistically 
significant, differences between those government advisers who attended both forms and 
those who attended the hazard management training only. 
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5.3 Prioritizing Effective Solutions (Correlation with Optimum Rank) 
One of the key variables measured was the prioritization of potential solutions. Subjects 
worked individually on cases seven, eight and nine and they worked in teams on cases ten, 
eleven and twelve. The data following is organised according to the four subject groups. A 
summary ofthe results then follows. 
5.3.1 Engineering Students Prioritizing Effective Solutions 
Case 
Seven 
Eight 
Nine 
Ten 
Eleven 
Twelve 
Mode 
Individual 
Individual 
Individual 
Team 
Team 
Team 
N 
21 
21 
21 
7 
7 
7 
Untrained 
Mean 
-0.29 
-0.08 
0.34 
0.00 
0.38 
0.83 
SD 
0.45 
0.50 
0.51 
0.33 
0.24 
0.19 
N 
21 
21 
21 
7 
7 
7 
Trained 
Mean 
0.09 
0.14 
0.61 
0.45 
0.76 
0.86 
SD 
0.58 
0.53 
0.41 
0.56 
0.25 
0.13 
M a n n 
U 
137 
162 
160 
14.5 
6.5 
24.5 
-Whitney Test 
P 
0.018 
0.068 
0.062 
0.099 
0.010 
0.500 
Table 5-15 Correlation with Optimum Ranking of a Set of Safety Solutions by Engineering Students: Untrained 
and Trained 
Case 
Nine 
Case 
Eight 
Case 
Seven 
•Trained 
• Untrained 
-1 
Safe Person 
-0.5 0.5 1 
_. Safe Place 
Figure 5-21 Correlation with Optimum Ranking of 
a Set of Safety Solutions by Engineering Students 
Individually: Untrained and Trained 
Case 
Twelve 
Case 
Eleven 
Case 
Ten 
• Trained 
•Untrained 
-1 
Safe Person 
-0.5 0.5 1 
_. Safe Place 
Figure 5-22 Correlation with Optimum Ranking of 
a Set of Safety Solutions by Engineering Students in 
Teams: Untrained and Trained 
179 
5.3.2 Technology Students Prioritizing Effective Solutions 
Individually 
Case 
Seven 
Eight 
Nine 
Condition 
Pretestl 
Pretest2 
Trained 
Trained (3 Months) 
Pretestl 
Pretest2 
Trained 
Pretest] 
Pretest2 
Trained 
N 
18 
15 
13 
13 
18 
15 
13 
18 
15 
13 
r 
-0.33 
-0.17 
-0.19 
-0.02 
-0.40 
-0.13 
-0.18 
-0.05 
0.11 
0.15 
SD 
0.54 
0.56 
0.58 
0.54 
0.55 
0.64 
0.55 
0.56 
0.64 
0.62 
Pairs 
15 
12 
11 
15 
12 
15 
12 
Paired Wilcoxon Test 
A 
10+, 4-
6+,4-
6+,3-
9+,5-
5+,5-
11+, 2-
6+,6-
T 
1.16 
0.45 
1.31 
2.04 
0.61 
2.06 
0.00 
P 
0.122a 
0.323b 
0.096c 
0.021a 
0.270b 
0.019a 
0,500b 
Table 5-16 Correlation with Optimum Rank by Technology Students Working Individually: Pretestl, Pretest2 & 
Creative Thinking Trained 
(a) Compared to Pretestl 
(b) Compared to Pestest2 
(c) Compared to Trained 
Case 
Nine 
Case 
Eight 
Case 
Seven 
M 
• Untrained (P2) 
•Untrained (PI) 
-1 -0.5 
Safe Person _. 
0.5 1 
fr, Safe Place 
Figure 5-23 Correlation with Optimum Ranking of a 
Set of Safety Solutions by Technology Students 
Individually: Untrained (Pretestl and Pretest2) 
(Paired Data) 
• Trained 
•Untrained (P2) 
Case 
Nine 
Case 
Eight 
Case 
Seven 
-1 -0.5 
Safe Person _« 
0.5 1 
Safe Place 
Figure 5-24 Correlation with Optimum Ranking of 
a Set of Safety Solutions by Technology Students 
Individually: Untrained (Pretest2) and Trained 
(Paired Data) ' 
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5.3.3 Technology Students Prioritizing Effective Solutions in Teams 
Case Mode Group N SD 
Ten Teams 
Eleven Teams 
Twelve Teams 
Pretestl 
Pretest2 
Trained 
Trained (3-Month) 
Pretestl 
Pretest2 
Trained 
Pretestl 
Pretest2 
Trained 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
-0.08 
-0.16 
0.14 
0.44 
0.08 
0.13 
0.38 
0.26 
0.33 
0.29 
0.49 
0.73 
0.54 
0.27 
0.40 
0.25 
0.49 
0.70 
0.65 
0.87 
Table 5-17 M e a n Correlation with Optimum Rank by Technology Students Working in Teams: Pretestl, 
Pretest2 & Creative Thinking Trained 
Note: Statistical test not possible as data is dependant and pairs are mixed 
Case 
Twelve 
Case 
Eleven 
Case 
Ten 
-1 
Safe Person 
-0.5 
• Untrained (P2) 
• Untrained (PI) 
0.5 1 
Safe Place 
Figure 5-25 Correlation with Optimum Ranking of 
a Set of Safety Solutions by Technology Students in 
Teams: Untrained (Pretestl and Pretest2) 
Case 
Twelve 
Case 
Eleven 
Case 
Ten 
• Trained 
• Untrained (P2) 
-1 
Safe Person 
-0.5 0.5 1 
Safe Place 
Figure 5-26 Correlation with Optimum Ranking of 
a Set of Safety Solutions by Technology Students in 
Teams: Untrained (Pretest2) and Trained 
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5.3.4 Industry Advisers Prioritizing Effective Solutions 
Case 
Seven 
Eight 
Nine 
Ten 
Eleven 
Twelve 
Mode 
Individual 
Individual 
Individual 
Team 
Team 
Team 
N 
24 
24 
24 
8 
8 
8 
Untrained 
Mean 
0.11 
0.28 
0.59 
0.84 
0.84 
0.84 
SD 
0.62 
0.61 
0.40 
0.31 
0.16 
0.18 
N 
24 
24 
24 
8 
8 
8 
Trained 
Mean 
0.34 
0.34 
0.64 
0.81 
0.79 
0.89 
SD 
0.58 
0.56 
0.52 
0.34 
0.38 
0.16 
Mann 
U 
207 
272 
248 
24.0 
28.0 
25.5 
-Whitney Test 
P 
0.047 
0.340 
0.200 
0.177 
0.334 
0.241 
Table 5-18 Mean Correlation with Optimum Rank by Industry Advisers: N o Training versus Creative Thinking 
Trained 
1 
Case 
Nine 
Case 
Eight 
Case 
Seven 
•Trained 
• Untrained 
• _ • 
-1 -0.5 
Safe Person _, 
0.5 1 
Safe Place 
Figure 5-27 Correlation with Optimum Ranking of 
a Set of Safety Solutions by Industry Advisers 
Individually: Untrained and Trained 
Case 
Twelve 
Case 
Eleven 
Case 
Ten 
^m 
• Trained 
• Untrained 
' • 
\ 
-1 
Safe Person 
-0.5 0.5 1 
Safe Place 
Figure 5-28 Correlation with Optimum Ranking of 
a Set of Safety Solutions by Industry Advisers in 
Teams: Untrained and Trained 
182 
5.3.5 Government Advisers Prioritizing Effective Solutions 
Individually 
Case 
Seven 
Eight 
Nine 
Mode 
Individual 
Individual 
Individual 
Condition 
Untrained 
Trained (CT) 
Trained (HM) 
Trained (CT+HM) 
Untrained 
Trained (CT) 
Trained (HM) 
Trained (CT+HM) 
Untrained 
Trained (CT) 
Trained (HM) 
Trained (CT+HM) 
N 
15 
19 
110 
33 
15 
19 
111 
33 
15 
19 
111 
33 
Mean 
0.09 
0.25 
0.13 
0.46 
0.14 
0.12 
0.30 
0.39 
0.29 
0.10 
0.24 
0.57 
SD 
0.40 
0.54 
0.52 
0.52 
0.46 
„ 0.73 
0.59 
0.55 
0.62 
0.68 
0.57 
0.45 
Mann 
U 
115 
805 
1150 
137 
634 
1670 
117 
765 
1170 
-Whitney Test 
P 
0.170a 
0.438a 
O.OOlb 
0.424a 
0.067a 
0.227b 
0.188a 
0.304a 
O.OOlb 
Table 5-19 Mean Correlation with Optimum Rank by Government Advisers Working Individually: N o Training, 
Creative Thinking Trained, Hazard Management Trained & Combined Training 
(a) Compared to Untrained Group 
(b) Compared to Hazard Management Trained Group 
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5.3.6 Government Advisers Prioritizing Effective Solutions in Teams 
Case Mode Condition N Mean SD Mann-Whitney Test 
U p 
Ten Team 
Eleven Team 
Twelve Team 
Untrained 
Trained (CT) 
Trained (HM) 
Trained (CT+HM) c 
Trained (CT+HM) d 
Trained (CT+HM) e 
Untrained 
Trained (CT) 
Trained (HM) 
Trained (CT+HM) c 
Trained (CT+HM) d 
Trained (CT+HM) e 
Untrained 
Trained (CT) 
Trained (HM) 
Trained (CT+HM) c 
Trained (CT+HM) d 
Trained (CT+HM) e 
5 
7 
33 
9 
6 
15 
5 
7 
33 
9 
6 
15 
5 
7 
31 
9 
6 
15 
0.64 
0.79 
0.51 
0.76 
0.91 
0.82 
0.54 
0.63 
0.53 
0.81 
0.68 
0.76 
0.85 
0.74 
0.77 
0.79 
0.83 
0.81 
0.37 
0.22 
0.57 
0.45 
0.12 
0.36 
0.40 
0.23 
0.44 
0.28 
0.33 
0.30 
0.15 
0.34 
0.26 
0.34 
0.21 
0.29 
12.5 
82.0 
93.5 
50.5 
144 
0.205a 
0.491a 
0.O44b 
0.028b 
O.OOlb 
16.5 
79.5 
60.5 
79.5 
140 
16.5 
76.5 
128 
87.0 
215 
0.435a 
0.449a 
0.003b 
0.223b 
0.008b 
0.434a 
0.395a 
0.253b 
0.316b 
0.224b 
Table 5-20 Mean Correlation with Optimum Rank by Government Advisers Working in Teams: N o Training. 
Creative Thinking Trained, Hazard Management Trained & Combined Training 
(a) Compared to Untrained Group 
(b) Compared to Hazard Management Trained Group 
(c) Whole team Creative Thinking Trained 
(d) One person in team Creative Thinking Trained 
(e) At least one person in team Creative Thinking Trained (c&d) 
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Case 
Nine 
Case 
Eight 
Case 
Seven 
I Trained (CT) 
lUntrained 
-1 
Safe Person 
-0.5 0.5 1 
Safe Place 
Figure 5-29 Correlation with Optimum Ranking of 
a Set of Safety Solutions by Government Advisers 
Individually: Untrained and Trained (CT) 
Case 
Twelve 
Case 
Eleven 
Case 
Ten 
• Trained (CT) 
H Untrained 
-1 
Safe Person 
-0.5 0.5 1 
Safe Place 
Figure 5-30 Correlation with Optimum Ranking of 
a Set of Safety Solutions by Government Advisers 
in Teams: Untrained and Trained (CT) 
Case 
Nine 
Case 
Eight 
Case 
Seven 
•Trained (HM) 
• Untrained 
-1 
Safe Person 
-0.5 0.5 1 
Safe Place 
Figure 5-31 Correlation with Optimum Ranking of 
a Set of Safety Solutions by Government Advisers 
Individually: Untrained and Trained ( H M ) 
Case 
Twelve 
Case 
Eleven 
Case 
Ten 
•Traine 
• Untrai 
d(HM) 
ned 
-1 
Safe Person 
-0.5 0.5 1 
Safe Place 
Figure 5-32 Correlation with Optimum Ranking of 
a Set of Safety Solutions by Government Advisers 
in Teams: Untrained and Trained O ^ M ) 
Case 
Nine 
Case 
Eight 
Case 
Seven 
-1 
Safe Person 
• Trained 
(CT+HM) 
• Trained (HM) W^& 
-0.5 
* 
0.5 1 
w Safe Place 
Figure 5-33 Correlation with Optimum Ranking of 
a Set of Safety Solutions by Government Advisers 
Individually: Trained ( H M Only) and Trained 
(CT+HM) 
Case 
Twelve 
Case 
Eleven 
Case 
Ten 
-1 
Safe Person 
• Trair 
(CT-f 
• Trair 
_MB 
3a* H F 
_ ^ _ ^ 
-0.5 0 0.5 1 
. Safe Place 
Figure 5-34 Correlation with Optimum Ranking of 
a Set of Safety Solutions by Government Advisers 
in Teams: Trained ( H M Only) and Trained 
(CT+HM) 
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5.3.7 Prioritizing Effective Solutions (Correlation with Optimum Rank): 
Summary 
Table 5-21 shows the gain or loss of trained subjects over untrained on the mean correlation 
of subject's ranking of safety solutions with the optimum rank. 
Case 
Seven 
Eight 
Nine 
Mode 
Individual 
Individual 
Individual 
Tech. (a) 
Practice 
+0.11 
+0.31* 
+0.18* 
Tech. (b) 
CT 
-0.09 
-0.10 
0.00 
Eng. 
CT 
+0.38* 
+0.22 
+0.36 
Ind. 
CT 
+0.29* 
+0.06 
+0.05 
Gov. 
CT 
+0.17 
-0.02 
-0.19 
Gov. 
HM 
+0.05 
+0.17 
-0.06 
Gov. (c) 
CT+HM 
+0.32*** 
+0.09 
+0.33*** 
Ten Team -0.08(d) +0.31(d) +0.45 -0.03 +0.15 -0.13 +0.25* 
Eleven Team +0.05(d) +0.25(d) +0.38* -0.05 +0.09 -0.02 +0.28** 
Twelve Team +0.07(d) -0.03(d) +0.03 +0.05 -0.11 -0.08 +0.02 
Table 5-21 Summary ofthe Mean Correlation with Optimum Rank ofthe Trained Subjects compared to the 
Untrained Subjects 
(*/**/***) Statistically significant at 0.05/0.01/0.001 level 
(a) Technology Students Practice Effect compared with Pretestl 
(b) Technology Students CT Effect is Creative Thinking Training compared with Pretest2 
(c) Government Advisers C T + H M effect is Creative Thinking (in teams where all the Team C T Trained) + 
Hazard Management Training compared with those with Hazard Management Training Only 
(d) Statistical test not possible 
5.3.7.1 T h e Effect of Creative Thinking Training 
The results tend to indicate that creative thinking training improved the prioritization of 
solutions by the engineers (Table 5-15, Figure 5-21, Figure 5-22). On two ofthe six cases 
(one individually and one in teams) the trained engineering students scored significantly 
higher than the untrained engineering students. Furthermore in case twelve both untrained 
and trained scored near to the maximum and so no improvement could be evident. 
Therefore there were significant improvements on two of a possible five cases and changes 
of similar magnitude on the other three cases. 
The technology students (Table 5-16) demonstrated a significant improvement as 
individuals with practice on the test (Figure 5-23). They exhibited no practice 
improvement in teams (Figure 5-25), although a statistical test was not performed on the 
team data as the data is dependant and not able to be paired. Following creative thinking 
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training, individuals showed no further improvement (Figure 5-24) while teams seemed to 
improve (Figure 5-26). Overall there seemed to be no evidence to show clearly that creative 
thinking training improved prioritization by the technology students. 
The industry advisers (Table 5-18) and government advisers (Table 5-19 & Table 5-20) 
seemed to show little or no improvement as individuals following creative thinking training 
(Figure 5-27 & Figure 5-29). In teams also no improvement was evident but as shown by 
Figure 5-28 and Figure 5-30 the untrained teams ofthe industry advisers and government 
advisers performed near to the maximum. Therefore there was little room for the creative 
thinking trained subjects to improve, so the test is inconclusive except to note that the 
training showed no apparent disadvantage. 
In general the creative thinking training had a positive effect on the way that engineering 
students prioritized solutions but this effect was not evident for other groups. 
5.3.7.2 The Effect of Hazard Management and Combined Training 
The hazard management training produced no effect on the ability of government advisers 
to prioritize solutions (Figure 5-31 & Figure 5-32). However those who completed the 
creative thinking training prior to the hazard management training showed improvement on 
this task when compared with those who undertook hazard management training only 
(Figure 5-33 & Figure 5-34). This is moderated by the effect of practice demonstrated with 
the technology students (Figure 5-23 & Figure 5-25). The combined training group had 
completed the test once before and so some improvement due to practice might be 
expected. The effects appear larger than the practice effects noted with the technology 
students however the results remain somewhat uncertain. 
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5.4 Novice/ExpertEffects 
The study involved groups of widely varying expertise. The following are comparisons of 
the four groups of subjects on the three variables (generating alternative solutions, 
generating effective solutions, and prioritizing effective solutions). 
5.4.1 Novice/ExpertEffects: Generating Alternative Solutions 
Case 
One 
Two 
Three 
Four 
Five 
Six 
Mode 
Individual 
Individual 
Individual 
Team 
Team 
Team 
Mean Number of Solutions Untrained 
Tech 
4.9 
4.8 
5.1 
8.2 
7.6 
7.4 
Eng. 
4.9 
4.9 
4.4 
7.3 
7.9 
7.6 
Ind. 
4.9 
5.3 
5.6 
6.6 
9.0 
8.0 
Gov. (a) 
6.4 
8.8 
ANOVA 
F 
F(2, 62)=0.001 
F(2,62)=0.246 
F(3,77)=3.553 
F(2,19>=0.738 
F(3,24)=0.352 
F(2,19)=0.059 
P 
0.999 
0.783 
0.018 
0.493 
0.788 
0.943 
Table 5-22 Number of Alternative Solutions by Untrained Engineering Students, Technology Students, Industry 
Advisers, and Government Advisers: Comparison by Analysis of Variance 
(a) Government Advisers completed cases three and five only 
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Figure 5-35 Number of Alternative Solutions by 
Untrained Engineering Students, Technology 
Students, Industry Advisers, and Government 
Advisers Individually 
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Figure 5-36 Number of Alternative Solutions by 
Untrained Engineering Students, Technology 
Students, Industry Advisers, and Government 
Advisers in Teams 
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5.4.2 Novice/ExpertEffects: Generating Effective Solutions 
Case Mode % Safe-Place Solutions Untrained 
Tech Eng. Ind. Gov. (a) 
A N O V A 
One 
Two 
Three 
Four 
Five 
Six 
Individual 
Individual 
Individual 
Team 
Team 
Team 
53 
43 
34 
36 
29 
50 
72 
58 
53 
54 
37 
56 
71 
57 
40 
59 
44 
61 
42 
49 
F(2,62)=4.355 
F(2, 62)=2.810 
F(3,77)=2.332 
F(2,19)=2.251 
F(3,24)=1.416 
F(2,19)=0.976 
0.017 
0.068 
0.081 
0.136 
0.269 
0.397 
Table 5-23 Proportion of Safe-Place Solutions by Untrained Engineering Students, Technology Students, 
Industry Advisers, and Government Advisers: Comparison by Analysis of Variance 
(a) Government Advisers completed cases three and five Only 
100 
VI 
Case One Case Two Case Three 
iTech BEng Hind @Gov 
Figure 5-37 Proportion of Safe-Place Solutions by 
Untrained Engineering Students, Technology 
Students, Industry Advisers, and Government 
Advisers Individually 
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Figure 5-38 Proportion of Safe-Place Solutions by 
Untrained Engineering Students, Technology 
Students, Industry Advisers, and Government 
Advisers in Teams 
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5.4.3 Novice/ExpertEffects: Prioritizing Effective Solutions 
Case 
Seven 
Eight 
Nine 
Ten 
Eleven 
Twelv 
e 
Mode 
Individual 
Individual 
Individual 
Team 
Team 
Team 
Correlation with Optimum Rank Untrained 
Tech 
-0.33 
-0.40 
-0.05 
-0.084 
-0.076 
0.256 
Eng. 
-0.288 
-0.081 
0.342 
-0.004 
0.379 
0.830 
Ind. 
0.109 
0.279 
0.590 
0.835 
0.841 
0.836 
Gov. (a) 
0.087 
0.135 
0.292 
0.636 
0.544 
0.850 
Kruskal-Wallis A N O V A 
KW 
KW(3)=12.74 
KW(3)=15.38 
KW(3)=13.32 
KW(3)=I6.53 
KW(3)=13.65 
KW(3)=4-787 
P 
0.005 
0.002 
0.004 
<0.001 
0.003 
0.188 
Table 5-24 Correlation with Optimum Ranking of a Set of Safety Solutions by Untrained Engineering Students, 
Technology Students, Industry Advisers, and Government Advisers: Comparison by Analysis of Variance 
Case 
Nine 
Case 
Eight 
Case 
Seven 
•Ind 
• G o v 
DEng 
•Tech 
LI J 
-1 -0.5 
Safe Person ^ 
0.5 1 
£» Safe Place 
Figure 5-39 Correlation with Optimum Ranking of a 
Set of Safety Solutions by Untrained Engineering 
Students, Technology Students, Industry Advisers, 
and Government Advisers Individually 
Case 
Twelve 
Case 
Eleven 
Case 
Ten 
• Ind 1 
11 Gov 
• E n g 
•Tech 
— —4 - 1 
-1 -0.5 
Safe Person ^ 
0.5 1 
, Safe Place 
Figure 5-40 Correlation with Optimum Ranking of a 
Set of Safety Solutions by Untrained Engineering 
Students, Technology Students, Industry Advisers, 
and Government Advisers in Teams 
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5.4.4 Novice/ExpertEffects: Summary 
5.4.4.1 Generating Alternative Solutions 
The comparisons (Table 5-22) show that there were no apparent differences along the 
novice to expert continuum in terms of the number of solutions produced to a given 
problem (Figure 5-35 & Figure 5-36). There was no evidence to suggest that those 
experienced in handling safety problems (industry and government advisers) were any 
more able to generate alternative solutions than those with no experience (engineering and 
technology students). This seemed equally true for individuals and for teams. 
5.4.4.2 Generating Effective Solutions 
Table 5-23 shows that when in working in teams there was no difference between novices 
and experts in the proportion of safe-place solutions (solution quality) that they generated 
(Figure 5-38). On one case out of three (case one) shows that there appeared to be 
differences between the groups when working as individuals. Figure 5-37 shows that the 
difference one this one case seemed to be due to the poorer performance ofthe technology 
students; the other groups are closely grouped. 
5.4.4.3 Prioritizing Effective Solutions 
The task of prioritizing solutions showed the value of expert opinion. For every case, 
whether working as individuals or as teams, the results showed that the four groups 
(technology and engineering students, and industry and government advisers) were 
significantly different (Table 5-24). A visual examination (Figure 5-39 and Figure 5-40) 
shows that the groups are separated in the following order, from the most well-aligned to 
the optimum (industry advisers) to the least well-aligned (first-year technology students). 
1. Industry Advisers 
2. Government Advisers 
3. Engineering Students 
4. Technology Students 
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5.5 Results Summary 
The main intervention in this research was a training program in creative thinking. A 
second intervention was a training program in hazard management. The subjects for the 
research were undergraduate engineering and technology students, industry-based safety 
advisers and government-based safety advisers. The dependent variables were based on 
responses to safety case studies. Subjects were required to generate solutions to problems 
and to prioritize given solutions to other problems. Two variables were drawn from the 
first task; the number of alternative solutions; and the potential effectiveness of those 
solutions (proportion safe place solutions). The third variable was the correlation of each 
subject's prioritization of potential solutions with an optimum ranking of those solutions. 
The results show that the creative thinking training lead to large increases in the number of 
solutions generated by the undergraduate students and moderate increases by the industry 
and government advisers. The quality of those solutions, being the proportion of safe place 
solutions tended to either increase (about half the cases in total) or remain unchanged. The 
net result was substantial increases in the output of potentially good solutions. 
The creative thinking training did not seem to have a substantial impact on the ability to 
prioritize solutions. In the case ofthe engineering students an improvement was noted but 
this was not evident with any other subjects. 
The hazard management training (government advisers only) did not lead to any increase in 
the generation of solutions either in terms of number of solutions or the proportion of safe 
place solutions among those alternatives. 
In comparing novices and experts, there seemed to be no difference in the generation of 
alternative solutions in terms of the number of solutions and some minor effects on the 
quality of those solutions (the most novice subjects lower on one case as individuals). The 
prioritization of solutions, however showed substantial differences between experts and 
novices. Experts clearly tended to favour the safe place solutions. 
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Chapter Six 
Discussion 
6. Discussion 
The key variables measured were; 
1. The generation of alternative safety solutions. 
2. The generation of effective safety solutions. 
3. The prioritization of safety solutions. 
6.1 Generating Solutions to Safety Problems 
The issues surrounding the first two variables, the number and potential effectiveness 
solutions generated, are discussed together, under this heading of Generation of Solutions 
to Safety Problems. 
6.1.1 Creative Thinking Training and the Generation of Solutions 
Training in creative thinking for subjects with a variety of health and safety expertise lead 
to large improvements in the generation of safety solutions. This effect was shown with 
each group of subjects who took part in the research. The effect ofthe training in creative 
thinking was ofthe order of 100% with the undergraduate students and a little more modest 
with the other subjects (around 30 to 40%). The improvements found when subjects 
worked individually and when they worked in teams of three were of similar magnitude. 
The effects found here are similar to those found in studies ofthe brainstorming methods. 
While most research on brainstorming has studied components of brainstorming, such as 
the impact of teamwork, or the effect of criticism, some studies have shown the positive 
effect of actual training in brainstorming on the ability to generate ideas (Meadow & 
Parnes 1959; Parnes & Meadow 1959; Parnes 1961; Reese and Parnes 1970; Baer 1988). 
The effect sizes, where reported, were similar to the findings found in this research; for 
instance Parnes and Meadow (1959) reported a 100% improvement. Sometimes studies of 
brainstorming have not included any training but instead have examined the effect of 
encouraging subjects to make use of the brainstorming instructions as they work on the 
problems. Like the studies of training in the brainstorming methods, these studies have 
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shown that using the brainstorming instructions leads to increased idea output (Parnes & 
Meadow 1959; Meadow, Parnes & Reese 1959; Weisskopf-Joelson & Eliseo 1961; Parloff 
& Hanson 1964; Sappington & Farrar 1982; Szymanski & Harkins 1992). The size ofthe 
effect, has been between 70% and 450% increase in total ideas (Parnes and Meadow 1959; 
Weisskopf-Joelson & Eliseo 1961; Parloff and Hanson 1964; Szymanski & Harkins 1992) 
and between 50% and 100% increase in good ideas (Meadow, Parnes & Reese 1959; 
Parloff and Hanson 1964; Sappington and Farrar 1982). 
While a few studies have failed to find an effect for brainstorming training (Cohen, 
Whitmyre & Funk 1960; Kabanoff & Bottger 1991) the consensus seems to be that 
emphasising the brainstorming instructions can be effective and training in the 
brainstorming techniques is also effective. The results here show a similar effect for 
training in creative thinking training that was based on de Bono's six hats method. The 
results here demonstrated an effect for training in creative thinking of between 20% and 
150% increase in total ideas and 20% to 200% increase in good (safe place) ideas. 
6.1.2 Mechanisms that Facilitated the Generation of Solutions 
The training emphasised focussed thinking. During the training subjects were required to 
direct their attention toward a particular type of thinking. For instance when creative 
thinking was called for, trainees were encouraged to do green hat thinking for a short 
period of time. During green hat thinking, other types of thinking were excluded. The 
same was true for using any hat; other types of thinking should be excluded. The intense 
focus on one type of thinking contrasts with every-day thinking that is often not directed 
toward any particular objective. 
In the same vein as encouraging more focussed thinking, the training emphasised that the 
subjects should take specific control over their own thinking and choose what type of 
thinking was appropriate at a certain time. They were encouraged to make an effort to take 
a helicopter view of problems rather than take a narrow reactive approach. This was best 
emphasised by the use of the blue hat in allocating time to the planning of the kind of 
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thinking needed, rather than actually thinking about the situation itself. One would imagine 
that encouraging helicopter thinking would be worthwhile in improving the outcomes of 
creative thinking as it encourages a broad view and an openness to the possibility of 
multiple solutions, and from this a less immediate evaluation of ideas. 
For good application of the six thinking hats, there needs to be an appreciation of the 
overall thinking process. For instance, being able to focus on one type of thinking to the 
exclusion of another, is predicated on knowing how that piece of focussed thinking fits into 
a larger process. The over-viewing of thinking could be described as metacognition. 
Metacognition has been defined as; 'knowledge concerning one's own cognitive processes 
and products ... (and) the active monitoring and consequential regulation of these 
processes in relation to the cognitive objects or data on which they hear' (Flavell 1976 in 
Biggs 1987, p. 10), or 'thinking about one's own thinking' (Smith 1992, p. 25). Sternberg 
(1990a) and Arlin (1990) drew parallels between wisdom and metacognition. The 
encouragement of a metacognitive approach should assist the application of creative 
thinking by generating an appreciation of its place in a wider context. 
The training involved short periods of intense thinking. This may have created a belief 
among the subjects that they are capable of productive thinking in a short time. If subjects 
gained an enhanced expectation of their own ability then this may have translated into 
improved performance. While there is little research directly into the effect oi perception of 
ability on idea production, a few research studies have assessed the effect of setting goals, 
which may be related. For instance Latham and Saari (1979) and Locke (1982) found that 
goal setting had a positive effect. However later, after improving on some methodology 
problems in Locke's study, Lorenzi (1988) failed to show that goal-setting made any 
difference. The effect of goal-setting would not necessarily be the same though as the 
effect of a higher perception of ability. Therefore, it still seems reasonable that enhancing 
subjects perception of their own ability potentially had a positive effect on performance. 
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Osborn (1953) described criticism as cold water on ideas while cooperation and 
improvement of other people's ideas were the hallmarks of successful creative teamwork. 
Within the training there was discussion and exercises that emphasised how the dominance 
of criticism in our thinking and the seemingly natural tendency toward argument in our 
culture form blockages to creative thinking. Some research has shown that being critical 
offers a prestige advantage (Amabile 1983). Amabile showed that those who are critical are 
perceived as more intelligent by peers than those who are more supportive. Given this finding 
there is a good reason for people to be critical; they appear smarter. However the presence of 
criticism is not seen as a useful feature of creative efforts. The early self-evaluation of ideas 
(Sappington & Farrar 1982) and the injection of external criticism (Smith 1993) have been 
shown by research studies to impede creative performance. Even apprehension about the 
prospect of being evaluated by others has been shown to reduce the output of idea 
generation (Diehl & Stroebe 1987). Once convinced ofthe negative effect of criticism on 
creative performance, subjects may have been motivated to take some action to minimise 
criticism. Obviously this has particular application to team thinking, but it is also plausible 
that individual thinking could have been aided by addressing a typical critical approach. 
The accomplishment of a less critical approach may have been enhanced by the six hats 
model. The training encouraged a separation of thinking tasks into bite-size activities. This 
model has the potential to give freedom for those who feel the need to be critical, but who 
know of its deleterious effect on creative performance, to be helpful and creative when 
generating ideas, with the knowledge that criticism will be allowed at a certain time. The 
points above about the focus created by the six hats model are relevant here. While an 
explanation and demonstration of the negative influence of criticism may have encouraged 
a change of approach, this would have be enhanced by the use of the six hats tool that 
provided a simple method to allocate thinking time to creative thinking. 
Some research has shown that the difference in the performance of brainstorming groups 
and non-brainstorminggroups was due to the large amount of ideas that the group actually 
enunciated but failed to recognise as worthwhile ideas (Parloff & Hanson 1964). It would 
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seem then that encouraging participants to recognise the value in ideas would be 
worthwhile in improving creative performance. Judgement ofthe ideas should be delayed 
and in addition some specific effort should be made to find value in the ideas and develop 
them into something useful. Often during the training it was emphasised and demonstrated 
that some value can often be found in ideas that initially appeared useless. This 
demonstration may have created an openness to the exploration of possibilities and a 
reduction of critical thinking. 
As mentioned above, the minimisation of criticism and the enhancement of cooperation is 
seen as essential to teamwork. In groups the six hats model provides a structure to facilitate 
a cooperative approach to thinking. The emphasis in the training was on each person in a 
group thinking with the same hat. For instance, if a group was working on green hat, then 
the whole group were working on green hat. The method has the capacity to free those 
who perhaps feel as though they need to provide a balancing or cautioning role, to be able 
to go along with idea generation, knowing that a time would come when all would make an 
effort in the cautious role. An effort to balance ideas seems to be a normal feature of 
everyday conversations. The six hats method provided a simple structure to allow all 
people to avoid this tendency and work on one line of thinking at a time. This seems like a 
more productive strategy than the balancing of ideas that seems normal. 
Finally, the training emphasised that it is possible to use techniques to generate ideas. 
Participants learnt and practiced using techniques to enhance active divergent thinking and 
thus improve the generation of alternative solutions. While this processes is linked to other 
' elements such as the reduction of criticism, cooperation, and an openness to ideas, it is not 
just these factors. Participants hopefully completed the training with some understanding 
of how to employ simple techniques of divergent thinking to get ideas moving quickly. 
There is little background research about the effectiveness of such methods. Bouchard 
(1972) compared brainstorming groups using the analogy technique with those not using 
the technique. The results however were not clear, in one instance those using analogy 
generated 100% more ideas, however this did not occur for all problems in the research. 
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While research in this area is minimal, the techniques of active divergent thinking are 
widely cited as important features in creative thinking and so one would expect that 
developing a skill in the methods could lead to improved performance. 
In summary the mechanisms within the training in the research here that would seem to 
have facilitated improvement in creative output are; 
• encouraging more focussed thinking 
• encouraging metacognitive control, or helicopter vision 
• creating a belief in the ability to perform at a high level 
• encouraging the minimisation of criticism 
• providing a structure for thinking that facilitates a reduction in criticism 
• encouraging an openness to the possibility of alternatives and the value in other ideas 
• encouraging and providing a structure for cooperation in teams 
• developing a skill in the techniques of active divergent thinking. 
6.1.3 Group versus Individual Effects 
The level of research that has focussed on the brainstorming model or its components is 
indicative of the influence of brainstorming on the understanding of creative processes. 
While Osborn (1948) wrote about techniques of active divergent thinking, the model that 
seemed to catch attention was group brainstorming and the few simple rules that it 
involved. Osborn cautioned that group work was not always likely to be an effective way 
to generate ideas. These words have been vindicated many times since, and a few times 
prior to Osborn, in studies that examined the performance of groups compared with the 
performance of individuals. Typically these research programs have compared an 
interacting group with a nominal group. A nominal group was usually taken to mean the 
combination of the efforts of a number of individuals who worked alone. These studies 
have found that nominal groups, that is individuals, are capable of greater idea output alone 
than if they worked together in a group. This finding has been mainly shown for groups of 
four (for example; Taylor, Berry & Block 1958; Bouchard, Barsaloux & Drauden 1974; 
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Harari & Graham 1975; Graham 1977; Maginn & Harris 1980; Jablin 1981; Diehl & Stroebe 
1987; Diehl & Stroebe 1991; Thornburg 1991; Stroebe, Diehl & Abakoumkin 1992; 
Camacho & Paulus 1995; Furnham & Yazdanpanahi 1995; Paulus, Larey & Ortega 1995) but 
also for larger groups (Bouchard & Hare 1970; Bouchard, Barsaloux & Drauden 1974). 
Given the failure of groups to perform to expectations one might wonder why they were 
included in this study. Some of the research studies showing the negative influence of 
interacting groups also surveyed the participants and found that while the interacting 
groups were less effective, the participants perceived the opposite. People involved in 
groups perceived them to be more effective than individual work. Furthermore there are 
strong organisational trends toward the use of teams. It seems that team thinking is a part 
of organisational life and so it was clear that the research here must be done with the 
improvement of team performance in mind as well as the improvement of individual 
performance. The research here did not aim to repeat the examinations of the relative 
performance of individuals and teams, but rather to test the effect of training in both ways 
of working because they are both important in an organisational context. 
Virtually all the results found here were of similar magnitude for individuals and teams. 
Given the similarity ofthe effects for individual and team work the results are not discussed 
in the these terms any further. Whether problems are solved in teams or individually, the 
output of either way of working can be enhanced by about the same amount via the use of 
creative thinking skills. 
6.1.4 The Effectiveness of the Solutions 
The most immediately apparent question following a claim about the production of more 
alternatives to a problem concerns the potential usefulness of those ideas. An evaluation of 
the quality of solutions along with the quantity of the solutions has thus been a common 
model in many studies of creative thinking following the well-accepted model put forward 
by Guilford (1950). The research here did not differ and made an evaluation ofthe quality 
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of solutions in terms of their potential effectiveness by determining the proportion of safe 
place solutions among the list of alternatives. 
The total output of ideas by either novices or experts was improved following training in 
creative thinking. With this improvement there seemed to be no change in the proportion 
of safe place solutions (although not significant changes there were many more instances of 
improvements that reductions). 
Given the proportion of safe place ideas was maintained the increase in total ideas was 
accompanied by large increases in the number of safe place solutions. The success of 
problem solving is predicated by the ability to generate potential courses of action. The 
ability to recognise good solutions from poor is important, however this ability is of no 
value if there is nothing from which to choose. The research here showed that creative 
thinking training was an effective way to enhance the generation of solutions for safety 
problems. The increases in safe place solutions of up to 200% generated by the engineers 
following training was especially encouraging. 
6.1.5 Transfer of Creative Thinking Skills 
Most ofthe evaluations in studies of brainstorming have required participants to work on 
similar problems as they encountered within the training. Often these problems were novel 
problems ofthe type used as examples within the training (Parnes & Meadow 1959; Parnes 
1961; Reese and Parnes 1970; Baer 1988). There are some studies that avoided the type of 
problems in the subsequent testing (Meadow & Parnes 1959), however they are in the 
minority as there seems to be little report of studies that emphasise the use of evaluation 
problems that are of a type distinct from those already used in the training. The research 
here thus represents a variation from many studies. The tests here used a specific type of 
problem; safety problems. This topic was deliberately avoided during the training. The 
creative thinking training included no information about accident prevention; no safety 
examples of any kind were used in the training. The enhanced performance on problems 
outside the sphere of the examples emphasised during the training shows a skill transfer 
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from the training to other problem types. Guilford (1987) commented that transfer of skills 
to real problem situations may be problematic unless specific analogies or demonstrations 
are used that show participants the link. In this study no effort was made to show a link 
between the training and the safety problems and so the size ofthe effect that was measured 
is even more significant. Clearly subjects have transferred the skills in the training and 
applied these to the safety problems in the test. 
6.1.6 Creative Thinking Training as a 'Priming' Exercise 
The government advisers who took the hazard management training without any prior 
training in creative thinking made little progress as a result of the hazard management 
training. As stand-alone program, the training in hazard management seemed to have only 
a small impact on the ability to generate alternative solutions to safety problems. In 
contrast, following the hazard management training, subjects who previously trained in 
creative thinking, generated many more ideas (especially in teams) than those subjects who 
had only completed the hazard management training. The confounding factor was that the 
subjects completing both forms of training had taken the test twice and were thus compared 
to subjects who had completed the test only once. Possibly those completing the test the 
second time may have improved with practice alone. Past research in creative thinking has 
shown that there can be an improvement on a test like this with practice alone (Kabanoff 
and Bottger 1991; 30% improvement), however it's been more common to find that no 
improvementresulted from practice alone (Campbell 1968; de Sanchez, Astorga, de Blanco 
& de Griffin 1983 in Nickerson, Perkins & Smith 1985; Baer 1988; Goff 1992). 
The study with the technology students showed that the improvement on the test with 
practice alone was about 25% for individuals and about 10% when working in teams. In 
comparison, the improvement in the effectiveness of hazard management training by the 
addition of creative thinking training as a priming exercise was about 25% for individuals 
and about 60% in teams. The size of practice effect noted with the technology students is 
therefore about equal to the improvement noted for individuals but substantially less that 
that noted for teams. Therefore, for teams at least, it seems that the improvement noted for 
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the government advisers after they completed the hazard management training, and having 
first completed the creative thinking training, was probably due to this combination of 
training and not practice. Furthermore the effect size of about 60% is reasonably large. 
Interestingly, when only one ofthe team of three had been to the creative thinking training, 
the teams generated 20% more than those where there were no creative thinking trained 
members, however this effect was not significant and also should be considered in light of 
the possible impact of a practice effect. 
As single interventions the creative thinking and hazard management training had little 
impact on the generation of solutions among the government advisers. However, it seems 
that the training in creative thinking was a useful primer for the hazard management 
training. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the hazard management training in terms ofthe 
ideas generated following training was greatest among those participants who had been pre-
trained in creative thinking. 
6.1.7 Generalising the Effects to other Creative Thinking Techniques 
As discussed earlier, the following features ofthe training modelled on the six thinking hats 
technique would seem likely to have influenced the enhanced production of ideas: focussed 
thinking; helicopter vision; belief in ability; minimisation of criticism; openness to ideas; 
encouraging cooperation; and the techniques of active divergent thinking. The presence of 
these factors would seem to represent the basis of a good model for creative thinking. They 
build on the psychological theory that the mind is most adept at the repetition of ideas and 
this function forms something of a barrier to the generation of new ideas; a theory widely 
discussed from early this century (example; Spearman 1930; Kohler 1930). Also the range 
of factors present in the six thinking hats model would seem to be common to techniques 
promoted by many writers on creative thinking (for example Osborn 1948; Gordon 1961; 
Adams 1987; Rickards 1988; Dacey 1989; Barry & Rudinow 1989). Given that the six 
thinking hats seems to share this relationship with creative thinking in general, one might 
expect that other models embodying these principles would yield a similar result. 
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6.1.8 Novices and Experts Generating Solutions 
Among the research subjects were groups of varying health and safety expertise. For 
instance the technology students had no specialist safety education or experience, and while 
aligned toward a technical career by their choice of course, their knowledge about safety 
should be akin to that of the general community. Therefore the technology students could 
be described as novices in the area of safety. The other extreme was the industry adviser 
group who would be among the most safety knowledgable people in the community; they 
were involved in a post-graduate course in safety and most worked in specialist safety 
roles. The industry advisers could be referred to as experts. Between these two extremes 
were the engineering students who had the benefit of undergraduate safety education and 
the government safety advisers, who had extensive experience in the field, and some 
exposure to education via short training courses. 
It would seem logical to assume that health and safety expertise gained through study and 
experience (expert level) would be useful when proposing alternative solutions to a safety 
problem. However this contention was not supported by the results. When generating 
solutions to safety problems, the technology students, engineering students, government 
advisers, and industry advisers all performed at the same level. 
One might expect that the quality ofthe solutions produced by novices would be lower. On 
this topic, Perkins (1981), writing on creative thinking in general, argued that in terms of 
the effectiveness of solutions, information and knowledge are an important precursor to 
creative tasks to direct efforts in an ultimately useful way. In this area, Stavy, Meidav, Asa 
and Kirsch (1991) found that physics experts took conceptually difficult but expedient 
abstract approaches to solving physics problems while students preferred conceptually 
easier but more laborious approaches. Similarly, Tudor (1992) found that experts in 
environmental management were superior to novices in developing solutions both in terms 
of number and potential effectiveness, and Grosswald (1992) showed that experienced 
medical practitioners considered more possibilities in medical problem solving than 
undergraduate medical students. This line of thinking would suggest that experts in safety 
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would generate a greater proportion of good ideas; that their idea-producing efforts would 
be focussed in a more efficient manner. 
The research here found little support for a hypothesis that experts would generate a greater 
proportion of safe place solutions. The only indication that specialist knowledge may lead to 
a greater production of goo d ideas was the relatively poorer proportion of safe place solutions 
generated by the technology students (safety novices) on one case (out of three) when working 
individually. However, in contrast the engineering students performed at a similar level to 
the subjects with more expertise. Furthermore when subjects worked in teams the effect 
was not apparent at all; that is, even the technology students performed at a similar level. 
In addition, the proportion of safe place solutions by the technology students increased 
nearer to the level ofthe other groups following their training in creative thinking. 
Similarly, if knowledge about prevention was relevant to the generation of a greater 
proportion of safe place solutions then one would imagine that training in hazard 
management would enhance this ability. However the hazard management training with 
the government advisers did not improve the proportion of safe place solutions. The 
training lead to no detectable change in the performance of individuals and a significant 
drop in the performance of teams. Untrained teams generated about 50% safe place 
solutions while those teams working with the benefit of the hazard management training 
generated about 35% safe place solutions. This result was peculiar as one would expect 
that the training would focus attention on safe place solutions, and the results on the 
prioritization task did not indicate any tendency away from the safe place paradigm after 
the hazard management training. For the generation of solutions, it must be noted that all 
other subjects completed three case studies individually and three in teams, whereas the 
government advisers completed only one case study individually and one in teams. Thus, 
attempting to explain the apparently negative effect may be futile. While statistically 
significant it would seem to be unwise to make strong claims based on this result, given its 
counter-intuitive nature, and that the hazard management training was only tested on only 
one group and the testing was only one third as extensive. 
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Taking all the outcomes into account it seems that the level of safety expertise has little 
bearing on either the number of solutions or the proportion of safe place solutions. 
6.1.9 The Relative Success of Novices 
6.1.9.1 The Irrelevance of Specialist Information in Idea Generation 
The level of safety expertise did not seem to have any bearing on the ability to generate 
alternative solutions to safety problems. Historically, in the study of problem-solving 
methodology, information has been seen as the vital beginning point (for example; Ribot 
1906; Wallas 1926; Harrisberger 1966; Gordon 1969; Bransford & Stein 1984; 
Zechmeister & Johnson 1992). From the base of information the remainder ofthe process 
was thought to follow (first gather information, then incubate, and so on). While this 
model remains popular, many authors on creative thinking have moved away from relying 
on the mere presence of sufficient information to provide the creative jolt. For some time 
these authors have stressed the importance of divergent thinking techniques to provoke the 
mind toward new ideas (for example; Osborn 1948; Gordon 1961; Allen 1962; Koestier 
1969; de Bono 1971; Koberg 1981; Adams 1986; Rickards 1988; Barry and Rudinow 
1989). These writers have generally suggested that, while information is a component of 
successful problem solving, it's presence alone will often fail to produce high creativity. 
They've stressed that the generation of ideas is more dependent on skills of active divergent 
thinking. Thus it is arguable that the lack of difference between novices and experts on the 
generation of solutions to safety problems is no surprise. 
6.1.9.2 Knowledge and its Role in Encouraging Evaluation 
Since Osborn (1948) popularised the brainstorming model, many research studies have 
showed the value of employing the non-evaluative brainstorming instructions when 
generating ideas (Meadow & Parnes 1959; Parnes 1959; Parnes & Meadow 1959; Meadow, 
Parnes & Reese 1959; Parnes 1961; Weisskopf-Joelson & Eliseo 1961; Parloff & Hanson 
1964; Reese and Parnes 1970; Sappington & Farrar 1982; Baer 1988; Szymanski & 
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Harkins 1992). Removing evaluation from the idea generating phase of problem solving is 
a key part of strategies designed to facilitate the generation of ideas. 
One would assume that those most able to evaluate ideas would be those with specialist 
knowledge. For instance, in this research, the experts were shown to better discriminate 
good ideas from poor ideas. In contrast, novices do not have the knowledge to properly 
evaluate the ideas and thus performed poorly when called upon to prioritize solutions. 
Possibly the presence of sufficient knowledge to make evaluations, encourages the making 
of evaluations. If so, then the presence of knowledge would impede the generation of 
ideas. However, if this argument is sound, then it suggests that novices would be more 
productive than experts. Unfortunately this effect was not observed; there seemed to be no 
difference between novices and experts. This conundrum aside, the link between the 
presence of knowledge and the ability to evaluate that naturally follows, combined with the 
established relationship between evaluation and poor performance, may go some way 
toward explaining the poorer than intuitively expected performance of the experts on the 
task of generating solutions. 
6.1.9.3 Problem Relevance and Dominant Paradigms 
There have been a few studies of training in brainstorming that tested idea-output in 
relation to the type of problem. These studies examined problem types such as relevant 
versus irrelevant problems, and real versus unreal problems (Parloff & Hanson 1964; 
Harari & Graham 1975; Diehl & Stroebe 1987). The main idea of these studies seemed to 
be to examine the change in performance between working on problems close to one's own 
experience and working on problems removed from one's own experience. While Parloff 
& Hanson (1964) failed to show an effect for varying the problem type in this way, later 
studies showed that idea output was depressed by problems that were highly relevant to the 
subjects (Harari & Graham 1975) or highly controversial to the subjects (Diehl & Stroebe 
1987). Some studies have examined the link between the potential end uses of the ideas 
and the productive output. Sessions that seemed to lead to direct consequences lead to less 
ideas that when the session seemed to be a training exercise only (Maginn & Harris 1980). 
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Generally there seems to be some evidence that problems that are relevant, real, or maybe, 
serious, would be likely to result in lower output than novel, unreal, playful, problems. 
Within the research here all the problems were based on descriptions of accidents. In the 
past most research has been based on playful problems such as; find uses for a coat 
hanger. Thus the problems in the research here were of a serious nature when compared to 
the typical problems used in brainstorming research. While all subjects would probably 
regard the problems as serious, the relevance of the problems would have been highest 
among the government and industry advisers, due to their professional interest in safety.-
With these two points in mind, the problems used in the research here would be expected to 
yield a lower amount of ideas than typical brainstorming research problems, and that this 
effect might be pronounced for those subjects of greatest expertise. Providing this effect 
had an equal impact on both the untrained and trained groups then the comparison of 
trained and untrained subjects would be unaffected. Unfortunately this may not have been 
the case. The enhanced performance in the trained groups was hypothesised to be due to 
the creative thinking training. One of the main mechanisms of successful operation of 
creative thinking techniques is to assist subjects to break from dominant ideas. These ideas 
have become dominant through familiarity and repetition. Overcoming this dominance 
may be more difficult with highly relevant problems. For experts, these problems have the 
potential to evoke a strong link to an established means of dealing with this type of 
problem. Strong linkages of this kind would seem to be potential barriers to the 
development of many alternatives to a problem. This would indicate that finding a training 
effect is probably more difficult using highly relevant problems, and therefore a reduced 
effect among experts is understandable. 
In some sense the problem-relevance effect is consistent with some of the findings here. 
Untrained subjects perform at a similar level, whether they had a strong professional 
involvement with safety problems (health and safety practitioners) or had no particular past 
experience with safety (undergraduate students). However once trained in creative thinking 
methods, there were large differences between these two types of subjects. The 
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undergraduate students, w h o were less involved with safety issues clearly outperformed 
those subjects with careers in safety. This does not show that the relevance ofthe problems 
was the reason for this effect, as there were other obvious differences between the groups, 
such as age for instance. While the effect is not proven as such, the effect problem-
relevance was visibly apparent during the training with the government safety advisers. 
During the training the subjects seemed to be responding very well to the techniques and 
the exercises seemed vigorous, enjoyable and productive. At this stage the exercises were 
non-safety exercises and so had no particular relevance to the subjects. When the training 
was over, the assessment involved safety problems; problems that were of direct relevance 
to the subjects. The change in performance was visible; they seemed much more restricted 
and less fluent. There could be a number of potential explanations. For instance, tests that 
people are accustomed to are usually assessed based on rightness rather than the number of 
alternatives. While the instructions in this test emphasised developing options, it's probably 
reasonable to suggest that a focus on rightness in a testing situation is somewhat inbred in our 
culture. However, one would think this would apply equally to the other subjects, such as the 
undergraduate students, in fact, one could imagine that this effect would be stronger with the 
undergraduates who are accustomed to completing tests. An alternative explanation may be 
that this type of effect combines with the problem-relevance effect. These subjects have 
substantial experience in the field of safety and are accustomed to there being a right 
answer for these particular problem situations. With experience possibly comes a learnt 
paradigm that is difficult to move away from and then this effect is compounded by the 
pressure of a test. While similarly subjected to the pressure of a test, the novices may be 
less bound by preconceptions about what would be an appropriate set of solutions. 
It would seem that how the subjects relate to the problems would have affected the relative 
outcomes of the training. This leads to something of a paradox. Experts have more 
knowledge about potential solutions, however this knowledge may be an impediment to 
thinking of a range of solutions. 
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6.1.10 Summary of the Issue of Generating Solutions 
Increasing creative performance in the area of generating solutions to safety problems 
seemed to be mainly influenced by creative thinking tools rather than knowledge or 
information about safety. Evidence of this was in form of data that showed how groups 
with safety education and experience performed no better in terms of generating 
alternatives than those without this type of experience. 
In contrast to the lack of influence of specialised knowledge, training in creative thinking 
techniques lead to substantial improvements on the task of generating safety solutions. The 
increase in generation of alternative solutions was accompanied by either, a maintenance, 
or possible improvement, in the proportion of safe place solutions. This indication of a 
positive relationship between quantity and quality is in keeping with Osborn's (1957) 
suggestion that the relationship should be a positive. While some studies have confirmed 
this theory (Parnes 1961), others have found no relationship (Parnes 1959) but more 
commonly noted has been an inverse relationship (Weisskopf-Joelson & Eliseo 1961; 
Parloff and Hanson 1964; Szymanski and Harkins 1992). 
There were wide-differences between the safety expertise ofthe groups. However expertise 
did not seem to lead to better generation of alternative solutions to safety problems. The 
apparently benign effect of greater expertise when generating solutions was not so clear 
when the effectiveness (proportion of safe place solutions) of those ideas was examined. 
There was some evidence from the study that those with no safety education or experience 
generated less effective solutions when analysed against the preferred hierarchy of control. 
This difference was only significant for one of the individual cases and not for any of the 
cases where people worked in teams. Overall, the evidence is not as clear as for the basic 
generation of alternatives, but there was no strong evidence to say that safety education and 
experience had a bearing on the generation of a greater proportion of safe place solutions. 
Knowledge about safety theory has been well promoted in the quest for improved injury 
prevention abilities, however little attention has been paid to creative thinking skills. The 
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research showed that creative thinking tools were an effective w a y to improve the 
generation of solutions to safety problems. The training led to large increases in the 
number of solutions with no reduction in the proportion of safe place solutions. The net 
result being large increases in the number of safe place solutions. 
6.2 Prioritizing Effective Solutions to Safety Problems 
The prioritizationof potential solutions was the third key variable. From the examination 
of this issue there are a number of points for discussion. 
6.2.1 The Effect of Creative Thinking Training on the Prioritization of 
Solutions: Why Effective only for the Engineers? 
The creative thinking training seemed to benefit the engineers (both individually and in 
teams) in terms of the prioritization of solutions. However the same training seemed to 
have little effect on the technology students, industry advisers, or government advisers. 
While there was an age and work specialisation difference between the engineers and the 
two groups of advisers, these factors were not a point of difference between the engineering 
and technology students. Yet, the training appeared to have a more substantial effect on the 
engineering students than on the technology students. Engineering students were in fourth-
year and the technology students were in first-year. The most obvious difference is the 
education level; either the engineering education itself, or perhaps more likely, the health 
and safety component ofthe engineering education. Experiments in this research showed 
that those of greater expertise in safety performed better at the prioritization task. Given 
this result it seems as though the health and safety education within the engineering course 
would be an influential factor in the difference between the engineering and technology 
students. Therefore the possible explanation for their better response is that the creative 
thinking training can be effective in improving prioritization provided there is some basis 
for understanding the prevention methodologies. The training facilitated better decision 
making given a basic level of understanding of prevention theory. 
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Even with a basic level of understanding w h y would the creative thinking training improve 
the prioritization of safety solutions? It seems as though the creative thinking skills 
improved the handling of information in decision making tasks. The training emphasised 
the consideration of possibilities. The training emphasised that options that immediately 
appear silly or unwise may hold some value and perhaps should be considered. The highest 
ranking options in the prioritization task generally attack the source of the hazard by 
proposing an alternative way of achieving the job at hand. For many, perhaps these ideas 
are easily rejected. But the longer these options can be held within the realm of 
possibilities then the greater their chances of ultimate selection. The emphasis in the 
training of delaying judgement and considering seemingly weird possibilities can help keep 
the system-changing style options alive until their benefit becomes obvious. In this 
manner, it could be predictable that creative thinking training would enhance the 
prioritization of solutions. 
The question remains as to why the creative thinking training would not have this effect 
with the industry advisers and the government advisers. Both these groups have the 
expertise to recognise the value of the system-change options. One reason, was that when 
working in teams both the industry and government advisers prioritized the options with 
reasonably good correlations with the optimum prioritization and so an improvement 
following the training could not seen. As individuals this reason did not apply to the same 
extent; untrained their scores were low enough to allow an improvement following training 
to be evident. However as mentioned, there was no improvement in prioritization for these 
groups following the training in creative thinking. While with the engineers, creative 
thinking seemed to facilitate better prioritization based on their basic understanding of 
safety, the same training provided no assistance to the industry and government advisers on 
the same task. Potentially given their extensive experience in the area, the advisers were 
less apt to accept an alternative approach to the selection of solutions. While creative 
thinking improved the generation of ideas for all subjects, maybe this aspect of thinking is 
far less bound by preconceptions. Perhaps years of experience provide greater restriction to 
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the prioritization of good ideas than it does for the generation of ideas. Conceptually, 
prioritizationof solutions, is much closer to actual implementation than is the generation of 
alternatives. Therefore, the learnt paradigms about what is successful, and even practical, 
are brought to bear to a greater extent and stifle the consideration of the potential 
effectiveness of ideas that involve changes to the system. 
6.2.2 Novices and Experts Prioritizing Solutions 
In decision making, expertise in accident prevention was shown to be important. There 
were significant differences in prioritization of solutions depending on their level of safety 
expertise. Given a list of options that had already been created, the results showed that 
those with greater specialist understanding of safety tended to adopt solutions nearer to the 
preferred, safe place, end ofthe hierarchy of controls. 
However training in hazard management did not improve this measure for the government 
safety advisers. No significant improvement in performance was measured after two days 
of training designed to improve the ability. As mentioned, it was difficult to measure an 
effect for the training in the team work here as the teams in the untrained group were 
already reasonably good at the prioritization task. However there was some scope for 
improvement in teams, and ample for individuals where no change was also noted. 
Possibly the test was not sufficiently sensitive to measure such a change or that training to 
improve abilities like this needs to be more substantial. Two days of training does not 
necessarily form a substantial change in the concept of understanding safety compared to 
years of experience. While the training may have enhanced the subjects skills in some 
particular areas, the general philosophy of safety would hardly likely to be altered by such a 
small exposure to training. Interestingly it has since been shown that a five-day health and 
safety representatives course (of similar content) can achieve this type of change among 
health and safety representatives (Culvenor, Cowley & Else 1996). However, health and 
safety representatives are part-time in an OHS role and have had much less experience in 
the field than the government advisers studied in this project. 
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6.2.3 Summary of the Issue of Prioritization of Solutions 
The results indicated that the ability to prioritize potential solutions to safety problems was 
related to the level of expertise in the area of safety. However, no improvement was noted 
in the ability to prioritize following a short hazard management training program. To put 
this in perspective though, the training program was applied to a group of subjects with an 
extensive experience in the area, and thus represented a small addition to their body of 
knowledge. It may be true that the same training program applied to another group would 
result in a more positive effect on this test (as has now actually been shown elsewhere; 
Culvenor, Cowley & Else 1996). 
Training in creative thinking seemed to have a positive impact on the ability of the 
undergraduate engineers to prioritize safety solutions. However no such effect was noted 
for the industry advisers, or government advisers. Creative thinking training was a useful 
intervention for improving prioritization where there was a basis for understanding the 
mechanisms of safety via the safe place approach. The engineers had the benefit of 
education in this area but the technology students had not had this type of education. While 
their untrained performance was already high in teams, and thus the results are somewhat 
inconclusive, the industry and government advisers obviously were armed with 
contemporary knowledge of prevention methodologies and yet the training failed to assist 
them to better prioritize solutions. It seems possible that to make use of the creative 
thinking skills for prioritization, a basic understanding of prevention methodology was 
necessary. Conversely those with high level of expertise did not benefit from the creative 
thinking training in terms of their ability to prioritize solutions. For these experts, the 
widening of perspective generated by the creative thinking training may be limited 
somewhat by an intimate knowledge of what is practical. 
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6.3 Implications for the Training Assessment: Measuring Paradigms 
Evaluation of hazard management training, if undertaken, seems often to evaluate the effect 
ofthe training by measuring what the participants perceive as the value ofthe training. For 
example training participants might be asked whether the training fulfilled their 
expectations, or they may be asked to estimate there own learning achievement. These 
evaluations measure the effect of the training based on the perception of the those 
attending. Objective evaluation usually takes longer than self evaluation and so is 
uncommon in short training sessions. Methods for assessing such courses in health and 
safety appear to be unavailable 
For this project the intention was to evaluate the effect on performance effect rather than 
the perceived effect. The tools used in this project relied on measuring performance on 
various tasks rather than a self-reported perception of the value ofthe training. 
The first part of the evaluation tool tested the generation of solutions to safety problems. 
From this test, two variables were drawn. Firstly, the number of alternatives generated in 
the given time and secondly a subjective evaluation of the effectiveness of those 
alternatives was make by classifying as either safe place or safe person in nature. These 
measures were applied to individuals and to teams. This type of test is similar in style to 
the general model of creative outcome testing, as suggested by Guilford (1950). The tests 
here exposed the subject to a situation and required creative effort to solve a problem, given 
certain instructions and a time limit. The test requires creative thinking, and seemed to 
show up some weaknesses with relying on expertise as precursors of effective problem 
solving. The tests showed that those who might have appeared to be in a much better 
position to generate solutions to safety problems were no better than comparative novices. 
While Tudor (1992) found that experts were superior in developing solutions and the 
potential effectiveness of those solutions, few other studies seemed to have compared 
experts and novices on the generation of alternatives. 
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The second part ofthe test measured the prioritization of safety solutions from a given list 
of options. The purpose ofthe test was to evaluate the subjects' tendency to recognise the 
potential of solutions nearer the preferred safe place end of the hierarchy of controls in 
preference to safe person controls. 
The prioritization tool proved to be an effective tool to provide a simple and fast measure 
of conceptual knowledge of preferred controls. The test provided a measure of the extent 
that subjects adopted the safe place paradigm. 
The assessment tools provided a way to undertake objective assessment of training without 
imposing too great time constraints. The prioritization tool especially, took a short time to 
administer and discriminated between various levels of safety expertise levels. In this way 
the tool could be applied to training either prior to training as a needs analysis or following 
training as an evaluation ofthe effect ofthe training on the actual performance of subjects. 
Given that the test seems to be able to make an assessment ofthe strength ofthe safe place 
paradigm then it seems reasonable that tests of similar style but different content could be 
used to assess other types of culture changes. 
6.4 Messages for Risk Control in the Workplace 
The results support the philosophy of consultation as a mechanism for workplace health 
and safety problem solving. Consultative processes imply that those at risk may be well 
positioned to develop risk control solutions. The reasons for this are probably more based 
in issues such as ownership and information, however the research here indicated that those 
without particular safety expertise can play a useful role in solution development. 
Specialists would seem to offer no advantage over novices when the task is to generate 
alternative solutions to a safety problem. While it may seem intuitively logical to involve 
specialists, or to attempt to improve the skills of those involved to be closer to the specialist 
level, it may be more profitable to concentrate on the enhancement of creative thinking 
skills. Creative thinking training was shown to substantially improve the ability to 
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generate solutions to safety problems. Once solutions were developed and there were 
decisions to be made then expertise came to the fore. At this point novices appeared not to 
have the ability to prioritize solutions as well as those with safety expertise. These findings 
suggest that in an organisational setting, the support and coaching of safety experts would 
be worthwhile to maximise the effectiveness of solutions adopted and implemented. 
Despite teams having a strong popular connection to creative efforts, research studies have 
persistently shown them to be less effective than individual work. Some of these studies 
evaluated the perception of effectiveness ofthe subjects who took part. These evaluations 
show that teamwork is perceived to be effective. It seems that, at least for the moment, 
teams are here to stay; they remain popular among those involved and are a growing feature 
of organisational structures. With the great body of evidence showing their ineffectiveness 
in creative tasks there's obviously a great need for creative methods that support the team 
way of working and improve its effectiveness. The research here was undertaken with this 
in mind and evaluated the effect of the creative thinking training in both individual and 
team mode. The creative thinking training was shown to improve the creative performance 
of both individuals and teams. 
6.5 Discussion Summary 
Knowledge about accident prevention appeared to have no statistically significant apparent 
effect on the ability to generate alternative ways to handle safety problems. There is some 
evidence to suggest that knowledge may play a role in focussing the alternatives toward 
safe place solutions. However the trend for higher knowledge to focus alternatives toward 
safe place solutions was isolated. The effects with regard to creative tasks and decision 
making tasks seem to be generally the same for individuals and teams. 
In the strategy for the prevention of mechanical equipment injures, the National 
Commission highlighted the need for '.. new approaches to engineering/technology safety 
measures and their incorporation into the design of equipment' (NOHSC 1990c, p. 14). 
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For the development of new approaches to safety problems, creative thinking training 
seems to hold great promise. A short training program in creative thinking lead to a 
substantial increase in the generation of solutions to safety problems. This effect was 
equally apparent for individuals and teams and was demonstrated with a range of subjects. 
The logical step following solution development is prioritization and application. The 
National Commission commented on the need for '... greater application of known 
engineering/technology safety measures ... and measures already in the workplace' 
(NOHSC 1990c, p. 14). 
The application, or prioritization, of safety measures seemed to be a skill of a differing 
domain to that of the generation of solutions. Safety expertise was an important factor in 
determining how well subjects were able to prioritize given sets of solutions for a set of 
safety problems. This also was equally true for individuals and for teams. The creative 
thinking training had a worthwhile impact on the prioritization of solutions for the 
engineers, but for all other groups there seemed to be little effect. Creative thinking 
training would seem to have the potential to improve prioritization by expanding the range 
of possible solutions that subjects considered for a given problem. This may lead subjects 
to consider options normally rejected. For this process to operate with any success though 
there needed to be a basic understanding of prevention methodology, and yet paradoxically 
when experts were trained in creative thinking there was no effect perhaps due to solidly 
embedded paradigms about the typically successful ways to manage safety problems. 
In summary, the generation of solutions and the subsequent prioritization of those solutions 
according to their potential effectiveness seemed to be relatively distinct activities relying 
on different sets of abilities. Generating solutions seemed to be best improved via the 
enhancement of creative thinking skills. Creative thinking also had some impact on the 
prioritization of solutions, however the prioritization of solutions seemed to be a function 
ofthe level of safety expertise. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion 
7. Conclusion 
Each year in Australia many people are affected by workplace injury and disease. In 
addition to the burden of pain and suffering, there are substantial economic consequences. 
The Industry Commission (1995) estimated that the total cost of occupational health and 
safety failure was $20,000M per annum. This places the cost of workplace injury and 
disease at a figure approximating 5% of GDP and a magnitude greater than the Gross Farm 
Product. The imperative for change and the opportunities to be realised are clear. 
The initial focus for this work was the prevention of mechanical equipment injury. 
Mechanical equipment injury is involved in around 28% of workplace injures and most 
workplace fatalities (80%). With respect to engineering as a means to prevention of 
mechanical equipment injury, the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission 
(1990c, p. 14) pointed to the need for new approaches and to better application of existing 
technologies. The research here focussed on these two themes; generating new solutions; 
and the application of known solutions. 
As noted by the National Commission, the prevention of mechanical equipment injuries 
shares a common conceptual framework with prevention in general. Therefore the study 
was broadened to examine the themes above in a wider context. This research took the 
challenge of how to better facilitate safe place design. Education in hazard management is 
a logical way of improving design and engineers are a worthy target of these suggestions. 
However, this education for engineers has been problematic and so the aim of this study 
was to investigate a supplemental, innovative way of improving safety design. 
The hypothesis was that training in creative thinking would be effective in improving the 
ability to design for safety. There seemed to be a natural link between creative thinking 
and safe design. Contemporary models for prevention have as their priority the elimination 
of hazards. This demands an examination of assumptions about the hazardous system 
which implies a logical role for creative thinking in facilitatingthis change of paradigm. 
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The creative thinking technique chosen was the six thinking hats model (de Bono 1985) 
that embodies many accepted principles of creative thinking. Subjects were undergraduate 
engineering and technology students, postgraduate hazard management students and a 
group of government employed safety advisers. The assessment of the training 
effectiveness was in accordance with established principles in the assessment of creativity, 
but adapted to safety theory drawing on the two themes mentioned above; development and 
application, of safety solutions. The assessment employed a set of fictitious safety case 
study problems. Subjects were required to suggest solutions to some problems, and for 
other problems were required to prioritize given solutions according to their potential 
effectiveness. Subjects worked on both tasks as individuals and in teams of three. The 
variables drawn from these tasks were threefold. 
1. Generation of alternative solutions (number of solutions, idea fluency). 
2. Generation of effective solutions (proportion of safe place solutions, idea quality). 
3. Prioritizationof effective solutions (correlation with standard rank). 
7.1 Generation of Alternative Solutions 
The training in creative thinking lead to substantial improvements in the generation of 
alternative solutions to the safety problems presented in the case studies. This 
enhancement was noted for subjects of varying education and experience, however the 
effects were largest with the undergraduate engineering and technology students. The 
improvement in the generation of alternatives following training in creative thinking is 
consistent with the view in literature that creative thinking is a learnable skill. 
Improving education in safety seems to be an obvious way to accelerate the development of 
new approaches to safety problems. However the research here indicated that expertise in 
safety had little impact on the generation of alternative solutions to safety problems. 
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7.2 Generation of Effective Solutions 
The study showed that training in creative thinking produced very few significant changes 
in the proportion of safe place solutions. In terms of the number of safe place solutions 
though, the impact was substantial. The maintenance of the proportion of safe place 
solutions combined with large improvements in the number of alternatives lead to a 
substantially increased set of potentially effective solutions. For instance the engineering 
students with the benefit of the training generated between 150-200% more safe place 
solutions than their untrained colleagues. 
The research gave some indication that specialist safety knowledge may be important in 
improving the quality of solutions. For one case working individually there was a 
significant difference between the study groups on the proportion of safe place solutions. 
This was due to lower proportion of safe place solutions generated by the most novice 
subjects; the technology students. However there are a number of factors that mitigate the 
generalisation of this result. Firstly, this effect was only noted on one case out of three. 
Secondly, the other groups, while having varying expertise, generated similar proportions 
of safe place solutions. Thirdly, the effect was not apparant at all when working in teams. 
Furthermore the proportion of safe place solutions generated by individual technology 
students increased following the creative thinking training taking their quality of solutions 
nearer that of the other groups. Therefore the evidence of any effect of expertise on the 
proportion of safe place solutions was not substantial. 
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7.3 Prioritization of Solutions 
For the engineers, the creative thinking training proved to be effective in enhancing the 
prioritizationof solutions. However, this was not apparent for the other groups of subjects. 
It seems that there is some potential for creative thinking to impact on prioritization of 
solutions, but this may be less likely to occur where there is little understanding of 
prevention methodologies and where paradigms about practical solutions tend to be strong. 
The research indicated that specialist safety knowledge had a positive impact on the 
prioritization of safety solutions. Those with higher levels of safety expertise were more 
likely to select solutions from the safe place end ofthe hierarchy of control. They favoured 
solutions relying on system changes rather than solutions relying on human behaviour. 
Consequently it seems that safety expertise plays an important role in hazard management 
at the decision making and control implementation stage. 
7.4 Combining Creative Thinking with Hazard Management Training 
In the study with the government safety advisers, the research showed that training in 
creative methods were an effective precursor to training in hazard management. The 
evaluation showed that alone, neither the hazard management training nor the creative 
thinking training had a substantial impact on subsequent test performance. However when 
creative thinking training was a precursor to the hazard management training, the 
generation of solutions by teams following both forms of training was substantially 
enhanced. The effect ofthe hazard management training seemed to be improved by the 
presence of the creative thinking training as a preliminary exercise. 
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7.5 Summary 
The aim was to investigate an innovative way of improving the ability of engineers to 
design for safety. The research centred on the hypothesis that training in creative thinking 
methods would be an effective way to improve the ability of engineers to design for safety. 
The key conclusion is that improving the generation of alternatives to safety problems can 
be achieved with creative thinking training. This training significantly enhanced the 
generation of alternatives with no loss in quality. Consequently the training lead to large 
increases in the output of solutions aligned with the safe place approach. 
Making use of safety options requires an ability to distinguish between good and poor 
solutions. For the undergraduate engineers creative thinking training was an effective 
method to shift their paradigms about prevention toward the safe place approach. This 
effect was not noted for other groups. For the most part, the good prioritization of solutions 
depended on expert knowledge. 
The findings support a model of empowerment in workplace risk control at the stage of 
generating potential solutions. Expertise in safety was not shown to be a prerequisite for 
this activity. However the process will require support from those expert in hazard 
management at the stage of selecting and implementing the most effective solutions. 
The recommendations based on the findings of this research are that creative thinking 
methods be given greater primacy in education for those involved in the process of hazard 
management. These people may be engineers, where the enhancement of these skills might 
be best implemented via undergraduate education, or workplace-based hazard management 
teams who would benefit from this type of training in the workplace. The case of the 
engineers is especially interesting and indicates the potentially useful combination of the 
creative thinking training with their existing education in safety and health. The 
encouragement of creative thinking should be greeted by a receptive industrial climate 
given the growing need for innovation as a competitive priority. 
227 
In summary; 
• Creative thinking training lead to an increase in the generation of alterative safety 
solutions. For example, the increase was approximately 100-150% for the engineers. 
• The improvement in the number of alternatives was accompanied by no reduction in the 
proportion of safe place solutions. 
• The set of solutions generated by those equipped with the creative thinking skills 
therefore contained a substantial increase in good solutions. For example; the increase 
in safe place solutions was approximately 150-200% for the engineers. 
• Novices and experts seemed equally able to generate alternative safety solutions. 
• Creative thinking training as a precursor to hazard management training proved to be an 
effective way to maximise the effectiveness of the hazard management training. 
• When prioritizing solutions, subjects with the greatest safety expertise favoured 
solutions nearest to the safe place ideal. 
• Creative thinking training had a positive effect on the engineering students' 
prioritizationof solutions. 
• Creative thinking training was an effective way to enhance the generation and 
prioritizationof safe place solutions by safety-educated undergraduate engineers. 
Tackling workplace injury and disease should be a social and economic priority. The 
opportunities for improvement are substantial and will be best realised with competent 
application of the safe place approach to prevention. It is vital for safety paradigms to 
move away from the distraction of behaviour-based concepts and toward the models of 
control at source and ergonomics. Creative thinking about safety can potentially facilitate 
this paradigm shift; potentially encourage outside-the-square thinking, which is after all the 
creative challenge presented by the hierarchy of control. 
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Chapter Eight 
Further Research 
8. Further Research 
8.1 Engineering and Creative Thinking 
The research here showed that a program in creative thinking training was effective in 
improving the solution generation by engineers. A s mentioned in the introduction, the 
recent review of engineering education, Changing the Culture: Engineering education into 
the future, emphasised the importance of creative thinking skills. 
There is a need for the introduction into courses at an early stage of greater attention to 
problem solving and the encouragement of creativity and innovation - knowing when analysis 
stops and synthesis starts. (IEAust, ATSE & EACED1996, p. 7) 
Given the potential demonstrated here, research is indicated to determine the extent that 
engineering schools are including independent studies on creative thinking. Research is 
indicated to determine h o w these skills are integrated with other subjects. Research is 
indicated to compare the effects ofthe programs with the effects measured in this research. 
8.2 Creative Thinking Application 
Creative thinking training proved to have a positive effect on a test of safety design. The 
research showed a wider transfer of skills than has been shown in many other studies. 
However taking the transfer of skills to the logical next step, research is indicated to 
determine the effect of such training in an applied setting. Furthermore, given that the 
training proved useful on safety tasks then one would imagine that there would be 
improvement in problem solving in other applied areas. Therefore research is indicated to 
determine the broad effects of such training. 
8.3 Safety Paradigms versus Actual Safety Recommendations 
O n the prioritization test, experts tended to favour the safe place solutions as an ideal. 
However, the test here was undertaken in an environment where subjects could put aside 
the constraints of practicalities and focus on what solutions would be most effective in an 
ideal sense. It would be interesting to know what relationship there is between the scores 
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on this instrument and the type of solutions that would be recommended in a real work 
situation. Research is indicated to determine the relationships between safety paradigms 
and the types of approaches that would be recommended given a real problem. 
8.4 The Poor Creativity of Experts 
Training in creative thinking, without any reference or link to safety, lead to substantial 
improvements in the generation of solutions (up to a 200% increase in the number of safe 
place solutions for the engineers). While novices and experts alike benefited from the 
training, there seemed to be indications that experts may respond less well. Further 
research is indicated to test the hypothesis that creative thinking is more difficult in one's 
own field. If so it is indeed a conundrum worth solving. Some reasons that it seems likely 
to occur are discussed in this paper. If it becomes established that experts respond less well 
to creative thinking training then research is indicated to determine the barriers and to 
investigate the ways that these can be overcome. 
8.5 Teaming-up Novices and Experts 
The results showed that novices were equally able as experts to generate solutions to safety 
problems. It seemed then that training to enhance safety knowledge would be unlikely to 
lead to an improvement in this area. Training workplace teams in creative thinking would 
seem to hold more promise if the desired outcome is a greater ability to develop new ways 
to solve problems. However creative thinking training had only minor impact on the 
prioritization of solutions. This task was best accomplished by those with expertise in 
safety. This would suggest that expert knowledge is needed, whether via experts or input 
by training programs to enhance the expertise of workplace teams. Research is indicated to 
determine how the skills of novice and expert problem solvers can be best integrated. 
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Appendix A 
Research in Brainstorming 
and Creative Thinking 
A. Research in Brainstorming and Creative Thinking 
A.1 Brainstorming 
Meadow and Parnes (1959) assessed the effect of a training program in brainstorming. 
Subjects were 162 university students. Fifty-four subjects in the experimental group were 
enrolled in a creative thinking course and two further groups of 54 subjects acting as 
controls were enrolled in other programs. The training consisted of 30 hours of instruction 
based on Osborn's methods. The test consisted of a battery of tests of creative thinking; 
generally around the model of divergent thinking with an assessment of the quantity and 
quality ofthe ideas both before and after the training. The brainstorming instructions were 
not reinforced at the point of testing, and during the training the trainer deliberately avoided 
problems of the type that would be in the test. While the size of the increase was not 
reported, the trained groups recorded statistically significant increases in the quantity and 
quality of those ideas when compared to the improvements by the control groups. 
Meadow, Parnes and Reese (1959) compared the brainstorming performance of individuals 
when the brainstorming instructions were emphasised at the point of evaluation and when 
they were not emphasised. All 32 subjects had been trained in the brainstorming methods. 
The 32 subjects were divided into four treatment conditions and all completed two 
problems (unusual uses for a hanger; and for a broom) working on one problem using 
brainstorming (forget about quality, go for quantity) and one using non-brainstorming 
(forget about brainstorming, go for quality ideas). Order of problems and order of 
instructions was crossed across the four groups. The evaluation was based on the number 
of ideas and a quality measure ofthe ideas (uniqueness and value). Meadow, Parnes and 
Reese found that brainstorming yielded more ideas (8 ideas) than non-brainstorming (4 
ideas). This effect was pronounced when using the brainstorming first however it was still 
evident under the reverse condition. Brainstorming instructions also resulted in more good 
ideas, however one would imagine that this was largely dependant on the total number of 
ideas. This study showed that reinforcing the brainstorming instructions results in 
improved performances for subjects trained in the methods. 
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Parnes and M e a d o w (1959) examined the effect of brainstorming instructions and other 
factors such as the influence of creative problem solving training and problem difficulty. 
Subjects were 52 undergraduate students who had never received any training in the 
brainstorming method. There were two tasks; uses for a coat hanger, and uses for a broom. 
Half the subjects worked to brainstorming instructions while the other half worked to non-
brainstorming instructions (only write good ideas and only good ideas would be counted). 
Parnes and Meadow arranged the subjects into four groups (brainstorming/non-
brainstorming and broom first/hanger first). Subjects spent five minutes on each problem 
working individually. Ideas were rated on a uniqueness scale and a value scale. These 
measures were combined and a cut-off point decided to categorise ideas as good ideas or 
poor ideas. Parnes and Meadow found strong correlations between the total number of 
ideas and the number of good ideas. They found that more good ideas were generated in 
response to the hanger problem (3.8 good ideas) than in response to the broom problem (3 
good ideas). Combining the problems, Parnes and Meadow found that the brainstorming 
instructions yielded more ideas (4.3 good ideas) than the non-brainstorming instructions 
(2.5 good ideas). The experiment showed the effectiveness of the brainstormingtechniques 
in generating ideas. Osborn, who developed the brainstorming model, suggested that as the 
quantity of ideas increases so does the quality, however Parnes and Meadow found a strong 
relationship between total ideas and the number of good ideas; that is; the average quality 
did not seem to vary greatly with the quantity of ideas. 
Parnes and Meadow (1959) conducted a further experiment with 34 undergraduate students 
to measure the effectiveness of training in creative problem solving on brainstorming 
performance. Seventeen of the subjects had undertaken a one-semester course in 
brainstorming principles. The other 17 subjects were similar in other ways but had not 
undertaken the course. Subjects worked on the hanger problem for five minutes under 
brainstorming instructions. Parnes found that individuals in the trained group (10.2 good 
ideas) clearly outperformed those in the untrained group (5.3 good ideas). Both the 
untrained and the trained group worked according to the brainstorming instructions. 
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Parnes and M e a d o w (1960) later examined the long-term persistence ofthe effects ofthe 
one-semester course in creative problem solving described above. The trained group 
consisted of 24 subjects who had completed the training between eight months and four 
years prior to the testing (mainly one to two years prior). Nine of these subjects were 
recruited as they enrolled for the advanced course. A further 15 subjects were selected 
from past enrolment lists (all these subjects attended) and these subjects were shown to be 
of similar ability as the first nine subjects. There were two control groups of 24 subjects 
selected from students who had registered to attend the basic course. Parnes and Meadow 
administered individual tests using the Guilford (apparatus, unusual uses, and think of a 
title) tests and the test involving listing uses for a coat hanger. The results showed that the 
previously trained group tended to be more productive. For instance on the coat hanger 
problem the trained group generated a mean of 16 uses per person while the control groups 
generated about 9 ideas per person. This difference was statistically significant. 
Cohen, Whitmyre and Funk (1960) examined brainstorming and the effect of a number of 
related factors such as the effect of training and the effect of group cohesiveness. Subjects 
were 48 hospital workers. Twenty four ofthe subjects took a ten-hour training course in 
creative thinking. The other 24 received no training. All subjects ranked their preferred 
partner for brainstorming. From this information they created, in both the trained and non-
trained conditions; cohesive pairs (pairs who preferred to work with each other); non-
cohesive pairs (who preferred not to work together); and nominal pairs. The problems were 
the tourist problem and the thumbs problem and two further, directly relevant problems; the 
discharge problem and the treatment problem. The discharge problem concerned the 
benefits and difficulties should psychiatric patients all return home while the treatment 
problem involved developing toys or games that might assist the rehabilitation of 
psychiatric patients. They had problems with the responses to the treatment problem and so 
only analysed the information from the first three problems. The measures were the 
number of ideas and an estimate ofthe quality of these ideas based on the number of unique 
ideas. The results showed that for the two remote problems (tourists and thumbs) there was 
275 
no effect for training or for the type of group. The number of ideas were all similar and 
while there appeared to be many more unique ideas in the trained group, the differences 
were not significant. That is; training had no effect and neither did group cohesiveness or 
the nominal group technique. On the problem relevant to the subjects (discharge problem) 
there was no difference between any of the conditions in terms of the number of ideas. 
However for this problem the large differences on the number of ideas for the trained group 
were significantly different. The nominal group and the non-cohesive group were similar 
while the cohesive groups developed many more unique ideas. In summary, Cohen, 
Whitmyre and Funk found that cohesiveness of brainstorming pairs had a positive effect on 
performance when working on problems relevant to those people. 
Weisskopf-Joelson and Eliseo (1961) undertook a similar experiment to the first 
experiment in Parnes' earlier paper (1959). They compared brainstorming instructions with 
critical instructions. Critical instructions emphasised combination of ideas (like 
brainstorming), however these instructions emphasised that only good ideas were wanted 
and that the ideas should be well-thought out. Subjects were 42 undergraduate students 
arranged into six groups of seven. Three groups worked under the brainstorming 
instructions and three under the critical instructions. All groups worked on inventing a 
brand name for three products; a cigar, deodorant, and an automobile. They spent ten 
minutes on each problem. Weisskopf-Joelson and Eliseo assessed the number of brand 
names and assessed these for quality by having 150 students rate the quality responses in 
terms of their attraction to a product of that name. The results show that the brainstorming 
groups generated between 100% and 300% more ideas for each product than the critical 
groups. When rated for quality, the results showed than the critical groups generated a 
higher average quality of ideas. Most of the gain in ideas by the brainstorming groups was 
at the lower quality end of the ratings. These results supported the notion that 
brainstorming increases the output of thinking sessions. However the increase in ideas was 
accompanied by an overall reduction in the average quality. While the average quality was 
lower the total number of worthwhile ideas was still far higher in the brainstorming groups. 
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Parnes (1961) investigated the output of brainstorming in terms of quality of ideas in the 
second half of ideas generated compared to the first half of ideas. Subjects were 146 
undergraduate students. They brainstormed individually for five minutes on the hanger 
problem. Ideas were rated for quality on the measures of uniqueness and value. Parnes 
found an overall higher number of good quality ideas among the last half of ideas 
generated. Parnes recognised that the brainstormingtime was short and conducted a further 
experiment with 42 undergraduate students who took part in a creative thinking course. 
These subjects had been trained in the brainstorming method. They brainstormed 
individually for 15 minutes on the hanger problem. Ideas were rated for quality according 
to uniqueness and value. Parnes divided the ideas generated into thirds. Parnes found that 
the number of good ideas as a proportion of the number of ideas increased as the 
brainstorming progressed. Parnes also compared the first five minutes of brainstorming in 
this experiment with the earlier experiment and found that these trained subjects 
outperformed the untrained subjects. 
Parloff and Hanson (1964) investigated brainstorming in two person groups under various 
conditions and problem types. Subjects were 24 female undergraduate students who 
completed surveys about their preferred partners. From these subjects the experimenters 
selected 12 subjects arranged into six congenial and six uncongenial dyads. The problems 
were three real problems (teacher shortage; how to meet a boy; and the tourists problem) 
and three unreal problems (extra thumbs; consequences of increased physical maturation; 
and the advantages and disadvantages of being able to read minds). Individuals worked for 
ten minutes on each problem. During the following five days the subjects worked again on 
the problems under various conditions. They completed all the problems again in the dyads 
under; neutral conditions; low-critical conditions; and high-critical conditions. Neutral 
meant to work any way you think best; low-critical was the typical brainstorming 
instructions; while high critical meant that the subjects were told to select only the good 
ideas. Dyads were instructed to write down ideas they had not thought of as individuals. 
Parloff and Hanson measured the number of ideas reported this way and also measured the 
number of ideas by monitoring the brainstorming by tape recording and also made ratings 
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of the quality of the ideas. The results show that low-critical instructions lead to many 
more written ideas (230 ideas) than high-critical instructions (42 ideas). Low-critical 
instructions also lead to more good ideas (47 ideas) compared to high-critical instructions 
(21 ideas). When compared to the overall number of ideas, it seems that the high-critical 
instructions lead to a greater proportion of good ideas. The tape recordings show that the 
high-critical groups generated more unwritten ideas than the low-critical groups (192 ideas 
compared to 147 ideas) and more unwritten good ideas (67 good ideas compared to 256 
good ideas). When the unwritten and written ideas are combined the results show that 
high-critical groups generated many less ideas in total that the low-critical groups (234 
ideas versus 377 ideas). However combining the written and unwritten ideas showed that 
the low-critical groups generated about as many good ideas (88 good ideas) as the low-
critical groups (73 good ideas). There were no differences for dyads of different levels of 
congeniality or for different problem types. In summary, it seemed that high-critical 
instructions impeded the verbalisation of ideas somewhat but did not impede the 
verbalisation of good ideas. While the good ideas were verbalised they were easily 
discounted under high-critical instructions and thus not recorded. 
According to Osborn's model, ideas should be evaluated following brainstorming. Brilhart 
and Jochem (1964) assessed brainstorming based on the following model; 
1. Problem definition. 
2. Brainstorm. 
3. Set the criteria for evaluation. 
4. Evaluate solutions. 
5. Select best solution. 
They created three types of problem solving; the first used the model above, the second 
used the model above with the transposition of steps two and three (that is criteria setting 
before brainstorming), and a third model where steps two, three and four were combined 
into one step of; how are we to solve this problem? Subjects were 135 undergraduate 
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students arranged into 27 groups of five. The problems were; the tourists problem; thumbs 
problem; and a local problem of damage and theft of library books. Each group worked on 
each problem for 35 minutes, on three days. Each group used one ofthe problem solving 
modes for each problem. Measures were total solutions, total good solutions and a rating of 
the quality ofthe best solution from each group. Results show that there was no difference 
between the problems (about 15 ideas for each). The two problem-solving models 
incorporating evaluation yielded more ideas (15 ideas each) than the problem-solution 
model (ten ideas). In terms of good ideas, the differences between groups were significant 
at the 10% level and showed a trend that brainstorming first is the best, followed by criteria 
setting first, and lastly, no idea evaluation. Overall the results showed that combining 
evaluation with idea generating reduced the number of ideas and had a similar effect on the 
number of good ideas (due to less overall ideas). The effects of establishing criteria before 
brainstorming appeared to have little effect on the number of ideas but may have had a 
negative effect on the number of good ideas. 
Reese and Parnes (1970) investigated the effect of Parnes' (1967) model of creative 
thinking. Subjects were 188 high-school students selected from 957 volunteers according 
to a specified IQ range. Subjects were divided into three groups; a program group that 
undertook self-directed learning from the manual (Parnes 1967); an instructor group who 
took the same program under the direction and assistance of an instructor; and an untrained 
control group. The training program was two 40 minute sessions per week for 13 weeks. 
Reese and Parnes administered tests to measure fluency, flexibility, originality, elaboration 
and sensitivity as pre-tests and post-tests. The results show that both the experimental 
groups performed better than the control group. The instructor-based group outperformed 
the self-directed group. 
Sappington and Farrar (1982) tested the effect of promoting the divergent brainstorming 
instructions compared to convergent evaluative instructions. Their subjects were 32 
undergraduate students arranged into two equal groups. Subjects worked individually on a 
task to develop workable strategies to manage a behaviour problem. The task was in two 
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parts, firstly to develop possible solutions and then to suggest a final list of viable solutions. 
The experimental group were encouraged to first develop as many ideas as possible in the 
traditional brainstorming approach and then select the final list. The control group were 
given more subdued instructions that encouraged participants to evaluate each possibility as 
they wrote them down and mark them good or poor. Once they had a reasonable list then 
they were to suggest final viable solutions. Each solution on the final lists of solutions 
were assessed by an expert as workable or not workable. The results show that the 
brainstorming group (3.5 workable ideas) outperformed the evaluative group (2.3 workable 
ideas). Sappington and Farrar repeated the experiment with a further 20 students working 
on developing ways to improve productivity in an organisation. The results were similar to 
the earlier experiment. The brainstorming groups generated 12.3 workable solutions, 
significantly greater than the 7.5 workable solutions generated by the evaluative group. 
Sappington and Farrar concluded that brainstorming was an effective way to increase both 
total output and the output of workable solutions. 
Baer (1988) tested the effect of the Parnes' (1967) model of creative problem solving. 
Subjects were 58 high-school students (28 experiment and 20 controls). The experimental 
subjects were trained over two and a half days in creative problem solving along the lines 
of Parnes' model. Control subjects received no treatment. The experimental and control 
groups were pre-tested and post-tested six months later. The creativity test was closely 
aligned to the training; measuring data finding, problem finding, solution finding, and 
action planning. Baer found that there were no appreciable gains due to practice alone 
(control group). Baer found that the trained group recorded significant improvements on 
all measures when compared to the control group. 
Kabanoff and Bottger (1991) assessed the effectiveness of creativity training within an 
MBA program. The training was based on the Osborn-Parnes model of fact finding, 
problem finding, idea finding, solution finding and action finding. The program was two 
80 minute sessions per week for ten weeks. Subjects were 76 students, 32 in the training 
program and 44 controls. Kabanoff and Bottger used four activities from the verbal part of 
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the Torrance Tests as a pre-test and a different four items as the post-test (five minutes per 
item). Control groups were offered a report on their scores and a $30 cash prize for the best 
performance as an incentive to participate. The experimental group were not offered the 
cash prize incentive. Kabanoff and Bottger found that training (by 36%) and no-training 
(30%) increased the subjects' fluency. Flexibility also increased in both the groups but 
only the training increased originality. The results indicated that the training, compared to 
the control activity and motivation, had no additional effect on fluency and flexibility but it 
did increase originality. Kabanoff and Bottger administered personality questionnaires to 
the creativity course participants and to other students in the MBA program. The main 
point was that students with high achievement orientation tended to avoid the creativity 
program. They suggested that this may be due to the high-achievement oriented person 
wishing to avoid unstructured problems, or maybe avoiding a course that they see might be 
more related to chance than skill. 
Golovin (1993) used the Torrance Tests to assess the effects on creative performance of 
training in creative thinking, centring on Osborn's methods, taught either in a traditional or 
cooperative mode. Cooperative learning meant organising students into teams. Golovin's 
subjects were 159 fifth-grade students arranged about equally into the two creative thinking 
groups and a control group. The creativity training lasted for about one hour per day for 10 
days. Results show that immediately following the training both the trained groups 
performed better than the control group on the verbal section ofthe Torrance Tests with the 
tradition mode of teaching proving to be the most effective. A delayed post-test still 
recorded gains (reduced) for the trained groups, however at this later time the subjects who 
took the training in cooperative mode had declined less and thus scored higher than the 
traditionally trained group. 
The effectiveness of brainstorming has been attributed to the follow-on ideas that come 
from other ideas. Madsden and Finger (1978) compared the brainstorming efforts of 
groups of four in interacting groups, nominal groups and in a variant of the two types. The 
third group brainstormed individually while in a group, by writing ideas on carbon-backed 
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paper. Mid-way through the brainstorming session, the group members gave the other 
three members a copy of their ideas. This condition imitated an interacting session, as the 
individuals were physically together and able to share ideas somewhat, and had some 
nominal group features, such as the individuality of the brainstorming. Their subjects were 
48 male undergraduate students arranged into the three conditions. Each group 
brainstormed for 20 minutes on what would happen if everyone had two extra thumbs and 
for 10 minutes on brand names for a new toothpaste. Madsden and Finger (1978) found 
that there was no difference between the condition on the thumbs problem with each group 
generating about 33 ideas. On the toothpaste problem, the nominal groups (63 ideas) and 
the written feedback group (76 ideas) were not different, but both these conditions 
outperformed the interacting groups (36 ideas). When compared with the nominal group, 
the experimenters noted that the idea-stimulus appears to have had little effect. Madsden 
and Finger explained the no-effect on the thumbs problem as due to a lack of practice (they 
suggest nominal groups improve with practice) and the greater perceived difficulty of 
solution space when compared with brand names for a toothpaste. 
Connolly, Routhieaux and Schneider (1993) studied the impact of idea-stimulus in 
brainstorming. They first conducted an experiment with 52 undergraduate students who 
brainstormed for 40 minutes on ideas to balance the college budget. From this exercise 
they developed a list of 53 rare ideas that were mentioned only once, and a list of 50 
common ideas that were mentioned at least five times. To test the idea-stimulus 
hypothesis, Connolly, Routhieaux and Schneider studied the brainstorming performance of 
a further 50 undergraduate students. The subjects were split into three groups and 
brainstormed using electronic methods that allowed the experimenters to provoke the 
subjects by the addition of either no ideas, common ideas, or rare ideas. Subjects with 
stimulation developed more ideas, however when duplicate ideas were removed, 
brainstorming for 40 minutes yielded an average of about 20 ideas from groups in each 
condition. Connolly, Routhieaux and Schneider found no evidence that the input of rare 
ideas resulted in any improvement. 
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Less formal studies of brainstorming than those above have been reported by Rickards (1975) 
and Thorn (1987). Rickards (1975) made a study of brainstorming efforts in 35 actual 
business meetings over a two year period. Some meetings were within training sessions 
emphasising brainstorming while some were not and some had experienced leaders while 
others did not. Rickards found that an experienced leader could contribute to greater numbers 
of ideas, but that greater numbers of ideas was not necessarily related to greater originality or 
speculation. Thorn (1987) described the long-term benefits of a five year creative thinking 
program at Lord Corporation; an organisation with 2000 employees. The program involved 
training in creative thinking skills such as synectics and brainstorming. Thorn claimed that 
the program was beneficial over the long-term and improved with time. 
While not specifically addressing the brainstorming model the following two studies ofthe 
effects of a training effort in creativity are worthy of inclusion because the subjects are 
engineering students. Many studies of creativity involve psychology students. This is 
probably because many of the experimenters are psychologists and often have access to 
these students. Few studies of creative thinking seem to involve engineering students. 
Clapham and Schuster (1992) conducted an experiment with 56 engineering students to 
measure the effect of a short course in creativity. Twenty-seven student engineers took part 
in the creativity training, while 29 of their colleagues participated in training in interview 
skills for a similar length of time as a control group. The one-hour creativity training 
consisted of promoting and practicing techniques like brainstorming and using analogies. 
Clapham and Schuster found that on two separate tests of creativity (Owens' and Meeker's 
tests) the experimental group made more progress than the control group. The 
improvement was about 100% on the test measures. 
Basadur, Graen and Scandura (1986) assessed the effects of a creative thinking training 
program on 112 engineers in two groups working at a manufacturing company. The 
measurements were the subjects' preference for ideation and preference for making 
premature critical evaluations. Subjects made self-reports on questionnaires to measure 
these preferences and their bosses also made assessments. They measurements were taken 
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three times, five week apart. The first group (65 subjects) took the training between 
measurement one and two, while the second group was trained between measurement two 
and three. The training was three days duration and covered problem solving processes 
such as problem finding, problem solving and implementation stages. They found that the 
training improved the engineers preference for divergent thinking and reduced their 
tendency to prematurely criticise ideas. The two groups were different in that the first 
comprised engineers from many work areas, while the second were all from one area. 
Since the measurements were taken five weeks after the training, there was the influence of 
work environment and peer support on the uptake of the methods. They found that the 
effects were greatest among the group who had the support of other trainees. 
A.2 Brainstorming in Groups 
While some research, such as those just described in detail examine the effect of using the 
brainstorming model, Bouchard (1969) and McGrath (1984) both commented that the main 
body of research in brainstorming has not focussed on brainstorming as a technique but 
instead concentrated on groupwork as the central theme of the method. This seems to be 
true today. With the emphasis on groupwork, many researchers have been interested in 
comparing the output of a team of people who interact with a team of people who work 
individually and then pool their results. A team who work individually and then pool 
results is known as a nominal team or nominal group as against an interacting group. Hare 
(1962) said that, based on a literature review, that individuals are usually more productive 
than groups, especially on intellectual tasks. Bouchard, Drauden and Barsaloux (1974) 
compared a number of published studies and found that nominal groups consistently 
outperformed interacting groups. More recently Dennis and Valacich (1995) reviewed fifty 
studies comparing nominal groups with interacting groups and found no study that claimed 
a higher performance for interacting groups. 
Watson (1928) compared interacting groups and nominal groups on word generating. 
Subjects were 108 graduate students arranged into 20 groups of between three and ten 
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people. The task was to generate as many ideas as possible using the letters in a word. 
Watson used four words; educators; neurotics, secondary; and universal. Following 15 
minutes of practice, group members first worked alone on the first word for ten minutes. 
Then they worked in their groups on the next two words for ten minutes on each. For the 
fourth word they again worked individually for ten minutes. Subjects had a short break 
between each session. The problems were rotated around the groups in random order. The 
results showed little difference between the difficulty of the words. Per ten minutes, 
individuals averaged 32 words; groups averaged 75 words; and the nominal group averaged 
87 words. Watson (1928) noted that the groups all performed better than the best 
individual, however in most cases the group performed worse than the compilation ofthe 
individual efforts. 
Shaw (1932) compared interacting groups and individuals on various problem-solving 
tasks. Subjects were 41 graduate students arranged into two groups; 21 individuals and five 
groups of four. The tasks had limited possible solutions and were thus not brainstorming 
tasks. Problems ranged for ones like, how to get three cannibals and three missionaries 
across a river, to completing the final lines of a sonnet. Most individuals and many groups 
failed to solve the problems. Shaw said that on problem solving tasks, groups achieved 
successful outcomes more often than individuals. 
Taylor, Berry and Block (1958) compared brainstorming in interacting groups of four and 
in nominal groups of four. Subjects were 96 undergraduate students, who in their course of 
study had been often working on class problems in groups of about ten. Taylor, Berry and 
Block (1958) formed 12 groups of four people that had worked together previously, while 
the remaining 48 subjects worked as individuals to make up the nominal groups. The 
subjects in interacting groups were used to working in small groups and with each other. 
The original allocation to these groups at the beginning of the course was random. 
Problems were; the tourists problem (how to encourage European tourists to the United 
States); the thumbs problem (benefits and difficulties if everyone had extra thumbs); and 
the teachers problem (how to overcome an increasing need for school teachers). Subjects 
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listened to a lecture on creativity emphasising brainstorming and then began the 
experiment. Subjects brainstormed on each problem for 12 minutes. The results show that 
nominal groups (about 70 ideas for each problem) outperformed interacting groups (about 
40 ideas for each problem). There was some differences between the problems, however 
the main effect was evident for all problems. Taylor, Berry and Block rated the quality 
measures such as feasibility, but found little difference in the average quality of ideas; it 
seems that the quality remains relatively constant and independent of large differences in 
the number of ideas. Taylor, Berry and Block conclude that interacting groups inhibit 
brainstorming. They suggest a number of possibilities for the poor performance of 
interacting groups. Firstly that an individual may feel as though ideas will be criticised 
(even though the brainstorming rules discourage criticism), and secondly that a group of 
individuals together are more likely to pursue similar approaches to a problem than are 
people working alone. 
Dunnette, Campbell and Jaastad (1963) investigated brainstorming among research 
scientists and advertising staff. Since brainstorming was originally intended for use in 
advertising they hypothesised that the effects might be greater in advertising workers than 
in science workers. Their subjects were 48 3M scientists and 48 staff from 3M's 
advertising department. Subjects were arranged into groups of four people who had 
worked together previously. Subjects worked on two problems individually and two 
problems in their group. The problems were in two sets; the thumbs and education 
problems; and the tall people and tourists problems. Some subjects worked individually 
first and then in groups; some worked on one problem set first and others worked on the 
other set first. All subjects worked under the brainstorming instructions for 15 minutes on 
each problem. The results showed that nominal groups (about 140 ideas for four problems) 
outperformed the interacting groups (about 105 ideas). They measured the mean quality of 
the ideas (overall quality divided by the number of ideas) and found that nominal groups 
were either better or similar to the interacting groups. There were no apparant differences 
between the performances of the advertising and research staff. 
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Campbell (1968) compared the performance of nominal and interacting groups of four on a 
problem solving task. Campbell's subjects were 81 managers who knew each other 
reasonably well and worked together in a public utility in the USA. The task was to 
develop a solution to a hypothetical conflict that had arisen about work practices in a 
factory. The task was to develop one best solution to the problem. Campbell rated the 
solutions according to a set criteria. The nominal group quality was assessed by taking the 
best features of each of the four solutions to create a composite and also by averaging the 
four scores. Campbell found that nominal groups outperformed interacting groups when 
comparing either the composite or average score. This means that groups performed worse 
than even the average effort of an individual. 
Bouchard (1969) examined brainstorming in nominal and semi-interacting groups. 
Bouchard compared nominal groups (individuals) brainstorming for 20 minutes with 
interacting groups who brainstormed for 10 minutes followed by 10 minutes of individual 
brainstorming. The brainstorming was according to Osborn's model and as an example 
subjects heard a sample tape of a brainstorming session where many unusual ideas were 
suggested. The subjects were 48 male undergraduate students arranged into groups of four. 
All groups worked in both conditions, on two sets of problems: extra thumbs and taller 
people problems; and the teacher shortage and tourists problems. Bouchard found no 
differences between nominal and interacting groups; each condition generating about 74 
ideas on the thumbs and people set of problems and about 60 ideas on the teachers and 
tourists set of problems. 
Bouchard and Hare (1970) compared brainstorming in nominal and interacting groups and 
the effect of group size. Their subjects were 168 male undergraduate students. The task 
was to brainstorm according to Osborn's instructions for 25 minutes on the problem of what 
would happen should everyone have extra thumbs. Half the subjects worked in interacting 
groups of five, seven and nine. There were four groups of each size. Results show that 
nominal groups of five, seven and nine (100 ideas, 150 ideas, 180 ideas respectively) 
outperform interacting groups ofthe same size (70 ideas, 60 ideas, 70 ideas respectively). 
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The differences seem more apparent for the large groups, with the interacting groups 
making no extra progress in larger groups. Although all the interacting groups at least 
performed better than individuals (30 ideas). 
Chapanis, Ochsman, Parrish and Weeks (1972) compared the problem solving of two 
person groups who used various forms of communication. Subjects were 40 high school 
students. The two problems were; to locate the nearest physician to a certain address; and 
to assemble a piece of furniture. In the problem solving pairs, each person had part ofthe 
information needed to solve the problems. Thus pairs needed to cooperate. Four types of 
communication were studied; interacting discussion; typewriting; handwriting; and voice. 
Interacting discussion meant that the two people were together and could communicate any 
way they wished. In the other three modes the pairs were separated by a wall. The groups 
communicated by type using keyboards that printed on both sides ofthe wall. The groups 
using handwritten paper notes, passed these through slots in the wall. The groups using 
voice could hear each other but not see each other. Chapanis, Ochsman, Parrish and Weeks 
found that the interacting and voice communication groups were similar to each other and 
solved the problems much faster (about 30 minutes) than the two written groups (about 60 
minutes). They tested the effect of inexperienced versus experienced typists and found 
little difference between these showing that the effect of slow typing was not important. 
This study shows that value of voice-based interaction when solving problems. Chapanis, 
Ochsman, Parrish and Weeks (1977) later examined the recorded data to assess the types of 
communication used by each type of groups. They counted information like the number of 
messages, number of words per message, and so on. They found great differences between 
the amount of communication between the voice communicating groups and the written 
communication groups. The handwriting groups exchanged 16 messages and the 
typewriting groups exchanged about 20 messages. The voice communication-only groups 
exchanged 160 messages and the interacting groups exchanged 230 messages. The higher 
number of messages by the voice methods also occurred in about half the time as they 
completed the solution much quicker. Groups that could not see each other communicated 
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much less however solved the problem in a similar time (33 minutes) to the interacting 
groups (29 minutes). 
Street (1974) compared brainstorming performance of nominal groups, interacting groups 
and coacting groups (individuals physically together but not interacting). Their subjects 
were 108 psychology students who worked in 36 groups of three. All groups brainstormed 
for 10 minutes on one of three problems; what if people became taller and heavier; what if 
people had extra thumbs; or how to improve tourism. Street (1974) found that nominal 
groups (28 ideas) and coacting groups (27 ideas) generated more ideas that the interacting 
groups (17 ideas). Street concluded that the gains made by nominal groups were not 
affected by working in the same room and suggested that the poor performance of 
interacting groups only occurs when interaction occurs. 
Bouchard, Barsaloux and Drauden (1974) studied brainstorming in nominal and interacting 
groups as well as the effects of group size (four and seven). Their subjects were 44 male 
and 44 female undergraduate students who brainstormed for 35 minutes on what would 
happen if everyone was suddenly without sight. As well as brainstorming procedure and 
group size they investigated the effect of assisting the brainstorming by having some ofthe 
groups brainstorm in the dark given (mimicking the problem). The results showed that 
nominal groups outperformed interacting groups of four and seven by about 100% and 
160% respectively. In the nominal condition, groups of seven were significantly better than 
groups of four. However in interacting sessions, groups of seven were no better than 
groups of four. 
Harari and Graham (1975) studied brainstorming in a 2*2*2 study. The three factors were; 
interacting versus nominal groups; a fun problem versus a serious problem; and 
consequences versus no consequences. The fun problem was the extra thumbs problem and 
the serious problem was a question about what students could do about the growing 
environmental problem. The consequences, where emphasised, were that the thumbs ideas 
were to be sent to a television station for use in a program and the environmental ideas 
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would be sent to a government body. Subjects were 128 male psychology undergraduates 
who brainstormed in groups of four for 20 minutes on one problem. The results showed, 
averaged across the other factors, that nominal groups (about 80 ideas) generated about 
twice as many ideas as interacting groups (about 40 ideas). The results also showed 
significant effects for the type of problem, with more ideas being generated for the trivial 
problem and more ideas generated when the ideas were not proposed to be used. However 
the differences in the consequences factor and the problem relevance factor were minor in 
the nominal group. In the interacting group the effects were more substantial. Harari and 
Graham (1975) concluded that nominal groups were more effective at generating ideas and 
that problem relevance, and the perception that ideas will be used, hampered performance. 
Chatterjea and Mitra (1976) compared brainstorming in groups of three with brainstorming 
individually. Subjects were 60 students (30 female and 30 male) arranged into 20 same-
sex, and previously unacquainted, groups. Problems were to develop unusual uses for a 
newspaper, and unusual uses for a paper clip. The brainstorming instructions were 
emphasised. All subjects worked on both problems for eight minutes, one problem 
individually and one problem in a group of three. The order of group and individual work 
and the order of problems were counterbalanced. The results showed that the nominal 
group of three was more productive than the interacting groups (for both males and 
females). The actual differences however were relatively small for the males (19 ideas in 
interacting group compared to 21 ideas in nominal group), whereas the differences for 
females was pronounced (7 ideas interacting compared to 14 ideas in nominal group). 
Graham (1977) examined interacting groups versus nominal groups in brainstorming and 
investigated the way that these groups select the best solutions. Graham's subjects were 
128 undergraduate students. Sixty-four worked in interacting groups of four and 64 worked 
in nominal groups. Half the subjects brainstormed on the thumbs problem and half on the 
teachers problem; each for 20 minutes. Graham found that nominal groups generated about 
50% more ideas than interacting groups (64 ideas compared to 42 ideas for the thumbs 
problem; and 39 ideas compared to 25 ideas for the teachers problem). Graham had all 
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groups, including the nominal groups who came together for this task, to select the best 
idea by consensus and measured the time to make this selection. Graham then asked all 
subjects to rate the quality of the selected idea on a scale. The time to make the selection 
and the ratings of approval or acceptance of the best idea was no different for interacting 
and nominal groups. Graham suggested that this showed nominal groups to be more 
effective than interacting groups at generating ideas and the selection of best ideas took no 
longer and was equally as well accepted. 
Diehl and Stroebe (1991) compared interacting groups and nominal groups brainstorming 
over varied lengths of time. They worked with 96 undergraduate students and found that 
on a task to generate ideas on road safety and ideas on energy consumption, nominal 
groups consistently out-performed interacting groups in terms ofthe number of ideas and in 
terms ofthe quality of ideas. Brainstorming for 10 minutes in groups of four, nominal 
groups generated 57 ideas while the interacting groups generated 3 8 ideas. After rating the 
ideas for quality, Diehl and Stroebe found that the differences were larger; nominal groups 
generated 32 good ideas compared to 8 good ideas for the interacting groups. They found 
similar effects in 20 minute brainstorming sessions. A further experiment with 112 high-
school students also showed that nominal groups outperformed interacting groups. 
Most ofthe studies of nominal versus interacting groups have involved groups of four and 
sometimes larger groups. For the smallest type of group, that is groups of two, or dyads, 
the situation has sometimes been different. For instance Thornburg (1991) examined the 
difference in productivity between interacting and nominal groups of four and two-person 
interacting dyads. Fourteen interactive groups, 19 nominal groups and 14 dyads were 
compared on their efforts brainstorming for six minutes on three tasks. The tasks were to 
find unusual uses for a clothes hanger, a light bulb and a film container. Thornburg found 
that nominal groups generated the most ideas. Two-person groups generated 80% as many 
ideas as nominal groups while interacting groups generated only 60% as many ideas as 
interacting groups. Furnham and Yazdanpanahi (1995), their research described below, 
also found that interacting pairs generated similar outputs to that of nominal pairs. 
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A.3 Perception of the Value of Groups 
Many studies have shown the effectiveness of nominal groups versus interacting groups 
(for example, mentioned above; Taylor, Berry & Block 1958; Dunnette, Campbell & 
Jaastad 1963; Campbell 1968; Bouchard & Hare 1970; Street 1974; Bouchard, Barsaloax& 
Drauden 1974; Harari & Graham 1975; Chatterjea & Mitra 1976; Graham 1977; Diehl & 
Stroebe 1991; Thornburg 1991; and mentioned below; Madsden & Finger 1978; Jablin 
1981; Diehl & Stroebe 1987; Stroebe, Diehl & Abakoumkin 1992; Paulus, Dzindolet, 
Poletes & Camacho 1993; Camacho & Paulus 1995; Furnham & Yazdanpanahi 1995; 
Paulus, Larey & Ortega 1995). 
Despite the evidence to the contrary, the perception of success among those involved in 
interacting groups has usually been favourable. The popular nature of brainstorming has 
either generated, or tapped into, a perception among people that groupwork is an effective 
way to generate ideas. In experiments showing the disadvantage of interacting groupwork, 
participants in these very experiments have often remained convinced that interacting 
groupwork is more effective. Diehl and Stroebe's( 1991) experiments showed that nominal 
groups outperformed interacting groups and yet post-session questionnaires showed that 
those in the interacting groups found the sessions more enjoyable. 
Paulus, Dzindolet, Poletes and Camacho (1993) had 36 undergraduate students brainstorm 
two problems individually and then surveyed their expectations about their effectiveness 
brainstorming alone compared to their performance if they had brainstormed in a group. 
Sixty-five percent believed they would perform better in a group while 30% believed they 
would be better alone. Quality of ideas was also perceived to be better in groups. 
Stroebe, Diehl and Abakoumkin (1992) examined brainstorming in interacting groups 
versus brainstorming in nominal groups. Their subjects were 92 female high-school 
students arranged about equally into nominal and interacting groups of four. Subjects 
brainstormed using Osborn's rules for 15 minutes on how to improve traffic safety. Ideas 
were tape recorded and coded by the experimenters. The interacting groups generated 
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about 84 ideas each and the nominal groups about 111 ideas each. Following the sessions 
subjects estimated their performance. Subjects vastly underestimated their performance. 
Nominal groups estimated they generated 35 ideas and interacting groups estimated the 
generated about 23 ideas. This underestimation indicates that the subjects tend to 
categorise several items as one idea, where the evaluators tend to separate the ideas. Post-
session questionnaires also revealed that interacting groups were more satisfied with their 
performance than nominal groups. 
Paulus, Larey and Ortega (1995) studied the brainstorming performance of 40 employees 
of an organisation that had conducted considerable training in effective teamwork. The 
subjects worked in groups of four, brainstorming for two separate sessions of 15 minutes on 
how to improve the company. Half the groups worked first in interacting groups and then 
in nominal groups. The others worked in the reverse pattern. Nominal groups generated 
about twice as many ideas as interacting groups in the first session (97 versus 45) and in the 
second session (81 versus 28). Post-study questionnaires revealed that the participants 
perception of the effectiveness of the two types of brainstorming was the reverse of the 
actual results. Participants rated that both the quality and quantity of ideas would be greater 
in interacting groups. 
A.4 Computer-Based Brainstorming 
While interactive groups remain popular, many studies have shown interacting groups to be 
less productive than nominal groups. Computer technology allows for variations in the 
way groups interact and these have been compared with traditional brainstorming. 
Computer-based brainstorming has also been used to investigate the reasons behind the 
poor performance of interacting groups. 
Nagasundaram and Dennis (1993) explain that when using computer-based brainstorming 
participants tend to be reacting to the development of ideas, rather than be reacting to the 
other participants. They say that electronic brainstorming provides the benefit of not 
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having to listen to other discussion (as in the nominal condition) but provide access to 
others ideas as sources of variety and stimulation (as in the interacting condition). Aiken 
and Riggs (1993) said that the main benefits of electronic brainstorming are; 
• Increased participation due to the absence of criticism, increases time to speak and 
removes other unhelpful interpersonal influences. 
• Added synergy where ideas form stimulus for other ideas. 
• Automatic record keeping. 
• Formalised structure ofthe exercise. 
Some studies have shown that electronic brainstorming in large groups can out-perform 
nominal groups. Dennis and Valacich (1993) thought that electronic brainstorming might 
overcome idea blocking and evaluation in interactive groups and overcome redundancy in 
nominal groups. Dennis and Valacich (1993) arranged 276 university students into four 
groups in a 2*2 design. They investigated electronic interacting group brainstorming 
versus nominal brainstorming and they investigated groups size (six members and 12 
members). All groups completed two tasks in different order, for 15 minutes on each task. 
The tasks were to generate ways to encourage more tourists to a city and how to improve 
security on the university campus. Dennis and Valacich found that the 12 person electronic 
groups generated, at a significant level, about 30% more ideas than nominal groups. In 
groups of six, the nominal groups generated about 20% more ideas however the differences 
were not significant. The number of ideas per person was similar in groups of six and 
twelve. Dennis and Valacich said that the results show the value of electronic 
brainstorming in large groups. They reasoned that the success of electronic brainstorming 
in large groups may have been due to the absence of blocking and the benefit of extra 
stimulating ideas and elimination of redundancy. 
Gallupe, Dennis, Cooper, Valacich, Bastianutti and Nunamaker (1992) investigated the 
effect of electronic versus traditional brainstorming and the effect of group size. Their 
subjects were 120 undergraduate students who brainstormed in groups of two, four and six. 
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They brainstormed the issues about how to improve tourism and h o w to improve campus 
security, working once in an electronic group and once in interacting groups. They found 
that groups of two generated a similar number of ideas when using electronic and non-
electronic groups (about 25 ideas). Groups of four generated more ideas using the 
electronic method (42 ideas versus 32 ideas) and so too did groups of six (70 ideas versus 
36 ideas). They made a further study of 144 undergraduate students in group sizes of six 
and 12 under similar conditions. In this study they found no difference between electronic 
and non-electronic in the groups of six (both about 30 to 40 ideas) but significant 
improvements when using electronic brainstorming in groups of 12 (86 versus 30 ideas). 
Valacich, Dennis and Connolly (1994) worked with a total of 199 business students to 
compare nominal groups and electronic interacting groups on an idea generating task. 
They also varied the size of groups, using groups of three, nine and eighteen. They found 
that nominal and electronic groups were similar in terms of idea quantity and quality when 
in small groups. In groups of nine and 18 the electronic interacting groups generated more 
ideas than the nominal groups. The groups of 18 using the electronic technique generated 
higher quality solutions. Valacich, Dennis and Connolly (1994) repeated the above 
experiment with 156 business students, this time using groups of four, eight and 12 and 
providing a small prize as an incentive for better performance. They found similar effects 
although not so clear. Only the groups of twelve using the electronic technique 
outperformed the nominal groups in the quantity and quality of ideas. The incentive of a 
cash reward lead to an increased overall performance compared with there previous 
experiment. They further repeated the experiment with 180 business students in groups of 
six and twelve, working in nominal and electronic interacting groups. In this experiment 
they highlighted Osborn's brainstorming rules to the groups. This experiment yielded 
similar results, the nominal group were better in the groups of six and the electronic group 
were better in the groups of 12. The measure of success was only the number of ideas. The 
quality of ideas was unfortunately not measured and there was no assessment of the 
effectiveness of brainstorming versus no brainstorming. 
295 
As seen in studies such as Dennis and Valacich (1993); Gallupe, Dennis, Cooper, Valacich, 
Bastianutti and Nunamaker (1992); and Valacich, Dennis and Connolly (1994), the value of 
electronic brainstorming over nominal groups generally depends on the number of 
participants. For large groups (12 and above) the electronic method seems to be an 
advantage but in smaller groups it may be no better, or less effective, than traditional 
nominal groups. There are further difficulties with the electronic approach discussed below 
among the general discussion of group dynamics. 
A.5 Personalities and Group Brainstorming 
Hoffman (1959) created groups of homogenous and non-homogenous personality and 
compared their ability at two problem solving tasks (how to get across a land-mined road 
and a work-organisation problem involving conflict between workers and management). 
Hoffman measured the personality (using Guilford-Zimmerman survey) of 175 
undergraduate students and then sorted them into 13 four-person homogeneous personality 
groups, and 17 four-person non-homogenous personality groups (some subjects dropped 
out). The problem solutions were classified as old, new or inventive. The non-
homogenous groups generated more solutions (17 compared with 12) and many more 
inventive solutions (seven compared with two). 
Jablin (1981) studied nominal and interacting groups in brainstorming and also the effect of 
the personality of those involved as apprehensive or non-apprehensive communicators. 
Subjects were 104 undergraduate students who took a test of communication apprehension. 
Jablin created three types of groups; all low communication-apprehension; all high 
communication-apprehension and mixed high and low communication-apprehension. 
Jablin gave brainstorming instructions and introduced a practice exercise (thumbs problem) 
before the experimental tourist problem that subjects worked on for 15 minutes. The 
results show that communication apprehension had no effect on nominal groups, with all 
types of nominal groups generating about 58 ideas. The nominal groups outperformed 
interacting groups, across the measures of communication apprehension. Within the 
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interacting groups the direction ofthe results were as predicted. The high-apprehension (36 
ideas), mixed-apprehension (48 ideas) and low-apprehension (50 ideas) were not 
significantly different. Jablin asked subjects in the interacting group condition to rate their 
satisfaction with the group performance and found that in homogeneous groups low-
apprehension subjects were more satisfied with group performance than high-apprehension 
subjects. However Jablin did not find this effect in mixed groups. 
Camacho and Paulus (1995) studied the effect of social anxiousness in group 
brainstorming. They conducted an experiment with 200 students considering 
brainstorming group type (interacting or nominal) and personality type (high or low social 
anxiousness as measured by a psychological test). To select the subjects they administered 
a psychological test of social anxiousness to 700 students. Camacho and Paulus ranked the 
scores and selected 100 subjects from each ofthe upper, and lower, one third. The task was 
to brainstorm ideas for 20 minutes on the thumbs problem. Combining the anxiousness 
measure, nominal groups averaged about 50% more ideas than interacting groups. 
Camacho and Paulus said that the difference was mainly due to the poor performance ofthe 
high-anxious subjects in the interacting groups. The high-anxious nominal groups 
generated an average of about 40 ideas while all other groups generated between 80 and 
100 ideas. A mixed group, of two high, and two low, social anxiousness students generated 
about 50 ideas in a interacting group. Camacho and Paulus made a further study of social 
anxiousness in brainstorming with 64 university students. They compared the number of 
ideas produced on the thumbs problem by subjects brainstorming for 20 minutes in 
interacting groups. The eight groups of low-anxiousness students averaged about 40 ideas 
compared to the eight groups of high-anxiousness students that averaged about 20 ideas. 
The two experiments show similar effects of social anxiousness, although Camacho and 
Paulus did not explain the large difference in results between the two experiments. 
Camacho and Paulus concluded that in interacting groups, high social anxiousness can be 
important in poor brainstorming performance and that groups tend to be drawn toward 
lower performance if some members are socially anxious, however as expected social 
anxiousness seemed to have limited effect on nominal groups. 
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Furnham and Yazdanpanahi (1995) investigated nominal and interacting groups of two and 
four and the effect of psychotic personality. Subjects were 52 undergraduates pre-qualified 
into high and low psychotic personality. Subjects brainstormed on several problems; 
invent a name for a chocolate bar (five minutes); invent what happens in the next scene of a 
cartoon (ten minutes); and develop a television commercial sequence for a cough medicine 
(15 minutes). Results were totalled for the three tasks. Subjects were encouraged to 
develop many ideas and that quality and quantity were both important. Results showed that 
the number of ideas produced by two person nominal groups was similar to that of 
interacting pairs. In groups of four the nominal groups generated 200% to 300% as many 
ideas as interacting groups (133 versus 49 for high psychotism and 133 versus 45 for low 
psychotism). Interacting groups of four and groups of two in either interacting or nominal 
mode generated about 45-50 ideas. Furnham and Yazdanpanahi (1995) rated the quality of 
all ideas on a scale and then counted the number of highly creative ideas for each group. In 
every condition the nominal groups generated more good quality ideas. The study also 
showed some evidence that high psychotic groups generated more creative ideas but had no 
impact on the number of ideas. 
A.6 Idea Blocking in Group Brainstorming 
A.6.1 Limiting the Time to Speak 
In interacting brainstorming individual participants can only speak for a proportion of the 
time, whereas participants who work alone can each speak for the whole time (ideas 
recorded by tape recorder). Bouchard and Hare (1970) did not set out to measure this in 
their experiments described earlier, but they noted that when viewing the interacting 
brainstorming processes there appeared to be ample time when nobody was speaking; and 
thus they expected that the lack of time to speak was not important. 
Diehl and Stroebe (1991) (experiment described earlier) considered the possible effects of 
the extra time available for participants in nominal groups to put forward their ideas. Their 
subjects were 112 high-school students in groups of four and brainstorming for 20 minutes 
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on h o w to improve traffic safety. They arranged the groups into nominal and interacting 
conditions. In some ofthe nominal groups they limited the time that one individual could 
talk for to five minutes. They found that the restricted speaking time made no difference 
among the performance of nominal groups. 
Gallupe, Cooper, Grise and Bastianutti (1994) (described earlier) supposed that electronic 
groups out-perform interacting groups because of the impact of blocking (those in 
interacting groups are prevented from speaking for a certain amount of time). Subjects 
were 20 undergraduate students who brainstormed in groups of four on the thumbs problem 
for 15 minutes. The subjects were handicapped by a five second delay into the keyboard 
after an idea was entered. Gallupe, Cooper, Grise and Bastianutti (1994) compared these 
results with the earlier study of Gallupe, Bastianutti and Cooper (1991) who compared 
electronic and interacting groups of five on the same problem and under the same 
conditions. The electronic-delay groups generated a mean of 40 ideas. In the earlier study 
electronic groups had generated 50 ideas and verbal interacting group generated 39 ideas. 
Gallupe, Cooper, Grise and Bastianutti (1994) concluded that the keyboard delay reduced 
the performance ofthe electronic groups to that of interacting groups. 
A.6.2 Taking-Turns to Add Ideas 
Gallupe, Cooper, Grise and Bastianutti (1994) examined the effect of restricting the 
addition of ideas by creating a rotating schedule for adding ideas. Subjects were 80 
undergraduate students arranged into 20 groups of two women and two men. All groups 
brainstormed for 15 minutes on features of a new library. Ten groups used electronic 
brainstorming and ten groups used interacting verbal brainstorming. In both groups, ideas 
could only be added according to a rotating schedule; each person had to wait their turn to 
add an idea. The results showed that the restriction of taking turns reversed the results 
often found when comparing electronic and verbal groups. Electronic and verbal groups 
generated a mean of 34 and 60 ideas respectively. Gallupe, Cooper, Grise and Bastianutti 
concluded that when the advantages of electronic brainstorming such as the free addition of 
ideas are removed, this technique can be inferior to verbal brainstorming. 
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Gallupe, Cooper, Grise and Bastianutti (1994) also examined the effects of electronic 
versus verbal brainstorming and conditions of; normal conditions, taking turns, and first-in 
conditions (where ideas can only be added one at a time, in any order on a first-in basis). 
All groups brainstormed ideas about features for the new library and ways to increase 
tourism for 15 minutes on each issue. They combined the results as there were no 
differences between the problems. The results showed that electronic groups under normal 
conditions (63 ideas) out-performed those in the turn-taking (45 ideas) and first-in (40 
ideas) conditions. There was no difference between the turn-taking and first-in conditions 
for electronic groups. There was also no difference across the conditions for the verbal 
groups. Verbal groups generated 52 ideas under normal conditions, 53 under turn-taking 
and 47 under first-in conditions. Gallupe, Cooper, Grise and Bastianutti concluded that the 
gains made under electronic brainstorming conditions are fragile and can be lost with 
changes to the nature ofthe input of ideas. 
A.6.3 Adding Ideas One-at-a-Time 
To investigate blocking in brainstorming, Diehl and Stroebe (1987; experiment four) 
manipulated the time that individuals in nominal groups could speak. Subjects were 60 
undergraduate students who brainstormed in groups of four for 15 minutes on how to 
reduce unemployment. Diehl and Stroebe created five conditions including interacting, 
nominal, and three semi-nominal groups. The three semi-nominal groups simulated the 
restricted talking time (blocking), that occurs in interacting groups. All three conditions 
had lights to indicate a person talking. In one condition, individuals could hear all ideas but 
were only to talk when the lights were off, in another, individuals could not hear other 
group members and could only talk when other lights were off, and in the third the subjects 
could not hear, could see the lights, and could talk whenever they wanted. Diehl and 
Stroebe found that the regular nominal group, and the nominal group that could see the 
lights but with no blocking and no communication, outperformed (about 100 ideas) all the 
blocked conditions (about 45 ideas). 
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Diehl and Stroebe (1991) later tested the effects of allowing teams to add ideas at any time 
compared with forcing ideas to be added according to a structure. They compared 
unorganised adding of ideas (talk at any time) with two other conditions; predictable 
addition of ideas and controllable addition of ideas. Predictable meant that participants 
took turns at presenting an idea and controllable meant that as they had an idea they entered 
themselves into the list and added the idea when their turn came. Diehl and Stroebe 
crossed these measures with; groups who were physically separated (nominal groups); and 
groups physically separated groups interacting via intercom. They arranged one traditional 
nominal group as a control non-communicating group, this however was not really the 
same as a nominal group, as they introduced an idea recording system where only one 
person could speak at a time according to the various conditions (unorganised, predictable 
and controllable). Subjects were 96 psychology students. The control nominal group 
generated the most ideas. There was no difference between the other nominal groups and 
the interacting groups. Ofthe groups who could interact, Diehl and Stroebe found that the 
groups with fixed order or no order to the speaking were similar, but the groups who had 
the added task of self-organisingthe speaking order were less productive. In summary they 
found that the availability of interpersonal communication did not affect productivity and 
that increasingly complex procedures for adding ideas had a negative effect, especially 
when the group had to self organise the idea adding procedures. These results suggested 
that in group work obstructions to the free addition of ideas are a greater problem than the 
availability of communication. 
Other experiments by Diehl and Stroebe (1991) showed that the poor performance of 
interacting groups was not due to the reduced amount of time to speak. Valacich, Dennis 
and Connolly (1994) confirmed this with their study of 72 business students. They 
compared groups of nine subjects working either in electronic groups where they could add 
ideas at any time with electronic groups where the ideas could be only added one a time 
and in order. The were large differences in the two methods when subjects generated 
solutions to a problem with a time limit of 15 minutes. The group that could only record 
ideas in a specified order produced only 25% as many ideas. 
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A.7 Individual Motivation and Social Loafing 
A.7.1 Individual Ability 
Graham and Dillon (1974) investigated the effectof individual brainstorming ability on the 
performance of groups. Their subjects were 80 undergraduate students. The subjects were 
tested for individual brainstorming ability; Graham and Dillon then formed the subjects 
into groups of four on the basis of individual ability. They formed high-ability groups and 
low-ability groups. The brainstorming problem was about ideas to cope with an increased 
demand for teachers. Groups worked on the problem for 20 minutes. Graham and Dillon 
found that groups with high-ability individuals generated more ideas (62 ideas) that groups 
with low-ability individuals (38 ideas), showing the relationship between the level of 
individual ability and the performance of groups. 
A.7.2 Social Loafing 
Social loafing is the term used for the situation where people will exert more effort when 
working individually than when in a group. Sims (1928) showed that training to improve 
relatively simple mental tasks was best achieved when the training encouraged individual 
competition rather than group-based competition. Sims had 126 college students complete 
a task of substituting numbers for letters. From this Sims selected three matched groups of 
12 subjects to undergo 12 short practice sessions over four weeks. One group acted as a 
control; the second group was split in to two further groups who competed against each 
other at each practice session; and the third group competed against each other as 
individuals. The improvement was about 100% for the first two groups (no competition 
and group competition) and about 160% for the group who competed against each other 
individually. Sims repeated the experiment with a rate of reading task (three groups of 15 
subjects) and found that the first two groups improved about 10% while the individually 
motivated group improved about 35%. Sims conducted no statistical tests, however overall 
the results appeared to support a claim that individual motivation was more effective. 
Price (1993) studied the brainstorming performance of small groups when the ideas were 
attributed to the whole group versus the ideas being attributed to individuals within the 
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group (using individual boxes for ideas, or one group box). Price arranged 132 
undergraduate students in groups of three or four and had them brainstorm two tasks for 12 
minutes each. The tasks were to find uses for a shoelace and a pencil. Groups under both 
conditions generated about 20 uses for the shoelace and about 25 uses for the pencil. Price 
found that there were no differences in performance due to attributing the ideas to either 
individuals or to the group as a whole. 
Price (1993) repeated the experiment with 219 students and with two different tasks; 
finding uses for a box and a knife. Again Price found no differences due to the way that 
ideas would be counted, collectively or individually. Groups generated about 24 uses for 
the box and about 30 uses for the knife. Given that these results are not consistent with the 
social loafing phenomena, Price continued with a third experiment where he introduced 
motivation as another variable. Price reduced the motivation of some groups with a lecture 
to reduce their arousal and enthusiasm for the test. The study with 106 students in groups 
of three or four exhibited social loafing in the low arousal state. With low arousal, groups 
working collectively generated about 20 ideas for the box, while those working in a group, 
but whose ideas could be identified individually, generated about 25 ideas. In the high 
arousal condition, groups under both types of expected assessment generated about 25 
ideas. Price concluded that social loafing was not common but may exist under certain 
conditions. Price said that social loafing is not a social disease and that productivity loss is 
far from automatic when identification and responsibility is shared. 
Paulus, Dzindolet, Poletes and Camacho (1993) compared brainstorming in nominal and 
interacting groups of four and tested for the effects of individual motivation. Subjects were 
120 undergraduate students who worked on two problems; the thumbs problem; and how to 
improve the university. The experimenters evaluated the impact of recording the 
interacting group ideas with one group microphone or with individual microphones. The 
results showed that nominal groups generated a mean of 69 ideas. The interacting groups 
generated 51 ideas with individual microphones and 29 ideas with a common microphone 
although the only significant difference was between the nominal groups and the common 
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microphone interacting groups. Paulus, Dzindolet, Poletes and Camacho surveyed 
perceptions of performance and found that although nominal groups produced the highest 
performance, their perception of performance was the lowest. Nominal groups estimated 
that they generated about seven ideas per person (the actual number of ideas was 69 for a 
group of four). Paulus, Dzindolet, Poletes and Camacho said that the enhanced 
performance of individually miked participants supported the social-loafing theory. They 
also found that individuals in groups tended to overestimate their own contribution to the 
group. Individuals estimated that they contribute about 40% of the ideas in the group, 
significantly higher than the true mean of 25%. Paulus, Dzindolet, Poletes and Camacho 
suggested that this showed that individuals take the credit for others ideas. However, in 
brainstorming one should extend and modify other ideas and so it might be reasonable for 
individuals to feel as though they contributed to ideas voiced by other people. Paulus, 
Dzindolet, Poletes and Camacho (1993) conducted a further study with 100 undergraduate 
students. They arranged the subjects in brainstorming pairs who worked on one problem in 
two sessions. The experimenters examined the effect of allowing partners to exchange 
ideas in the second session and of informing partners ofthe other partner's performance in 
the first session. They found no significant effects for either intervention. 
A.7.3 Individual Motivation and Responsibility 
Hurlock (1927) investigated the effect of rivalry and competition within groups on 
performance of arithmetic tasks. Subjects were 155 primary school children. Hurlock 
arranged the subjects into equal-ability control and experimental groups based on the 
results of a control test. Hurlock had the children work on arithmetic tasks in a number of 
trials. On the second day Hurlock introduced rivalry into the experimental group by 
dividing them into two further groups of equal ability who were to compete against each 
other. This procedure continued for the experimental group up to the fifth trial. Hurlock 
measured the number of problems solved in a limited time and also the accuracy of the 
solutions. Hurlock found that introducing this motivating effect improved the number of 
problems solved on subsequent trials while the control groups made little progress on later 
trials. The overall accuracy of the solutions remained relatively steady with the 
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improvement in productivity. The group of children who were defeated on the first day 
improved substantially however they never defeated their opponents. 
Dashiell (1930) compared the effect on performance when subjects worked; alone; in pairs 
but non-competitive; in pairs and competing; and alone but observed. The tasks were a 
multiplication, analogy and word association tasks. Subjects were to complete the tasks as 
quickly as possible and accurately. The results showed that speed was highest working 
under competition or observation, but these conditions tended to reduce accuracy. 
Maginn and Harris (1980) compared nominal and interacting brainstorming groups of four. 
They also introduced four different assessment conditions that the subjects could expect. 
The four conditions were immediate versus delayed assessment and relevant versus 
irrelevant assessment. To simulate the immediate type of assessment, they said to subjects 
that assessors were behind a one-way mirror, whereas those expecting delayed assessment 
were told that ideas would be recorded and assessed later. Relevant assessment was 
simulated by saying that those assessing the ideas were experts, whereas those subjected to 
irrelevant assessment were told that the assessors were interested in studying language, 
rather than the ideas, for a different project. Their subjects were 152 undergraduate 
students who brainstormed on two problems; extra thumbs; and ways to reduce energy 
consumption. The results showed that nominal groups generated twice as many ideas as 
interacting groups on the thumbs (97 versus 51 ideas) and energy problem (55 versus 30 
ideas). The results showed that the differences in expected evaluation had no effect. 
Harkins and Jackson (1985) investigated social loafing in brainstorming groups. Subjects 
were 160 undergraduate students arranged into four conditions. They compared pooled 
ideas versus ideas attributable to individuals and perception or not that ideas could be 
compared (some subjects were told that other groups were working on the same problems 
and so their ideas could be compared while others were told that all groups were working 
on separate problems). All subjects worked in groups of four for 12 minutes to generate 
uses for a knife. Groups of individuals whose ideas were individually identifiable 
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generated a few more ideas (22 ideas) than groups where the ideas were pooled (20 ideas). 
This difference was significant but small. When ideas were pooled there was no effect for 
the perception of comparability. However when being individually assessed, groups 
generated more ideas when there was a perception that ideas could be compared (25 ideas 
versus 20 ideas). Thus the main difference was for groups who thought they were being 
individually assessed and there was the perception of comparison to other groups. 
Diehl and Stroebe (1987; experiment one) examined nominal and interacting groups when 
brainstorming as well as examining the effect of collective versus individual assessment. 
Subjects were 48 male high-school students arranged into groups of four. The task was to 
brainstorm for 15 minutes on ways to improve relationships between the German 
population and foreign guest workers. Diehl and Stroebe found that nominal groups (74 
ideas) outperformed interacting groups (28 ideas). Those subjects working under personal 
assessment generated more ideas than those under collective assessment (nominal: 84 to 64 
and interacting: 32 to 24). Nominal groups tended to produce more good ideas, once ideas 
were rated for quality, however given the overall greater productivity the average quality of 
ideas seemed to be constant. Diehl and Strobe said that the experiment showed that free-
riding or social loafing did not explain the whole difference between nominal and 
interacting groups; that is interacting groups under collective assessment still generated 
many less ideas than nominal groups, also under collective assessment. 
Diehl and Stroebe (1991) compared nominal and interacting groups and considered the 
effects of suggesting to participants that the output would be assessed individually with 
suggesting that the results would be collated and assessed as a team. Their study with 112 
high school students showed no differences among the nominal groups by varying the 
amount of time available to speak or the suggestion of individual versus group assessment 
These factors seemed to make no difference. For brainstorming over 10 minutes, the 
nominal groups generated about 50% more total ideas, and 300% more good ideas, than the 
interacting groups. For brainstorming over 20 minutes the differences were about 40% in 
total ideas, and about 40% in good ideas. 
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Szymanski and Harkins (1992) examined the effect on brainstorming various methods of 
assessment. The conditions were; self-assessment(at completion subjects knew they would 
be able to compare their individual results with previous results); experimenter-assessment 
(subjects were told that ideas would be evaluated on an individual basis); and no individual 
assessment (where subjects were not told they would be able to compare themselves to a 
standard and the experimenter would be evaluating the group as a whole). These 
conditions were crossed with two types of instructions; either to generate creative ideas and 
not worry about quantity; or generate many ideas and not worry about quality. Their 
subjects were 96 undergraduate students. For the two groups aiming for many ideas, the 
self-evaluation group generated about 30 ideas compared to 20 ideas in the no individual-
evaluation group. The quality of the ideas was the same. The three groups aiming for 
high-creativity ideas rather than quantity generated less ideas under all three types of 
assessment (self-assessment; 9 ideas, no assessment 11 ideas and experimenter-assessment 
13 ideas). Szymanski and Harkins did not arrange a group who aimed for high numbers 
and would be assessed by the experimenters. Szymanski and Harkins found that subjects 
achieved a greater number of ideas when specifically aiming for a high number of ideas and 
greater creativity when specifically aiming for creativity. When seeking creativity, subjects 
performed best with no prospect of evaluation. When seeking a high-number of ideas, 
subjects performed best with the prospect of self-evaluation compared to the prospect of no 
evaluation (no test for the effect of experimenter evaluation). Szymanski and Harkins 
suggested that the high-creativity instructions are more interesting and challenging and in 
this type of task, evaluation is best avoided. 
In summary, social loafing and the role of individual motivation or responsibility has 
sometimes been shown to contribute to the poor performance of interacting groups and 
sometimes been shown to have no effect. 
307 
A.7.4 Setting Goals 
Amabile, DeJong and Lepper (1976) compared the effect of imposing task deadlines on 
crossword designing games. Subjects were 40 undergraduate students. They arranged 
subjects into groups who were encouraged to either; work at their own pace; work as fast as 
they could; or were given a strict deadline. Subjects working as fast as possible or working 
to a deadline completed the task in a similar time and were faster than those who were 
asked to work at their own pace. They also measured the subjects subsequent interest in the 
games and found that imposing deadlines reduced interest in the task. 
Latham and Saari (1979) compared individuals brainstorming under different goal 
conditions. One condition had no goal, only to do your best, and two conditions had goals; 
one where the goal was assigned and one where the subjects set a goal themselves. 
Subjects were 60 undergraduate students given 20 minutes to develop uses for wood. They 
were given various categories of uses as a stimulus. Latham and Saari found that the 
experimenter-assignedgoal group and the self-assessed goal group (85 and 78 ideas) were 
similar and both outperformed the group with no goal (59 ideas). When quality ratings 
were compared there appeared no relationship between goal setting and idea quality. 
Latham and Saari said that goal setting improved performance and that assigned or self-set 
goals were equally effective. However their study gave no indication of the relationship 
between goal level and performance, only that a goal of some level was better than none. 
Locke (1982) examined the effect of goal-setting on brainstorming performance. Subjects 
were 247 undergraduate students who brainstormed alone for one minute on the uses for a 
coat hanger. Locke gave subjects different goals. Subjects aimed for between two ideas 
and 298 ideas in steps of two. Locke found that up to a goal often, a higher goal lead to 
better performance, beyond ten, the goal did not seem to increase performance. The results 
however are clouded by Locke's instruction for subjects to stop when they reached their 
goal. Hence how do we know if those with low goals used all the available time. 
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Lorenzi (1988) conducted a similar experiment to Locke (1982). Subjects were 350 
undergraduate and high-school students in 14 groups of between 13 and 35 students. 
Lorenzi investigated the effect of monetary incentive and goal setting. All groups 
brainstormed for one minute on a practice item. After this practice, the experimenter 
randomly awarded a number of subjects a small cash prize pretending that they were the 
best performers (these subjects were ultimately removed from the data). Groups were then 
given goals of six, 12 or 18 ideas. While Locke (1982) had told subjects to stop once they 
reached their goal, Lorenzi did not indicate that they should stop. One control group was 
given neither a monetary incentive nor goal, and another control group given a monetary 
incentive but no goal. Lorenzi found that goal levels made no difference where there was 
no monetary reinforcement, but made a slight improvement with the added effect of 
monetary reinforcement. Lorenzi found that an implied monetary reinforcement improved 
brainstorming performance at all goal levels (but did not report the size of the effects). 
From this study, the main difficulty with concluding that goals have little relationship to 
performance was that the brainstorming time may been inadequate. Lorenzi concluded that 
Locke's (1982) effects seemed to be due to low-goal subjects not using the available time. 
A.8 Evaluation Apprehension and Criticism 
Diehl and Stroebe (1987; experiment two) examined the effect of evaluation apprehension 
and topic types in interacting brainstorming. They created three conditions of evaluation 
apprehension; subjects observed through a one-way mirror by a panel of experts; subjects 
videotaped for later viewing by a psychology class; and a condition of no monitoring. The 
topic types were two controversial topics; reducing guest workers in Germany and 
increasing economic growth; and two uncontroversial topics; improving television 
programs and improving life in the suburbs. Subjects were 36 male undergraduate students 
who brainstormed in groups of six for 15 minutes on each of two problems. Diehl and 
Strobe found that the uncontroversial topics yielded about 40% more ideas and that no 
evaluation lead to between 50% and 100% more ideas than any type of evaluation. Diehl 
and Strobe concluded that apprehension about evaluation impeded brainstorming. 
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Diehl and Stroebe (1987; experiment three) investigated the effect of session type (nominal 
versus interactive), evaluation apprehension (direct viewing by experts and also 
videotaping versus audio recording) and assessment type (individual versus collective). 
Their subjects were 64 undergraduate students who brainstormed in groups of four for 15 
minutes about how to decrease the number of guest workers in Germany. Diehl and 
Stroebe found that nominal groups generated more ideas than interacting groups (about 
100%). High-evaluation apprehension lead to less ideas only in the case of personal 
assessment. There was no effect for the type of assessment. 
Amabile (1983) showed that critical people were perceived as more intelligent and of 
greater expertise than those who were positive. Amabile presented subjects (100 
undergraduate students) with a one paragraph book review reworded to be either negative 
or positive toward the book. Subjects rated the reviewer for measures such as expertise, 
intelligence and fairness. Amabile (1983) found that although pre-tests showed the text to 
be equal in writing quality, subjects rated the negative reviewers as more intelligent and 
expert, but less kind, fair, likeable and open-minded. Amabile concluded that individuals 
who wish to appear intelligent may tend to be heavily critical of other people and ideas. 
Smith (1993) examined the effect of discounting behaviour in brainstorming groups. 
Discounting meaning behaviour that is critical of others either by verbal or non-verbal way. 
Subjects were 52 undergraduate students arranged into groups of six to eight participants. 
Four groups served as controls, however two of these groups were trained in the effects of 
discounting and encouraged to eliminate this behaviour. The other four groups had an 
experimenter present in the group who injected four separate types of discounting 
influence, minor non-verbal, minor verbal, major non-verbal or major verbal discounting. 
The task was to brainstorm ideas for the content of a student radio service for 20 minutes. 
Smith measured the number of ideas and rated the quality of ideas. Smith also had subjects 
review a video of their session and rate on a minute by minute their feelings toward the 
session (on a seven point scale positive to negative). Smith found that the control groups 
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outperformed the groups where discounting was introduced (about 3 0 % more ideas). 
Those subjects in the discounted groups were emotionally less positive toward the 
brainstorming. Smith found no effects on the quality of ideas. 
A.9 Experts versus Novices 
Saiz and Breuleux (1992) compared the performance of 12 experts and 12 novices on two 
machining tasks of different complexity. They expected to find that the experts required 
less time for planning in both tasks and that both experts and novices would plan less in the 
simple task. Saiz and Breuleux (1992) found no significant differences between the experts 
and the novices in the amount of task planning. 
Stavy, Meidav, Asa and Kirsch (1991) studied the way that 34 students approached a 
dynamics problem compared to the way that 22 teachers approached the same problem. 
The two main avenues to solve the problem were Newton's Laws of Motion requiring step-
by-step thinking (process thinking) and the Conservation of Energy principle that will 
generally be easier and faster but requires the thinking to leap from the initial state to the 
final state (structure thinking). They found that the majority of experts took the more 
conceptually difficult but more expedient structure approach while the students took the 
conceptually easier but more laborious process approach. The students had been taught 
both approaches and yet took the more difficult path. Stavy, Meidav, Asa and Kirsch 
(1991) concluded that novice problem solvers tended to prefer a familiar and step-by-step 
approach rather than approaches requiring more abstract concepts. 
Tudor (1992) compared the problem-solving skills of 17 experts with 69 novices. The 
subjects worked on environmental problems. Tudor found that experts were superior in 
developing solutions and the potential effectiveness of those solutions. 
Grosswald (1992) studied problem solving among medical practitioners. Grosswald said 
that physicians 'receive little or no actual training in the skills of problem-solving'. 
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Grosswald compared the strategies of experienced physicians with the strategies of 
undergraduate physicians when they worked on tasks related to their training and on un-
related tasks. The experienced physicians made better use of problem-solving heuristics to 
consider more possibilities in medical problem solving. However, Grosswald found that 
when the task was not related to their training, experienced physicians were no better than 
novices. Grosswald concluded that the experienced physicians'problem-solving skills only 
related to their area of knowledge and were not general problem-solving skills. 
A.10 The Nine Dot Problem 
Burnham and Davis (1969) measured the success rate of subjects working on the nine dot 
problem when given various levels of clues (Table A-l). Subjects were given a ten minute 
period in which to solve the problem. Based on discussions with previous students, 
Burnham and Davis, tested the effect of various clues in the physical appearance of the 
problem combined with four levels of additional verbal clues. The four ways that the 
problem could be presented were: standard; standard plus an indication to start at the lower 
left hand corner dot; eleven dot diagram (Figure A-l); and eleven dot diagram plus an 
indication to start at the lower left hand dot. They various levels of additional clues were: 
no clues; drawing outside the boundary is permitted; crossing lines and touching a dot more 
than once is permitted; and outside, crossing and touching is permitted. Subjects were 194 
undergraduate students randomly allocated to one of 12 conditions and asked to solve the 
problem. Following the test subjects were asked if they had solved the problem using 
previous knowledge, those that had were deleted and the procedure continued until there 
were 15 subjects in each condition (total of 180 valid subjects). 
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Figure A-l The Eleven Dot 'Nine Dot' Task 
(from Burnham & Davis 1969) 
0 
1 
12 
4 
3 
NA 
1 
2 
12 
3 
2 
NA 
Number of Subjects out of 15 Solvingthe Nine-Dot Problem in Ten Minutes Given Various Clues 
Verbal Clues 
Presentation Clues None A B A+B 
Standard nine dots 
Starting point given 
Eleven dots 
Eleven dots plus starting point 14 NA 14 NA 
Table A-l Number of Subjects out of Fifteen Solving the Nine-Dot Problem in Ten Minutes Given Various 
Clues by Way of Problem Presentation and Verbal Clues (Burnham & Davis 1969 
A: "The lines can extend beyond the square formed by the dots" 
B: "The lines can cross one another and can touch the same dot more than once" 
NA: Not applicable, not tested 
As shown in Table A-l, Burnham and Davis (1969) found that none ofthe 15 subjects who 
worked from the standard nine dot problem and without any clues were able to solve the 
problem in ten minutes. While drawing outside the boundary is important to the ultimate 
solution, the clue alone facilitated a reasonable but not a comprehensive improvement. 
Providing the clue to travel outside the boundary with the addition of two additional dots 
(Figure A-1) seemed to lead to a dramatic improvement. 
Similarly, Weisberg and Alba (1981) showed that breaking the boundary did not lead to an 
immediate solution. For instance in the first experiment that they describe, they tested the 
effects of various levels of clues. They arranged the task so that subjects could draw each 
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trial as they thought about the problem on prepared pads of paper. In this way they were 
able to count the number of trials. The subjects were 80 undergraduate students divided 
into four groups of 20; one control and three treatment groups. Some of the subjects had 
previous experience with the problem and were thus analysed separately. The control 
group (15 novice subjects) were given no clues and were stopped after 20 attempts. The 
three treatment groups were each allowed 10 attempts and then a clue was given. The first 
treatment group (15 novice subjects) were given the clue that to solve the problem they 
must go outside the square. The second treatment group (14 novice subjects) were given 
this clue and were shown the first line outside the square (on prepared paper). The third 
treatment group (17 novice subjects) were given the same clue and were shown the first 
two lines (on prepared paper). Only one ofthe 61 novices solved the problem in less than 
ten attempts. None of the control group solved the problem in 20 attempts and none went 
beyond the boundary. AH but two of the subjects from the three treatment groups went 
beyond the boundary after the clues. The number of subjects that solved the problem in the 
ten attempts following the clues seemed to increase with the level of information in the 
clue, from 20% in the case ofthe clue only, to 60% in the case ofthe clue and one line, to 
100% of the group that received the clues and two lines. Interestingly, although the 
experienced subjects were separately analysed the results were similar. Very few of those 
experienced were able to solve the problem without the clue and following the clue the 
proportions solving the problem in the next 10 attempts were similar to the novices. 
Thinking that they may not have allowed enough attempts, Weisberg and Alba (1981) 
conducted a further experiment with a further 12 novice subjects who were allowed 100 
attempts. None of these solved the problem. With the clue to draw outside the boundary, 
three of these 12 were able to solve the problem within a further 20 attempts. 
Weisberg and Alba (1981) were interested in the small difference that previous experience 
had made on the success rate and so conducted a further experiment where they showed the 
solutions to a group of subjects and tested them again some time later. They gave 50 
subjects the problem during a class and allowed five minutes working time in which none 
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solved the problem. They gave the clue to the subjects and then a further two minutes after 
which none had solved the problem and so they showed the solution. Five months later, 
without notice, the problem was given to 12 students of the original 50 who happened to be 
in a class together. About half (seven out of 12) could recall the solution within four 
minutes. From these experiments, and some further experiments that they describe, 
Weisberg and Alba (1981), like Burnham and Davis (1969) showed that while the clue to 
break the assumed boundary exposes the subjects to the domain in which the solution can 
be found, it does not necessarily quickly lead to the solutions itself. 
A.11 CoRT Research Studies 
Rosenthal, Morrison and Perry (1977) compared the effects of teaching creativity using a 
problem-based lesson format and using a lecture format. In the first case the lesson was the 
first two lessons from the CoRT program, consisting of an introduction and practice 
sessions employing the concepts of po and random input. The second format consisted of a 
lecture about the concepts of lateral thinking and the two tools above, without allowing 
time for practicing these tools. Both sessions lasted 40 minutes. Subjects were 90 
undergraduate students tested in three groups. Each group were divided into two equal 
groups, half attending the lesson and half attending the lecture. Three teachers gave one 
lesson and one lecture each. Subjects were asked to work for 7 minutes of each of two of 
Torrance's problems; draw unusual objects using a circle and think of unusual uses for a 
tin can. Responses were measured for flexibility and originality but not for fluency 
(number of ideas). Subjects completed the test as a pre-test and post-test. The results 
showed that the lesson group significantly outperformed the lecture group on originality on 
the circles test and both originality and flexibility on the tin can test. The changes between 
the pre and post-test were not reported. 
De Bono (1978) published a summary of experiments with the CoRT program in the 
United Kingdom undertaken by David Tripp. Most ofthe experiments compared a group 
of children who worked on a series of CoRT lessons with a matched group that did not 
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participate. Both groups were required to respond to an issue such as; 'How would you 
reorganise the local bus service to improve it?' There seemed to be no time restriction 
placed on the output. The researcher measured the number of ideas and sometimes 
separated the ideas into various categories such as positive, negative and neutral. The 
output was sometimes by essay, tape recorded interview, or other unspecified ways. The 
improvement in the number of ideas ranged from 40% to 200%. Some of the experiments 
showed improvement in the range of ideas and subjective observations like the tendency to 
explore possibilities. The experiments covered a range of ages (ten to 15) and while 
youngest group recorded the highest increase there seemed to be little correlation between 
age and performance. The various groups studied in the experiments were difficult to 
compare as the experiments were conducted under varying conditions and used different 
tests. Although experienced teachers, the teachers of the CoRT program had no formal 
training in teaching these lessons or in the theory behind the lessons. 
The reporting of the experiments by de Bono (1978) has been criticised as being too brief to 
assess the quality of the research (Halpern 1993). The reporting did not explain the 
experiments sufficiently for a judgement to be made about the effects of the program. 
Tripp, now of Murdoch University in Western Australia, cited the CoRT program as useful 
intervention (1993) although he expressed reservations about the methodology of the 
experiments (1977) and pointed later (1979) to the relatively uncontrolled nature ofthe 
teaching. How the CoRT materials were used is unclear as teachers had scope to vary the 
program. Tripp (1979) mentioned some ofthe different styles teachers used to teach the 
CoRT methods. For instance one teacher left children to use a tool for fifteen minutes at a 
time without any help. Consequently the children spent the time talking generally rather 
than practising the tool. The lack of training of teachers and subsequent program variation 
can be positive in that it shows the program was not reliant on teacher-traininghowever the 
drawback is uncertainty about content and the difficulty of repeating the experiments. 
In 1983 de Sanchez, Astorga, de Blanco and de Griffin published results ofthe impact of 
the Aprender a Pensar (Learning to Think) program in Venezuela. The program was based 
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on the C o R T program, although modified somewhat by de Sanchez. The 1983 publication 
was not in English so the description here relies on de Sanchez's later summary of the 
results (1987) and Nickerson, Perkins and Smith's (1985) report ofthe results. 
The subjects were ten to twelve year-old Venezuelan school children. There were 322 
subjects in the treatment group who were compared with 275 in a control group. All 
subjects worked on open-ended style problems after one, two and three years of the 
program. The measures were the total number of ideas, and some qualitative measures like 
the number of relevant ideas and the level of abstraction (similar to novelty), and level of 
elaboration (subjective assessment of vocabulary, etcetera). D e Sanchez reported; 
Significant differences in favour ofthe experimental group in number of ideas, pertinence of 
ideas and level of abstraction and organisation of ideas, (de Sanchez, 1987) 
Nickerson, Perkins, and Smith (1985) reported more specific results. The experimental 
group improved about 3 0 % on the number of ideas and about 4 0 % on the number of 
relevant ideas after one year but made no progress on the abstraction and elaboration. After 
three years of lessons the experimental group improved about 1 0 0 % in the number of ideas 
and number of relevant ideas with smaller increases in abstraction and elaboration. The 
control group changed on none of the measures. The study showed a continued 
improvement over the three years, however this was achieved with ongoing teaching. The 
teaching was modified and so is not directly comparably to other studies. 
Edwards and Baldauf (1982) studied the effects ofthe CoRT program on 72 high school 
students. The measure of success was responses to an essay question (number and quality 
of ideas). Many more ideas were generated in response to the essay question and the 
results show an improvement in science exams. The results were a comparison of 
performance without the C o R T training compared to the same subjects' performance after 
the training. Given the study lacked control group there is uncertainty about the effect of 
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practice on the tests and how science exam improvements were measured. One would 
assume that the improvement in the science exam could be due to normal science classes. 
Edwards and Baldauf (1985) continued their research with 67 grade seven students. All 
subjects received ten, 50-minute CoRT-1 lessons over four weeks. Subjects were then 
divided into three groups of about equal size that received different levels of follow-up 
support; no follow-up; teacher reinforcement; or teacher and parent reinforcement. 
Edwards and Baldauf reported small improvements on the Torrance Test, IQ, and self-
concept, but no improvement on the essay question. Significant improvements were noted 
in two school subjects and no change and slight worsening in the other two subjects. 
Ruffels (1986) investigated the effect of CoRT program on students at Deloraine High 
School in Tasmania. The treatment was the ten lessons ofthe CoRT-1 program and ten 
additional lessons; four from Chatfield and Russel's (1965) Try Thinking program, three 
debates and three essay writing lessons. The program consisted of two 50-minute lessons 
per week over a total of ten weeks. Ruffles compared the subjects before and after 
treatment with; an essay question; a critical thinking appraisal test; and a comparison of 
science grades. Ruffels found a significant improvement on the critical thinking appraisal 
test while the results of the essay test were difficult to interpret as both the experimental 
group and control group performed worse on the second essay (different topic). Given that 
it was different to the first topic this was not necessarily surprising but did make 
comparison difficult. Ruffels explained that the reason for using different topics in pre-test 
and post-test was to avoid the problem of ideas being pooled. Ruffels found no change in 
science grades although perhaps a positive trend appeared. Subjects in the study were 
asked to comment on the tools and generally made comments in favour about the value and 
use of the methods. In general Ruffels concluded in a positive way about the CoRT 
methods and suggested that thinking skills can be improved with training in this area. 
Eriksson (1990) reported an experiment at the Schemerenbeck Educational Centre for 
Gifted and Talented Children at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. The 
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experiment studied the C o R T program together with the Integrative Educational Model 
(IEM). The subjects were 150 children in grades six to eight. From the sample, subjects 
were randomly allocated to four treatment groups and one control group. Half of the 
subjects self-selected for the program by responding to an open invitation and half were 
nominated for the project. The four treatment groups were split between CoRT/IEM and 
self-selection/nominated. The treatment was the ten lessons ofthe CoRT-1 Program. It 
was unclear if the teacher was specifically trained in these methods. Eriksson used the 
Torrance Tests and two other tests designed to measure the extent that subjects believe in 
internal control as against external control and to measure their self concept. Eriksson 
found significant differences on the creativity tests and locus of control following the CoRT 
training but no difference on self concept. Eriksson concluded that the CoRT program can 
have a positive effect on creative ability and on students' perception of control. Eriksson 
commented that the long term effects are unknown and the transfer of skills to other life 
areas (real world problems) are also worthy of investigation. 
Edwards (1991) reported a third study ofthe CoRT program. The subjects were 202 grade 
seven students (final year of elementary school) in two schools. The students were in seven 
classes; three at a Catholic school and four at a state school. Two classes at each school 
(115 subjects) received ten CoRT lessons (each about 45 minutes over five weeks). The 
other three classes (87 subjects) served as controls. Teachers of the treatment group had 
three hours instruction and worked from the teacher's notes but integrated the teaching with 
normal lessons in their own way. Edwards performed a pre-test, post-test (11 weeks) and a 
delayed post-test (15 weeks). Compared to the control group, there were improvements in 
IQ and on the flexibility and originality measures of the Torrance Tests. There was no 
significant improvement in fluency or on a self-concept scale either as assessed by the 
subjects themselves or by their teachers. The treatment group scored better on the Thinking 
Approaches Questionnaire that measured use ofthe thinking skills targeted by CoRT. On 
the assessment of other school subjects the control group improved in the language arts and 
social science but made no progress in science and mathematics. This was inconsistent 
with earlier findings (Edwards & Baldauf 1985). 
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Appendix B 
The Assessment Tools 
Book One and Book Two 
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Appendix C 
Case Studies, Standard 
Solution Categorisation and 
Ranking 
C. Case Studies. Standard Solution Categorisation and Ranking 
C.1 Generating Safety Solutions: Cases One to Six 
The task for the first six cases (See Appendix B) was to generate solutions. The 
measurement was by counting the number of solutions (generating alternatives), which was 
a straight forward task. The second measurement was to classify these solutions as either 
safe-place or safe-person. Clearly there is no clear distinction, however to gain a measure 
of the potential effectiveness of the solutions, a list of possible ideas for each case was 
generated and split into the two categories. These standard categories were then a standard 
way to classify the solutions generated in the research. The standard categories follow. 
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C.1.1 Case One: Grain Worker and Rail Carriage 
Kim worked as a labourer in a grain processing plant. He severely damaged his neck and 
shoulder manually moving a rail carriage back onto its rails. 
The rail car carried grain around the inside of the factory. A hand crank on one ofthe wheels 
drove the car. The flanged wheels ran on rails embedded in concrete. Often the cars became 
derailed due in part to; the unbalanced single-wheel drive, poor wheel bearings and an 
uneven track joined for factory extensions. 
On the day ofthe accident the car derailed between work shifts. Kim tried re-railing the car 
on his own. Two people normally use levers to raise the car onto blocks and then push it back 
on the tracks. The company now specifies the re-railing of grain cars as a team-liftingtask 
Safe-Place « 
Solutions < 
Cut-off Point 
Safe-Person 
Solutions 
• Other products (no grain) 
» Different layout (don't move grain around) 
> Conveyor (no trolley) 
> Vacuum system (no trolley) 
» Forklift (no trolley) 
> Two-, or four-wheel drive trucks (less derailment) 
> N e w track (less derailment) 
• N e w wheel bearings (less derailment) 
* Rubber tyred carriages (no derailment) 
» Small trolleys (less derailment, easier to re-rail) 
• Re-railment jacks, crane (just as much derailment, easier to re-rail) 
» Maintenance of current system (maybe less derailment) 
» Training (making sure people know what to do) 
• Safe-work procedures (making sure people know what to do) 
» Teamwork, rostering (making sure two people are on hand) 
Table C-l Case One: Standard Categorisation of Safe Place and Safe Person Solutions 
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C.1.2 Case Two: Lawyer and Coconut Tree 
A Hawaiian holiday with their families was a welcome break for Jeremy and Charles. Both 
lawyers, they had been six months working on the same case. Jeremy and Charles attended a 
Luau; a traditional Hawaiian celebration involving a feast and other entertainment. 
Hagar, the tree climber, was a feature of the luau. Hagar, weighing about one hundred 
kilograms and wearing only a loin cloth, was quite a sight scurrying up the tree to shower 
flowers on the tourists below. 
As Hagar climbed, the tree swayed and shook; the crowd of about seventy people gasped and 
shouted him on. Jeremy, in an especially festive mood, moved to the front ofthe crowd. Then 
disaster struck; a coconut fell. Time seemed to stand still as the coconut descended. Jeremy 
was unable to move back because ofthe crowd and screamed in agony as the coconut struck 
him on the head and split in two. 
Luckily Jeremy's injuries were minor and he recovered fully to continue holidaying with his 
family and friends. 
Safe-Place 
Solutions 
Cut-off Point 
Safe-Person « 
Solutions • 
» Different type of holiday 
» Different event 
• N o tree climber 
» Different type of tree 
» Remove all coconuts 
» Plastic replica coconuts 
» Light weight tree climber 
» Sturdier tree 
» Smaller crowd 
» Net under tree catching coconuts letting flowers through 
» Remove loose coconuts prior 
> Rope barriers 
» Spread crowd out 
> Helmets 
Supervise/control crowd 
Warning signs 
Table C-2 Case Two: Standard Categorisation of Safe Place and Safe Person Solutions 
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C.1.3 Case Three: Motorist and the Car 
Bob, driving his car, was in a single vehicle road accident. The accident occurred on a 
country road in Victoria. The road was relatively straight, flat, horizontal and dry. 
His car collided with the left hand side of a bridge railing. The bridge railing is 
approximately fifty years old and made of stone. There are many bridge railings of this type. 
Bob was twenty-two years old at the time and recorded a blood alcohol reading ofO. 03%. He 
suffered major injuries and survived. No other passengers were in the vehicle. 
Safe-Place 
Solutions 
Cut-off Point 
Safe-Person • 
Solutions • 
» Other transport 
» Remove bridges 
» Widen bridge 
> Slow cars 
» Speed humps 
» Traffic islands 
» Shock absorbing railing 
» Shock absorbing cars 
• Air bags 
> Ignition link to alcohol level 
» Rumble strips 
» Reflective strips 
» Warning devices in cars 
» Training 
» Alcohol limits 
> Helmets 
» Age limits 
» Speed limits 
» Warning signs 
» Advertising 
Table C-3 Case Three: Standard Categorisation of Safe Place and Safe Person Solutions 
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C.1.4 Case Four: Sawyer and the Circular Saw 
Kareem was a sawyer working in a timber mill. An accident with a circular saw lacerated his 
upper body and right arm. 
Kareem was cutting timber using a circular saw permanently fixed to a long 'bed'. Before 
processing, the timber would be about three hundred by two hundred millimetres and about 
six metres long. Kareem 'sjob was to cut the slab into smaller sections. He would choose the 
sizes according to the timber quality. 
A rotating vertical cylinder called a 'hob' holds the timber against a backing plate. The hob 
ensures even product thickness and feeds the timber through the saw. 
The cuffofKareem's overalls became trapped between the hob and the timber he was feeding 
through. The rotating hob then dragged his arm and upper body against the saw. Another 
worker stopped the saw with an emergency button. 
The hob had no emergency stop button. The company has since installed emergency stop 
buttons on all machine equipment. 
Safe-Place 
Solutions 
Cut-off Point 
Safe-Person « 
Solutions • 
• Automatic process 
• Contract cutting 
• Different product 
• Control booth - remote control 
» Different cutting method 
» Physical guard 
» Remove hob 
» Small trees 
» Push sticks 
» Stop buttons 
> Training 
> Supervision 
Clothing 
Emergency procedures 
Two-person operation 
Table C-4 Case Four: Standard Categorisation of Safe Place and Safe Person Solutions 
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C.1.5 Case Five: Mining Supervisor and the Dump Truck 
A mining supervisor, Barbara, broke many bones in her upper body when struck by a dump 
truck. Barbara had seventeen years in the mining industry including four years with this 
employer as a supervisor. 
Barbara was responsible for operation of two hoppers. The hoppers are next to each other. 
One hopper contains gravel and the other, sand. Trucks reverse under the elevated hoppers 
and the gravel or sand runs out ofthe hopper when the chute is open. Truck drivers are 
unable to see objects directly behind the truck closer than twenty metres. 
Barbara was standing under the gravel hopper. A front-end loader was under the adjoining 
sand hopper. She motioned to the front-end loader driver, Julius, to clean up spillage under 
the sand hopper. As Julius began cleaning up the sand a dump truck backed under the gravel 
hopper and ran into Barbara. 
Safe-Place 
Solutions 
Cut-off Point 
3 > 
Safe-Person • 
Solutions 
» Eliminate need for sand and gravel 
» Eliminate hoppers (piles of material) 
» Drive-through system 
» Eliminate spillage 
• Automatic spill clean up (eg grid) 
» Separate hoppers 
» Eliminate trucks (eg conveyor) 
» N o supervisor 
• Supervisor in control cabin 
> Electronic devices to sense person and stop truck 
• Barriers 
» Radios 
• Warning devices (reversing beepers) 
» Clean-up procedures 
> Training 
Video cameras 
Mirrors 
Visible clothing 
P P E 
Table C-5 Case Five: Standard Categorisation of Safe Place and Safe Person Solutions 
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C.1.6 Case Six: Bank Manager and the Chain Saw 
Sophia is a bank manager. She travelledfrom her home in the town to a friend's farm to cut 
firewood. She was gathering wood to use in a combustion heater to heat her home. 
Sophia was sawing a log from above when the log 'sagged' owing to the weight ofthe log 
closing the saw cut. The chain jammed and the chain saw thrust sharply forward. Sophia 
overbalancedforwards and cut her left hand and forearm as she fell coming in to contact with 
the chain. 
Safe-Place « 
Solutions • 
Cut-off Point 
Safe-Person 
Solutions 
> Warmer climate 
> Gas or electric heating 
> Insulate house 
» Buy wood 
» Chain brake 
» Saw guard 
» Other cutting methods (for example, axe, handsaw, saw-bench) 
• Training 
» Log holders 
» Instructions 
» Protective clothing 
» Two-person operation 
» Safe-work methods 
» Licence wood cutters 
C.2 Prioritizing Safety Solutions: Cases Seven to Twelve 
Part two of the training evaluation tool used case studies and sets of given options. The 
task was to prioritize the options from most effective to least effect in term of their risk 
control potential. Success was measured by correlating a subjects score with a standard 
rank. For each case following the given options are listed in their order of the standard 
ranking. Each option includes a brief rationale that explains the reason for its position in 
the rank. As a further evaluation four lecturers in VIOSH-Australia, who had no 
involvement in the development ofthe tool completed the test. The mean correlations are 
shown on the following pages (Table C-7; Table C-8; Table C-9; Table C-10; Table C-l 1; 
Table C-l2). The results show that the way the experts prioritized the solutions correlated 
with the standard prioritization (0.8-0.9). 
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Standard Ranking 1 6 3 4 2 5 
ExpertA 3 6 2 4 1 5 0.83 
Expert B 3 6 2 4 15 0.83 
Expert C 2 6 3 5 14 0.89 
Expert D 16 2 5 3 4 0.89 
Mean 0.86 
Table C-7 Case Seven: Correlation of Expert Rankings with Standard Ranking 
Standard Ranking 
ExpertA 
Expert B 
Expert C 
Expert D 
Mean 
5 
5 
5 
4 
5 
4 
6 
6 
5 
4 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
3 
3 
2 
3 
3 
2 
1 
3 
2 
6 
4 
4 
6 
6 
V 
0.71 
0.60 
0.94 
0.94 
0.80 
Table C-8 Case Eight: Correlation of Expert Rankings with Standard Ranking 
Standard Ranking 
Expert A 
Expert B 
Expert C 
Expert D 
Mean 
6 
6 
6 
4 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 1 
4 
4 1 
4 
5 
I 2 
I 2 
2 
1 2 
I 2 
5 
5 
5 
5 
6 
V 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.83 
Table C-9 Case Nine: Correlation of Expert Rankings with Standard Ranking 
0.96 
385 
Standard Ranking 3 5 2 4 6 1 V 
Expert A 
Expert B 
Expert C 
Expert D 
Mean 
4 
3 
6 
3 
6 
5 
4 
5 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
4 
5 
4 
5 
6 
3 
6 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0.89 
1.00 
0.43 
1.00 
0.83 
Table C-10 Case Ten: Correlation of Expert Rankings with Standard Ranking 
Standard Ranking 
Expert A 
Expert B 
Expert C 
Expert D 
Mean 
6 
5 
4 
6 
6 
1 
1 
3 
2 
2 
5 
4 
5 
5 
5 
3 
3 
2 
3 
3 
4 
6 
6 
4 
4 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
'r' 
0.83 
0.60 
0.94 
0.94 
0.83 
Table C-l 1 Case Eleven: Correlation of Expert Rankings with Standard Ranking 
Standard Ranking 
Expert A 
Expert B 
Expert C 
Expert D 
Mean 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
5 
4 
4 
6 
S 1 
4 ) 
5 1 
5 ] 
5 1 
I 6 
6 
6 
6 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
'r' 
0.94 
1.00 
1.00 
0.60 
0.89 
Table C-I2 Case Twelve: Correlation of Expert Rankings with Standard Ranking 
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C.2.1 Case Seven: Aircraft Fitter and Tug 
Aircraft fitters inspect aircraft before each flight. To gain access for inspection Jim, an 
aircraft fitter, stood on a tug. A tug is aflat topped vehicle designed for towing aircraft and 
luggage trailers, etc. Jim was able to stand on the tug, inspect the aircraft and drive around 
underneath the aircraft by operating the controls away from the driver's seat. 
Jim was moving the tug to a new inspection point when he collided with the aircraft. The 
collision trapped Jim between the tug and the aircraft fuselage. Jim received multiple 
fractures to his upper body. 
Company rules insist tugs are operated only if the driver is seated in the driver's seat. 
Standard Rank Rationale 
1. R e d u c e the height Of aircraft Tug will be unnecessary to inspect beneath the aircraft. Eliminates 
landing gear. energy. 
2, I ncrease aircraft Component Reduces frequency of inspections. 
reliability. Reduces exposure to energy. 
3. Provide a special motorised Purpose built equipment improves control of energy. 
maintenance trolley. 
4. Provide training to the fitters in May improve control of energy. 
safe equipment USe. Task may still require this type of use. 
5. I ncrease supervision to ensure May pressure fitters into compliance and improve control of 
compliance with safety rules. energy. 
Task may still require this type of use. 
6. Institute an employee incentive May encourage different working practices depending on the 
s c h e m e promoting safe incentives and how well the safe practices are outlined 
practices. Task may still require this type of use. 
Table C-13 Case Seven: Standard Rank and Rationale 
C.2.2 Case Eight: Gardener and the Gang Mower 
Kelly is a gardener at a metropolitan hospital. Kelly was cleaning a 'gang' mower when she 
cut her foot. Kelly had seen other gardeners clean the mower by hosing the blades with water 
while operating them in reverse. Kelly was washing the mower in this way when her left foot 
touched the moving blades. The blades left deep cuts in her big toe and two adjacent toes. 
There had been no verbal or written instruction about how to wash the mower safely. The 
hospital provides safety boots but Kelly was not wearing them at the time ofthe accident. 
Often outdoor workers wear their own shoes claiming that they are more comfortable. 
The hospital has now developed a code of practice for the safe operation ofthe gang mowers. 
Standard Rank Rationale 
1. Use sheep to graze the grass. Eliminates the need for the mower. 
Eliminates the energy. 
2. Purchase a self cleaning 
mower. 
Cleaning task is eliminated. 
Maintains separation from energy. 
3. Re-sow the grass with a slower Reduces need for mowing. 
growing native variety. Reduces exposure to energy. 
4. Remind all outdoor staff to wear May lead to staff using supplied boots. 
Safety boots. Provides personal protection from energy. 
5. Provide training in the new 
code of practice. 
May lead to a safer method (if there is one) and less likely contact 
with energy. 
6. Provide training away from the Does nothing directly about the energy source 
workplace in hazard recognition 
and reporting. 
Table C-l4 Case Eight: Standard Rank and Rationale 
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C.2.3 Case Nine: Cable Laying Contractor and the Bogged Utility 
Percy was a supervisor in a team installing cable to remote areas for a new pay-television 
service. Percy broke bones in both legs during an accident while attempting to un-bog a 
vehicle. 
A two-wheel-drive utility carrying generating equipment became bogged. Percy decided to 
pull the utility out using a much larger four-wheel-drivevehicle mounted with a cable-laying 
machine. 
Percy asked Bill and Ben, two machinery operators, to each drive one ofthe vehicles while he 
gave directions. They connecteda chain between the front bumper bars ofthe vehicles. The 
larger vehicle began reversing and the chain tightened. The bumper bar ofthe bogged utility 
then broke loose and stuck Percy in the legs. 
Standard Rank Rationale 
1. Install pay television as a 
satellite based system. 
Eliminates the need for the task. 
Eliminates the energy. 
2. Supply all vehicles as four-
wheel-drive for off road use. 
Reduces the possibility of getting bogged. 
Reduces the creation of energy. 
3. Build vehicles with towing 
hooks at the front and rear. 
If bogged provides a proper connection point. 
Provides better control of energy. 
4. Train employees in emergency Training may leads to a different procedure. 
towing and appropriate w a y s to May achieve better control of energy. 
connect to the chassis of 
vehicles. 
5. Increase supervisor training in 
towing hazards. 
Supervisor may encourage different methods. 
May achieve better control of energy. 
Only impacts on supervisor and doesn't necessarily indicate better 
ways. 
6. Avoid standing near to 
operations such as this 
because chains under high 
tension are prone to 
unpredictable behaviour. 
May lead to separation of recipient and energy. 
Does nothing about the energy or its control. 
Table C-l5 Case Nine: Standard Rank and Rationale 
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C.2.4 Case Ten: Orchardistand the Power Line 
Janine operates an orchard. She received an electric shock from an overhead power line. At 
the time Janine was standing on an aluminium ladder to access the top of a concrete tower 
used to monitor flow in a pipe line. 
The concrete tower was approximately one metre in diameter and six metres high. The tower 
looked like a concrete pipe stood on end. 
Janine carried a long handle aluminium tool to the top ofthe tower. The tool was for making 
adjustments inside the tower. At the top ofthe tower Janine made contact with the overhead 
power line with the aluminium tool. The shock threw her off the ladder and she suffered 
minor burns. 
Standard Rank 
1. Use solar or wind powered 
appliances. 
Rationale 
Eliminates the power lines. 
Eliminates the energy. 
2. Place power lines underground. Improves control of energy. 
3. Place power lines higher. Reduces possibility of contact. 
Separates recipient and energy. 
4. Insulate low height power lines. Improves control of energy, probability of contact with power 
lines remains the same. 
5. Use WOOden ladders to access Improves control of energy. 
towers Where electricity is Probability of contact remains the same. 
involved. May improve insulation to ground. 
6. Insulate the tools used to make Probability of contact remains the same. 
adjustments to the tower and May insulate the user from the energy. 
other such tools used near to 
live electric wires. 
Table C-16 Case Ten: Standard Rank and Rationale 
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C.2.5 Case Eleven: Transport Worker and the Falling Pipes 
An employee of a brewing company suffered a severe injury while supervising the unloading 
of scaffolding pipes from a truck. A large sign on the factory was to be re-painted. The 
scaffold was for painters to access the sign. A hired mobile crane often used instead of 
scaffoldingfor such tasks was too expensive because ofthe lengthy re-painting. 
'Webbing'ropes held the pipes in place. After being untied one ofthe rope hooks had caught 
on a bundle of pipes. Sam climbed onto the truck to untangle the hook. While he was on the 
truck the twoforklift drivers began unloading the pipes. This was despite an un-enforced 
company rule that trucks be unloaded by oneforklift only. 
While aforklift was lifting a bundle of pipes another pipe dislodged. The pipe fell to the 
ground knocking Sam off the truck and landing on him. Sam received head and back injuries 
from the fall and chest injuries from the impact ofthe pipe. 
The company is now writing a safe-work procedure for securing and unloading of pipe and 
other unstable materials. 
Standard Rank Rationale 
1. Place Signs near to the ground. Eliminates the need for the pipe. 
Eliminates energy. 
2. Paint the sign on the ground Eliminates the need for the pipe. 
using a hired crane to remove Eliminates energy. 
and re-install Sign. Introduces crane and associated energy. 
3. Use mobile elevated platforms Eliminates the need for the pipe. 
in place Of scaffolding. Eliminates energy. 
Introduces elevated platforms and associated energy 
4. Enforce the existing rule that Improves control over the energy. 
Only one forklift work at a truck May be difficulties with compliance. 
at one time. 
5. Provide training in the new 
safe-work procedure. 
Effectiveness depends on what is in the new work procedure and 
how well it is implemented. 
6. Provide hard hats to all 
employees. 
Does nothing about energy sources or their control. 
Hard hats would offer limited protection in cases like this. 
Table C-l7 Case Eleven: Standard Rank and Rationale 
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C.2.6 Case Twelve: Production Engineer and the Forklift 
Karen worked in a food processing factory as a production engineer. A forklift collided with 
Karen causing multiple fractures and severe bruising. 
Bill, a storeman, uses a forklift to shift drums of liquid. He moves the drums from the 
receiving storage area to the production area. 
The accident happened at 7pm on a winter night. The lighting in the production area was 
good but the lighting in the storage and forklift 'roadway'area was poor. Karen was walking 
from the well-lit Tea Room across the 'roadway'when struck by the forklift. 
The load obstructed Bill's view. The noise ofthe production line obscured the forklift motor 
noise. People can walk around the factory on an elevated walkway, but this is not always 
convenient and often not used despite a company rule. 
Standard Rank Rationale 
1. Pipe the liquid from the 
receiving storage area to the 
production area. 
2. Build a conveyor to carry the 
drums from the receiving 
storage area to the production 
area. 
3. Provide forklifts with dual 
controls such that they can be 
driven in reverse. 
4. Improve the lighting in the 
Eliminates the forklift. 
Eliminates the energy. 
Eliminates the forklift. 
Eliminates the energy. 
Creates further energy source in comparison to the piping solution. 
Improves control over the energy as driver has unobstructed view. 
Improves control over the energy as driver has better vision. 
'roadway' section Of the factory. Recipient should be better able to maintain separation with better 
vision. 
5. Install a beeper on the forklift. 
6. Create a strict rule that in the 
interests of safety the existing 
walkways must be used. 
Does nothing about energy or control. 
Recipient may be better able to maintain separation due to the 
warning. 
Separates recipient and energy. 
Rule already exists and is ineffective. 
Table C-l8 Case Twelve: Standard Rank and Rationale 
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Appendix D 
Tabulations of Raw Data 
D. Tabulations of Raw Data 
D.1 Terminology Used in the Following Tables 
Abbreviation Meaning 
Ideas Number of solutions generated 
SP1 Number of safe-place solutions generated 
SPe Number of safe-person solutions generated 
%SP1 Percentage of safe-place solutions (100* SPl/Ideas) 
'r' Correlation of subject's rank with standard optimum rank 
Ind Industry Advisers 
Gov Government Advisers 
Eng Engineering Students 
Tech Technology Students 
Table D-l Terminology 
D.2 Engineering Students: Generating Solutions 
D.2.1 Generation of Solutions by Untrained Engineering Students 
Individually 
Subject 
1A 
IB 
1C 
2A 
2B 
2C 
3A 
3B 
3C 
4A 
4B 
4C 
5A 
5B 
5C 
6A 
6B 
6C 
7A 
7B 
7C 
Case One 
Ideas 
6 
5 
4 
2 
7 
9 
4 
3 
3 
5 
4 
4 
4 
7 
4 
5 
3 
4 
7 
8 
5 
SPI 
5 
5 
4 
2 
6 
7 
3 
2 
1 
5 
2 
2 
3 
6 
2 
3 
2 
4 
3 
6 
2 
SPe 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
2 
] 
1 
2 
0 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
I 
0 
4 
2 
3 
%SP1 
83% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
86% 
78% 
75% 
67% 
33% 
100% 
50% 
50% 
75% 
86% 
50% 
60% 
67% 
100% 
43% 
75% 
40% 
Case Two 
Ideas 
5 
4 
1 
4 
3 
6 
5 
5 
3 
7 
6 
6 
2 
6 
6 
4 
2 
4 
7 
11 
5 
SPI 
2 
3 
1 
3 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
5 
5 
4 
1 
3 
4 
2 
1 
4 
5 
6 
3 
SPe 
3 
1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
4 
2 
2 
1 
2 
1 
3 
2 
2 
1 
0 
2 
5 
2 
%SPI 
40% 
75% 
100% 
75% 
33% 
50% 
20% 
20% 
33% 
71% 
83% 
67% 
50% 
50% 
67% 
50% 
50% 
100% 
71% 
55% 
60% 
Case Three 
Ideas 
5 
5 
3 
2 
4 
5 
5 
3 
3 
6 
6 
5 
4 
7 
4 
5 
1 
2 
5 
8 
5 
SPI 
3 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
3 
0 
3 
3 
2 
3 
2 
1 
2 
2 
7 
1 
SPe 
2 
3 
2 
0 
2 
3 
4 
2 
1 
3 
6 
2 
1 
5 
1 
3 
0 
0 
3 
1 
4 
%SPI 
60% 
40% 
33% 
100% 
50% 
40% 
20% 
33% 
67% 
50% 
0% 
60% 
75% 
29% 
75% 
40% 
100% 
100% 
40% 
88% 
20% 
Total 103 75 28 73% 102 59 43 5 8 % 93 45 48 4 8 % 
Mean 4.9 3.6 13 7 2 % 4.9 2.8 2.0 5 8 % 4.4 2.1 23 5 3 % 
Table D-2 Generation of Solutions by Untrained Engineering Students Individually 
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D.2.2 Generation of Solutions by Trained Engineering Students 
Individually 
Subject 
UA 
UB 
UC 
12A 
12B 
12C 
13A 
13B 
13C 
14A 
14B 
14C 
15A 
15B 
15C 
16A 
16B 
16C 
17A 
17B 
17C 
Case One 
Ideas 
11 
2 
7 
12 
12 
13 
7 
9 
9 
8 
12 
8 
15 
7 
8 
8 
9 
7 
12 
9 
5 
SPI 
9 
0 
2 
10 
8 
12 
5 
6 
3 
6 
7 
4 
12 
4 
4 
7 
4 
3 
9 
8 
5 
SPe 
2 
2 
5 
2 
4 
1 
2 
3 
6 
2 
5 
4 
3 
3 
4 
1 
5 
4 
3 
1 
0 
%SP1 
82% 
0% 
29% 
83% 
67% 
92% 
71% 
67% 
33% 
75% 
58% 
50% 
80% 
57% 
50% 
88% 
44% 
43% 
75% 
89% 
100% 
Case Two 
Ideas 
15 
6 
9 
14 
13 
17 
9 
15 
7 
12 
13 
10 
5 
13 
10 
13 
15 
15 
16 
17 
6 
SPI 
11 
4 
7 
13 
10 
10 
6 
10 
5 
7 
11 
5 
3 
10 
6 
10 
10 
8 
5 
13 
4 
SPe 
4 
2 
2 
1 
3 
7 
3 
5 
2 
5 
2 
5 
2 
3 
4 
3 
5 
7 
11 
4 
2 
%SP1 
73% 
67% 
78% 
93% 
77% 
59% 
67% 
67% 
71% 
58% 
85% 
50% 
60% 
77% 
60% 
77% 
67% 
53% 
31% 
76% 
67% 
Case Three 
Ideas 
14 
9 
4 
13 
14 
16 
8 
13 
6 
15 
12 
10 
0 
11 
10 
13 
13 
19 
17 
13 
7 
SPI 
10 
5 
4 
12 
5 
11 
4 
10 
3 
8 
7 
7 
0 
6 
5 
8 
9 
9 
7 
4 
1 
SPe 
4 
4 
0 
1 
9 
5 
4 
3 
3 
7 
5 
3 
0 
5 
5 
5 
4 
10 
10 
9 
6 
%SP1 
71% 
56% 
100% 
92% 
36% 
69% 
50% 
77% 
50% 
53% 
58% 
70% 
55% 
50% 
62% 
69% 
47% 
41% 
31% 
14% 
Total 190 128 62 6 7 % 250 168 82 6 7 % 237 135 102 5 7 % 
Mean 9.0 6.1 3.0 6 3 % 11.9 8.0 3.9 6 7 % 
Table D-3 Generation of Solutions by Trained Engineering Students Individually 
11.3 6.4 4.9 5 8 % 
397 
D.2.3 Generation of Solutions by Untrained Engineering Students in 
Teams 
Team 
1A,B,C 
2A,B,C 
3A,B,C 
4A,B,C 
5A3,C 
6A,B,C 
7A,B,C 
Case Four 
Ideas 
8 
7 
4 
7 
4 
11 
10 
SPI 
3 
4 
3 
3 
2 
8 
4 
SPe 
5 
3 
1 
4 
2 
3 
6 
%SPI 
38% 
57% 
75% 
43% 
50% 
73% 
40% 
Case Five 
Ideas 
7 
9 
4 
7 
6 
11 
11 
SPI 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
5 
4 
SPe 
5 
7 
2 
4 
4 
6 
7 
%SPI 
29% 
22% 
50% 
43% 
33% 
45% 
36% 
Case Six 
Ideas 
11 
4 
5 
7 
5 
10 
11 
SPI 
6 
3 
2 
4 
3 
6 
5 
SPe 
5 
1 
3 
3 
2 
4 
6 
%SPI 
55% 
75% 
40% 
57% 
60% 
60% 
45% 
Total 51 27 24 5 3 % 55 20 35 3 6 % 53 29 24 5 5 % 
Mean 7.3 3.9 3.4 5 4 % 7.9 2.9 5.0 3 7 % 7.6 4.1 3.4 5 6 % 
Table D-4 Generation of Solutions by Untrained Engineering Students in Teams 
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D.2.4 Generation of Solutions by Trained (Creative Thinking) 
Engineering Students in Teams 
Case Four Case Five Case Six 
Team 
UA,B,C 
12A,B,C 
13A,B,C 
14A,B,C 
15A,B,C 
16A3,C 
17A,B,C 
Ideas 
14 
22 
12 
11 
16 
14 
19 
SPI 
7 
15 
6 
7 
11 
9 
10 
SPe 
7 
7 
6 
4 
5 
5 
9 
%SPI 
50% 
68% 
50% 
64% 
69% 
64% 
53% 
Ideas 
11 
19 
17 
17 
18 
18 
21 
SPI 
4 
14 
9 
9 
6 
11 
7 
SPe 
7 
5 
8 
8 
12 
7 
14 
%SPI 
36% 
74% 
53% 
53% 
33% 
61% 
33% 
Ideas 
11 
22 
12 
26 
24 
14 
25 
SPI 
7 
16 
8 
18 
13 
7 
18 
SPe 
4 
6 
4 
8 
11 
7 
7 
%SP1 
64% 
73% 
67% 
69% 
54% 
50% 
72% 
Total 108 65 43 6 0 % 121 60 61 5 0 % 134 87 47 65% 
Mean 15.4 9.3 6.1 60% 17.3 8.6 8.7 49% 19.1 12.4 6.7 64% 
Table D-5 Generation of Solutions by Trained (Creative Thinking) Engineering Students in Teams 
D.3 Engineering Students: Prioritizing Solutions 
D.3.1 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Seven by Untrained 
Engineering Students Individually 
Standard Rank 1 6 3 4 2 5 'r' 
Subject 
1A 6 5 
IB 2 5 
1C 6 3 
2A 6 3 
2B 5 2 
2C 5 3 
3A 6 4 
3B 2 4 
3C 5 2 
4A 5 3 
4B 6 2 
4C 6 4 
5A 1 6 
SB 5 2 
5C 5 4 
6A 6 3 
6B 4 2 
6C 4
 5 
7A 6 2 
7B
 5 4 
7C
 6 4 
3 
3 
2 
4 
1 
2 
2 
5 
3 
2 
4 
2 
4 
3 
2 
2 
3 
2 
3 
3 
2 
1 
6 
5 
5 
6 
6 
5 
3 
6 
6 
5 
5 
3 
6 
6 
5 
5 
6 
5 
6 
5 
4 
4 
4 
2 
4 
4 
3 
6 
4 
1 
3 
3 
5 
4 
3 
4 
6 
3 
4 
2 
3 
0.14 
0.31 
-0.49 
-0.60 
-0.66 
-0.43 
-0.43 
0.66 
-0.54 
-0.77 
-0.66 
-0.43 
0.94 
-0.54 
-0.37 
-0.49 
-0.14 
-0.09 
-0.60 
-0.43 
-0.43 
-0.29 
Engineering Students Individually 
Mean 
Table D-6 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Seven by Untrained 
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D.3.2 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eight by Untrained 
Engineering Students Individually 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
1A 
IB 
1C 
2A 
2B 
2C 
3A 
3B 
3C 
4A 
4B 
4C 
5A 
SB 
5C 
6A 
6B 
6C 
7A 
7B 
7C 
5 
3 
3 
4 
2 
2 
2 
3 
4 
2 
4 
2 
2 
5 
1 
1 
3 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
4 
6 
6 
6 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
3 
5 
6 
3 
2 
5 
6 
3 
5 
6 
2 
1 
5 
1 
2 
6 
6 
6 
5 
6 
6 
2 
6 
6 
1 
6 
5 
6 
4 
6 
2 
5 
6 
2 
1 
2 
2 
4 
4 
5 
3 
2 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
6 
2 
4 
3 
5 
4 
3 
5 
6 
4 
2 
2 
6 
3 
4 
6 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
3 
1 
3 
3 
6 
4 
3 
4 
2 
3 
2 
3 
5 
4 
4 
3 
V 
0.14 
0.54 
0.43 
-037 
-037 
-037 
-0.54 
-0.09 
-031 
0.89 
-0.26 
-031 
0.77 
-0.89 
-0.66 
-037 
031 
0.14 
0.43 
0.03 
-0.83 
Mean -0.08 
Table D-7 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eight by Untrained Engineering Students Individually 
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D.3.3 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Nine by Untrained 
Engineering Students Individually 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
1A 
IB 
1C 
2A 
2B 
2C 
3A 
6 2 3 1 5 
6 2 4 1 3 
5 2 4 1 3 
3 4 2 5 1 
5 1 2 6 4 
4 5 3 1 2 
3 2 1 4 6 
3B 5 1 2 6 3 
3C 4 2 1 3 5 
4A 6 4 3 1 2 
4B 4 1 3 6 2 
4C 6 3 4 1 2 
5A 6 3 4 1 2 
5B 1 2 3 6 4 
5C 3 4 2 6 1 
6A 4 3 2 6 1 
6B 6 2 1 5 3 
6C 5 2 3 6 1 
7A 5 4 2 1 3 
7B 6 2 4 1 3 
7C 5 3 2 6 1 
Mean 0.34 
Table D-8 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Nine by Untrained Engineering Students Individually 
4 
5 
6 
6 
3 
6 
3 
4 
6 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
4 
4 
6 
5 
4 
0.66 
0.94 
0.89 
0.09 
-0.20 
0.71 
-0.47 
-0.03 
0.20 
0.94 
0.03 
1.00 
1.00 
-0.60 
-0.14 
0.03 
0.20 
0.14 
0.77 
0.94 
0.09 
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D.3.4 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Seven by Trained (Creative 
Thinking) Engineering Students Individually 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
UA 
UB 
UC 
12A 
12B 
12C 
13A 
13B 
13C 
14A 
14B 
14C 
15A 
15B 
15C 
16A 
16B 
16C 
17A 
17B 
17C 
1 
1 
3 
2 
1 
4 
3 
3 
6 
1 
3 
6 
5 
6 
3 
6 
6 
6 
1 
6 
3 
6 
6 
5 
5 
4 
5 
2 
4 
5 
3 
3 
5 
2 
4 
4 
1 
2 
4 
3 
6 
3 
6 
4 
3 
3 
1 
6 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
3 
1 
1 
2 
4 
2 
1 
4 
2 
6 
3 
6 
5 
5 
6 
4 
4 
4 
5 
3 
3 
5 . 
1 
2 
2 
3 
1 
4 
2 
2 
4 
2 
1 
3 
6 
1 
1 
5 
6 
1 
3 
6 
5 
4 
5 
3 
5 
5 
5 
1 
3 
5 
6 
4 
5 
4 
3 
6 
4 
2 
5 
6 
4 
2 
2 
6 
4 
5 
4 
4 
2 
5 
5 
V 
0.71 
0.60 
0.54 
0.77 
-0.43 
0.66 
0.66 
-0.60 
0.26 
0.77 
-037 
-0.43 
-0.49 
-0.03 
-0.71 
-0.09 
-0.49 
0.66 
-0.77 
0.83 
-0.09 
Table D-9 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Seven by Trained (Creative Thinking) Engineering Students 
Individually 
D.3.5 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eight by Trained (Creative 
Thinking) Engineering Students Individually 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
UA 
UB 
UC 
12A 
12B 
12C 
13A 
13B 
13C 
14A 
14B 
14C 
15A 
15B 
15C 
16A 
16B 
16C 
17A 
17B 
17C 
5 
3 
3 
5 
3 
2 
5 
6 
2 
3 
1 
3 
2 
2 
4 
6 
2 
2 
3 
2 
4 
3 
4 
5 
2 
4 
5 
3 
3 
4 
4 
6 
2 
4 
6 
3 
6 
2 
3 
4 
5 
3 
6 
2 
1 
2 
6 
1 
2 
6 
1 
3 
6 
1 
6 
5 
1 
5 
2 
3 
5 
6 
6 
6 
2 
6 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
4 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
3 
1 
3 
6 
5 
6 
6 
4 
4 
2 
5 
4 
5 
6 
5 
6 
3 
5 
4 
5 
2 
5 
1 
4 
6 
4 
4 
3 
4 
5 
6 
5 
3 
5 
3 
2 
4 
4 
5 
4 
6 
3 
4 
1 
5 
5 
V 
0.43 
-0.20 
0.49 
0.43 
-0.09 
0.94 
0.77 
-0.37 
0.71 
-0.77 
-031 
037 
-0.14 
0.77 
0.49 
0.20 
-0.37 
-0.03 
-0.94 
0.66 
-0.03 
Table D-10 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eight by Trained (Creative Thinking) Engineering Students 
Individually 
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D.3.6 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Nine by Trained (Creative 
Thinking) Engineering Students Individually 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
UA 
UB 
UC 
12A 
12B 
12C 
13A 
13B 
13C 
14A 
14B 
14C 
15A 
15B 
15C 
16A 
16B 
16C 
17A 
17B 
17C 
6 
4 
5 
4 
6 
6 
3 
4 
5 
5 
6 
6 
5 
4 
6 
4 
3 
4 
6 
2 
6 
6 
3 
6 
1 
2 
3 
5 
6 
2 
3 
3 
2 
5 
6 
5 
3 
3 
4 
3 
4 
5 
3 
3 
4 
2 
2 
5 
4 
2 
4 
3 
4 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
4 
5 
2 
2 
3 
3 
4 
4 
1 
3 
6 
6 
2 
1 
3 
1 
2 
3 
2 
5 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
1 
6 
2 
1 
2 
2 
5 
5 
4 
3 
5 
4 
5 
6 
6 
6 
5 
4 
4 
6 
5 
6 
6 
5 
5 
4 
5 
5 
V 
037 
-0.03 
-0.03 
1.00 
0.71 
0.49 
0.54 
0.94 
0.94 
0.83 
0.83 
0.66 
0.71 
0.94 
0.83 
0.09 
031 
0.94 
-0.37 
1.00 
1.00 
Mean 0.61 
Table D-l 1 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Nine by Trained (Creative Thinking) Engineering Students 
Individually 
D.3.7 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Ten by Untrained 
Engineering Students in Teams 
Standard Rank 
Team 
1A,B,C 
2A,B,C 
3A,B,C 
4A,B,C 
5A,B,C 
6A,B,C 
7A,B,C 
Mean 
3 
6 
3 
6 
3 
3 
5 
2 
5 
4 
5 
2 
2 
5 
2 
4 
2 
2 
4 
3 
2 
4 
4 
2 
4 
5 
6 
5 
4 
3 
5 
4 
3 
3 
1 
I 
6 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
V 
0.66 
0.03 
-0.26 
-0.03 
0.03 
-0.37 
-0.09 
0.00 
Table D-12 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Ten by Untrained Engineering Students in Teams 
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D.3.8 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eleven by Untrained 
Engineering Students in Teams 
Standard Rank 
Team 
1A,B,C 
2A,B,C 
3A,B,C 
4A3,C 
5A,B,C 
6A,B,C 
7A,B,C 
Mean 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
1 
5 
5 
5 
5 
3 
5 
4 
5 
4 
4 
2 
3 
4 
4 
3 
3 
2 
2 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
3 
3 
1 
4 
5 
3 
5 
2 
1 
1 
4 
2 
2 
2 
2 
V 
0.43 
0.43 
-0.09 
031 
0.71 
037 
0.49 
038 
Table D-13 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eleven by Untrained Engineering Students in Teams 
D.3.9 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Twelve by Untrained 
Engineering Students in Teams 
Standard Rank 3 4 5 1 6 
Team 
1A,B,C 
2A,B,C 
3A,B,C 
4A,B,C 
5A,B,C 
6A,B,C 
7A,B,C 
3 
6 
4 
4 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
3 
5 
4 
3 
3 
6 
5 
6 
6 
5 
5 
6 
1 5 
1 3 
5 
3 
6 
6 
5 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
0.94 
0.49 
0.89 
0.66 
1.00 
0.94 
0.89 
Mean (183 
Table D-14 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Twelve by Untrained Engineering Students in Teams 
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D.3.10 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Ten by Trained (Creative 
Thinking) Engineering Students in Teams 
Standard Rank 
Team 
UA,B,C 
12A,B,C 
13A3,C 
14A,B,C 
15A,B,C 
16A3.C 
17AJB.C 
Mean 
3 
3 
6 
6 
4 
5 
4 
4 
5 
6 
5 
5 
6 
4 
6 
6 
2 
4 
l 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
4 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
6 
2 
4 
4 
5 
2 
5 
5 
1 
5 
2 
1 
1 
6 
1 
1 
V 
-031 
0.54 
0.60 
0.89 
-037 
0.89 
0.89 
0.44 
Table D-15 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Ten by Trained (Creative Thinking) Engineering Students in 
Teams 
D.3.11 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eleven by Trained (Creative 
Thinking) Engineering Students in Teams 
Standard Rank 
Team 
UA3.C 
12A,B,C 
13A,B,C 
14A,B,C 
15A,B,C 
16A,B,C 
17AJ8.C 
Mean 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
1 
3 
3 
1 
1 
4 
5 
1 
5 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
3 
5 
3 
2 
2 
2 
3 
1 
1 
3 
4 
5 
5 
5 
4 
3 
4 
4 
2 
1 
1 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
•r' 
0.77 
0.77 
0.89 
1.00 
0.60 
031 
1.00 
0.76 
Table D-16 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eleven by Trained (Creative Thinking) Engineering Students in 
Teams 
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D.3.12 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Twelve by Trained (Creative 
Thinking) Engineering Students in Teams 
Standard Rank 3 4 5 1 6 2 
Team 
UA,B,C 
12A,B,C 
13A,B,C 
14A,B,C 
15A,B,C 
16A,B,C 
17A,B,C 
6 
3 
4 
3 
4 
4 
3 
4 
4 
3 
5 
5 
3 
5 
3 
5 
6 
4 
3 
5 
6 
5 
6 
1 5 
6 
6 
6 
1 4 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
0.60 
1.00 
0.89 
0.94 
0.83 
0.94 
0.83 
Mean 0.86 
Table D-17 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Twelve by Trained (Creative Thinking) Engineering Students in 
Teams 
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D.4 Technology Students Generating Solutions 
D.4.1 Generation of Solutions by Untrained (Pretestl) Technology 
Students Individually 
Subject 
1A 
IB 
1C 
2A 
2B 
2C 
3A 
3B 
3C 
4A 
4B 
4C 
4D 
4E 
5A 
5B 
5C 
5D 
Case One 
Ideas 
5 
10 
5 
5 
5 
6 
4 
3 
3 
7 
5 
4 
6 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
SPI 
3 
5 
3 
3 
5 
2 
2 
0 
2 
4 
3 
3 
3 
1 
0 
2 
3 
4 
SPe 
2 
5 
2 
2 
0 
4 
2 
3 
1 
3 
2 
1 
3 
1 
3 
2 
2 
2 
%SPI 
60% 
50% 
60% 
60% 
100% 
33% 
50% 
0% 
67% 
57% 
60% 
75% 
50% 
50% 
0% 
50% 
60% 
67% 
Case Two 
Ideas 
3 
11 
4 
6 
7 
5 
3 
4 
2 
7 
2 
6 
6 
4 
2 
4 
4 
6 
SPI 
3 
6 
2 
4 
4 
2 
0 
1 
1 
4 
1 
2 
3 
2 
0 
1 
2 
1 
SPe 
0 
5 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
1 
3 
1 
4 
3 
2 
2 
3 
2 
5 
%SPI 
100% 
55% 
50% 
67% 
57% 
40% 
0% 
25% 
50% 
57% 
50% 
33% 
50% 
50% 
0% 
25% 
50% 
17% 
Case Three 
Ideas 
4 
12 
5 
6 
5 
5 
4 
3 
5 
6 
5 
5 
5 
4 
3 
5 
4 
6 
SPI 
2 
6 
2 
4 
3 
1 
0 
0 
2 
3 
1 
3 
2 
2 
0 
1 
1 
1 
SPe 
2 
6 
3 
2 
2 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
4 
2 
3 
2 
3 
4 
3 
5 
%SPI 
50% 
50% 
40% 
67% 
60% 
20% 
0% 
0% 
40% 
50% 
20% 
60% 
40% 
50% 
0% 
20% 
25% 
17% 
Total 88 48 40 5 5 % 86 39 47 4 5 % 92 34 58 3 7 % 
Mean 4.89 2.67 2.22 5 3 % 4.78 2.17 2.61 4 3 % 
Table D-18 Generation of Solutions by Untrained (Pretestl) Technology Students Individually 
5.11 1.89 3.22 3 4 % 
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D.4.2 Generation of Solutions by Untrained (Pretest2) Technology 
Students Individually 
Subject 
1A 
IB 
1C 
2A 
2B 
2C 
3A 
3B 
3C 
4A 
4B 
4C 
4D 
4E 
5A 
5B 
5C 
5D 
Case One 
Ideas 
7 
12 
6 
7 
8 
7 
4 
4 
5 
8 
6 
4 
5 
8 
10 
SPI 
3 
7 
4 
4 
5 
2 
1 
1 
2 
3 
3 
1 
0 
5 
3 
SPe 
4 
5 
2 
3 
3 
5 
3 
3 
3 
5 
3 
3 
5 
3 
7 
%SPI 
43% 
58% 
67% 
57% 
63% 
29% 
25% 
25% 
40% 
38% 
50% 
25% 
0% 
63% 
30% 
Case Two 
Ideas 
6 
10 
4 
6 
7 
5 
2 
4 
5 
6 
9 
3 
3 
7 
7 
SPI 
4 
7 
2 
3 
6 
2 
0 
1 
2 
5 
5 
0 
1 
4 
1 
SPe 
2 
3 
2 
3 
1 
3 
2 
3 
3 
1 
4 
3 
2 
3 
6 
%SPI 
67% 
70% 
50% 
50% 
86% 
40% 
0% 
25% 
40% 
83% 
56% 
0% 
33% 
57% 
14% 
Case Three 
Ideas 
5 
8 
5 
4 
4 
7 
4 
3 
6 
7 
7 
4 
4 
7 
10 
SPI 
1 
5 
3 
3 
2 
1 
0 
1 
3 
2 
5 
1 
1 
2 
1 
SPe 
4 
3 
2 
1 
2 
6 
4 
2 
3 
5 
2 
3 
3 
5 
9 
%SPI 
20% 
63% 
60% 
75% 
50% 
14% 
0% 
33% 
50% 
29% 
71% 
25% 
25% 
29% 
10% 
Total 101 44 57 4 4 % 84 43 41 5 1 % 85 31 54 3 6 % 
Mean 6.7 2.9 3.8 41% 5.6 2.9 2.7 45% 5.7 2.1 3.6 37% 
Table D-19 Generation of Solutions by Untrained (Pretest2) Technology Students Individually 
D.4.3 Generation of Solutions by Trained (Creative Thinking) 
Technology Students Individually 
Subject 
1A 
IB 
1C 
2A 
2B 
2C 
3A 
3B 
3C 
4A 
4B 
4C 
4D 
4E 
5A 
5B 
5C 
5D 
Case One 
Ideas 
5 
16 
11 
5 
17 
7 
9 
14 
15 
11 
12 
17 
16 
SPI 
1 
9 
8 
3 
10 
5 
5 
11 
10 
8 
8 
10 
6 
SPe 
4 
7 
3 
2 
7 
2 
4 
3 
5 
3 
4 
7 
10 
%SP1 
20% 
56% 
73% 
60% 
59% 
71% 
56% 
79% 
67% 
73% 
67% 
59% 
38% 
Case Two 
Ideas 
3 
18 
10 
7 
22 
7 
8 
11 
15 
11 
12 
15 
13 
SPI 
2 
12 
7 
5 
13 
3 
5 
9 
10 
5 
10 
8 
5 
SPe 
1 
6 
3 
2 
9 
4 
3 
2 
5 
6 
2 
7 
8 
%SPI 
67% 
67% 
70% 
71% 
59% 
43% 
63% 
82% 
67% 
45% 
83% 
53% 
38% 
Case Three 
Ideas 
4 
17 
8 
5 
15 
6 
8 
15 
16 
16 
12 
17 
13 
SPI 
1 
10 
4 
4 
10 
2 
3 
9 
2 
7 
7 
9 
4 
SPe 
3 
7 
4 
1 
5 
4 
5 
6 
14 
9 
5 
8 
9 
%SPI 
25% 
59% 
50% 
80% 
67% 
33% 
38% 
60% 
13% 
44% 
58% 
53% 
31% 
Total 155 94 61 6 1 % 152 94 58 6 2 % 152 72 80 4 7 % 
Mean 11.9 7.2 4.7 6 0 % 11.7 7.2 4.5 6 2 % 11.7 5.5 6.2 4 7 % 
Table D-20 Generation of Solutions by Trained (Creative Thinking) Technology Students Individually 
414 
D.4.4 Generation of Solutions by Trained (Creative Thinking) 
Technology Students Individually: Tested 3-Months Later 
Case Two 
Subject Ideas SPI SPe %SPI 
1A 
IB 16 9 7 56% 
13 
14 
19 
14 
6 
10 
16 
10 
7 
4 
3 
4 
46% 
71% 
84% 
71% 
1C 7 5 2 71% 
2A 
2B 20 15 5 75% 
2C 
3A 6 3 3 50% 
3B 
3C 
4A 
4B 
4C 
4D 
4E 
5A 
5B 
5C 
5D 
6A 
Total 170 109 61 64% 
13.1 8.4 4J 61%_ 
18 
4 
18 
13 
8 
12 
1 
11 
5 
6 
6 
3 
7 
8 
2 
67% 
25% 
61% 
38% 
75% 
Mean 
Table D-21 Generation of Solutions by Trained (Creative Thinking) Technology Students Individually: Tested 
3-Months Later 
D.4.5 Generation of Solutions by Untrained (Pretestl) Technology 
Students in Teams 
Team 
1A,B,C 
2A,B,C 
3A,B,C 
4A,B,C 
5A,B,CJ) 
Case Four 
Ideas 
11 
10 
5 
9 
6 
SPI 
5 
6 
1 
5 
0 
SPe 
6 
4 
4 
4 
6 
%SP1 
45% 
60% 
20% 
56% 
0% 
Case Five 
Ideas 
5 
10 
4 
13 
6 
SPI 
3 
3 
0 
5 
1 
SPe 
2 
7 
4 
8 
5 
%SPI 
60% 
30% 
0% 
38% 
17% 
Case Six 
Ideas 
7 
8 
4 
13 
5 
SPI 
5 
4 
1 
6 
3 
SPe 
2 
4 
3 
7 
2 
%SP1 
71% 
50% 
25% 
46% 
60% 
Total 41 17 24 4 1 % 38 12 26 3 2 % 37 19 18 5 1 % 
Mean 8.2 3.4 4.8 3 6 % 7.6 2.4 5.2 29% 7.4 3.8 3.6 5 0 % 
Table D-22 Generation of Solutions by Untrained (Pretestl) Technology Students in Teams 
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D.4.6 Generation of Solutions by Untrained (Pretest2) Technology 
Students in Teams 
Team 
1A3,C 
2A,B,C 
3A,B,C 
4B,C,D,E 
5A3,CJ) 
Case Four 
Ideas 
13 
10 
5 
9 
9 
SPI 
6 
6 
2 
5 
3 
SPe 
7 
4 
3 
4 
6 
%SP1 
46% 
60% 
40% 
56% 
33% 
Case Five 
Ideas 
9 
11 
4 
10 
8 
SPI 
6 
4 
0 
3 
3 
SPe 
3 
7 
4 
7 
5 
%SP1 
67% 
36% 
0% 
30% 
38% 
Case Six 
Ideas 
10 
10 
5 
8 
9 
SPI 
5 
4 
1 
5 
4 
SPe 
5 
6 
4 
3 
5 
%SP1 
50% 
40% 
20% 
63% 
44% 
Total 46 22 24 4 8 % 42 16 26 3 8 % 42 19 23 45% 
Mean 9.2 4.4 4.8 4 7 % 8.4 3.2 5.2 3 4 % 8.4 3.8 4.6 43% 
Table D-23 Generation of Solutions by Untrained (Pretest2) Technology Students in Teams 
D.4.7 Generation of Solutions by Trained (Creative Thinking) 
Technology Students in Teams 
Case Four Case Five Case Six 
Team 
1A,B 
2A,B 
1C3A,C 
4A,B,C 
5A,C,D 
Ideas 
22 
23 
15 
16 
16 
SPI 
12 
13 
9 
11 
9 
SPe 
10 
10 
6 
5 
7 
%SP1 
55% 
57% 
60% 
69% 
56% 
Ideas 
21 
21 
15 
15 
15 
SPI 
12 
7 
5 
8 
9 
SPe 
9 
14 
10 
7 
6 
%SP1 
57% 
33% 
33% 
53% 
60% 
Ideas 
18 
22 
14 
16 
14 
SPI 
11 
12 
8 
9 
9 
SPe 
7 
10 
6 
7 
5 
%SP1 
61% 
55% 
57% 
56% 
64% 
Total 92 54 38 5 9 % 87 41 46 4 7 % 84 49 35 5 8 % 
Mean 18.4 10.8 7.6 59% 17.4 8.2 9.2 47% 16.8 9.8 7.0 59% 
Table D-24 Generation of Solutions by Trained (Creative Thinking) Technology Students in Teams _ 
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D.4.8 Generation of Solutions by Trained (Creative Thinking) 
Technology Students in Teams: Tested 3-Months Later 
Case Six 
Team Ideas SPJ SPe %SP1 
4A,B,C 
3A,C,6A 
1B,C,2B 
5B,C 
5A,D 
Total 111 70 41 63% 
Mean 22.2 14.0 8.2 62% 
25 
22 
29 
15 
20 
17 
15 
19 
8 
11 
8 
7 
10 
7 
9 
68% 
68% 
66% 
53% 
55% 
Table D-25 Generation of Solutions by Trained (Creative Thinking) Technology Students in Teams: Tested 3-
Months Later 
D.5 Technology Students Prioritizing Solutions 
D.5.1 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Seven by Untrained 
(Pretestl) Technology Students Individually 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
1A 
IB 
IC 
2A 
2B 
2C 
3A 
3B 
3C 
4A 
4B 
4C 
4D 
4E 
5A 
5B 
5C 
5D 
1 
6 
1 
6 
4 
4 
5 
5 
6 
5 
6 
6 
2 
6 
5 
2 
6 
5 
6 
6 
4 
6 
2 
2 
3 
4 
3 
4 
2 
2 
5 
6 
4 
4 
4 
1 
2 
4 
3 
2 
2 
1 
5 
2 
3 
1 
4 
4 
3 
4 
1 
6 
3 
1 
2 
2 
6 
3 
3 
3 
2 
5 
3 
2 
5 
3 
3 
1 
2 
5 
3 
5 
6 
6 
6 
4 
5 
6 
5 
4 
3 
5 
6 
3 
5 
6 
5 
5 
3 
4 
4 
3 
5 
3 
2 
1 
4 
4 
3 
4 
2 
1 
6 
2 
1 
2 
V 
-0.49 
0.83 
-0.60 
-0.66 
-0.20 
-0.37 
-0.31 
-0.60 
-0.54 
-0.60 
-0.20 
0.77 
-0.49 
-0.60 
0.66 
-1.00 
-0.89 
-0.60 
Table D-26 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Seven by Untrained (Pretestl) Technology Students Individually 
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D.5.2 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eight by Untrained (Pretestl) 
Technology Students Individually 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
1A 
IB 
IC 
2A 
2B 
2C 
3A 
3B 
3C 
4A 
4B 
4C 
4D 
4E 
5A 
5B 
5C 
5D 
5 
1 
4 
3 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
4 
3 
6 
1 
6 
2 
2 
2 
4 
5 
6 
4 
2 
4 
3 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
3 
3 
5 
4 
3 
1 
1 
4 
1 
6 
6 
5 
6 
5 
6 
6 
5 
6 
2 
5 
6 
4 
6 
6 
5 
2 
2 
3 
1 
4 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
1 
3 
5 
4 
3 
6 
2 
5 
5 
6 
5 
6 
5 
5 
4 
4 
6 
4 
5 
2 
5 
4 
6 
6 
3 
5 
2 
3 
2 
2 
3 
2 
1 
6 
2 
5 
2 
2 
3 
1 
1 
3 
V 
-0.26 
0.77 
-0.43 
-0.77 
-0.66 
-0.89 
-0.60 
-0.89 
-0.94 
0.20 
-0.37 
0.54 
-0.03 
-0.89 
0.37 
-0.83 
-1.00 
-0.60 
Table D-27 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eight by Untrained (Pretestl) Technology Students Individually 
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D.5.3 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Nine by Untrained (Pretestl) 
Technology Students Individually 
Standard Rank 6 3 4 1 2 5 V 
Subject _ ^ _ ^ _ _ _ _ ^ _ _ _ 
1A 6 4 1 2 3 
IB 6 3 4 1 2 
IC 3 2 4 6 1 
2A 1 3 2 6 5 
2B 5 2 3 6 1 
2C 5 2 1 6 4 
3A 1 5 3 6 2 
3B 3 2 1 5 6 
3C 1 3 4 6 2 
4A 4 3 2 6 1 
4B 4 5 1 6 2 
4C 2 3 4 1 5 
4D 6 3 2 5 4 
4E 2 4 5 3 1 
5A 6 1 4 3 2 
SB 3 4 1 6 5 
5C 5 2 6 4 1 
5D 2 5 1 6 4 
5 
5 
5 
4 
4 
3 
4 
4 
5 
5 
3 
6 
1 
6 
5 
2 
5 
3 
0.66 
1.00 
-0.03 
-0.83 
0.14 
-0.26 
-0.60 
-0.49 
-0.43 
0.03 
-0.31 
0.26 
-0.14 
0.31 
0.77 
-0.77 
0.58 
-0.77 
Mean 
-0.05 
Table D-28 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Nine by Untrained (Pretestl) Technology Students Individually 
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D.5.4 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Seven by Untrained 
(Pretest2) Technology Students Individually 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
1A 
IB 
IC 
2A 
2B 
2C 
3A 
3B 
3C 
4A 
4B 
4C 
4D 
4E 
5A 
5B 
5C 
5D 
1 
3 
1 
5 
4 
4 
2 
4 
6 
5 
6 
2 
1 
6 
6 
6 
6 
2 
5 
1 
5 
2 
5 
5 
3 
3 
1 
6 
4 
2 
2 
4 
3 
4 
3 
3 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
4 
1 
2 
4 
1 
1 
4 
6 
6 
4 
2 
3 
3 
3 
2 
1 
2 
4 
5 
1 
4 
2 
2 
1 
2 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
5 
6 
3 
5 
3 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
4 
2 
1 
5 
4 
2 
4 
4 
5 
3 
6 
3 
3 
3 
V 
0.26 
0.83 
-0.89 
-0.31 
-0.31 
0.31 
-0.14 
-0.49 
-0.49 
-0.60 
0.49 
0.77 
-0.83 
-0.66 
-0.43 
Mean -0.17 
Table D-29 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Seven by Untrained (Pretest2) Technology Students Individually 
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D.5.5 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eight by Untrained (Pretest2) 
Technology Students Individually 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
1A 
IB 
IC 
2A 
2B 
2C 
3A 
3B 
3C 
4A 
4B 
4C 
4D 
4E 
5A 
5B 
5C 
5D 
5 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
3 
4 
1 
1 
1 
3 
6 
1 
2 
1 
4 
5 
6 
2 
4 
4 
2 
1 
3 
3 
3 
5 
4 
4 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
6 
1 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
2 
1 
5 
6 
6 
2 
2 
3 
3 
2 
1 
1 
3 
2 
4 
2 
1 
2 
2 
4 
4 
3 
3 
2 
5 
6 
6 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
6 
3 
6 
5 
5 
6 
4 
4 
1 
5 
3 
4 
2 
4 
2 
4 
4 
5 
3 
3 
3 
V 
0.83 
0.71 
-0.71 
0.60 
-0.26 
-0.20 
-0.60 
-0.43 
-0.89 
-0.43 
0.43 
0.94 
-0.43 
-0.71 
-0.77 
Table D-30 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eight by Untrained (Pretest2) Technology Students Individually 
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D.5.6 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Nine by Untrained (Pretest2) 
Technology Students Individually 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
1A 
IB 
IC 
2A 
2B 
2C 
3A 
3B 
3C 
4A 
4B 
4C 
4D 
4E 
5A 
5B 
5C 
5D 
6 
6 
6 
1 
1 
5 
5 
2 
3 
5 
6 
5 
4 
5 
4 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
2 
3 
2 
5 
1 
1 
5 
3 
3 
3 
3 
5 
4 
5 
4 
2 
3 
1 
1 
3 
2 
2 
3 
2 
5 
2 
5 
1 
1 
1 
1 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
5 
6 
2 
1 
2 
6 
2 
4 
2 
2 
2 
5 
5 
2 
3 
1 
4 
4 
1 
6 
1 
1 
1 
6 
5 
4 
5 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
6 
3 
4 
4 
6 
4 
6 
2 
V 
0.94 
1.00 
-0.94 
-0.77 
-0.03 
-0.09 
-0.37 
-0.09 
-0.20 
0.77 
0.37 
0.77 
0.09 
0.77 
-0.60 
D.5.7 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Seven by Trained (Creative 
Thinking) Technology Students Individually 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
IA 
IB 
IC 
2A 
2B 
2C 
3A 
3B 
3C 
4A 
4B 
4C 
4D 
4E 
5A 
SB 
5C 
5D 
1 
4 
1 
6 
4 
6 
6 
6 
5 
6 
5 
2 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
2 
3 
3 
2 
3 
6 
3 
3 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
2 
4 
5 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
3 
5 
4 
4 
1 
5 
1 
6 
2 
4 
2 
2 
2 
1 
5 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
5 
2 
5 
5 
5 
4 
4 
6 
1 
3 
5 
5 
5 
4 
3 
1 
4 
3 
4 
3 
5 
4 
6 
2 
2 
•r' 
0.49 
0.89 
-0.83 
-0.20 
-0.49 
-0.66 
-0.49 
0.09 
-0.31 
-0.49 
0.77 
-0.49 
-0.77 
Table D-32 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Seven by Trained (Creative Thinking) Technology Students 
Individually 
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D.5.8 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eight by Trained (Creative 
Thinking) Technology Students Individually 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
IA 
IB 
IC 
2A 
2B 
2C 
3A 
3B 
3C 
4A 
4B 
4C 
4D 
4E 
5A 
5B 
5C 
5D 
5 
5 
5 
2 
2 
4 
3 
1 
3 
1 
2 
5 
3 
2 
4 
4 
6 
3 
4 
3 
1 
3 
6 
3 
4 
4 
1 
1 
1 
6 
1 
5 
1 
6 
6 
5 
5 
6 
5 
1 
4 
5 
2 
1 
2 
4 
6 
1 
2 
4 
I 
2 
1 
3 
6 
4 
3 
2 
3 
6 
3 
5 
4 
6 
4 
5 
6 
2 
5 
6 
6 
3 
4 
1 
5 
2 
5 
2 
2 
4 
3 
6 
2 
3 
V 
-0.03 
0.77 
-0.83 
0.26 
-0.37 
-0.14 
-0.77 
-0.20 
-0.43 
-0.26 
0.94 
-0.66 
-0.60 
Mean -0.18 
Table D-33 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eight by Trained (Creative Thinking) Technology Students 
Individually 
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D.5.9 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Nine by Trained (Creative 
Thinking) Technology Students Individually 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
IA 
IB 
IC 
2A 
2B 
2C 
3A 
3B 
3C 
4A 
4B 
4C 
4D 
4E 
5A 
5B 
5C 
5D 
6 
6 
6 
5 
1 
5 
2 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
3 
2 
3 
2 
3 
1 
2 
2 
6 
3 
4 
3 
3 
3 
6 
4 
4 
3 
5 
2 
4 
3 
3 
1 
2 
4 
1 
4 
1 
1 
1 
4 
1 
6 
6 
6 
4 
6 
5 
1 
5 
1 
4 
6 
2 
1 
2 
4 
5 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
4 
2 
2 
5 
5 
5 
4 
3 
3 
4 
5 
4 
3 
5 
2 
5 
5 
3 
V 
0.66 
0.94 
-0.20 
-0.83 
0.14 
-0.03 
-0.03 
0.26 
1.00 
-0.09 
1.00 
-0.03 
-0.83 
Table D-34 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Nine by Trained (Creative Thinking) Technology Students 
Individually 
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D.5.10 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Seven by Trained (Creative 
Thinking) Technology Students Individually: Tested Three Months 
Later 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
IA 
IB 
IC 
2A 
2B 
2C 
3A 
3B 
3C 
4A 
4B 
4C 
4D 
4E 
5A 
5B 
5C 
5D 
6A 
1 
1 
6 
4 
6 
6 
6 
6 
4 
2 
1 
6 
6 
4 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
3 
2 
4 
3 
4 
6 
3 
3 
6 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
4 
1 
1 
1 
3 
4 
1 
4 
3 
4 
6 
2 
2 
4 
1 
5 
3 
2 
5 
5 
4 
1 
5 
2 
3 
5 
5 
3 
5 
3 
2 
6 
1 
3 
2 
5 
1 
5 
4 
3 
6 
5 
2 
4 
5 
5 
6 
2 
5 
2 
2 
V 
0.77 
-0.43 
-0.03 
-0.31 
-0.77 
-0.37 
0.03 
-0.20 
0.77 
0.66 
-0.09 
-0.77 
0.43 
Table D-35 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Seven by Trained (Creative Thinking) Technology Students 
Individually: Tested Three Months Later 
D.5.11 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Ten by Untrained (Pretestl) 
Technology Students in Teams 
Standard Rank 
Team 
1A,B,C 
2A,B,C 
3A,B,C 
4A,B,C 
5A,B,CJ> 
Mean 
3 
4 
6 
5 
3 
6 
5 
3 
2 
3 
5 
4 
2 
2 
3 
1 
1 
2 
4 
6 
4 
2 
2 
3 
6 
5 
1 
4 
4 
1 
1 
1 
3 
6 
6 
5 
V 
0.71 
-0.47 
-0.20 
0.03 
-0.49 
-0.08 
Table D-36 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Ten by Untrained (Pretestl) Technology Students in Teams 
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D.5.12 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eleven by Untrained 
(Pretestl) Technology Students in Teams 
Standard Rank 
Team 
1A,B,C 
2A,B,C 
3A,B,C 
4A,B,C 
5A,B,C,D 
Mean 
6 
5 
6 
5 
5 
4 
1 
4 
4 
6 
4 
5 
5 
6 
1 
4 
3 
2 
3 
1 
2 
1 
2 
3 
4 
2 
3 
3 
6 
1 
2 
3 
5 
2 
1 
6 
V 
0.43 
-0.03 
0.09 
0.43 
-0.54 
0.08 
Table D-37 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eleven by Untrained (Pretestl) Technology Students in Teams 
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D.5.13 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Twelve by Untrained 
(Pretestl) Technology Students in Teams 
Standard Rank 
Team 
1AJB,C 
2A,B,C 
3A,B,C 
4A,B,C 
5A3,CJD 
Mean 
3 
4 
6 
5 
5 
3 
4 
3 
4 
2 
4 
2 
5 
5 
5 
6 
6 
4 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
6 
6 
6 
1 
4 
3 
1 
2 
2 
3 
3 
2 
5 
'r' 
0.94 
-0.03 
0.60 
0.60 
-0.83 
0.26 
Table D-38 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Twelve by Untrained (Pretestl) Technology Students in Teams 
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D.5.14 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Ten by Untrained (Pretest2) 
Technology Students in Teams 
Standard Rank 
Team 
1A.B.C 
2A,B,C 
3A,B,C 
4B,CJD,E 
5A,B,C4) 
Mean 
3 
3 
5 
5 
4 
6 
5 
5 
l 
l 
6 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
1 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
2 
1 
6 
6 
2 
3 
3 
3 
1 
1 
6 
6 
5 
5 
V 
1.00 
-0.77 
-0.54 
0.09 
-0.60 
-0.16 
Table D-39 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Ten by Untrained (Pretest2) Technology Students in Teams 
D.5.15 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eleven by Untrained 
(Pretest2) Technology Students in Teams 
Standard Rank 
Team 
1A,B,C 
2A,B,C 
3A,B,C 
4A,B,C4),E 
5A,B,CJ) 
Mean 
6 
3 
6 
6 
6 
5 
1 
5 
5 
5 
4 
6 
5 
6 
3 
3 
2 
1 
3 
2 
2 
2 
1 
4 
4 
4 
1 
4 
5 
3 
2 
1 
4 
1 
3 
2 
V 
0.20 
0.03 
0.37 
0.31 
-0.26 
0.13 
Table D-40 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eleven by Untrained (Pretest2) Technology Students in Teams 
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D.5.16 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Twelve by Untrained 
(Pretest2) Technology Students in Teams 
Standard Rank 
Team 
1A3,C 
2A,B,C 
3A,B,C 
4A,B,C4>,E 
5A,B,C,D 
Mean 
3 
3 
6 
4 
5 
l 
4 
4 
2 
1 
3 
2 
5 
6 
5 
6 
4 
3 
1 
1 
3 
2 
1 
6 
6 
5 
1 
5 
6 
4 
2 
2 
4 
3 
2 
5 
V 
0.94 
-0.31 
0.60 
0.83 
-0.43 
033 
Table D-41 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Twelve by Untrained (Pretest2) Technology Students in Teams 
D.5.17 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Ten by Trained (Creative 
Thinking) Technology Students in Teams 
Standard Rank 
Team 
1A,B 
2A3 
1C3A,C 
4A,B,C 
5A,CJ) 
Mean 
3 
3 
4 
4 
5 
6 
5 
6 
2 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
I 
I 
I 
3 
4 
4 
3 
5 
2 
4 
6 
5 
5 
2 
4 
5 
1 
1 
6 
6 
6 
I 
V 
0.94 
-0.09 
-0.37 
-0.20 
0.43 
0.14 
Table D-42 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Ten by Trained (Creative Thinking) Technology Students in 
Teams 
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D.5.18 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eleven by Trained (Creative 
Thinking) Technology Students in Teams 
Standard Rank 
Team 
1A,B 
2A,B 
1C3A.C 
4A,B,C 
5A,CJ) 
Mean 
6 
5 
6 
6 
5 
5 
1 
1 
5 
5 
3 
6 
5 
6 
4 
2 
4 
2 
3 
3 
2 
3 
2 
3 
4 
4 
3 
4 
6 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
4 
V 
0.94 
• 0.43 
0.26 
0.66 
-0.37 
038 
Table D-43 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eleven by Trained (Creative Thinking) Technology Students in 
Teams 
D.5.19 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Twelve by Trained (Creative 
Thinking) Technology Students in Teams 
Standard Rank 
Team 
1A,B 
2A,B 
1C3A,C 
4A,B,C 
5A,C,D 
Mean 
3 
3 
6 
2 
3 
4 
4 
4 
l 
3 
5 
3 
5 
5 
3 
4 
4 
6 
1 
1 
4 
5 
1 
2 
6 
6 
2 
1 
6 
5 
2 
2 
5 
6 
2 
I 
V 
1.00 
-0.60 
-0.71 
0.94 
0.83 
0.29 
Table D-44 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Twelve by Trained (Creative Thinking) Technology Students in 
Teams 
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D.5.20 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Ten by Trained (Creative 
Thinking) Technology Students in Teams: Tested 3-Months Later 
Standard Rank 
Team 
4A,B,C 
3A,C,6A 
1B,C,2B 
5B,C 
5A,D 
Mean 
3 
2 
2 
6 
5 
5 
5 
5 
6 
4 
2 
4 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
4 
3 
5 
2 
4 
3 
6 
4 
3 
5 
6 
6 
1 
6 
4 
3 
3 
1 
V 
0.09 
0.37 
0.43 
0.49 
0.83 
0.44 
Table D-45 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Ten by Trained (Creative Thinking) Technology Students in 
Teams: Tested 3-Months Later 
D.6 Industry Advisers: Generating Solutions 
D.6.1 Generation of Solutions by Untrained Industry Advisers 
Individually 
Subject 
IA 
IB 
IC 
2A 
2B 
2C 
3A 
3B 
3C 
4A 
4B 
4C 
5A 
5B 
5C 
6A 
6B 
6C 
7A 
7B 
7C 
8A 
8B 
8C 
Case One 
Ideas 
8 
5 
4 
3 
5 
6 
6 
6 
3 
3 
5 
5 
4 
4 
4 
7 
5 
4 
6 
8 
7 
2 
6 
2 
SPI 
3 
5 
3 
2 
2 
4 
3 
3 
2 
I 
4 
4 
3 
3 
2 
7 
l 
4 
5 
7 
5 
2 
6 
2 
SPe 
5 
0 
1 
1 
3 
2 
3 
3 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
0 
4 
0 
1 
1 
2 
0 
0 
0 
%SPI 
38% 
100% 
75% 
67% 
40% 
67% 
50% 
50% 
67% 
33% 
80% 
80% 
75% 
75% 
50% 
100% 
20% 
100% 
83% 
88% 
71% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
Case Two 
Ideas 
6 
3 
3 
4 
6 
4 
3 
5 
2 
4 
4 
11 
4 
4 
5 
9 
5 
4 
8 
12 
4 
3 
9 
4 
SPI 
3 
1 
1 
2 
4 
3 
1 
3 
1 
3 
3 
6 
2 
2 
3 
7 
3 
3 
6 
8 
0 
2 
4 
3 
SPe 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
5 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
4 
4 
1 
5 
1 
%SPI 
50% 
33% 
33% 
50% 
67% 
75% 
33% 
60% 
50% 
75% 
75% 
55% 
50% 
50% 
60% 
78% 
60% 
75% 
75% 
67% 
0% 
67% 
44% 
75% 
Case Three 
Ideas 
6 
3 
6 
3 
7 
6 
3 
7 
6 
7 
5 
8 
5 
6 
5 
6 
5 
4 
8 
12 
4 
4 
6 
3 
SPI 
2 
1 
1 
1 
6 
3 
1 
2 
1 
3 
4 
4 
0 
2 
3 
2 
0 
1 
5 
5 
2 
3 
3 
1 
SPe 
4 
2 
5 
2 
1 
3 
2 
5 
5 
4 
1 
4 
5 
4 
2 
4 
5 
3 
3 
7 
2 
1 
3 
2 
%SPI 
33% 
33% 
17% 
33% 
86% 
50% 
33% 
29% 
17% 
43% 
80% 
50% 
0% 
33% 
60% 
33% 
0% 
25% 
63% 
42% 
50% 
75% 
50% 
33% 
Total 118 83 35 7 0 % 126 74 52 5 9 % 135 56 79 4 1 % 
Mean 4.9 3.5 1.5 7 0 % 53 3.1 2.2 5 7 % 5.6 23 33 4 0 % 
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D.6.2 Generation of Solutions by Trained (Creative Thinking) Industry 
Advisers Individually 
Subject 
UA 
UB 
UC 
12A 
12B 
12C 
13A 
13B 
13C 
14A 
14B 
14C 
15A 
15B 
15C 
16A 
16B 
16C 
17A 
17B 
17C 
18A 
18B 
18C 
Case One 
Ideas 
3 
8 
12 
6 
5 
5 
6 
7 
6 
5 
8 
7 
12 
6 
7 
2 
4 
7 
10 
4 
6 
7 
5 
2 
SPI 
3 
6 
9 
2 
1 
5 
2 
6 
3 
5 
7 
5 
10 
3 
5 
1 
3 
5 
7 
3 
5 
6 
4 
1 
SPe 
0 
2 
3 
4 
4 
0 
4 
1 
3 
0 
1 
2 
2 
3 
2 
1 
1 
2 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
%SPI 
100% 
75% 
75% 
33% 
20% 
100% 
33% 
86% 
50% 
100% 
88% 
71% 
83% 
50% 
71% 
50% 
75% 
71% 
70% 
75% 
83% 
86% 
80% 
50% 
Case Two 
Ideas 
4 
12 
13 
8 
2 
8 
6 
11 
6 
6 
10 
8 
10 
8 
8 
5 
3 
5 
6 
6 
9 
6 
10 
6 
SPI 
2 
10 
12 
7 
1 
8 
1 
9 
5 
4 
8 
6 
6 
7 
7 
3 
1 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
7 
3 
SPe 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
0 
5 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
4 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
5 
1 
3 
3 
%SPI 
50% 
83% 
92% 
88% 
50% 
100% 
17% 
82% 
83% 
67% 
80% 
75% 
60% 
88% 
88% 
60% 
33% 
80% 
67% 
67% 
44% 
83% 
70% 
50% 
Case Three 
Ideas 
4 
11 
11 
7 
4 
7 
6 
8 
7 
7 
10 
9 
11 
7 
9 
5 
5 
9 
4 
3 
5 
4 
9 
5 
SPI 
1 
6 
6 
3 
1 
5 
2 
4 
3 
1 
5 
6 
6 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
2 
2 
3 
3 
5 
3 
SPe 
3 
5 
5 
4 
3 
2 
4 
4 
4 
6 
5 
3 
5 
3 
4 
0 
0 
4 
2 
1 
2 
1 
4 
2 
%SP1 
25% 
55% 
55% 
43% 
25% 
71% 
33% 
50% 
43% 
14% 
50% 
67% 
55% 
57% 
56% 
100% 
100% 
56% 
50% 
67% 
60% 
75% 
56% 
60% 
Total 150 107 43 7 1 % 176 128 48 73% 167 91 76 5 4 % 
Mean 63 4.5 1.8 7 0 % 73 53 2.0 69% 7.0 3.8 3.2 55% 
Table D-47 Generation of Solutions by Trained (Creative Thinking) Industry Advisers Individually 
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D.6.3 Generation of Solutions by Untrained Industry Advisers in 
Teams 
Team 
1A,B,C 
2A,B,C 
3A,B,C 
4A,B,C 
5A,B,C 
6A3.C 
7A,B,C 
8A,B,C 
Case Four 
Ideas 
6 
6 
6 
6 
10 
8 
6 
5 
SPI 
3 
5 
2 
5 
6 
4 
3 
3 
SPe 
3 
1 
4 
1 
4 
4 
3 
2 
%SPI 
50% 
83% 
33% 
83% 
60% 
50% 
50% 
60% 
Case Five 
Ideas 
12 
4 
9 
8 
9 
13 
9 
8 
SPI 
6 
3 
2 
4 
4 
5 
4 
2 
SPe 
6 
1 
7 
4 
5 
8 
5 
6 
%SP1 
50% 
75% 
22% 
50% 
44% 
38% 
44% 
25% 
Case Six 
Ideas 
7 
5 
6 
10 
7 
11 
14 
4 
SPI 
4 
4 
3 
5 
3 
7 
10 
3 
SPe 
3 
1 
3 
5 
4 
4 
4 
1 
%SP1 
57% 
80% 
50% 
50% 
43% 
64% 
71% 
75% 
Total 53 31 22 5 8 % 72 30 42 4 2 % 64 39 25 6 1 % 
Mean 6.6 3.9 2.8 59% 9.0 3.8 53 4 4 % 8.0 4.9 3.1 6 1 % 
Table D-48 Generation of Solutions by Untrained Industry Advisers in Teams 
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D.6.4 Generation of Solutions by Trained (Creative Thinking) Industry 
Advisers in Teams 
Team 
UA.B.C 
12A,B,C 
13A3.C 
14A,B,C 
15A,B,C 
16A,B,C 
17A,B,C 
18A,B,C 
Case Four 
Ideas 
13 
7 
9 
11 
14 
8 
7 
9 
SPI 
9 
3 
5 
9 
9 
7 
5 
6 
SPe 
4 
4 
4 
2 
5 
1 
2 
3 
%SP1 
69% 
43% 
56% 
82% 
64% 
88% 
71% 
67% 
Case Five 
Ideas 
15 
11 
10 
11 
15 
10 
8 
10 
SPI 
6 
5 
3 
8 
8 
8 
2 
5 
SPe 
9 
6 
7 
3 
7 
2 
6 
5 
%SP1 
40% 
45% 
30% 
73% 
53% 
80% 
25% 
50% 
Case Six 
Ideas 
16 
11 
12 
14 
17 
10 
8 
9 
SPI 
12 
9 
7 
8 
10 
9 
6 
6 
SPe 
4 
2 
5 
6 
7 
1 
2 
3 
%SP1 
75% 
82% 
58% 
57% 
59% 
90% 
75% 
67% 
Total 78 53 25 68% 90 45 45 50% 97 67 30 69% 
Mean 9.8 6.6 3.1 68% 11.3 5.6 5.6 50% 12.1 8.4 3.8 70% 
Table D-49 Generation of Solutions by Trained (Creative Thinking) Industry Advisers in Teams 
D.7 Industry Advisers: Prioritizing Solutions 
D.7.1 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Seven by Untrained Industry 
Advisers Individually 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
IA 
IB 
IC 
2A 
2B 
2C 
3A 
3B 
3C 
4A 
4B 
4C 
5A 
5B 
5C 
6A 
6B 
6C 
7A 
7B 
7C 
8A 
8B 
8C 
6 
6 
5 
6 
6 
3 
6 
6 
6 
l 
3 
5 
6 
6 
3 
l 
3 
5 
1 
2 
6 
3 
2 
5 
5 
5 
6 
3 
3 
6 
3 
1 
4 
6 
6 
6 
4 
1 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
1 
6 
3 
4 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
4 
3 
1 
3 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
3 
5 
4 
2 
1 
1 
1 
3 
2 
4 
2 
5 
1 
4 
3 
4 
2 
4 
1 
3 
4 
4 
4 
3 
4 
4 
3 
5 
4 
2 
3 
2 
4 
1 
5 
4 
5 
5 
5 
2 
5 
1 
3 
5 
1 
5 
2 
1 
2 
1 
5 
1 
5 
6 
4 
4 
3 
5 
4 
2 
2 
2 
2 
5 
4 
3 
5 
4 
5 
3 
5 
4 
5 
3 
2 
4 
6 
3 
-0.09 
0.09 
0.09 
-0.03 
-0.49 
037 
-0.77 
-0.94 
-0.49 
1.00 
0.37 
0.37 
-0.14 
-0.77 
0.83 
0.60 
0.77 
0.43 
1.00 
0.71 
-1.00 
0.77 
0.31 
-037 
Mean 
Table D-50 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Seven by Untrained Industry Advisers Individually 
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D.7.2 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eight by Untrained Industry 
Advisers Individually 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
IA 
IB 
IC 
2A 
2B 
2C 
3A 
3B 
3C 
4A 
4B 
4C 
5A 
5B 
5C 
6A 
6B 
6C 
7A 
7B 
7C 
8A 
8B 
8C 
5 
4 
3 
1 
5 
6 
3 
1 
5 
3 
5 
3 
3 
1 
4 
5 
4 
4 
2 
5 
4 
1 
5 
3 
3 
4 
6 
4 
3 
6 
4 
6 
3 
1 
4 
6 
6 
6 
3 
6 
4 
6 
6 
4 
6 
5 
4 
6 
6 
5 
1 
5 
6 
6 
1 
2 
1 
6 
6 
6 
3 
1 
1 
6 
2 
2 
3 
2 
6 
1 
1 
6 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
4 
2 
3 
2 
4 
3 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
1 
2 
4 
3 
3 
5 
5 
3 
1 
4 
2 
4 
5 
2 
5 
5 
4 
3 
1 
2 
3 
5 
3 
3 
5 
3 
4 
2 
6 
2 
2 
2 
4 
5 
5 
5 
2 
2 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
6 
5 
5 
3 
4 
6 
2 
4 
5 
6 
V 
-0.09 
-0.43 
-0.89 
0.77 
0.77 
0.71 
-037 
-0.49 
-0.43 
0.60 
0.54 
0.54 
-0.26 
0.77 
0.83 
0.66 
0.77 
-037 
0.77 
0.94 
-0.77 
0.71 
0.71 
0.71 
Mean 0.28 
Table D-51 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eight by Untrained Industry Advisers Individually 
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D.7.3 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Nine by Untrained Industry 
Advisers Individually 
Standard Rank 6 3 4 1 2 5 'r' 
Subject 
IA 
IB 
IC 
2A 
2B 
2C 
3A 
3B 
3C 
4A 
4B 
4C 
5A 
5B 
5C 
6A 
6B 
6C 
7A 
7B 
7C 
8A 
8B 
8C 
2 
4 
5 
6 
4 
6 
5 
5 
3 
5 
6 
6 
5 
6 
6 
5 
5 
4 
6 
6 
4 
6 
6 
6 
4 
3 
4 
4 
3 
2 
3 
2 
6 
1 
4 
5 
6 
3 
3 
6 
3 
3 
3 
3 
5 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
5 
4 
4 
1 
2 
3 
2 
4 
4 
4 
4 
3 
4 
2 
5 
4 
2 
4 
4 
2 
1 
5 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
1 
4 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
6 
1 
1 
6 
1 
1 
5 
4 
1 
6 
3 
2 
3 
6 
3 
5 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
3 
2 
2 
1 
6 
6 
3 
5 
6 
5 
2 
6 
4 
6 
5 
3 
3 
5 
5 
4 
6 
5 
4 
5 
1 
5 
5 
4 
0.31 
0.26 
0.26 
0.83 
0.83 
0.94 
0.26 
0.37 
0.09 
0.54 
0.71 
0.77 
0.60 
1.00 
1.00 
0.66 
0.94 
0.03 
0.94 
1.00 
-0.54 
1.00 
1.00 
0.37 
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D.7.4 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Seven by Trained (Creative 
Thinking) Industry Advisers Individually 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
UA 
UB 
UC 
12A 
12B 
12C 
13A 
13B 
13C 
14A 
14B 
14C 
ISA 
15B 
15C 
16A 
16B 
16C 
17A 
17B 
17C 
18A 
18B 
18C 
1 
4 
2 
3 
1 
6 
3 
5 
3 
1 
3 
5 
6 
3 
3 
3 
6 
1 
6 
6 
3 
3 
6 
6 
1 
6 
5 
6 
6 
6 
2 
4 
4 
6 
6 
6 
4 
5 
6 
5 
5 
3 
6 
2 
5 
6 
6 
5 
3 
5 
3 
1 
3 
2 
3 
4 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
3 
1 
I 
1 
2 
1 
2 
3 
4 
2 
4 
4 
4 
1 
5 
3 
5 
4 
4 
2 
3 
5 
6 
4 
5 
5 
4 
3 
4 
4 
2 
1 
4 
2 
3 
1 
1 
2 
5 
1 
2 
2 
3 
1 
6 
2 
2 
1 
1 
4 
2 
3 
4 
2 
1 
4 
4 
2 
5 
6 
5 
5 
5 
3 
6 
6 
4 
5 
5 
3 
4 
4 
4 
6 
2 
4 
5 
2 
5 
5 
3 
5 
6 
V 
0.43 
0.94 
0.83 
1.00 
-0.83 
0.66 
0.26 
0.71 
0.94 
0.83 
-037 
0.09 
0.71 
0.66 
0.77 
-0.49 
0.94 
-031 
-0.26 
0.77 
0.83 
-0.20 
-037 
0.94 
Mean 0.40 
Table D-53 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Seven by Trained (Creative Thinking) Industry Advisers 
Individually 
D.7.5 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eight by Trained (Creative 
Thinking) Industry Advisers Individually 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
UA 
UB 
UC 
12A 
12B 
12C 
13A 
13B 
13C 
14A 
14B 
14C 
15A 
15B 
15C 
16A 
16B 
16C 
17A 
17B 
17C 
18A 
18B 
18C 
5 
4 
4 
5 
4 
I 
6 
2 
5 
4 
6 
2 
4 
4 
5 
4 
3 
5 
5 
3 
3 
4 
2 
1 
4 
4 
5 
5 
6 
5 
2 
4 
6 
4 
6 
5 
4 
5 
5 
6 
5 
5 
6 
6 
5 
5 
6 
3 
2 
6 
1 
6 
2 
3 
2 
6 
I 
5 
2 
2 
1 
5 
1 
1 
3 
2 
4 
2 
2 
6 
6 
2 
6 
6 
1 
2 
1 
3 
1 
1 
4 
3 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
2 
2 
1 
3 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
4 
3 
3 
3 
1 
2 
6 
5 
2 
3 
3 
3 
2 
6 
6 
3 
2 
1 
2 
1 
3 
4 
4 
1 
5 
5 
2 
6 
2 
6 
4 
3 
3 
5 
4 
6 
5 
4 
3 
3 
6 
4 
6 
6 
4 
4 
2 
2 
5 
4 
3 
5 
V 
-0.26 
0.77 
0.60 
0.37 
-0.77 
0.89 
0.03 
0.94 
0.77 
0.77 
-0.26 
0.43 
0.94 
0.60 
0.77 
0.54 
0.60 
0.71 
-0.37 
-0.37 
0.66 
-0.26 
-0.77 
0.77 
Table D-54 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eight by Trained (Creative Thinking) Industry Advisers 
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D.7.6 Prioritizationof Solutions for Case Nine by Trained (Creative 
Thinking) Industry Advisers Individually 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
UA 
UB 
UC 
12A 
12B 
12C 
13A 
13B 
13C 
14A 
14B 
14C 
15A 
15B 
15C 
16A 
16B 
16C 
17A 
17B 
17C 
18A 
18B 
18C 
6 
6 
6 
6 
4 
5 
6 
5 
6 
6 
6 
5 
6 
4 
6 
6 
5 
6 
6 
5 
4 
5 
6 
3 
5 
3 
4 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
1 
3 
3 
3 
2 
4 
6 
2 
2 
3 
5 
3 
2 
1 
6 
4 
4 
3 
4 
2 
4 
4 
5 
1 
4 
4 
5 
4 
4 
3 
5 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
3 
3 
3 
3 
1 
4 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
6 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
6 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
6 
6 
1 
1 
6 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
4 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
1 
5 
2 
2 
5 
2 
5 
5 
5 
5 
6 
2 
5 
6 
4 
5 
5 
4 
3 
5 
5 
5 
6 
3 
4 
4 
2 
4 
5 
2 
6 
V 
0.71 
1.00 
1.00 
0.83 
-037 
1.00 
0.71 
0.94 
1.00 
1.00 
0.14 
0.83 
0.60 
0.94 
0.94 
0.94 
0.77 
0.94 
0.14 
-0.49 
0.66 
0.94 
-0.77 
0.94 
Table D-55 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Nine by Trained (Creative Thinking) Industry Advisers 
Individually 
D.7.7 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Ten by Untrained Industry 
Advisers in Teams 
Standard Rank 
Team 
IA,B,C 
2A,B,C 
3A,B,C 
4A,B,C 
5A,B,C 
6A,B,C 
7A,B,C 
8A,B,C 
Mean 
3 
2 
5 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
3 
5 
4 
4 
5 
6 
6 
6 
5 
5 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
4 
6 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
3 
4 
6 
3 
6 
6 
5 
5 
5 
6 
6 
1 
5 
V 
0.09 
0.83 
1.00 
0.94 
0.94 
0.94 
0.94 
1.00 
0.84 
Table D-56 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Ten by Untrained Industry Advisers in Teams 
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D.7.8 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eleven by Untrained Industry 
Advisers in Teams 
Standard Rank 
Team 
1A,B,C 6 4 3 2 5 
2A,B,C 6 1 5 3 4 
3A,B,C 6 3 4 2 5 
4A,B,C 6 3 4 2 5 
5A,B,C 6 1 4 3 5 
6A,B,C 6 1 5 3 4 
7A,B,C 6 1 4 3 5 
8A3,C 6 3 4 2 5 
Mean 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
0.54 
1.00 
0.77 
0.77 
0.94 
1.00 
0.94 
0.77 
0.84 
Table D-57 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eleven by Untrained Industry Advisers in Teams 
D.7.9 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Twelve by Untrained Industry 
Advisers in Teams 
Standard Rank 
Team 
1A,B,C 
2A,B,C 
3A3.C 
4A,B,C 
5A,B,C 
6A,B,C 
7A,B,C 
8A,B,C 
3 
3 
6 
5 
4 
3 
3 
6 
3 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
5 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
4 
4 
5 
4 
5 
3 
6 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
6 
6 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
4 
4 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
V 
1.00 
0.66 
0.83 
0.94 
0.94 
1.00 
0.49 
0.83 
Mean 0.84 
Table D-58 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Twelve by Untrained Industry Advisers in Teams 
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D.7.10 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Ten by Trained (Creative 
Thinking) Industry Advisers in Teams 
Std Rank 
Team 
UA,B,C 
12A3.C 
13A,B,C 
14A,B,C 
15AAC 
16A,B,C 
17A,B,C 
18A,B,C 
Mean 0.81 
3 
4 
3 
3 
6 
4 
4 
3 
6 
5 
6 
6 
5 
6 
5 
6 
2 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
4 
3 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
4 
5 
6 
5 
5 
2 
5 
6 
5 
1 
1 
2 
1 
4 
1 
1 
1 
0.94 
0.94 
0.89 
0.94 
-0.03 
0.89 
0.94 
0.94 
Table D-59 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Ten by Trained (Creative Thinking) Industry Advisers in Teams 
D.7.11 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eleven by Trained (Creative 
Thinking) Industry Advisers in Teams 
Standard Rank 
Team 
UA,B,C 
12A,B,C 
13A,B,C 
14A3,C 
15A,B,C 
16A,B,C 
I7A,B,C 
18A,B,C 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
5 
6 
6 
6 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
6 
1 
1 
1 
5 
4 
5 
4 
5 
2 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
1 
3 
3 
4 
4 
5 
4 
5 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
3 
2 
2 
2 
V 
0.89 
1.00 
0.89 
1.00 
-0.14 
0.94 
0.94 
0.83 
Mean
 0.79 
Table D-60 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eleven by Trained (Creative Thinking) Industry Advisers in 
Teams 
D.7.12 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Twelve by Trained (Creative 
Thinking) Industry Advisers in Teams 
Standard Rank 
Team 
UA,B,C 
12A,B,C 
13A,B,C 
14A,B,C 
15A,B,C 
16A,B,C 
17A3,C 
18A,B,C 
Mean 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
6 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
3 
5 
5 1 
5 1 
5 
5 
6 
3 
6 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
I 5 
I 5 
1 5 
1 6 
I 3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
V 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.94 
0.60 
0.94 
0.94 
0.66 
0.89 
Table D-61 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Twelve by Trained (Creative Thinking) Industry Advisers in 
Teams 
D.8 Government Advisers: Generating Solutions 
D.8.1 Generation of Solutions by Untrained Government Advisers 
Individually 
Case Three 
Subject Ideas SPI SPe %SPI 
IA 
IB 
IC 
2A 
2B 
2C 
3A 
3B 
3C 
4A 
4B 
4C 
5A 
5B 
5C 
Total 96 42 54 44% 
Mean 6.4 2.8 3.6 42% 
5 
7 
9 
6 
8 
6 
6 
8 
5 
7 
4 
7 
9 
6 
3 
l 
5 
4 
3 
5 
3 
3 
4 
4 
2 
l 
3 
3 
l 
0 
4 
2 
5 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
l 
5 
3 
4 
6 
5 
3 
20% 
71% 
44% 
50% 
63% 
50% 
50% 
50% 
80% 
29% 
25% 
43% 
33% 
17% 
0% 
Table D-62 Generation of Solutions by Untrained Government Advisers Individually 
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D.8.2 Generation of Solutions by Trained (Creative Thinking) 
Government Advisers Individually 
Case Three 
SubJect Ideas SPI SPe %SPI 
UA 
UB 
UC 
12A 
12B 
12C 
13A 
13B 
13C 
14A 
14B 
14C 
15A 
I5B 
15C 
16A 
16B 
17A 
17B 
Total 144 65 79 45% 
Mean Z6 3A 42 45% 
Table D-63 Generation of Solutions by Trained (Creative Thinking) Government Advisers Individually 
6 
10 
8 
7 
6 
13 
6 
7 
5 
10 
7 
6 
7 
7 
9 
6 
6 
10 
8 
4 
0 
6 
2 
3 
10 
3 
0 
4 
6 
4 
4 
3 
0 
4 
1 
4 
5 
2 
2 
10 
2 
5 
3 
3 
3 
7 
1 
4 
3 
2 
4 
7 
5 
5 
2 
5 
6 
67% 
0% 
75% 
29% 
50% 
77% 
50% 
0% 
80% 
60% 
57% 
67% 
43% 
0% 
44% 
17% 
67% 
50% 
25% 
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D.8.3 Generation of Solutions by Trained (Hazard Management) 
Government Advisers Individually 
Subject 
IA 
IB 
IC 
2A 
2B 
2C 
4B 
4C 
5A 
5B 
5C 
6A 
6B 
6C 
7A 
7B 
7C 
8A 
8B 
8C 
9A 
9B 
9C 
10A 
IOB 
UA 
IIB 
UC 
12B 
Continued Next Page 
Case Three 
Ideas 
16 
6 
5 
7 
6 
3 
6 
8 
3 
4 
3 
6 
3 
3 
1 
2 
5 
3 
1 
5 
5 
5 
7 
6 
9 
4 
7 
3 
12 
SPI 
4 
4 
3 
3 
4 
2 
1 
0 
0 
2 
2 
3 
1 
1 
0 
1 
3 
0 
0 
2 
2 
2 
4 
1 
3 
1 
2 
1 
4 
SPe 
12 
2 
2 
4 
2 
1 
5 
8 
3 
2 
1 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
3 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
5 
6 
3 
5 
2 
8 
%SPI 
25% 
67% 
60% 
43% 
67% 
67% 
17% 
0% 
0% 
50% 
67% 
50% 
33% 
33% 
0% 
50% 
60% 
0% 
0% 
40% 
40% 
40% 
57% 
17% 
33% 
25% 
29% 
33% 
33% 
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From Previous Page 
Case Three 
SubJect Ideas SPI SPe %sp| 
12C
 7 16 14% 
13A 6l5 17% 
13B
 6 4 2 67% 
14A
 5 3 2 60% 
16A
 8 0 8 0% 
16B 7 3 4 43% 
16C 4 0 4 0% 
17A
 8 0 8 0% 
17B 8 2 6 25% 
17C
 6 15 17% 
ISA 4 13 25% 
18B 4 3 1 75% 
18C 23 7 16 30% 
21A 6 4 2 67% 
21B 9 5 4 56% 
21C 4 2 2 50% 
23A 12 4 8 33% 
23B 7 3 4 43% 
23C 14 7 7 50% 
27A 8 6 2 75% 
27B 3 0 3 0% 
27C 6 5 1 83% 
33A 5 3 2 60% 
33B 15 12 3 80% 
33C 7 16 14% 
34A 4 0 4 0% 
34B 4 13 25% 
34C 9 4 5 44% 
35A 5 14 20% 
Continued Next Page 
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From Previous Page 
Case Three 
Subject 
35B 
36A 
36B 
36C 
37A 
37B 
37C 
38A 
38B 
38C 
39A 
39B 
39C 
40A 
40B 
40C 
41A 
41B 
41C 
42A 
42B 
42C 
43B 
43C 
44A 
44B 
44C 
45A 
45B 
Ideas 
9 
11 
17 
9 
12 
6 
6 
10 
15 
4 
14 
10 
11 
2 
8 
8 
11 
7 
15 
8 
12 
9 
7 
7 
5 
6 
5 
13 
5 
SPI 
4 
4 
13 
4 
4 
3 
1 
7 
9 
2 
11 
5 
9 
2 
6 
2 
7 
2 
9 
1 
6 
5 
2 
4 
1 
1 
3 
6 
1 
SPe 
5 
7 
4 
5 
8 
3 
5 
3 
6 
2 
3 
5 
2 
0 
2 
6 
4 
5 
6 
7 
6 
4 
5 
3 
4 
5 
2 
7 
4 
%SP1 
44% 
36% 
76% 
44% 
33% 
50% 
17% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
79% 
50% 
82% 
100% 
75% 
25% 
64% 
29% 
60% 
13% 
50% 
56% 
29% 
57% 
20% 
17% 
60% 
46% 
20% 
Continued Next Page 
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From Previous Page 
Case Three 
Subject Ideas SPI SPe %SP1 
45C 8 4 
46A 8 3 
46B 6 3 
46C 10 3 
47A 9 6 
47B 11 9 
47C 10 2 
48A 7 4 
48B 12 8 
48C 7 4 
49A 5 1 
49B 5 0 
49C 6 2 
50A 10 0 
SOB 18 7 
50C 12 2 
52A 12 8 
52B 10 6 
52C 8 4 
53A 6 1 
53B 7 0 
53C 3 1 
57A 10 3 
57B 9 6 
57C 10 5 
Total 849 366 483 43% 
4 
5 
3 
7 
3 
2 
8 
3 
4 
3 
4 
5 
4 
10 
11 
10 
4 
4 
4 
5 
7 
2 
7 
3 
5 
50% 
38% 
50% 
30% 
67% 
82% 
20% 
57% 
67% 
57% 
20% 
0% 
33% 
0% 
39% 
17% 
67% 
60% 
50% 
17% 
0% 
33% 
30% 
67% 
50% 
Mean 7.6 33 43 40% 
Table D-64 Generation of Solutions by Trained (Hazard Management) Government Advisers Individually 
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D.8.4 Generation of Solutions by Trained (Creative Thinking + Hazard 
Management) Government Advisers Individually 
Subject 
Case Three 
Ideas SPI SPe %SPI 
3A 
3B 
3C 
4A 
IOC 
12A 
13C 
19A 
19B 
I9C 
20A 
20B 
20C 
22A 
22B 
22C 
24A 
24B 
24C 
25A 
25B 
25C 
26A 
26B 
26C 
43A 
51A 
51B 
51C 
35C 
58A 
58B 
58C 
12 
10 
8 
4 
8 
12 
7 
5 
5 
12 
9 
21 
7 
15 
9 
12 
16 
8 
8 
9 
11 
9 
4 
8 
10 
12 
6 
7 
11 
9 
6 
8 
9 
9 
1 
4 
2 
5 
7 
5 
4 
3 
8 
6 
15 
3 
9 
5 
7 
1 
4 
4 
7 
10 
7 
3 
4 
7 
5 
0 
5 
7 
6 
4 
4 
7 
3 
9 
4 
2 
3 
5 
2 
1 
2 
4 
3 
6 
4 
6 
4 
5 
15 
4 
4 
2 
1 
2 
1 
4 
3 
7 
6 
2 
4 
3 
2 
4 
2 
75% 
10% 
50% 
50% 
63% 
58% 
71% 
80% 
60% 
67% 
67% 
71% 
43% 
60% 
56% 
58% 
6% 
50% 
50% 
78% 
91% 
78% 
75% 
50% 
70% 
42% 
0% 
71% 
64% 
67% 
67% 
50% 
78% 
Total 307 178 129 58% 
Mean 93 5.4 3.9 58% 
Table D-65 Generation of Solutions by Trained (Creative Thinking + Hazard Management) Government 
Advisers Individually 
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D.8.5 Generation of Solutions by Untrained Government Advisers in 
Teams 
Team 
Case Five 
Ideas 
10 
5 
12 
8 
9 
SPI 
4 
4 
5 
4 
3 
SPe 
6 
1 
7 
4 
6 
%SPI 
40% 
80% 
42% 
50% 
33% 
1A3,C 
2A,B,C 
3A,B,C 
4A,B,C 
5A3,C 
Total 44 20 24 4 5 % 
Mean 8.8 4.0 4.8 49% 
Table D-66 Generation of Solutions by Untrained Government Advisers in Teams 
D.8.6 Generation of Solutions by Trained (Creative Thinking) 
Government Advisers in Teams 
Case Five 
Team Ideas SPI SPe %SPI 
UA,B,C 
12A,B,C 
13A3,C 
14A,B,C 
15A,B,C 
16A,B 
17A,B 
Total 72 32 40 4 4 % 
Mean 103 4.6 5.7 4 5 % 
11 
13 
7 
10 
10 
12 
9 
6 
5 
4 
8 
3 
3 
3 
5 
8 
3 
2 
7 
9 
6 
55% 
38% 
57% 
80% 
30% 
25% 
33% 
Table D-67 Generation of Solutions by Trained (Creative Thinking) Government Advisers in Teams 
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D.8.7 Generation of Solutions by Trained (Hazard Management) 
Government Advisers in Teams 
Team 
Case Five 
Ideas 
7 
10 
5 
6 
2 
4 
5 
7 
5 
7 
8 
9 
16 
9 
10 
3 
12 
13 
8 
10 
9 
10 
10 
8 
14 
11 
7 
8 
13 
8 
15 
SPI 
4 
3 
2 
4 
0 
2 
2 
3 
1 
3 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
1 
5 
4 
4 
5 
3 
4 
4 
1 
7 
2 
2 
4 
3 
2 
7 
SPe 
3 
7 
3 
2 
2 
2 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
11 
8 
8 
2 
7 
9 
4 
5 
6 
6 
6 
7 
7 
9 
5 
4 
10 
6 
8 
%SP1 
57% 
30% 
40% 
67% 
0% 
50% 
40% 
43% 
20% 
43% 
38% 
44% 
31% 
11% 
20% 
33% 
42% 
31% 
50% 
50% 
33% 
40% 
40% 
13% 
50% 
18% 
29% 
50% 
23% 
25% 
47% 
1A,B,C 
2A,B,C 
5A3,C 
6A3,C 
7A,B,C 
8A,B,C 
9A,B,C 
UA,B,C 
16A,B,C 
17A3,C 
18A,B,C 
21A3,C 
23A3,C 
27A,B,C 
33A,B,C 
34A3,C 
36A3.C 
37A,B,C 
38A,B,C 
39A,B,C 
40A,B,C 
41A,B,C 
42A,B,C 
44A,B,C 
45A,B,C 
46A,B,C 
47A,B,C 
49A3,C 
50A3,C 
53A3,C 
57A3,C 
Total 269 97 172 36% 
Mean 8/7 3J 5^ 5 3 6% 
Table D-68 Generation of Solutions by Trained (Hazard Management) Government Advisers in Teams 
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D.8.8 Generation of Solutions by Trained (Creative Thinking + Hazard 
Management: One Team Member attended Creative Thinking Training) 
Government Advisers in Teams 
Team 
4A3,C 
10A3,C 
12A3,C 
13A3,C,14A 
35A3.C 
43A3.C 
Case Five 
Ideas 
5 
13 
16 
6 
8 
14 
SPI 
2 
8 
9 
3 
2 
5 
SPe 
3 
5 
7 
3 
6 
9 
%SPI 
40% 
62% 
56% 
50% 
25% 
36% 
Total 62 29 33 4 7 % 
Mean 103 48 5;5 4 5 % 
Table D-69 Generation of Solutions by Trained (Creative Thinking + Hazard Management: One Team Member 
attended Creative Thinking Training) Government Advisers in Teams 
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D.8.9 Generation of Solutions by Trained (Creative Thinking + Hazard 
Management: All Team attended Creative Thinking Training) 
Government Advisers in Teams 
Case Five 
Team Ideas SPI SPe %SPI 
3A3,C 13 6 7 46% 
19A3.C 3 2 1 67% 
20A3,C 18 8 10 44% 
22A3.C 20 9 11 45% 
24A3,C 26 13 13 50% 
25A3.C 11 5 6 45% 
26A3,C 16 8 8 50% 
51A3.C 9 6 3 67% 
58A3,C 12 7 5 58% 
Total 128 64 64 50% 
Mean 142 IA 7JL 53% 
Table D-70 Generation of Solutions by Trained (Creative Thinking + Hazard Management: All Team attended 
Creative Thinking Training) Government Advisers in Teams 
D.9 Government Advisers: Prioritizing Solutions 
D.9.1 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Seven by Untrained 
Government Advisers Individually 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
IA 
IB 
IC 
2A 
2B 
2C 
3A 
3B 
3C 
4A 
4B 
4C 
5A 
5B 
5C 
Mean 
1 
6 
3 
1 
1 
4 
6 
6 
6 
2 
4 
5 
5 
6 
3 
6 
6 
5 
5 
5 
6 
5 
4 
5 
5 
5 
6 
6 
6 
4 
6 
5 
3 
4 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
3 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
4 
1 
4 
4 
5 
2 
2 
1 
3 
4 
2 
3 
2 
2 
4 
2 
2 
3 
1 
6 
4 
6 
6 
4 
2 
6 
5 
2 
3 
5 
5 
1 
5 
2 
6 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
1 
3 
3 
4 
4 
3 
2 
4 
V 
-0.31 
0.77 
0.37 
0.71 
-0.09 
-0.47 
-0.37 
-0.26 
0.26 
0.14 
0.37 
0.26 
-0.43 
0.26 
0.09 
0.09 
Table D-71 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Seven by Untrained Government Advisers Individually 
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D.9.2 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eight by Untrained 
Government Advisers Individually 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
IA 
IB 
IC 
2A 
2B 
2C 
3A 
3B 
3C 
4A 
4B 
4C 
5A 
5B 
5C 
5 
3 
4 
4 
3 
3 
2 
4 
4 
3 
5 
4 
3 
2 
3 
5 
4 
2 
5 
3 
4 
4 
1 
6 
6 
6 
6 
3 
2 
4 
5 
4 
1 
6 
2 
1 
5 
6 
6 
2 
3 
1 
2 
1 
6 
6 
4 
3 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
5 
6 
6 
6 
5 
5 
5 
2 
5 
3 
6 
5 
5 
6 
6 
6 
4 
3 
5 
2 
2 
4 
3 
5 
4 
4 
5 
4 
3 
2 
2 
V 
-0.20 
0.37 
0.66 
-0.31 
-0.43 
-0.49 
0.43 
0.66 
0.54 
0.71 
0.66 
-0.20 
-0.37 
-0.14 
0.14 
Table D-72 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eight by Untrained Government Advisers Individually 
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D.9.3 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Nine by Untrained 
Government Advisers Individually 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
IA 
IB 
IC 
2A 
2B 
2C 
3A 
3B 
3C 
4A 
4B 
4C 
5A 
5B 
5C 
Mean 
T a h l p Fl-71 Pi-i/M-iti-*.!*.'^ * 
6 
5 
4 
4 
6 
5 
5 
3 
6 
6 
4 
6 
2 
3 
4 
4 
3 
3 
2 
3 
3 
2 
2 
4 
2 
3 
3 
2 
3 
5 
6 
6 
4 
2 
3 
2 
5 
4 
3 
1 
4 
2 
2 
5 
1 
1 
3 
5 
1 
6 
1 
1 
I 
1 
6 
6 
1 
1 
1 
1 
6 
6 
1 
1 
2 
4 
6 
5 
2 
3 
1 
5 
3 
4 
6 
3 
4 
4 
2 
2 
5 
1 
5 
6 
4 
6 
4 
2 
5 
5 
5 
4 
5 
2 
5 
3 
V 
-0.43 
0.37 
0.49 
0.94 
0.89 
0.14 
-0.77 
0.94 
0.77 
0.31 
0.89 
-0.54 
-0.71 
0.60 
0.49 
0.29 
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D.9.4 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Seven by Trained (Creative 
Thinking) Government Advisers Individually 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
UA 6 3 1 2 4 
UB 4 6 2 3 1 
UC 4 6 12 5 
12A 16 2 4 5 
12B 3 5 12 6 
12C 2 6 3 4 1 
13A 15 2 6 3 
13B 5 6 4 13 
13C 16 3 4 2 
14A 5 6 13 4 
14B 2 6 14 3 
14C 5 6 2 3 1 
15A 6 4 2 3 5 
15B 14 5 6 3 
15C 2 5 13 4 
16A 6 4 12 5 
16B 6 4 2 3 5 
17A 6 4 12 5 
17B 16 2 3 5 
5 
5 
3 
3 
4 
5 
4 
2 
5 
2 
5 
4 
1 
2 
6 
3 
1 
3 
4 
-0.31 
0.66 
0.14 
0.60 
0.14 
0.94 
0.77 
-0.03 
1.00 
0.03 
0.83 
0.43 
-0.60 
0.37 
0.66 
-0.43 
-0.60 
-0.43 
0.66 
Mean 0.25 
Table D-74 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Seven by Trained (Creative Thinking) Government Advisers 
Individually 
D.9.5 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eight by Trained (Creative 
Thinking) Government Advisers Individually 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
UA 
UB 
UC 
12A 
12B 
12C 
13A 
13B 
13C 
14A 
14B 
14C 
15A 
15B 
15C 
16A 
16B 
17A 
I7B 
5 
2 
6 
1 
4 
3 
3 
5 
6 
4 
5 
5 
6 
1 
2 
4 
2 
1 
6 
4 
4 
3 
4 
3 
1 
4 
4 
6 
3 
6 
6 
4 
5 
3 
3 
6 
3 
3 
3 
5 
1 
6 
2 
6 
6 
6 
6 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
5 
6 
1 
6 
5 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
4 
3 
I 
1 
2 
2 
3 
2 
3 
2 
4 
4 
2 
1 
4 
2 
2 
3 
5 
3 
5 
5 
5 
5 
3 
4 
1 
3 
2 
3 
6 
5 
5 
5 
6 
4 
6 
6 
4 
5 
2 
2 
2 
2 
4 
5 
5 
4 
6 
4 
2 
1 
3 
4 
2 
5 
3 
V 
-0.26 
0.89 
-0.89 
-0.60 
-0.43 
-0.43 
0.77 
0.89 
0.66 
0.77 
0.94 
0.83 
-0.77 
-0.94 
0.49 
-0.26 
-0.77 
0.89 
0.43 
Table D-75 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eight by Trained (Creative Thinking) Government Advisers 
Individually 
472 
D.9.6 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Nine by Trained (Creative 
Thinking) Government Advisers Individually 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
UA 
UB 
UC 
12A 
12B 
12C 
13A 
13B 
13C 
14A 
14B 
14C 
15A 
15B 
15C 
16A 
16B 
17A 
17B 
6 
4 
2 
3 
1 
4 
4 
6 
3 
5 
2 
4 
5 
1 
2 
6 
1 
6 
4 
6 
3 
2 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
4 
6 
4 
5 
2 
6 
4 
2 
5 
3 
2 
5 
4 
3 
5 
1 
4 
5 
2 
5 
6 
3 
6 
3 
4 
3 
1 
4 
2 
4 
1 
3 
1 
6 
1 
6 
6 
6 
6 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
6 
1 
6 
1 
6 
1 
2 
1 
4 
5 
5 
2 
5 
3 
2 
2 
3 
2 
3 
5 
5 
3 
4 
5 
5 
2 
5 
5 
6 
4 
3 
3 
3 
4 
5 
4 
5 
6 
6 
2 
3 
5 
3 
2 
3 
4 
V 
0.09 
0.37 
-0.54 
-0.83 
-0.09 
-0.43 
0.89 
0.60 
0.66 
0.37 
0.71 
0.89 
-0.77 
-0.83 
0.94 
-0.89 
0.49 
-0.49 
0.83 
Table D-76 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Nine by Trained (Creative Thinking) Government Advisers 
Individually 
D.9.7 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Seven by Trained (Hazard 
Management) Government Advisers Individually 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
IA 
IB 
IC 
2A 
2B 
2C 
4B 
4C 
5A 
5B 
5C 
6A 
6B 
6C 
7A 
7B 
7C 
8A 
8B 
8C 
9A 
9B 
9C 
10A 
IOB 
UA 
IIB 
nc 
12B 
Continued Next Page 
1 
6 
3 
2 
6 
2 
2 
1 
6 
6 
6 
6 
2 
6 
6 
5 
5 
4 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
4 
6 
2 
5 
6 
6 
3 
6 
4 
6 
6 
4 
6 
6 
6 
5 
5 
5 
5 
6 
5 
2 
6 
6 
6 
4 
5 
5 
3 
5 
5 
5 
6 
4 
5 
4 
5 
3 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
4 
1 
1 
5 
2 
1 
I 
4 
2 
2 
2 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
3 
4 
5 
2 
4 
4 
3 
2 
2 
2 
3 
4 
2 
1 
3 
3 
1 
1 
2 
3 
2 
3 
3 
3 
4 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
5 
1 
3 
5 
3 
3 
4 
4 
3 
3 
2 
1 
4 
5 
2 
2 
2 
5 
3 
2 
5 
1 
1 
1 
1 
6 
3 
5 
6 
5 
2 
5 
4 
3 
5 
5 
5 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
3 
3 
4 
4 
3 
3 
4 
4 
1 
4 
6 
4 
5 
3 
4 
3 
4 
V 
-0.49 
0.83 
0.77 
-0.43 
0.83 
0.83 
0.83 
-0.20 
-0.03 
-0.03 
0.09 
0.94 
-0.20 
-0.83 
0.37 
0.37 
0.26 
-0.49 
-0.03 
0.09 
-0.83 
0.14 
0.60 
0.14 
0.94 
-0.37 
-0.03 
-0.43 
0.14 
474 
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Standard Rank 
Subject 
12C 
13A 
13B 
14A 
16A 
16B 
16C 
17A 
17B 
17C 
18A 
18B 
18C 
21A 
21B 
21C 
23A 
23B 
23C 
27A 
27B 
27C 
33A 
33B 
33C 
34A 
34B 
34C 
35A 
5 
6 
4 
2 
6 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
5 
2 
6 
2 
6 
6 
3 
6 
2 
6 
4 
1 
5 
5 
6 
5 
4 
6 
6 
4 
3 
6 
4 
6 
5 
2 
4 
5 
2 
6 
5 
5 
6 
4 
5 
4 
5 
5 
4 
5 
6 
4 
6 
5 
3 
6 
4 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
5 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
3 
6 
2 
2 
3 
3 
2 
4 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
2 
1 
2 
3 
4 
4 
3 
4 
5 
2 
4 
2 
2 
4 
2 
2 
2 
2 
5 
3 
4 
5 
6 
1 
5 
4 
4 
5 
5 
4 
6 
3 
3 
3 
1 
2 
1 
1 
4 
3 
5 
6 
3 
6 
4 
4 
4 
1 
1 
2 
2 
5 
5 
3 
3 
3 
4 
3 
3 
2 
4 
4 
2 
5 
5 
2 
6 
3 
6 
3 
3 
5 
3 
3 
1 
1 
3 
5 
0.03 
-0.49 
-0.20 
0.94 
-0.43 
0.09 
-0.20 
-0.60 
-0.43 
-0.20 
-0.85 
0.26 
0.76 
-0.14 
0.94 
0.03 
-0.03 
0.66 
-0.20 
0.77 
-0.43 
-0.09 
0.94 
-0.37 
0.09 
-0.43 
-0.66 
0.54 
0.09 
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From Previous Page 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
35B 
36A 
36B 
36C 
37A 
37B 
37C 
38A 
38B 
38C 
39A 
39B 
39C 
40A 
40B 
40C 
41A 
41B 
41C 
42A 
42B 
42C 
43B 
43C 
44A 
44B 
44C 
45A 
45B 
1 
6 
1 
1 
5 
2 
2 
5 
5 
2 
3 
6 
2 
6 
I 
1 
5 
5 
6 
3 
6 
6 
5 
6 
5 
6 
6 
1 
2 
6 
4 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
5 
4 
4 
6 
6 
4 
6 
5 
4 
4 
4 
2 
5 
6 
5 
5 
6 
6 
3 
1 
3 
3 
0 
3 
1 
4 
2 
6 
4 
2 
5 
5 
4 
2 
4 
5 
3 
5 
2 
4 
2 
2 
2 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
2 
2 
2 
4 
4 
4 
2 
5 
2 
2 
4 
3 
1 
2 
3 
3 
2 
2 
3 
5 
3 
4 
6 
4 
2 
2 
5 
5 
6 
4 
3 
4 
2 
2 
5 
5 
3 
4 
5 
3 
4 
4 
3 
4 
5 
4 
4 
6 
3 
5 
5 
3 
3 
3 
6 
2 
3 
4 
3 
4 
3 
3 
5 
3 
V 
-0.43 
0.83 
1.00 
0.09 
0.77 
0.89 
0.31 
0.26 
0.83 
0.71 
0.09 
0.66 
-0.43 
0.94 
0.77 
-0.37 
0.09 
0.03 
0.60 
-0.60 
-0.43 
-0.54 
-0.20 
0.26 
-0.20 
0.05 
1.00 
0.49 
Continued Next Page 
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Standard R a n k 
Subject 
45C 
46A 
46B 
46C 
47A 
47B 
47C 
48A 
48B 
48C 
49A 
49B 
49C 
50A 
SOB 
50C 
52A 
52B 
52C 
53A 
53B 
57A 
57B 
57C 
1 
3 
6 
5 
5 
6 
4 
5 
5 
1 
6 
5 
6 
5 
6 
6 
6 
4 
4 
4 
6 
5 
5 
3 
1 
6 
6 
5 
6 
6 
3 
6 
4 
6 
6 
3 
6 
5 
6 
4 
5 
4 
6 
6 
6 
5 
4 
4 
6 
6 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
7 
4 
1 
1 
2 
2 
4 
4 
2 
3 
4 
2 
2 
2 
3 
4 
2 
4 
2 
4 
2 
2 
3 
2 
3 
3 
1 
2 
2 
4 
4 
2 
1 
3 
2 
2 
5 
5 
6 
4 
3 
5 
1 
4 
1 
5 
4 
5 
5 
2 
2 
2 
6 
6 
1 
3 
5 
5 
4 
4 
3 
4 
3 
3 
2 
5 
4 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
3 
5 
7 
3 
3 
3 
5 
5 
V 
0.83 
-0.03 
0.37 
0.31 
-0.49 
0.14 
-0.37 
0.03 
0.94 
-0.49 
0.37 
-0.20 
0.37 
-0.43 
-0.20 
-0.49 
0.14 
0.60 
0.53 
-0.14 
-0.37 
-0.37 
0.83 
0.94 
Mean 
Table D-77 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Seven by Trained (Hazard Management) Government 
Individually 
D.9.8 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eight by Trained (Hazard 
Management) Government Advisers Individually 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
IA 
IB 
IC 
2A 
2B 
2C 
4B 
4C 
5A 
5B 
5C 
6A 
6B 
6C 
7A 
7B 
7C 
8A 
8B 
8C 
9A 
9B 
9C 
10A 
IOB 
UA 
UB 
U C 
12B 
5 
5 
5 
3 
5 
4 
6 
6 
6 
6 
4 
4 
5 
3 
1 
5 
5 
3 
4 
5 
2 
1 
5 
6 
5 
5 
6 
4 
4 
5 
4 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
4 
4 
5 
5 
6 
5 
6 
6 
3 
2 
2 
6 
3 
6 
4 
3 
4 
5 
6 
6 
2 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
6 
4 
4 
1 
6 
1 
6 
5 
1 
3 
2 
2 
5 
6 
5 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
4 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
1 
4 
2 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
4 
1 
5 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
2 
3 
3 
4 
5 
6 
6 
5 
5 
2 
5 
6 
3 
2 
3 
1 
3 
5 
2 
3 
6 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
4 
3 
5 
6 
4 
5 
2 
3 
3 
4 
1 
4 
3 
2 
6 
4 
4 
4 
4 
3 
6 
6 
'r' 
0.54 
0.54 
0.54 
0.71 
0.83 
0.89 
0.89 
0.83 
0.66 
0.66 
0.94 
0.77 
0.71 
-0.89 
0.09 
0.09 
0.54 
-0.60 
0.71 
-0.37 
-0.77 
1.00 
0.66 
0.71 
0.60 
0.26 
-0.26 
0.43 
0.94 
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From Previous Page 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
12C 1 3 6 5 4 2 -0.94 
13A 1 2 6 3 5 4 -0.54 
13B 4 5 1 2 3 6 0.94 
14A 5 6 2 3 1 4 0.60 
16A 2 1 6 4 5 3 -0.71 
16B 1 3 6 5 4 2 -0.94 
16C 2 3 6 1 4 5 -0.09 
17A 2 6 1 3 5 4 0.37 
17B 2 3 6 1 5 4 -0.26 
17C 3 4 6 1 5 2 -0.43 
18A 1 2 6 5 6 2 -0.85 
18B 6 4 2 1 3 5 0.89 
18C 6 4 1 2 3 5 0.94 
21A 4 6 1 2 3 5 0.83 
21B 5 4 1 2 3 6 1.00 
2ic 5 4 6 1 2 3 -0.03 
23A 
23B 
4 5 6 1 2 3 -0.09 
6 4 1 3 2 5 0.89 
2 3 C 4 5 1 2 6 3 0.43 
4 5 1 2 6 3 0.43 
4 3 1 2 6 5 0.66 
3 4 1 2 6 5 0.60 
4 6 1 2 3 5 0.83 
4 5 2 3 1 6 0.77 
5 4 1 2 6 3 0.49 
27A 
27B 
27C 
33A 
33B 
33C 
3 4 A 1 2 6 5 4 3 -0.83 
34B 3 4 6 2 5 1 -0.66 
3 4 C 2 6 3 1 5 4 0.26 
35A 4 6 1 3 2 5 0-77 
Continued Next Page 
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From Previous Page 
Standard Rank 5 
Subject 
35B 3 2 
36A 4 6 
36B 4 6 
36C 1 4 
37A 4 2 
37B 4 2 
37C 5 4 
38A 4 5 
38B 6 5 
38C 4 6 
39A 6 4 
39B 4 3 
39C 3 4 
40A 5 4 
40B 4 5 
40C 2 4 
41A 2 4 
41B 2 4 
41C 4 6 
42A 1
 2 
42B 3
 2 
42C 4 j 
43B 1
 2 
43C
 3 4 
44A
 4 5 
44B 
44C 
45A 
45B 
6 5 
4 6 
5 6 
5 6 
: 6 
» l 
i 
6 
6 
6 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
6 
6 
3 
2 
6 
4 
5 
6 
1 
2 
3 
2 
3 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
I 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
2 
5 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
5 
5 
3 
5 
5 
5 
3 
6 
3 
3 
3 
6 
5 
3 
3 
5 
5 
6 
3 
5 
6 
6 
4 
6 
6 
2 
3 
2 
4 
4 
3 
5 
3 
3 
3 
6 
3 
4 
5 
5 
5 
6 
6 
6 
3 
3 
5 
5 
4 
5 
3 
3 
5 
3 
4 
5 
4 
3 
-0.20 
0.49 
0.83 
-0.54 
-0.26 
-0.26 
0.94 
0.43 
0.83 
0.77 
0.94 
0.60 
0.77 
0.94 
0.94 
-0.37 
-0.37 
0.31 
0.77 
-0.54 
0.20 
-0.26 
-0.83 
0.60 
0.37 
0.66 
0.77 
0.60 
0.60 
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From Previous Page 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
45C 
46A 
46B 
46C 
47A 
47B 
47C 
48A 
48B 
48C 
49A 
49B 
49C 
50A 
SOB 
SOC 
52A 
52B 
52C 
53A 
53B 
57A 
57B 
57C 
5 
4 
2 
3 
3 
5 
6 
5 
3 
6 
4 
2 
3 
3 
2 
5 
3 
2 
5 
1 
3 
4 
4 
5 
4 
4 
6 
4 
2 
4 
6 
5 
4 
4 
3 
5 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
6 
3 
1 
3 
5 
4 
5 
Mean ^ = = = = = 
Table D-78 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eight 
Individually 
1 
6 
6 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
6 
6 
6 
5 
3 
6 
5 
1 
5 
5 
5 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
1 
3 
4 
4 
1 
2 
2 
2 
3 
5 
5 
6 
3 
3 
3 
6 
4 
1 
5 
2 
5 
6 
2 
5 
6 
2 
6 
6 
6 
3 
3 
6 
5 
3 
4 
5 
4 
4 
6 
5 
5 
6 
3 
5 
2 
3 
6 
1 
3 
4 
2 
2 
2 
6 
6 
3 
0.83 
-0.37 
-0.20 
0.54 
0.77 
0.77 
1.00 
0.60 
0.89 
0.77 
-0.37 
0.09 
-0.43 
-0.26 
0.83 
-0.66 
-0.26 
0.71 
-0.77 
-0.66 
-0.26 
0.94 
1.00 
0.43 
030 
Trained (Hazard Management) Government Advisers 
D.9.9 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Nine by Trained (Hazard 
Management) Government Advisers Individually 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
IA 
IB 
IC 
2A 
2B 
2C 
4B 
4C 
5A 
5B 
5C 
6A 
6B 
6C 
7A 
7B 
7C 
8A 
8B 
8C 
9A 
9B 
9C 
10A 
IOB 
UA 
UB 
UC 
12B 
Continued Next Page 
6 
2 
6 
6 
4 
6 
6 
4 
3 
3 
4 
3 
6 
2 
3 
5 
5 
6 
2 
4 
5 
3 
5 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
4 
3 
3 
3 
3 
5 
1 
3 
1 
2 
5 
5 
2 
4 
3 
3 
5 
3 
3 
2 
5 
3 
4 
4 
4 
2 
6 
4 
4 
2 
2 
2 
4 
5 
4 
3 
3 
4 
4 
3 
2 
1 
3 
5 
4 
4 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
5 
3 
1 
3 
3 
5 
6 
2 
4 
3 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
6 
1 
3 
6 
6 
6 
6 
1 
1 
1 
6 
6 
6 
5 
6 
1 
6 
6 
1 
6 
1 
1 
1 
6 
6 
6 
2 
4 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
4 
2 
1 
2 
2 
5 
4 
2 
2 
1 
3 
2 
1 
5 
2 
1 
2 
2 
6 
1 
1 
1 
5 
6 
5 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
1 
4 
5 
6 
5 
6 
2 
4 
4 
4 
4 
6 
2 
2 
6 
5 
3 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
0.37 
1.00 
0.83 
0.03 
1.00 
0.77 
0.09 
-0.77 
-0.37 
0.09 
0.66 
1.00 
0.26 
-0.71 
-0.03 
-0.03 
0.43 
-0.60 
0.83 
-0.09 
-0.77 
0.89 
0.09 
0.49 
0.60 
0.14 
-0.03 
0.09 
-0.03 
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From Previous Page 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
12C 
13A 
13B 
14A 
16A 
16B 
16C 
17A 
17B 
17C 
18A 
18B 
18C 
21A 
21B 
21C 
23A 
23B 
23C 
27A 
27B 
27C 
33A 
33B 
33C 
34A 
34B 
34C 
35A 
3 
1 
3 
5 
5 
4 
3 
3 
5 
6 
5 
6 
5 
2 
3 
2 
3 
6 
4 
1 
1 
1 
6 
1 
3 
5 
4 
1 
6 
4 
4 
5 
3 
3 
3 
4 
2 
2 
2 
4 
3 
2 
4 
6 
5 
5 
3 
6 
5 
5 
5 
3 
3 
2 
6 
3 
6 
5 
1 
2 
2 
4 
2 
1 
2 
6 
3 
3 
3 
2 
4 
5 
4 
1 
2 
4 
3 
2 
4 
3 
4 
5 
4 
4 
2 
5 
4 
6 
5 
1 
1 
6 
6 
6 
4 
6 
4 
6 
1 
1 
1 
1 
6 
6 
1 
2 
6 
6 
6 
1 
2 
1 
1 
6 
2 
1 
5 
3 
4 
2 
4 
5 
4 
3 
3 
2 
3 
1 
2 
1 
4 
2 
2 
2 
4 
6 
2 
5 
4 
2 
2 
4 
6 
6 
1 
2 
5 
5 
4 
5 
2 
5 
6 
6 
5 
4 
4 
5 
5 
3 
3 
4 
5 
6 
5 
3 
1 
3 
3 
-0.77 
-0.69 
0.37 
0.94 
-0.43 
-0.60 
-0.14 
0.31 
0.14 
0.66 
-0.09 
0.77 
0.89 
0.43 
0.49 
-0.60 
-0.26 
1.00 
0.54 
-0.89 
-0.66 
-0.60 
1.00 
0.09 
0.26 
0.60 
-0.66 
-0.26 
0.77 
Continued Next Page 
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From Previous Page 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
35B 
36A 
36B 
36C 
37A 
37B 
37C 
38A 
38B 
38C 
39A 
39B 
39C 
40A 
40B 
40C 
41A 
41B 
41C 
42A 
42B 
42C 
43B 
43C 
44A 
44B 
44C 
45A 
45B 
6 
2 
5 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
2 
1 
3 
5 
6 
6 
6 
3 
1 
5 
6 
5 
3 
5 
1 
1 
3 
1 
5 
4 
4 
6 
3 
4 
2 
3 
3 
3 
2 
4 
5 
3 
2 
3 
3 
3 
1 
5 
2 
3 
3 
3 
4 
3 
2 
5 
6 
3 
1 
2 
2 
2 
4 
1 
3 
5 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
2 
1 
4 
1 
2 
3 
3 
5 
2 
4 
3 
3 
4 
1 
6 
1 
1 
6 
6 
6 
2 
1 
6 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
6 
1 
4 
1 
6 
6 
6 
2 
1 
6 
3 
6 
1 
I 
2 
5 
4 
2 
1 
I 
I 
1 
4 
2 
5 
2 
2 
2 
3 
1 
3 
4 
2 
2 
5 
1 
5 
6 
2 
5 
2 
1 
5 
3 
5 
3 
6 
6 
4 
4 
4 
6 
6 
5 
6 
6 
5 
5 
5 
6 
5 
6 
5 
6 
2 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
6 
5 
6 
5 
-0.83 
0.77 
0.83 
0.09 
0.09 
0.14 
0.83 
0.26 
-0.43 
0.43 
0.94 
1.00 
1.00 
0.83 
0.54 
-0.49 
0.71 
0.49 
0.94 
-0.77 
0.09 
-0.77 
-0.37 
0.43 
-0.83 
0.71 
0.09 
0.54 
0.94 
Continued Next Page 
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From Previous Page 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
45C 
46A 
46B 
46C 
47A 
47B 
47C 
48A 
48B 
48C 
49A 
49B 
49C 
50A 
SOB 
50C 
52A 
52B 
52C 
53A 
53B 
57A 
57B 
57C 
5 
4 
6 
5 
3 
2 
6 
4 
6 
2 
5 
5 
5 
4 
4 
5 
3 
6 
6 
2 
5 
3 
6 
6 
3 
6 
3 
2 
6 
3 
4 
3 
5 
3 
3 
4 
3 
2 
2 
6 
2 
3 
5 
5 
4 
6 
2 
5 
4 
3 
4 
3 
4 
4 
3 
2 
4 
4 
2 
2 
1 
1 
3 
3 
4 
4 
2 
3 
3 
5 
5 
2 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
1 
1 
1 
1 
6 
6 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
6 
2 
5 
3 
5 
1 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
5 
2 
4 
4 
1 
2 
3 
3 
6 
5 
5 
4 
5 
5 
5 
6 
2 
6 
4 
3 
4 
5 
5 
4 
6 
5 
3 
1 
2 
4 
4 
4 
0.94 
0.60 
1.00 
0.14 
0.49 
0.09 
0.94 
0.49 
0.60 
0.26 
0.09 
-0.03 
-0.03 
-0.14 
0.09 
0.66 
0.43 
1.00 
0.54 
-0.89 
-0.09 
0.43 
0.89 
0.71 
Mean 
0.24 
Table D-79 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Nine by Trained (Hazard Management) Government Advisers 
Individually 
D.9.10 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Seven by Trained (Creative 
Thinking + Hazard Management) Government Advisers Individually 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
3A 
3B 
3C 
4A 
IOC 
12A 
13C 
19A 
19B 
19C 
20A 
20B 
20C 
22A 
22B 
22C 
24A 
24B 
24C 
25A 
25B 
25C 
26A 
26B 
26C 
35C 
58A 
58B 
58C 
43A 
51A 
51B 
51C 
Mean 
Tahlp D-Rf) Pr^i-it;-™*;™ 
1 
1 
2 
6 
6 
5 
3 
1 
5 
6 
6 
1 
1 
3 
2 
1 
2 
2 
3 
2 
6 
1 
1 
1 
4 
3 
5 
6 
2 
3 
6 
6 
4 
2 
6 
6 
4 
5 
5 
3 
6 
6 
6 
5 
5 
6 
6 
6 
3 
6 
6 
5 
6 
6 
5 
6 
6 
5 
6 
6 
6 
5 
6 
6 
5 
3 
6 
6 
3 
3 
1 
I 
1 
4 
2 
2 
2 
I 
2 
2 
3 
2 
1 
3 
1 
3 
1 
3 
1 
2 
4 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
3 
4 
3 
1 
4 
4 
6 
2 
3 
1 
4 
4 
3 
2 
3 
5 
4 
4 
4 
4 
3 
4 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
4 
2 
5 
1 
2 
4 
4 
1 
1 
2 
4 
2 
2 
5 
4 
2 
6 
1 
3 
1 
4 
1 
3 
2 
1 
6 
2 
4 
1 
2 
1 
2 
5 
2 
3 
5 
2 
3 
4 
3 
2 
4 
5 
1 
3 
5 
5 
3 
3 
4 
2 
5 
5 
4 
3 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
6 
3 
5 
4 
4 
5 
6 
3 
4 
4 
3 
5 
5 
2 
2 
5 
5 
V 
1.00 
0.26 
-0.20 
0.09 
-0.71 
0.83 
0.94 
0.43 
-0.20 
0.14 
0.89 
1.00 
0.83 
0.14 
1.00 
0.71 
0.89 
0.65 
0.94 
0.09 
0.66 
0.94 
0.89 
0.14 
0.71 
0.20 
-0.20 
0.83 
0.77 
-0.37 
-0.77 
0.60 
0.83 
0.45 
Government Advisers Individually 
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D.9.11 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eight by Trained (Creative 
Thinking + Hazard Management) Government Advisers Individually 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
3A 
3B 
3C 
4A 
IOC 
12A 
13C 
19A 
19B 
19C 
20A 
20B 
20C 
22A 
22B 
22C 
24A 
24B 
24C 
25A 
25B 
25C 
26A 
26B 
26C 
35C 
58A 
58B 
58C 
43A 
51A 
51B 
51C 
5 
6 
4 
4 
5 
2 
5 
4 
3 
4 
2 
5 
4 
5 
2 
5 
3 
5 
3 
5 
6 
3 
3 
4 
6 
3 
5 
6 
3 
3 
2 
l 
4 
1 
4 
3 
5 
5 
4 
3 
4 
5 
6 
6 
4 
4 
6 
4 
4 
3 
4 
6 
4 
4 
5 
5 
6 
5 
4 
4 
2 
3 
4 
2 
5 
3 
5 
3 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
5 
6 
1 
1 
2 
5 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
3 
6 
6 
4 
1 
6 
6 
6 
1 
6 
2 
2 
1 
1 
3 
6 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
3 
1 
3 
3 
2 
4 
2 
1 
1 
3 
1 
2 
1 
1 
4 
2 
2 
3 
4 
3 
6 
2 
4 
3 
6 
4 
3 
5 
3 
3 
3 
6 
4 
6 
2 
6 
2 
2 
6 
1 
3 
2 
5 
4 
5 
6 
5 
4 
3 
6 
5 
6 
5 
6 
3 
6 
5 
6 
3 
5 
2 
3 
6 
5 
6 
3 
6 
5 
4 
5 
6 
4 
4 
5 
6 
5 
2 
1 
2 
5 
4 
3 
2 
3 
4 
V 
0.89 
0.89 
0.37 
0.94 
0.20 
1.00 
0.43 
0.71 
-0.09 
-0.37 
1.00 
0.83 
0.94 
-0.26 
0.94 
0.54 
0.71 
0.54 
0.94 
0.77 
0.49 
0.49 
0.94 
0.77 
-0.43 
-0.60 
0.09 
0.60 
-0.20 
-0.31 
-0.90 
0.43 
-0.43 
Table D-81 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eight by Trained (Creative Thinking + Hazard Management) 
Government Advisers Individually 
D.9.12 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Nine by Trained (Creative 
Thinking + Hazard Management) Government Advisers Individually 
Standard Rank 
Subject 
3A 
3B 
3C 
4A 
IOC 
12A 
13C 
19A 
19B 
19C 
20A 
20B 
20C 
22A 
22B 
22C 
24A 
24B 
24C 
25A 
25B 
25C 
26A 
26B 
26C 
35C 
58A 
58B 
58C 
43A 
51A 
51B 
51C 
6 
3 
5 
3 
5 
2 
6 
5 
6 
6 
3 
6 
2 
6 
3 
5 
4 
5 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
5 
5 
1 
6 
4 
5 
3 
2 
6 
6 
3 
4 
I 
4 
6 
5 
2 
3 
3 
3 
2 
3 
6 
4 
4 
4 
3 
2 
3 
3 
3 
5 
3 
4 
2 
3 
4 
6 
3 
6 
4 
3 
2 
4 
6 
2 
6 
3 
6 
4 
2 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
2 
5 
3 
5 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
2 
3 
5 
5 
3 
4 
2 
1 
4 
3 
2 
2 
3 
2 
4 
3 
3 
6 
2 
2 
5 
2 
4 
5 
2 
6 
2 
6 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
4 
5 
2 
5 
5 
5 
4 
5 
2 
4 
5 
4 
5 
5 
6 
5 
3 
3 
6 
2 
6 
3 
6 
5 
5 
3 
5 
6 
4 
4 
3 
5 
6 
5 
3 
5 
4 
1.00 
0.60 
-0.03 
0.60 
0.31 
0.26 
0.94 
0.37 
1.00 
1.00 
0.43 
1.00 
0.03 
0.49 
0.66 
0.20 
0.83 
0.37 
0.94 
1.00 
1.00 
0.77 
1.00 
0.77 
0.14 
-0.49 
0.83 
0.60 
0.94 
0.26 
-0.83 
1.00 
0.66 
Mean 
0.57 
Table D-82 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Nine by Trained (Creative Thinking + Hazard Management) 
Government Advisers Individually 
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D.9.13 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Ten by Untrained 
Government Advisers in Teams 
Standard Rank 
Team 
1A3,C 
2A3,C 
3A3.C 
4A3,C 
5A3,C 
Mean 
3 
4 
4 
3 
6 
2 
5 
6 
6 
5 
5 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
6 
5 
5 
6 
3 
5 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
6 
V 
0.89 
0.83 
0.94 
0.43 
0.09 
0.63 
Table D-83 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Ten by Untrained Government Advisers in Teams 
D.9.14 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eleven by Untrained 
Government Advisers in Teams 
Standard Rank 
Team 
1A3,C 
2A3.C 
3A3,C 
4A3,C 
5A3,C 
Mean 
6 
5 
6 
6 
6 
5 
1 
3 
1 
1 
5 
1 
5 
4 
4 
4 
2 
2 
3 
i 
3 
2 
1 
3 
4 
6 
5 
5 
3 
4 
2 
2 
2 
3 
4 
6 
V 
0.60 
0.94 
0.89 
0.03 
0.26 
0.54 
Table D-84 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eleven by Untrained Government Advisers in Teams 
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D.9.15 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Twelve by Untrained 
Government Advisers in Teams 
Standard Rank 
Team 
1A3,C 
2A3,C 
3A3,C 
4A3.C 
5A3,C 
Mean 
3 
3 
5 
4 
3 
3 
4 
5 
4 
3 
4 
5 
5 
6 
6 
5 
5 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
6 
4 
3 
6 
6 
6 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
V 
0.83 
0.60 
0.94 
0.94 
0.94 
0.85 
Table D-85 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Twelve by Untrained Government Advisers in Teams 
D.9.16 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Ten by Trained (Creative 
Thinking) Government Advisers in Teams 
Standard Rank 
Team 
UA3,C 
12A3,C 
13A3.C 
14A3.C 
15A3,C 
16 A 3 
17A3 
Mean 
3 
3 
6 
3 
4 
3 
5 
4 
5 
6 
3 
6 
6 
5 
6 
5 
2 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
4 
4 
5 
5 
3 
4 
4 
3 
6 
5 
4 
4 
5 
6 
3 
6 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
V 
0.94 
0.43 
0.83 
0.83 
1.00 
0.54 
0.94 
0.79 
Table D-86 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Ten by Trained (Creative Thinking) Government Advisers in 
Teams 
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D.9.17 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eleven by Trained (Creative 
Thinking) Government Advisers in Teams 
Standard Rank 
Team 
UA3,C 
12A3C 
13A3,C 
14A3,C 
15A3.C 
16A3 
17A3 
Mean 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
4 
6 
6 
1 
3 
2 
1 
3 
1 
4 
5 
5 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
3 
4 
3 
1 
1 
3 
2 
3 
2 
2 
4 
5 
4 
5 
4 
5 
5 
3 
2 
4 
5 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
V 
0.37 
0.49 
0.94 
0.83 
0.83 
0.54 
0.43 
0.63 
Table D-87 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eleven by Trained (Creative Thinking) Government Advisers in 
Teams 
D.9.18 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Twelve by Trained (Creative 
Thinking) Government Advisers in Teams 
Standard Rank 
Team 
11A3.C 
12A3.C 
13A3C 
14A3.C 
15A3C 
16A3 
17A3 
Mean 
3 
5 
5 
3 
3 
3 
5 
3 
4 
4 
3 
4 
4 
4 
6 
5 
5 
6 
4 
5 
6 
5 
4 
6 
1 
2 
6 
1 
6 
6 
5 
6 
3 
4 
2 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
V 
0.09 
0.83 
1.00 
0.94 
1.00 
0.49 
0.83 
0.74 
Table D-88 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Twelve by Trained (Creative Thinking) Government Advisers in 
Teams 
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D.9.19 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Ten by Trained (Hazard 
Management) Government Advisers in Teams 
Standard Rank 3 5 2 4 6 1 V 
Team 
1A3,C 
2A3,C 
5A3.C 
6A3,C 
7A3.C 
8A3,C 
9A3.C 
UA,B,C 
16A3,C 
17A3,C 
18A3.C 
21A3.C 
23A3,C 
27A3,C 
42A3,C 
44A,B,C 
45A,B,C 
46A,B,C 
47A3.C 
48A3,C 
49A3,C 
50A3,C 
52A3,C 
53A3,C 
33A3,C 
34A3,C 
36A3,C 
37A3,C 
38A3,C 
39A3.C 
40A3,C 
41A3,C 
57A3,C 
4 
4 
3 
3 
5 
4 
3 
3 
5 
3 
3 
4 
3 
3 
5 
6 
3 
4 
3 
6 
5 
4 
3 
3 
6 
4 
6 
2 
3 
3 
3 
4 
3 
5 
5 
6 
5 
4 
5 
4 
2 
2 
6 
5 
5 
4 
5 
1 
4 
5 
3 
5 
5 
3 
3 
6 
5 
3 
2 
4 
5 
5 
5 
4 
6 
6 
2 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
4 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
4 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
3 
2 
4 
4 
2 
2 
2 
1 
4 
4 
4 
3 
6 
2 
3 
5 
4 
2 
4 
3 
1 
5 
4 
4 
3 
6 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
3 
4 
6 
6 
5 
6 
3 
3 
5 
5 
6 
5 
6 
6 
5 
4 
2 
3 
6 
5 
6 
5 
2 
2 
5 
6 
5 
3 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
5 
5 
1 
1 
1 
2 
6 
6 
6 
6 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
6 
6 
2 
1 
6 
1 
1 
6 
6 
2 
2 
1 
5 
2 
3 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
0.94 
0.83 
0.94 
0.94 
-0.26 
-0.14 
0.09 
-0.37 
0.60 
0.94 
1.00 
0.94 
0.83 
0.03 
-0.89 
0.37 
1.00 
-0.03 
1.00 
0.71 
-0.77 
-0.37 
0.89 
0.94 
0.57 
-0.14 
0.60 
0.83 
1.00 
1.00 
0.89 
0.83 
0.94 
Mean ' 
Table D-89 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Ten by Trained (Hazard Management) Government Advisers i 
Teams 
D.9.20 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eleven by Trained (Hazard 
Management) Government Advisers in Teams 
Standard Rank 
Team 
1A3,C 
2A3.C 
5A3,C 
6A3,C 
7A3,C 
8A3,C 
9A3,C 
UA3,C 
16A3.C 
17A3.C 
18A3.C 
21A3.C 
23A3.C 
27A3.C 
42A3,C 
44A3.C 
45A3.C 
46A3,C 
47A3.C 
48A3.C 
49A3.C 
50A3.C 
52A3,C 
53A3.C 
33A3.C 
34A3.C 
36A3.C 
37A3,C 
38A3.C 
39A3C 
40A3,C 
41A3,C 
57A3.C 
Mean 
5 
6 
6 
6 
4 
6 
6 
6 
3 
6 
4 
6 
6 
6 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
5 
6 
6 
1 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
2 
3 
3 
3 
5 
3 
3 
5 
4 
4 
5 
2 
3 
1 
6 
2 
2 
2 
2 
4 
5 
6 
4 
3 
4 
5 
5 
3 
2 
3 
3 
3 
2 
4 
4 
5 
5 
2 
5 
5 
4 
2 
3 
2 
4 
4 
5 
4 
4 
4 
3 
4 
3 
3 
2 
3 
5 
5 
1 
4 
5 
5 
4 
5 
4 
5 
3 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
2 
2 
1 
3 
3 
5 
3 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
6 
2 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
1 
3 
6 
5 
4 
4 
3 
4 
4 
2 
6 
5 
3 
5 
5 
4 
3 
5 
5 
4 
5 
5 
4 
3 
5 
4 
3 
4 
3 
4 
4 
5 
4 
5 
4 
1 
2 
1 
2 
6 
1 
2 
3 
5 
2 
6 
1 
1 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
4 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
0.77 
0.71 
0.83 
0.77 
-0.43 
0.83 
0.77 
0.26 
-0.26 
0.49 
-0.43 
0.89 
0.77 
0.94 
0.09 
0.89 
0.89 
0.71 
0.89 
0.49 
0.37 
-0.26 
0.49 
0.77 
-0.26 
0.03 
0.37 
0.83 
0.94 
0.71 
0.83 
0.71 
0.94 
0.53 
Table D-90 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eleven by Trained (Hazard Management) Government Advisers 
in Teams 
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D.9.21 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Twelve by Trained (Hazard 
Management) Government Advisers in Teams 
Standard Rank 
Team 
1A3,C 
2A3,C 
5A3,C 
6A3.C 
7A3,C 
8A3,C 
9A3,C 
UA3,C 
16A3,C 
17A3,C 
18A3,C 
21A3,C 
23A3.C 
27A3,C 
42A3,C 
44A3,C 
45A3,C 
46A3.C 
47A3,C 
48A3,C 
49A3,C 
50A3,C 
52A3,C 
53A3.C 
33A3,C 
34A3,C 
36A3,C 
37A3,C 
38A3,C 
39A3,C 
40A3,C 
41A3,C 
57A3,C 
Mean 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
6 
5 
5 
6 
3 
3 
3 
4 
6 
4 
5 
3 
3 
5 
3 
6 
6 
4 
5 
4 
3 
3 
4 
3 
4 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
6 
3 
4 
3 
5 
4 
4 
5 
5 
4 
3 
3 
5 
4 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
4 
3 
5 
4 
6 
6 
6 
5 
5 
4 
5 1 
5 1 
6 1 
5 1 
5 2 
1 4 
4 1 
3 1 
4 1 
4 1 
6 1 
6 1 
6 1 
6 1 
5 1 
5 1 
4 1 
4 1 
5 1 
6 1 
6 1 
5 1 
4 1 
5 1 
3 1 
5 1 
4 1 
5 1 
5 1 
4 1 
5 1 
4 1 
6 1 
5 1 
6 
6 
5 
6 
6 
5 
5 
6 
2 
3 
5 
5 
4 
3 
3 
6 
6 
6 
6 
3 
5 
4 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
3 
5 
3 
6 
4 
6 
i-mrvl \/fanacTf»mf*r 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
6 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
itl finvernn 
V 
1.00 
0.94 
1.00 
0.94 
0.14 
0.66 
0.77 
-0.09 
0.43 
0.94 
0.94 
0.83 
0.66 
0.49 
0.94 
0.83 
0.94 
1.00 
0.60 
0.94 
0.60 
0.66 
0.94 
0.77 
0.94 
0.94 
1.00 
0.60 
0.83 
0.60 
0.94 
0.83 
1.00 
0.77 
lent Advisers 
in Teams 
D.9.22 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Ten by Trained (Creative 
Thinking + Hazard Management: One Team Member attended Creative 
Thinking) Government Advisers in Teams 
Standard Rank 
Team 
4A3,C 
10A3,C 
12A3,C 
13A3,C,14A 
43A3.C 
35A3.C 
Mean 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
5 
3 
5 
5 
6 
5 
5 
3 
5 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
4 
4 
4 
6 
4 
2 
4 
6 
6 
5 
4 
6 
4 
6 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
6 
2 
V 
1.00 
0.94 
0.71 
1.00 
0.83 
1.00 
0.91 
Table D-92 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Ten by Trained (Creative Thinking + Hazard Management: One 
Team Member attended Creative Thinking) Government Advisers in Teams 
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D.9.23 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eleven by Trained (Creative 
Thinking + Hazard Management: One Team Member attended Creative 
Thinking) Government Advisers in Teams 
Standard Rank 
Team 
4A3,C 
10A3,C 
12A3.C 
13A3,C,14A 
43A3C 
35A3,C 
Mean 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
5 
1 
3 
1 
5 
4 
2 
4 
5 
4 
5 
3 
3 
4 
3 
3 
2 
3 
1 
2 
5 
2 
4 
5 
4 
2 
5 
3 
6 
2 
1 
2 
4 
1 
1 
1 
V 
0.77 
1.00 
0.09 
0.54 
0.71 
0.94 
0.68 
Table D-93 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eleven by Trained (Creative Thinking + Hazard Management: 
One Team Member attended Creative Thinking) Government Advisers in Teams 
D.9.24 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Twelve by Trained (Creative 
Thinking + Hazard Management: One Team Member attended Creative 
Thinking) Government Advisers in Teams 
Standard Rank 
Team 
4A3,C 
10A3C 
12A3.C 
13A3,C,14A 
43A3,C 
35A3C 
Mean 
3 
4 
4 
5 
3 
6 
3 
4 
5 
3 
6 
4 
3 
4 
5 
6 
5 
3 
5 
5 
5 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
6 
3 
6 
4 
6 
4 
6 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
V 
0.66 
0.94 
0.49 
1.00 
0.94 
0.94 
0.83 
Table D-94 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Twelve by Trained (Creative Thinking + Hazard Management: 
One Team Member attended Creative Thinking) Government Advisers in Teams 
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D.9.25 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Ten by Trained (Creative 
Thinking + Hazard Management: All Team attended Creative Thinking) 
Government Advisers in Teams 
Standard Rank 
Team 
3A3,C 
19A3.C 
20A3.C 
22A3,C 
24A3,C 
25A3,C 
26A3,C 
51A3,C 
58A,B,C 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
6 
6 
6 
5 
5 
6 
6 
5 
5 
6 
5 
4 
5 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
3 
3 
6 
6 
5 
5 
6 
6 
5 
3 
5 
4 
1 
2 
2 
V 
1.00 
0.94 
0.94 
1.00 
1.00 
0.94 
0.49 
0.94 
-0.37 
Table D-95 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Ten by Trained (Creative Thinking + Hazard Management: All 
Team attended Creative Thinking) Government Advisers in Teams 
D.9.26 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eleven by Trained (Creative 
Thinking + Hazard Management: All Team attended Creative Thinking) 
Government Advisers in Teams 
Standard Rank 
Team 
3A3C 
19A3,C 
20A3,C 
22A3.C 
24A3.C 
25A3.C 
26A3,C 
51A3,C 
58A3,C 
Mean 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
1 
5 
2 
3 
5 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
4 
4 
4 
5 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
3 
3 
1 
3 
1 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
4 
5 
3 
5 
4 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
V 
0.94 
0.94 
0.94 
0.89 
1.00 
0.94 
0.37 
1.00 
0.26 
0.81 
Table D-96 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Eleven by Trained (Creative Thinking + Hazard Management: 
All Team attended Creative Thinking) Government Advisers in Teams 
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D.9.27 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Twelve by Trained (Creative 
Thinking + Hazard Management: All Team attended Creative Thinking) 
Government Advisers in Teams 
Standard Rank 3 4 5 1 6 2 
Team 
3A3,C 
19A3,C 
20A3.C 
22A3,C 
24A3.C 
25A3,C 
26A3,C 
51A3,C 
58A3,C 
3 
5 
3 
3 
5 
3 
3 
3 
4 
5 
3 
4 
5 
3 
5 
4 
5 
3 
4 
4 
5 
4 
6 
4 
6 
4 
5 
1 6 
1 6 
1 6 
1 6 
1 4 
6 
5 
6 
6 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
0.94 
0.83 
1.00 
0.94 
0.71 
0.94 
0.94 
0.94 
-0.09 
Mean 0.79 
Table D-97 Prioritization of Solutions for Case Twelve by Trained (Creative Thinking + Hazard Management: 
All Team attended Creative Thinking) Government Advisers in Teams 
